

**A FORTRESS IN TURBULENT SEAS: MAO WENLONG AND HIS
MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN WARTIME NORTHEAST ASIA (1621-
1638)**

by

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Abstract

In 1621, with Manchu armies occupying Ming China's (1368-1644) northeastern territory, a Ming military officer named Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576-1629) and his followers left for an island off the northwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. They soon occupied the nearby islets, filled these locales with people fleeing from Manchu rule, and recruited some of them into military. In 1622, the Ming state officially recognized this military organization and named it Dongjiang 東江. This organization played a strategic role in the Ming military strategy against the Manchus, who later established the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Its location close to Chosŏn Korea (1392-1897) dragged Chosŏn into the conflict between great powers. Its existence posed a threat to the Manchus' rear. In a nutshell, Dongjiang became a lynchpin for the following two decades of Northeast Asian geopolitics.

This dissertation examines Dongjiang in the context of Northeast Asian geopolitics. It argues that the interactions among the Ming dynasty, the Manchus, and Chosŏn Korea gave rise to Dongjiang, nurtured its development, and eventually caused its collapse. Dongjiang was politically subordinated to the Ming court, which granted strategic importance to Dongjiang and provided corresponding political and material support. Dongjiang gradually increased its clout, but never converted itself into a sustained state-building enterprise. It remained a loosely organized military authority based on resource-deficient islands, which compelled it to seek resources from the littorals. This economic dependency paved the way for the souring relationships with all three land-based states. Dongjiang failed to live up to Ming expectations of being a functional force against the Manchus. Its continued existence overburdened Chosŏn and stood in the way of Manchu conquest and incurred Manchu attack in 1637. In 1638, at the behest of the Ming court, all the personnel in Dongjiang moved to mainland China, marking the

organization's end. This dissertation reveals the multilayered connections between Dongjiang and the surrounding states. These connections show that Dongjiang formed one integral part of a much larger conflict—the Ming-Qing conflict— that involved three land-based powers in Northeast Asia, namely Ming, Chosŏn, and the Manchus.

Lay Summary

Dongjiang 東江 was a military organization based on an island off the northwestern coast of Chosŏn Korea (1392-1897) between 1621 and 1638. This dissertation examines the relations between Dongjiang and the surrounding states, namely, Ming China (1368-1644), Chosŏn Korea, and the Manchus (1616-1911). This military organization was established in response to the Manchu annexation of the northeastern territory of Ming China in 1621 and was a product of the Ming military strategy. Its existence relied on material aid from Ming and Chosŏn. Its collapse happened against the backdrop of the deteriorating relationship between the Manchus and Chosŏn. This dissertation shows that Dongjiang was parasitic and land-dependant, and through the lens of Dongjiang, this dissertation reveals a neglected episode of early seventeenth-century Northeast Asian history.

Preface

This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Zoudan Ma.

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List of Abbreviations

FZK	Airusheng zhongguo fangzhiku 愛如生中國方志庫
HYJS	<i>Haiyun jishi</i> 海運紀事
MKSDB	Media Korean Studies Database
MWLD	<i>Manwen laodang</i> 滿文老檔
r.	reign
SSDB	Scripta Sinica Database

Conventions

Transliteration:

Chinese names and terms are transliterated using the *pinyin* system, although exceptions are made in two cases. First, when there are better-known alternative transliterations. Hence, Taipei 台北 instead of Taibei; Chang Tsun-Wu 張存武 instead of Zhang Cunwu. Second, to avoid confusion when romanization of different words coincide, I use either an alternative romanization or my own coinage. For instance, Jinzhou 金州 vs Chinchow 錦州; Zhang Pan 張盤 vs Zhang Pann 張攀.

Korean names and terms are transliterated using the McCune-Reischauer system, other than for the spellings of two cities: Seoul instead of Sŏul, Pyongyang instead of P'yŏngyang.

Japanese names and terms are transliterated using the Revised Hepburn system, except for words commonly used in English without diacritical marks. Hence, for instance, Tokyo instead of Tōkyō.

Manchu names and terms are transliterated using the Norman system.

Citation:

Annals—the Ming and the Chosŏn *Veritable Records*, *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, and *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*— are cited as follows: Title, reign and year, month and day by lunar calendar, followed by Western dating in brackets. For instance, *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/7/3 (1625/8/5).

Because I was unable to obtain a hard copy of *Han'guk munjip ch'onggan* (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch'ujinhoe, 1988), which contains all the collected works of Chosŏn scholar-officials used in this dissertation, all references to that source are to MKSDB. These works are cited as

follows: Author, original paragraph title, book title, fascicolo (fasc., *kwǒn*). For instance, Ch'oe Myǒnggil 崔鳴吉, “Chosa Kang Wang yanggong kōsabi” 詔使姜王兩公去思碑, in *Chich'ōn chip* 遲川集, fasc.19.

Chinese, Korean, and Japanese author names take the order of surname first, followed by personal name, except when citing their English-language works, in which case the name follows the English order.

Dating:

All the lunar dates are converted into their Western equivalents using *Synchronic Chinese–Western Daily Calendar, 1341–1661 A.D.* by Keith Hazelton. I have followed the convention of rendering the lunar year to its closest Western counterpart. Hence, for example, the 2nd year of the reign of the Tianqi emperor, which lasted from 10 February 1622 to 30 January 1623, would be referred to in the main text simply as 1622, if not otherwise noted.

Measurements and Weights:

1 *li* 里 \approx 576 m

1 *jin/ kǔn* 斤 \approx 600 g

1 *mu* 畝 \approx 608 m²

1 *pi/ p'il* 匹 = 1 bolt \approx 12.4 m if measured in silk

1 *shi/ sǒm* 石 = 107.3 l \approx 71.6 kg if measured in unhusked rice

1 *liang/ yang* 两 = 1 tael \approx 37.3 g

Sources: Endymion Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A New Manual* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 555-557, 560; Noa Grass, “Revenue as a Measure for Expenditure: Ming State Finance Before the Age of

Silver” (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 2015), 159; Jan Gyllenbok. *Encyclopaedia of Historical Metrology, Weights, and Measures*, vol.3 (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2018), 1673.

Reign Titles

Ming

Wanli 萬曆	1572-1620
Taichang 泰昌	1620
Tianqi 天啟	1621-1627
Chongzhen 崇禎	1628-1644

Chosŏn

Kwanghaegun 光海君	1608-1623
Injo 仁祖	1623-1649

Manchu

Tianming 天命/ Abkai fulingga	1616-1626
Tiancong 天聰/ Abkai sure	1627-1635
Chongde 崇德/ Wesihun erdemungge	1636-1643

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慧琳

递巾授扇 为卿整袖

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the autumn of 1621, the Ming court ordered supplies and provisions to be shipped by sea from Tianjin 天津 to the northwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. The goods were provided to several hundred Ming soldiers there, commanded by an officer named Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576-1629), and sustained them for a year while they received no other resources.

Supporting Mao's forces overseas was risky and economically irrational. Sea shipping then was not an easy task. It was first and foremost an unusual way of transporting goods due to the long-standing Ming sea ban (*haijin* 海禁). Organizing the boats, personnel, and other facilities necessary for sea shipping was challenging. It was also a costly business—the transportation cost was more expensive than the value of goods involved. Last but not least, the timing of this particular trip was unfavorable to an ocean-going voyage. The winds and currents in autumn and winter would make navigation difficult—some ships were indeed wrecked in the storms later. The Ming court was fully aware of all these difficulties but resolutely provided tangible support to its forces overseas. It seems moreover that Mao Wenlong and his soldiers did not deserve such costly Ming support. Mao was then a low-ranking Ming officer. A few months earlier, he and his men had lost control of their fortress to the Manchus. Mao's group of several hundred soldiers and even more commoners had retreated to Chosŏn Korea, only to be attacked again by the pursuing enemies. The Manchus captured most of the people in Mao's group. Mao Wenlong and only a few others narrowly escaped. The Chosŏn court monitored the whole process but chose to stay out of. Some local officials even refused to defend the refugees and guided the Manchus to pursue Mao's group. Before the Ming supplies reached the Chosŏn coast,

Mao and his followers had become the remnants of a defeated army, sojourning overseas and desperate for help.

Before this case can be analyzed in more detail, this cursory introduction presents many intriguing questions about Mao Wenlong's forces *vis-a-vis* Northeast Asian states. First, why did the Manchus launch an international pursuit of Mao's group at the risk of being attacked by Chosŏn forces? Second, why didn't Chosŏn protect the Ming forces led by Mao? Chosŏn Korea had been a Ming vassal state since the fourteenth century and so protecting the Ming subjects within Chosŏn territory was presumably a duty, but instead Chosŏn let in the Manchus at the risk of jeopardizing its national security. Last but not least, why did the Ming organize long-range maritime transport of supplies and provisions at all costs to support some remnants of a defeated army?

Wartime geopolitics in seventeenth-century northeast Asia hold the answers. At their center is what is now known as the Ming-Qing conflict (1618-1683). War between the Ming and the Manchus first burst out in 1618 after Nurhaci (1559-1626, r.1616-1626), once a Jurchen chieftain granted a Ming title, declared independence and founded in 1616 the Manchu state known as the Latter Jin 後金 (1616-1636), which was renamed the Qing (1636-1912) in 1636. The victories against the Ming forces and the lack of resources due to the ensuing Ming economic sanctions¹ motivated the Manchus to continue their territorial expansion. In 1619, the

¹ Once a tribal people living on the outskirts of the Ming northeastern frontier, the Jurchens engaged in tribute and border trade with China and Korea for centuries. The Jurchens traded such local produce as sable, livestock, pearls, and ginseng for things that they were poor at making, including iron plows, clothes, and rice. These commercial links brought wealth into the Jurchen area and power over other chieftains once control over these links were attained. Nurhaci rose from this process and managed to subsume all the Jurchens under his control after years of struggle. After that, he aspired to change the tide and challenge the hegemon, the Ming dynasty. Consequently, those links were cut off. Not only were such fine goods as silks unavailable to the Jurchens, later Manchus, but they were deprived of the necessities for survival, including salt and grain. See Yang Yulian 杨余练, "Mingdai houqi de Liaodong mashi yu Nüzhen zu de xingqi" 明代後期的遼東馬市與女真族的興起, *Minzu yanjiu* 民族研究 5

Manchus achieved a strategic victory at Sarhu 薩爾滸, close to their capital Hetu Ala 赫圖阿拉 in the far northeast, against the allied forces of the Ming and the Chosŏn. In 1621, the Manchus annexed most of the territory of the Ming northeastern frontier, Liaodong 遼東, and relocated their political center from Hetu Ala to there. Bordering Liaodong, now controlled by the Manchus, in the east, Chosŏn Korea was thus caught up in the conflict between two powers. Consequently, the geopolitics of the time explains many of the state actions taken towards Mao Wenlong's group. Chosŏn was unwilling to protect fleeing Ming refugees at the cost of offending the Manchus and in the process souring a neighborly relationship might bring catastrophic results in the long run. The Manchus sought to control all their newly conquered population to consolidate their rule in Liaodong. The Ming sought to recover the lost territory of Liaodong through every possible means, and an overseas force led by Mao Wenlong, from the Ming perspective, could become useful in containing the Manchus.

The material support provided by the Ming court in late 1621 gave rise to an island-based military organization. In late 1621, Mao Wenlong and his followers left the Chosŏn mainland for an island, named Pidao 皮島 (or Kado 椴島 in Korean), off the northwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. They soon occupied a series of nearby islets, staffed these locales with Liaodong people who were fleeing from Manchu rule in large numbers, and recruited some of them into military. In 1622, the Ming state officially recognized this military organization and named it Dongjiang 東江 from its location east of the Yalu River, the border between Liaodong and Chosŏn Korea. Mao Wenlong was the inaugural commander-in-chief until 1629, when he was executed by a Ming general Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥 (1584-1630). Dongjiang continued its

(1980): 27-32; Huang Pei, *Reorienting the Manchus: A Study of Sinicization, 1583-1795* (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2011), 73-74, 104-113.

resistance until the Manchus conquered Pidao in 1637 and the Ming withdrew all its overseas forces. At its peak, Dongjiang consisted of over 150,000 people, including some 50,000 soldiers and 100,000 ordinary people of all types. This military organization played a strategic role in the Ming military strategy against the Manchus. Its location close to Korea dragged Chosŏn into a conflict between two great regional powers. Its existence posed a threat to the Manchus' rear. In short, Dongjiang became a lynchpin for the next two decades in Northeast Asian geopolitics.

This dissertation examines the establishment, development, and collapse of Dongjiang in the broader context of Northeast Asian geopolitics. It reveals the complicated and multilayered connections between Dongjiang and the surrounding littorals and the surrounding land-based states. These connections show that Dongjiang formed one integral part of a much larger conflict—the Ming-Qing conflict—that involved three land-based powers in Northeast Asia, namely Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, and the Manchus.

By contextualizing Dongjiang in the history of Ming-Qing conflict, this dissertation refashions our understanding of the nature of Dongjiang. It has been long characterized as a semi-independent regime undergoing a centrifugal development beyond the control of the Ming dynasty. Another strand of scholarship sees this organization as a self-contained maritime commercial enterprise bordering on a stateless organization of speculators and traders. Such arguments do contain a measure of truth—Mao Wenlong did exploit support from the Ming court, and Dongjiang did benefit from a seaborne military logistical network—but they also leave unexamined the geopolitics to which Dongjiang was intrinsically connected.

This dissertation argues that the interactions—conflicts, compromise, and/or cooperation—among the Ming, the Qing/Manchus, and Chosŏn Korea that gave rise to Dongjiang, nurtured its development, and eventually caused its collapse. From beginning to the

end, this military organization was politically subordinated to the Ming court, which granted strategic importance to Dongjiang and provided the corresponding political and material support. Dongjiang increased its clout over time, but never converted itself into a sustained state-building program. The organization remained a loosely organized military authority based on resource-deficient islands, which compelled it to seek support and resources from the littorals. This economic dependency eventually soured relationships with all three land-based states. Dongjiang failed to live up to the Ming expectation of a functional force against the Manchus. Its continued existence overburdened Chosŏn and stood in the way of Manchu conquest. In 1637, the Manchus conquered Pidao, marking the end of Dongjiang. In short, this island-based military organization was parasitic and ultimately land-dependant.

1.1 Geographic Scope and Key Locations

As this dissertation primarily concerns connections between three major states in northeast Asia, it is important to clarify the geographic space where these connections took place. This area is termed the Bohai Region (or *Huanbohaiquyu* 環渤海區域 in Chinese). The region was a geopolitical arena shared by the Ming, Chosŏn, and the Manchus. In this region, their actions stimulated responses from the others, and all these responses were related to Dongjiang.

This region encompassed the waters of the Bohai Sea 渤海 and the northern part of the Yellow Sea 黃海 (or the *Sŏhae* 西海 in Korean²), as well as the littorals of northern Shandong 山東, Tianjin 天津, the Shanhai Pass 山海關, southern Liaodong, and northwestern Chosŏn Korea.

² *Sŏhae* literally means “western sea,” that is, the waters west of the Korean peninsula. Kim Bohan 김보한, “Han'guk chungshim hwan Han'guk hae' haeyŏg ūi sŏlchŏng gwa yŏksajŏk chŏn'gae” 한국 중심 ‘環韓國海’ 해역의 설정과 역사적 전개, *Tosŏ munhwa* 도서문화 41 (June 2013): 121.

The term is not a coinage of mine but has already been collectively used by such scholars as Christopher Agnew and Yang Qiang.³ Both Agnew and Yang have argued about the long durée history of the maritime connections in the region, such as diplomatic missions and maritime trade, from the seventh to the eighteenth centuries. However, a more careful examination of the regional history reveals that maritime connections ended in the sixteenth century and the Bohai Region began to be reconnected in the early seventeenth century.

Indeed, connections within the Bohai Region began to be established as early as the seventh century during the Tang dynasty (618-907). Trade and diplomatic groups from the states on the Korean peninsula and Japanese islands crossed the deep and entered Chinese territory through ports in northern Shandong. Various sea-based warlords in the region in the region also sporadically harassed the Shandong coast and engaged local forces. Under the subsequent Song dynasty (960-1279), the mercantile government promoted private seaborne trade, which further facilitated the connections in the region. The Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) continued to promote maritime trade. Moreover, Yuan preparations for invading Japan in the thirteenth century advanced the infrastructure of the shipbuilding industry and developed the harbours necessary for seafaring in northern Shandong and Korea.⁴

³ Although this region takes the name of Bohai, the sea space it encompasses goes beyond the Bohai Sea and extends to the northern part of the Yellow Sea. See Christopher Agnew, “Migrants and Mutineers: The Rebellion of Kong Youde and Seventeenth-Century Northeast Asia,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 52.3 (2009): 506; Yang Qiang 楊強, “Lun Ming-Qing huan bohai quyue de haiyang fazhan” 論明清環渤海區域的海洋發展, *Zhongguo shehui jingjishi yanjiu* 中國社會經濟史研究 1 (2004): 9.

⁴ Zhenping Wang, *Tang China in Multi-Polar Asia: A History of Diplomacy and War* (Honolulu: Hawai'i University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 55-96; Agnew, “Migrants and Mutineers,” 508-509; Guang Ma, *Rupture, Evolution, and Continuity: The Shandong Peninsula in East Asian Maritime History During the Yuan-Ming Transition*. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2021), 17-48; Jung-pang Lo, *China as a Sea Power 1127–1368* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 59-92, 247-283; Shan Zhaoying 單兆英 et al., *Dengzhou gugang shi* 登州古港史 (Beijing: Renmin jiaotong chubanshe, 1994), 150-163.

In the Ming dynasty, the rigorous sea ban, which was devised and implemented to ward off the so-called *wokou* 倭寇 or Japanese pirates, prohibited private seaborne trade. This prohibition backfired in the south, where state power had limited reach. As Lin Renchuan and Dahpon Ho, among others, have argued, Chinese coastal residents continued their business on the seas and defended it by forming their own pirate forces. Eventually, what the Chinese government claimed to fight against were mainly the Chinese themselves.⁵ As the struggle between these coastal residents and the state intensified, the Ming state partially lifted the sea ban in 1567 and made Yuegang 月港, or Moon Harbour, in Fujian 福建 the only port where private seaborne trade was legal.

Although the more considerable presence of the state and the hectic militarization in the early Ming smoothed the way for prohibiting private seaborne trade in the north, the sea ban did not terminate the maritime connections in the Bohai Region. A state-initiated logistic network soon replaced the previous private network and continued to knit the region together. Cotton cloth, grain, and paper cash collected from the south left the ports in northern Shandong for Tianjin, Beijing, Jizhou 薊州, Yongping 永平, and Liaodong and hence opened several sea routes. The purpose of this logistic network was to supply the north and feed the soldiers there defending against the Mongols. The Ming government maintained this seaborne logistic network until the late fifteenth century. Three main factors resulted in this network's downturn. First, by 1387, the yields of military farms in Liaodong were able to keep the northeast self-sufficient. Second, in 1415, the previously clogged Huitong Canal 會通河, the part of the Grand Canal in

⁵ Lin Renchuan 林仁川, *Mingmo qingchu siren haishang maoyi* 明末清初私人海上貿易 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1987), 40-84; Daphon David Ho, "Sealords Live in Vain: Fujian and the Making of a Maritime Frontier in Seventeenth-Century China" (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2011), 21-113.

Shandong, became open to shipping, and after that, canal transport superseded sea shipping.

Third, the monetization of taxation got underway over time. The military provisions collected in kind were converted into silver.⁶ Hence, to use Hoshi Ayao's words, "the sea shipping in the Bohai Gulf" 渤海灣内の海運 became unnecessary.⁷ The Imjin War (1592-1598) temporarily revived official sea shipping. Grain and other military provisions were shipped from Shandong to ports in northwest Chosŏn Korea. However, Ming and Chosŏn co-operated this supply line only briefly between 1597 and 1598. When the war came to an end in 1598, the sea ban resumed.⁸

Consequently, the sixteenth century was an era of disconnection in the Bohai Region, as a result of the Ming state monopolization. Only official seaborne connections were allowed, while private ones were prohibited, and when the government deemed the former unnecessary, there would be no connections, at least in theory. Chosŏn Korea also followed suit. Like the Ming government, the Chosŏn court "turned to a conservative attitude toward the maritime world to protect its coasts from pirate raids, as well as to preserve a hierarchical and sedentary small peasant society."⁹ As Jing Liu has vividly shown, Chosŏn and the Ming were familiar with their littorals, and their interest in acquiring information about the maritime world kept growing over time. The irony was that the knowledge gained was applied to better police the littoral, stop their people from putting out to sea, and repatriate or punish those who broke the sea ban.¹⁰

⁶ For a study about why sea shipping was not favored over the course of the Ming, see Fan Hua 樊鐔, *Zhengzhi juece yu mingdai haiyun* 政治決策與明代海運 (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008).

⁷ Hoshi Ayao 星斌夫, *Mindai sōun no kenkyū* 明代漕運の研究 (Tokyo: Nihon gakujustu shinkōkai, 1963), 388.

⁸ Masato Hasegawa, "Provisions and Profits in a Wartime Borderland: Supply Lines and Society in the Border Region between China and Korea, 1592-1644" (PhD diss., Yale University, 2013), 233-240; Jing Liu, "Beyond the Land: Maritime Interactions, Border Control, and Regional Powers between China and Korea, 1500-1637" (PhD diss., Syracuse University, 2019), 119-187; Hong Sung Ku, "Ming Dynasty Maritime Provisions Transport During the Second Stage of the East Asian War (1597-98)," *Chinese Studies in History* 52.1 (2019).

⁹ Liu, "Beyond the Land," 9.

¹⁰ Liu, "Beyond the Land," 27-68.

Admittedly, smuggling that covered a short distance of offshore sailing, particularly along the Liaodong coast, sporadically happened in the sixteenth century. The suspension of official sea shipping and the prohibition of private seaborne trade severely limited the goods and people in transition on the sea and entirely stopped oceangoing voyages. In this sense, starting from the sixteenth century, the sea space in the Bohai Region became a barrier and the littorals in the region were disconnected.

It was not until 1621, when the Ming court ordered to ship supplies and provisions to sustain Mao Wenlong and his forces that the littorals in the Bohai Region began to be reconnected. After leaving Tianjin, the barges first sailed east to the harbours in Dengzhou 登州 and Laizhou 萊州, two port cities in northern Shandong, and then turned northeast to Chosŏn Korea. The fleet eventually met Mao Wenlong in the coastal county of Sŏnch'ŏn 宣川 in P'yŏngan Province 平安道. Later that year, Mao Wenlong led his followers to the offshore island Pidao 皮島. They soon occupied the nearby island of Sinmi 身彌島 to the east and Ludao 鹿島, Xiaosong 小松, Shicheng 石城, Changsan 長山, Guanglu 廣鹿/祿, and Sanshan 三山 to the west. East of the last island was Lüshun 旅順, the southern tip of Liaodong, affiliated to Jinzhou 金州 Garrison. Mao Wenlong's soldiers briefly held Lüshun in 1623 but eventually lost it to the Manchus. The Ming seaborne logistic network kept all the locations connected.

Chosŏn Korea also kept close contact with Dongjiang. Chosŏn envoys (*chŏppansa* 接伴使) were dispatched to Pidao on a regular basis. People from Dongjiang also often came ashore through the port in Ch'ŏlsan 鐵山. In 1624, Mao Wenlong set up a permanent camp there, which would be destroyed by the Manchus in 1627. After coming ashore, Mao's men had a wide range of activity. They moved east overland to Ryongch'ŏn 龍川 and to Ŭiju 義州, and after crossing

the Yalu River 鴨綠江, to Zhenjiang 鎮江, once a Ming fortress later controlled by the Manchus. They also went west, reaching such locales as Kwaksan 郭山, Anju 安州, and Kaech'ŏn 价川.

In 1628, Yuan Chonghuan, now presiding over the Ming military, decided to reduce the material support to Dongjiang and make changes to sea shipping. Military provisions were to be sent from Ningyuan 寧遠, a fort city north of the Shanhai Pass, which Yuan strictly controlled. The relationship between Yuan and Mao soon deteriorated, leading to their meeting in 1629 in Shuangdao 雙島, an island east of Lüshun. Quarrels burst out between the two, and Mao was killed. Mao's sudden death did not destroy Dongjiang. With the established maritime connections centring on Dongjiang, the littorals in the Bohai Region remained connected until 1637. All the key locations in the Bohai Region have been listed above. How they came to be connected will be examined in the chapters to come (See Figure 1.1).¹¹

This geographic scope was a sub-region in Northeast Asia, covering the territories of three land-based states and large bodies of water. It was the historic site where most of the transnational and transboundary connections discussed in this dissertation took place. However, as this dissertation will show, the connectivity of historical events that determines the analysis sometimes goes beyond the regional scope extending to, for instance, such political centers as

¹¹ The locations mentioned in this paragraph will be examined in detail in the following chapters. However, for general understanding of the geography of the Bohai Region, I have found the travelogues written by the Chosŏn envoys travelling to China by sea quite vivid and illustrative. In particular, see Yi Minsŏng 李民晟, *Kyehae choch'ŏllok* 癸亥朝天錄, in *Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip* 燕行錄全集, vol.14, ed. Im Kijung (Seoul: Tongguk Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 2001), 313-319; Hong Ikhan 洪翼漢, *Hwap'o sŏnsaeng Choch'ŏn hanghaerok* 花浦先生朝天航海錄, in *Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip*, vol.17, 128-139; Chŏng Tuwŏn 鄭斗源, *Choch'ŏn'gi chido* 朝天記地圖, in *Hanguo hanwen yanxing wenxian xuanbian* 韓國漢文燕行文獻選編, ed. Fudan daxue wenshi yanjiuyuan, Chengjunguan daxue dongya xueshuyuan dadong wenhua yanjiuyuan 復旦大學文史研究院, 成均館大學東亞學書院大東文化研究院, vol.7 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2011), 63-100. Yi Minsŏng left for China in 1623; Hong Ikhan, 1624; Chŏng Tuwŏn, 1630.

Beijing, Liaoyang, and Seoul, and such inland locations as Juye 巨野 in Shandong, Chinchow 錦州 in Liaodong, and P'aju 坡州 close to Seoul.



Figure 1.1 Key Locations in the Bohai Region (made with [Harvard WorldMap](https://worldmap.maps.arcgis.com/home/index.html) <https://worldmap.maps.arcgis.com/home/index.html>)

1.2 Dongjiang in Scholarship

This dissertation is the first book-length study of Dongjiang in any language. It offers an alternative view of this military organization in response to two existing understandings: first that Dongjiang was an autonomous military regime, and second that it was a self-contained maritime commercial enterprise. While my own views will be elaborated in the chapters to come, it is necessary to showcase here how these two existing understandings have been presented in current scholarship and how they relate to the arguments put forth in this study.

Regarding the first understanding, Li Guangtao's 1948 essay on the misdeeds of Mao Wenlong during the Chosŏn period stresses Mao's warlordism. Li's evidence comes from one of Mao's letters to the Manchus contained in the Manchu archives, in which Mao affirms his independence from the Manchus. The Manchus, Li argues, had scruples about Mao's military power and so tried to call for his surrender. Li goes so far as to claim that Mao was planning to declare himself as king (*zili weiwang* 自立為王). Whether Mao's letter can be interpreted this way is subject to debate; the very issue with Li's claim is its contradictory nature. Much of Li's essay is focused on Mao's corruption and inaction, as he squandered the supplies and provisions provided by Ming and Chosŏn. Consequently, according to Li, one of the defining features of Dongjiang was its military incapacity. This contradiction between the claim that Mao was at the same time a heinous criminal and militarily incompetent is due to Li's cherry-picking of materials in favour of his argument about Mao as a heinous criminal—for instance, Li takes the Chosŏn officials' complaints about Mao's misdeeds without a grain of salt—and so cannot be reconciled.¹² Nevertheless, he has rightly pointed out the intricate relationship between military

¹² Li Guangtao 李光濤, "Mao Wenlong niangluan Dongjiang benmo" 毛文龍釀亂東江本末, *Zhongyanyuan shiyusuo jikan* 中研院史語所集刊 19 (1948).

capacity and ambitions for independence. Following this line of thought, Evelyn Rawski, although without an elaborated explanation, points out the parallel between Mao and such regional warlords as Li Chengliang 李成梁 (1526-1615), Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 (1604-1661), and even Nurhaci, and defines Dongjiang as a “semi-autonomous regional military command.”¹³

Dongjiang as a formidable military power has often been used to prove that Mao was a regional hegemon. Earlier than Li Guangtao, in 1932, Tagawa Kōzō had argued for Mao’s military capacity in containing the Manchus. He sees Mao’s military threat as the main motivation for the Manchu invasion of Chosŏn Korea in 1627. He also attributes much importance to Mao’s leadership and regards Mao’s death in 1629 as a watershed in Dongjiang’s destiny, after which Dongjiang could no longer prevent the Manchus from conquering the Ming.¹⁴ Likewise, both Xu Kai and Liu Jiaju highlight Dongjiang’s military power and argue that wiping out this power was the sole reason for the 1627 Manchu invasion of Korea.¹⁵ However, two issues arise. First, if Mao was determined enough, how could he avoid engaging the Manchus in 1627? Second, as Dongjiang’s military power declined over time, what was the reason for the 1636-37 Manchu invasion? More recent studies of the Manchu invasions have, by and large, downplayed Dongjiang’s importance in leading to the wars. Chao Zhongchen, Kim Chongwŏn, and Han Myŏnggi share the consensus that the Manchus invaded Chosŏn to smooth the way for gaining grain and reviving trade; the Manchu-Chosŏn trade partnership, after all, had

¹³ Evelyn Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 73.

¹⁴ Tagawa Kōzō 田川孝三, “Mō Bunryū to Chōsen to no kankei ni tsuite” 毛文龍と朝鮮との關係について, in *Seikyū setsusō* 青邱說叢 vol.3, ed., Imanishi Ryū 今西龍 (Keijō, Kyoto: Chikazawa insatsubu, Ibundō shoten, 1932).

¹⁵ Liu Jiaju 劉家駒, *Qingchao chuqi de zhonghan guanxi* 清朝初期的中韓關係 (Taipei: Taiwan wenshizhe chubanshe, 1986); Xu Kai 徐凱, “Lun dingmao luluan yu bingzi huluan—jianping Huang Taiji liangci yongbing Chaoxian” 論丁卯虜亂與丙子胡亂——兼評皇太極兩次用兵朝鮮, *Dangdai Hanguo* 當代韓國 3 (1994).

been terminated when the Ming-Qing conflict began, a partnership characterized by centuries of active economic links.¹⁶ Nevertheless, this economic explanation, as Kye Seung Bum has keenly observed, fails to account for the fact that the Manchus did not demand a huge amount of grain from Chosŏn after the invasions.¹⁷ For a more satisfying explanation, Kye and Tang Lie, turn to the diplomacy adopted by Hong Taiji, who took a hard-line against Chosŏn and was more ambitious than his father Nurhaci.¹⁸ No matter the reasons for the Manchu invasions, the consensus shared by recent Chosŏn-centered studies is that Dongjiang's military capacity was much lower than has been previously assumed.

A more focused appraisal of Dongjiang's military capacity has been conducted by Chen Hantao, who claims that Dongjiang had considerable military might. By relying on Mao Wenlong's military reports (*tangbao* 塘報) recording numerous self-declared victories, Chen attempts to show that Dongjiang was an important regional power in containing the Manchus. However, if one cross references, as I do later in this dissertation, Mao's records with other sources such as the *Veritable Records (Sillok)* of Chosŏn and the Ming and Manchu archives, one can find that Mao made false reports to earn trust and continued support from the Ming court. But because Chen Hantao attributes the eventual downfall of Dongjiang to the lack of material support provided by the Ming, he runs into a dilemma of how best to characterize this

¹⁶ Chao Zhongchen 晁中辰, "Manqing ruguanqian yu Lishi Chaoxian de guanxi" 滿清入關前與李氏朝鮮的關係, in *Hanguoxue lunwenji* 韓國學論文集 vol. 4, ed. Beijing daxue hanguo yanjiu zhongxin 北京大學韓國研究中心 (Beijing: Beijing dongfang chubanshe, 1995); Kim Chongwŏn 金鍾圓, "Chŏngmyohoranshiŭi hugŭmŭi ch'ulbyŏngdonggi" 丁卯胡亂時의 後金의 出兵動機, *Tongyang sahak yŏn'gu* 東洋史學研究 12-13 (1978); Han Myŏnggi 韓明基, *Imjin waeran kwa Han-Jung kwan'gye* 임진왜란과 한중관계 (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa, 1999), 368.

¹⁷ Seung Bum Kye, "In the Shadow of the Father: Court Opposition and the Reign of King Kwanghae in Early Seventeenth-Century Chosŏn Korea" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2006), 287.

¹⁸ Kye, "In the Shadow of the Father," 287; Tang Lie 唐烈, "Chaoxian wangchao yu qingchao wajiao guanxi de jiangou jiqi yingxiang yanjiu (1623-1776)" 朝鮮王朝與清朝外交關係的建構及其影響研究 (PhD diss., Yanbian University, 2018), 53.

military organization. In addition, he cannot explain why Dongjiang achieved no victories in engaging the Manchus in three major wars, namely the Manchu invasions in 1627 and 1636-37, and the last one destroying Pidao later in 1637.¹⁹ Military historian Kenneth Swope has noted a pattern in Dongjiang's military activities: "Mao would only lead small units of guerrillas against isolated Jin fortresses or settlements, inflicting minor casualties and sometimes capturing supplies."²⁰ An examination of several such cases conducted later in this dissertation will lend evidence to support Swope's claim. For instance, Mao was able to occupy Lüshun by taking advantage of the Manchu policy of giving up the littorals. Overall, the military capacity of Dongjiang should not be overestimated.

Characterizing Dongjiang as an independent military regime certainly holds a level of truth, given that it was distant from Beijing and, by extension, from political control. And suppose we use some ambiguous adjectives, for instance, semi-autonomous or centrifugal, to highlight its agency. In that case, such characterization cannot be unfounded. After all, even the most powerless can take the initiative to write their hidden transcripts.²¹ Nevertheless, such characterization also runs the danger of omitting a defining feature of Dongjiang, that is, its dependency.

The prolonged debate over whether Mao's execution in 1629 by Ming General Yuan Chonghuan was a just death has already alluded to the fact that the destinies of Mao Wenlong and, more generally, of Dongjiang, were indeed decided by the Ming court. What is in question

¹⁹ For instance, see Chen Hantao 陳涵濤, *Dongjiang shilüe—Mao Wenlong shengping shiji yanjiu* 東江事略——毛文龍生平事跡研究 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1996).

²⁰ Kenneth Swope, "Postcards from the Edge: Competing Strategies for the Defense of Liaodong in the Late Ming," in *Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History: From Ancient China to the Communist Takeover*, ed. Kai Filippiak (New York: Routledge, 2015), 153.

²¹ James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

is whether Yuan's charges against Mao were true. There were twelve charges, which can be broadly categorized into three groups: alliance with the eunuch faction, correspondence with the Manchus, and corruption.²² Recent studies by Kenneth Swope, Wang Ronghuang, and Meng Zhaoxin have confirmed that all these charges were well-grounded.²³ However, the ultimate cause of this debate, which started immediately after Mao's death, was the question of whether what Mao did was acceptable by the political standards of the day.²⁴ Such standards changed over time and, in turn, made profound impacts on Dongjiang. The alliance with the eunuch faction, for instance, was popular during the Tianqi 天啟 reign (1621-1627) but was deemed as treachery after the Chongzhen 崇禎 emperor (1611-1644, r.1628-1644) ascended to the throne, and the eunuch faction in turn collapsed. What mattered was not Mao's behaviour but was how the Ming court viewed this behaviour. In other words, Dongjiang very much depended on Ming politics.

This political dependency can be observed more clearly in the case of the Ming seaborne logistic network which supported Dongjiang. Wang Ronghuang and Sō Wōnik have detailed several important empirical aspects, including the sea routes, the process of navigation, and the goods, ships, and personnel involved.²⁵ However, the political dynamics behind this logistic

²² Articles written before the 1990s centring on this debate can be found in Luo Zhihuan 羅志歡 ed., *Yuan Chonghuan yanjiu lunwen xuanji* 袁崇煥研究論文選集 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2005), especially 482-506.

²³ Swope, "Postcards from the Edge," 146; Meng Zhaoxin 孟昭信, "Dongjiang yizhen jiqi xiangguan wenti bianxi—zaitan Mao Wenlong de pingjia wenti" 東江移鎮及相關問題辨析——再談毛文龍的評價問題, *Dongbei shidi* 5 (2007): 20-28; Wang Ronghuang 王榮煌, "Mao Wenlong yanjiu xianyi santi" 毛文龍研究獻疑三題, *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 2 (2016).

²⁴ Han Li, "History, Fiction, and Public Opinion: Writings on Mao Wenlong and the Early Seventeenth Century," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 134.1 (2014): 70.

²⁵ Wang Ronghuang 王榮煌 and He Xiaorong 何孝榮, "Mingmo Dongjiang haiyun yanjiu" 明末東江海運研究, *Liaoning daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 遼寧大學學報 (哲學社會科學版) 43.6 (November 2015): 145-152; Sō Wōnik 徐源翊, "Myōng-Ch'ōng kyoch'egi tonggangjin ūi wisang kwa kyōngjejōk kiban" 明清交替期東

network have been left unexamined. As this dissertation will show, the Ming court decided to provide material support to Dongjiang because the new leaders of the Ming military saw Mao and his men as a potential power worthy of investment. The political relationship also decided the continued operation of this seaborne logistic network between Mao Wenlong and other officials and the political changes in the Ming court.

The second understanding of Dongjiang stresses its involvement in maritime trade and characterises Dongjiang as a self-contained commercial enterprise.²⁶ Earlier studies by Chen Shengxi and Li Guangtao have offered thick descriptions of the lavish lifestyles of Mao Wenlong and his close associates on Pidao. They see the accumulated wealth as a direct result of Mao's active participation in commercial activities as merchants from Ming and Chosŏn brought in various commodities by sea. Such analysis characterizes Pidao as a "metropolis" (*dahui* 都會). Much of this analysis is focused on the argument that Yuan Chonghuan falsely killed Mao in 1630. To prove this argument hence is to verify Mao's crimes, which are evidenced by Mao's commercial exploitation and his operation of this profit-driven organization.

What should be recognized is that Dongjiang was indeed involved in maritime trade. There are anecdotal records from both Ming and Chosŏn that can show that private merchants were on the ships sailing to Pidao. Christopher Agnew, for instance, discovered a 1633 Ming report detailing the loss of merchant goods (*kehuo* 客貨) aboard a ship caught in a storm en route

江鎮의 위상과 경제적 기반, *Myŏng -Ch'ŏngsa hak'oe* 명청사연구 53 (2020). Jing Liu incorporates Wang's research in her dissertation. See Liu, "Beyond the Land," 267-268.

²⁶ Li, "Mao Wenlong niangluan Dongjiang benmo"; Chen Shengxi 陳生璽, *Ming-Qing yidaishi dujian* 明清易代史獨見 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), 199-261, especially 237.

to Pidao.²⁷ Zhao Shiyu also finds from the Ming local gazetteers and Ming official memorials that Chinese merchants from Anhui, Jiangnan, Shanxi, and Shandong left for Pidao to do business there.²⁸ Moreover, Chǒng Pyǒngch'ŏl has cited Chosŏn records about the ginseng trade on Pidao conducted by Chosŏn merchants.²⁹

However, such arguments exaggerate the importance of maritime trade *vis a vis* Dongjiang while ignoring Dongjiang's structural economic dependence on its neighboring countries. Zhao Shiyu stresses the institutional setting behind the maritime trade. It was the Ming court that allowed Chinese merchants to board Ming transport ships and bring along their own goods. While Zhao admits that he cannot evaluate how much profit the merchant goods brought to Dongjiang, the impression generated from his analysis is that maritime trade played a supplementary role in Dongjiang's economy.³⁰ Chǒng Pyǒngch'ŏl nevertheless makes it very clear that the trade volume and diversity of commodities was quite limited in Dongjiang. Goods and merchants were censored by both the Chosŏn and the Ming governments. Most merchant goods were daily necessities for the consumption of the island population, such as grain, cloths, and handcrafted materials. Records about luxury goods, which earlier studies often use to argue for Dongjiang's commercial success, often appear in the context of illegal trade and Chosŏn's

²⁷ Agnew, "Migrants and Mutineers," 510-511, 517, 538. This report can be found in Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館, Liaoningsheng dang'anguan 遼寧省檔案館 eds, *Zhongguo mingchao dang'an zonghui* 中國明朝檔案總匯, vol. 13 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2001), 310-312.

²⁸ Zhao Shiyu 趙世瑜 and Du Hongtao 杜洪濤, "Chongguan Dongjiang: Ming-Qing yidai shiqi de beifang junren yu haishang maoyi" 重觀東江：明清易代時期的北方軍人與海上貿易, in *Changcheng neiwai: shehuishi shiyexia de zhidu zuqun yu quyukaifa* 長城內外：社會史視野下的制度、族群與區域開發, ed., Zhao Shiyu (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2016), 69-94 (especially 84-87).

²⁹ Chǒng Pyǒngch'ŏl 鄭炳喆, "Myǒngmal yodong yǒnhae iltae ūi haesang seryōk" 明末 遼東 沿海 일대의 海上勢力, *Myǒng -Ch'ǒngsa yǒn'gu* 明清史研究 23 (April 2005). For a shortened version in English, see Byung-chul Jung, "Late Ming Island Bases, Military Posts and Sea Routes in the Offshore Area of Liaodong," in *The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources*, ed., Angele Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), 41-50.

³⁰ Zhao, "Chongguan Dongjiang," 86-88.

criticism of Mao and hence catch the modern reader's eye, but such illicit deeds were in fact uncommon. Compared to what happened in the East and South China Seas, the maritime trade in Dongjiang, Chǒng contends, was much smaller in scale.³¹

As can be inferred from the case above of the logistic network, Dongjiang demonstrated a strong economic dependency with heavy reliance on material support from Ming and Chosŏn. Both Jing Liu and Kenneth Swope have rightly pointed out that Dongjiang had a shattered economic foundation and the island environment led to impoverishment and sometimes even starvation.³² This is not to say that Dongjiang produced no agricultural yield. Wang Ronghuang, Sŏ Wŏnik, and Matsuura Akira have examined military farms on Dongjiang but, based on different sources, they disagree in their estimates of the island's grain yields. However, they reach the same conclusion that the yields could not have sustained the total population of Dongjiang.³³ Wang Ronghuang, as mentioned above, has detailed the material support from the Ming. As for the supplies provided by Chosŏn, both Sŏ Wŏnik and Jing Liu have cited some Chosŏn sources, but the information provided is still quite fragmentary.³⁴ By exhausting Chosŏn sources, this dissertation will provide a set of precise data for the grain that Chosŏn shipped to Dongjiang. More importantly, this dissertation will show that the reasons for Chosŏn's grain shipments were rooted in the country's domestic politics and in its international relationship with

³¹ Chǒng, "Myŏngmal yodong yŏnhae iltaeüi haesangseryŏk," 160-165.

³² Swope, "Postcards from the Edge," 166; Liu, "Beyond the Land," 244, 302.

³³ Sŏ mainly relies on the Ming *Veritable Records*, while Matsuura uses exclusively a 1623 record written by one of Mao's associates. Wang's sources are more inclusive, including the *Veritable Records* of the Ming and the Chosŏn, the 1623 record, and contemporary Ming officials' memorials. Wang Ronghuang 王榮煌, "Mingmo Dongjiang tuntian yanjiu" 明末東江屯田研究, *Nongye kaogu* 農業考古 6 (2015): 172-178; Sŏ, "Myŏng-Ch'ŏng kyoch'egi tonggangjin ūi wisang," 121-123; Matsuura Akira 松浦章, "Mō Bunryū no Katō senkyo to sono keizai kiban" 毛文龍の椴島占拠とその経済基盤, in *Mindai Chūgoku no rekishiteki isō: Yamane Yukio kyōju tsuitō kinen ronsō (genkan)* 明代中国の歴史的位相: 山根幸夫教授追悼記念論叢 (下巻) (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 2007), 165-180.

³⁴ Sŏ, "Myŏngch'ŏnggyoch'egi tonggangjin ūi wisang," 129-130; Liu, "Beyond the Land," 269-270.

the Ming. This in turn demonstrates that the two dimensions of Dongjiang's dependency—political and economic—were intrinsically related.

1.3 The History of Dongjiang and the Ming-Qing Transition

In a broad sense, this dissertation contributes to the study of the Ming-Qing transition. In the “general crisis” that marked seventeenth-century Eurasia, the Ming-Qing transition was arguably the most prolonged and grievous calamity, resulting from social and economic disorder, political upheaval, moral hazard, militarization and wars, and climate abnormality.³⁵ And as Lynn Struve has pointed out, this transition “involved just about everything that took place in China during the seventeenth century.”³⁶ Yet, the northeast between 1620 and 1638 is a time and place historians tend to gloss over. For example, in such a seminal work of the Ming-Qing transition as Frederic Wakeman's *The Great Enterprise*, the writing abruptly stops at the Manchu annexation of Liaodong in 1620, shifts to the turmoil at the court in Beijing, then continues to detail how the Manchus defeat the Ming forces on and off the battlefield. What happened to the northeast then? In just one paragraph, Wakeman summarizes the years between 1620 and 1638, rendering it as a period during which “Taizong (i.e., Hong Taiji) continued to expand Manchu control over northeastern Asia.” He then concludes that “By 1639, then, Taizong had militarily subjugated both Korea and Inner Mongolia, and he had gained complete control of the Liaodong seacoast

³⁵ The term “general crisis” comes from the context of European history and has been applied to a global historical context. For such an application, see Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). For a concise introduction, see X-XXVII.

³⁶ Lynn Struve, *The Ming-Qing Conflict, 1619–1683: A Historiography and Source Guide* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1998), 1.

and the northern reaches of the Gulf of Zhili.”³⁷ Clearly, Wakeman has not done full justice to the northeast.

Wakeman wrote almost forty years ago, but since then, it is surprising, since the “Great Enterprise” is essentially, in the words of Daphon Ho, a “northeastern undertaking,”³⁸ that the northeast has received such scant attention. More recent studies on the Ming-Qing transition have covered a wider scope of geography. Daphon Ho focuses on the ending of this Great Enterprise in Fujian, showing how the Qing state defeated sea lords there. Zhang Yimin documents China’s east coast ranging from Shandong to Zhejiang, depicting the literati as being unable to either pacify the peasant rebellions or ward off the Manchus.³⁹ Roger Des Forges has written a comprehensive history of Henan in the late Ming, documenting in detail the mass revolts there and the rise of Li Zicheng 李自成 (1609-1645).⁴⁰ Kenneth Swope shifts focus to the southwest and details the saga of Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠 (1606-1647) and the traumatic memories that Zhang left behind. The northeast, however, remains neglected. Hence, on the empirical level, this dissertation fills in one part of the mosaic and fleshes out the grand narrative of Ming-Qing transition.

However, suggesting a neglect of the northeast in scholarship is not so straightforward. To decry the neglect of the northeast and call for a focus on this region belies the privilege of historical hindsight and shows an implicit teleology that the Qing coming from the northeast

³⁷ Frederic Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise: the Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). For the annexation of Liaodong, see 59-66; for the politics in Beijing, 87-156; for the quotations, 209-210.

³⁸ Ho, “Sealords Live in Vain,” 14.

³⁹ Yimin Zhang, “The Role of Literati in Military Action during the Ming-Qing Transition” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2006).

⁴⁰ Roger Des Forges, *Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), especially 176-311.

would inevitably march down to Beijing and succeed the Ming. According to this teleology, what the Qing and the Ming did would contribute to an unstoppable historical progression towards the completion of the Great Enterprise. This teleology has been impacting time and space.⁴¹ Hence, many historians feel obliged to find reasons why such an enterprise could be achieved. For Qing historians such as Wakeman, it is a question of what the Qing did right. They highlight the Qing's successful state-formation through war-making and institution building. Some have even pushed forward to the ideological realm, arguing that the Qing developed renewed symbolic practices and consolidated its rule through rituals.⁴² For Ming historians, on the other hand, it is a question of what the Ming did wrong. They blame the incapability of generals and emperors,⁴³ the social elites' lack of adaptability towards the changing environment,⁴⁴ the everlasting factionalism and the deteriorating civil-military relationship.⁴⁵

But the Ming-Qing transition was also a period full of historical contingencies. To say the process was contingent is not simply to say that “for want of a nail the kingdom was lost,” but that there could have been alternative paths that unfolded. How might things have been different if, for instance, Mao Wenlong had stayed on land or fled back to Beijing after the Manchus chased him down in Chosŏn Korea? What if Nurhaci had implemented a lenient policy toward the Liaodong refugees, so they would not have sought refuge from Mao Wenlong? Might the Chosŏn court, which played a crucial role in sustaining the organization, have stopped supplying

⁴¹ For instance, Geoffrey Parker's 2013 work on the seventeenth-century global crisis, too, uses this term “great enterprise” to denote the Ming-Qing transition. See his *Global Crisis*, Chapter 5.

⁴² Macabe Keliher, *The Board of Rites and the Making of Qing China* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019).

⁴³ Kenneth Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty, 1618-44* (London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014).

⁴⁴ Zhang, “The Role of Literati in Military Action during the Ming-Qing Transition.”

⁴⁵ Lynn Struve, *The Southern Ming, 1644-1662* (London: Yale University Press, 1985).

the Dongjiang? Or might a different Ming military strategy have seen Mao and his men as strategically unimportant and thus reconfigured its deployment in the northeast? In all these cases, contingencies, as will be shown in the following chapters, played an integral part in the Ming-Qing transition. This is not to assert a decisive correlation, positive or negative, between contingencies and macrohistory. Rather, I demonstrate how contingencies led to historical ends that were hardly inevitable.

1.4 Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 “The Establishment of Dongjiang” answers two interrelated questions, neither of which has been answered in full before. First, why would Mao Wenlong as a local officer in Liaodong wind up on Pidao? Second, and more importantly, why would the Liaodong people in large numbers follow Mao and settle on Pidao and nearby islands? Contingent events certainly played a role. After fleeing to Beijing, Mao Wenlong was sent back to Liaodong simply because he was brushed off by a senior official with whom Mao sought to connect. But there are also three structural reasons. First, as the Manchus occupied all the territory east of the Liao River in 1621, they imposed a non-lenient, if not brutal, policy, one of extra-economic coercion: redistributing arable land to Manchu males and putting the Liaodong people on the estates working as serfs. This policy made sense, considering that their territorial expansion was largely driven by an ongoing famine and led to the desertion of Liaodong people in large numbers. Second, the Ming court’s attitude towards the Liaodong people coming inland was unwelcoming. This attitude translated into a depopulation policy which made the area west of the Liao River a depopulated zone and stopped the Liaodong people from entering Ming territory. The last structural reason is Chosŏn’s diplomatic dilemma between Kwanghae’s non-aggression policy

towards the Manchus and the long-standing *sade* 事大 policy, one of “serving the great” Ming. The compromise was to compel Mao Wenlong and his people to move to Chosŏn’s offshore islands so that the Manchus would not, at least for the time being, invade the Chosŏn mainland and the Ming would not punish Chosŏn for not protecting Ming subjects. Due to these structural factors, Mao Wenlong established Dongjiang and kept receiving people from Liaodong. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the rapid development of Dongjiang, a process that resulted in many offshore islands along the north coast of the Bohai Region being staffed with Mao’s men, alarming the Manchus.

Chapter 3 “Investment from the Ming Dynasty” explains why the Ming court was willing to invest in Dongjiang. Mao and his men would not survive overseas without support from the Ming dynasty. However, sea shipping was constrained by the difficulties of navigation, the stringent financial condition of the Ming court, and Ming officials’ capacity to organize and coordinate the task. In the face of these challenges, the Ming court had almost given up on Mao and his men, but the “timely” loss of Guangning, a strategic locale in the Ming military strategy, gave rise to a renewed strategic importance for Mao’s island-based forces. The new leadership of the Ming military deemed that Mao’s forces had the potential to open a second front on the Manchus’ rear and hence shipped supplies and provisions across the deep. The task of supplying Mao’s forces overburdened Tianjin, the central administration shouldering the shipping task, and created tensions between two Deng-Lai Grand Coordinators and Mao Wenlong. This was because Mao’s forces challenged Deng-Lai’s strategic importance, and it was later forced to contribute its part to the sea shipping. Nevertheless, such turmoil did not shake the Ming court’s confidence in Mao’s forces because, for a time, Mao Wenlong’s proactive action of controlling Lüshun, the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula, proved his forces were worthy of the Ming

investment and, in turn, brought in more resources from the Ming. Over time, however, Mao used the Ming investment to his own advantage. Moreover, as Mao was allied with the eunuch faction holding sway over Ming politics, the Ming court continued to support its forces overseas.

Chapter 4 “Grain Supply from Chosŏn Korea” traces the negotiation process over grain supply between Mao Wenlong and the Chosŏn government. It has been widely acknowledged that Mao and his men procured large amounts of grain from Chosŏn, but two questions remain: how much grain did they procure, and why did Chosŏn offer it? An examination of the exact amounts of grain delivered to Dongjiang every year from 1623 to 1626 shows a spike in grain supply. Such a spike seems abnormal given that the local administrations shouldering the task were supposedly overburdened, a nationwide taxation reform aiming to increase revenue failed, and there occurred a series of conflicts between Mao and the Chosŏn. However, the spike makes sense when we consider that it was implicated during three national crises. First, the legitimacy crisis resulting from King Injo ascending the throne through a coup in 1623 compelled King Injo to win support from the Ming at all costs. The Chosŏn court hence bribed Mao Wenlong with grain, hoping Mao would lobby the Ming court on behalf of King Injo. Second, a subsequent rebellion in 1624 provided a pretense for Mao Wenlong to send troop reinforcements to the Chosŏn mainland. Chosŏn hence used grain as a bargaining chip, hoping Mao could issue an order to withdraw and discipline his men. Third, two incoming Ming delegations in 1625 and 1626, particularly the first delegation, exhausted the silver reserves in Seoul and the Board of Taxation had no choice but to turn to Mao Wenlong for loans. Consequently, more grain was delivered to Dongjiang as repayment. The chapter concludes with the 1627 Manchu invasion of Korea, which temporarily ended the supply of grain to Dongjiang and tipped the balance in the Ming-Chosŏn-Manchu trilateral relationship, leading to the death of Mao Wenlong in 1629.

Chapter 5 “The Collapse of Dongjiang” traces the last years of Dongjiang from 1627 to 1638. The core of its analysis is to explain why Dongjiang kept existing after its undeniable leader died in 1629 and how its extended existence paved the way for its eventual collapse. The death of Mao Wenlong and a subsequent Manchu raid on Beijing in the same year gave rise to a withdrawal plan for relocating all of Mao’s people in the Bohai Region back to the inland territory. This withdrawal plan was later dropped, and the strategic importance of Dongjiang was revived, as this chapter will show, due to a series of contingent events, including the death of a potential Dongjiang leader, the power struggles among Mao’s previous subordinates, and mutinies in the Bohai Region. The post-Mao Dongjiang regime revived its communication with the Chosŏn court, which violated the 1627 peace treaty reached by Chosŏn and the Manchus. The conflict was further aggravated when Chosŏn-Manchu border markets began to fail, and Chosŏn envoys refused to acknowledge Hong Taiji as an emperor in 1636. As a result, the second Manchu invasion started in late 1636 and ended with the Battle of Pidao in 1637. The resulting subjugation of Chosŏn eventually helped the Ming court make up its mind to implement the withdrawal plan. By mid-1638, all the personnel in Dongjiang were relocated inland, marking the end of the organization’s history.

The concluding chapter recapitulates the findings elaborated in the previous chapters. It reinterprets the history of Dongjiang as a story of people, emphasizing the importance of historical contingency in shaping the human past. It also shows that this dissertation is a history of connection, revealing the interconnections of various events often examined as isolated incidents. Finally, it compares Dongjiang with the Zheng organization, showing that the differences in geopolitical environments gave rise to different maritime organizations and highlighting the importance of state power in writing the history of maritime China.

1.5 Scope of Primary Sources

For a study of Dongjiang, records generated within the organization are of course paramount. The extant sources are a collection of Mao Wenlong's military reports compiled by one of his sons, Mao Chengdou 毛承斗 (1620-?). *Jiechao* 節鈔 in the title suggests that it is a collection of excerpts, but Mao Chengdou never clarified his intent in the compilation process. Presumably, the writings in favour of his father's positive image have been preserved, and a quick survey of the content can confirm this presumption. Most of the content describes Mao Wenlong's self-declared victories against the Manchus. Details are so vivid and often exaggerated that one cannot help but take them with a grain of salt. These accounts, however, do contain a level of truth regarding the broad strokes of history. And what is worth noting is that Mao's record of the supplies he received from the Ming is quite precise, which can be verified by the Ming official records.

For a study of Dongjiang in the context of Northeast Asian geopolitics, one should gather sources from these Northeast Asian polities, namely Chosŏn, the Ming, and the Manchus. Among the three, the Chosŏn court perhaps kept the most numerous official records about Dongjiang, which was supported by specific institutional settings: the dispatching of envoys to Pidao on a regular basis, and the system of reporting, which demanded the border officials send military intelligence to Seoul promptly. Hence, local reports entered into the records of the central government. One can find most of them in the *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄. Another two sets of sources that I rely on are *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 備邊司謄錄 and *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 承政院日記. The former is the meeting minutes of the Border Defence Council (*Pibyŏnsa*), a supreme administrative organ in the 1620s. These minutes afford a glimpse into the discussion

of significant affairs of national defence and administration. Unfortunately, for the temporal scope of this dissertation 1620-1637, only the minutes of 1617, 1618 and 1624 survive today. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* is the journal of the Royal Secretariat (*Sŭngjŏngwŏn*), which records the Chosŏn king's public life and daily interactions with the bureaucracy. These sources compiled at the highest political level are based on "raw data" such as memorials, ministerial papers, official correspondence, etc. These raw data can better reflect historical reality, and some remain today. Hence, I also incorporate such records as *Imun tŭngnok* 吏文騰錄, a collection of Ming-Chosŏn official correspondence from 1593 to 1621, and *Changgye tŭngnok* 狀啟騰錄, a collection of investigation reports submitted by officials dispatched to inspect P'yŏngan and Hamgyŏng Provinces in the 1620s. I have also extensively used the collected works of the Chosŏn officials of the day, who provide some first-hand information about the historical events concerned in this dissertation. For instance, Chang Man's 張晚 (1566-1629) writings provide the real-time information about the Yi Kwal 李适 (1587-1624) Rebellion in 1624 when he was commissioned to pacify the rebellion. Sin Talto 申達道 (1576-1631), in the capacity of King Injo's special envoy, recorded his visit to Pidao later that year.

The records from the Ming dynasty also offer abundant information about Dongjiang. As the single largest historical source for the dynasty, the *Ming Veritable Records* (*Ming shilu* 明實錄) furnish the bulk of data. In addition, the collected works of late Ming officials piece together their official writings, mostly their memorials, scattered and shortened in the veritable records. I give special attention to the collected works of such officials as Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼 (1569-1625), Sun Chengzong 孫承宗 (1563-1638), Wang Zaijin 王在晉 (1567-1643), Bi Ziyang 畢自嚴 (1569-1638), Yuan Chonghuan, and Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌 (1588-1641). In one way or another,

all of them were related to Mao Wenlong and Dongjiang. And whenever possible, “raw data” are given priority. Consequently, for instance, when examining the sea shipping between Dengzhou and Liaodong between 1618 and 1621, *Haiyun jishi* 海運紀事, a collection of 113 official documents compiled by a local administration involved in the sea shipping, is used, although a good many of the documents, often in shortened and heavily edited versions, also appear in the veritable records and in the collected works of Tao Langxian 陶朗先 (1579-1625), who presided over the sea shipping at the time. Other raw data that this dissertation incorporates appear in several publications, including the Ming-Qing documents in printed editions compiled by Academia Sinica, various Ming documents in modern typeset editions published in the journal *Lishi dang'an* 歷史檔案 (historical archives), and the facsimile Ming documents published by Guangxi Normal University.

The Manchu archives are another significant source. Given the temporal scope of this dissertation, all the Manchu materials herein used are pre-conquest archives, including *Manwen laodang*/ *Manbun rōtō* 滿文老檔 (MWLD), *Neiguoshiyuan manwendang*/ *Naikokushiin tō* 內國史院(滿文)檔, and *Baqi zhiyue dang* 八旗值月檔. Compared to the much larger volume of Manchu materials produced after the conquest, many of which are unpublished or published in facsimile editions, all these archives are published, transliterated, and translated into Chinese and Japanese. These archives record the khan’s daily activities, imperial edicts, official memorials, and documents of all sorts produced by various administrative organs. Kanda Nobuo has well described these archives, and hence no further explanation is needed here.⁴⁶ But one thing worth noting is that after 1644, these archives formed the basis of *qijuzhu* 起居注, the daily records of

⁴⁶ Kanda Nobuo, “From Man-wen lao-tang to Chiu Man-chou tang,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko* 38 (1980).

the actions and words of the emperor in court, which in turn became the source of the *Qing Veritable Records*. While existing studies on Dongjiang have extensively used the *Qing Veritable Records*, the history in the records is often highly embellished. Hence, the Manchu archives are prioritized, and the veritable records are less often used. This is not to say the archives are not without limit. Like almost all the extant historical records, they are left behind by agents and representatives of the state and serve their respective political agendas. Nurhaci's enclosure movement, for instance, is described in MWLD as a policy intended to nourish the mass population. Hence, when dealing with all these historical records, my principle is critical examination and cross-reference.

I have also extensively used local gazetteers, travel accounts, and the *biji* 筆記 (the informal jotting genre) by Ming and Chosŏn contemporaries, which can provide valuable information that helps reconstruct the history of Dongjiang. In addition, recent developments in digital humanities have made some sources used in this dissertation much more accessible. I rely heavily on the Scripta Sinica Database (SSDB), which contains the full texts of Ming and Chosŏn veritable records, and the Media Korean Studies Database (MKSDB), which contains almost all the extant collected works of Chosŏn scholar-officials. The Kyujanggak 奎章閣 Electronic Archives is another treasure land. It surprised me every time when I “visited” there.

Given that an “armchair” historian writes this dissertation, the scope of the primary sources seems to be wide enough. And yet I have always wanted to get out of my armchair. Most locales in this dissertation are places I have never been to. On several occasions, I was notified that new local materials were found and new archaeological sites were unearthed. As David Faure has noted, “One has to travel to be impressed by China’s vastness and its varied character. One has to travel also to see firsthand the relics that stand as testimony of the society of a bygone

age. And one has to travel even to gather the documentary information that still abides on stone steles or fragments of paper tenderly preserved in private hands...Historians of today should consider it their privilege to be able to see the last remains of the great Ming and Qing achievements in social construction, and their duty to seize the opportunity of writing its history.”⁴⁷ I hope I can seize this opportunity if the conditions allow someday.

⁴⁷ David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 368.

Chapter 2: The Establishment of Dongjiang

In 1620, Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576-1629) might not have seen himself leading a life at sea. He was then a battalion commander (*Qianhu* 千戶) in Haizhou 海州, a garrison 120 *li* southwest of Liaoyang 遼陽, the administrative seat of the Ming northeastern frontier. Born and raised in Qiantang 錢塘 (in present-day Hangzhou 杭州), he was educated in Confucian classics during his youth, but wound up following his paternal uncle to Liaodong. He did so supposedly because he saw no prospect in sitting for the imperial examination, while the military could be an alternative, as a military title could be hereditary under Ming law. He received a military title from his uncle at the age of 30.⁴⁸ Fifteen years later, he had neither advanced in the military hierarchy nor recorded any triumphs on battlefields, suggesting that he was either a mediocre officer or had yet to have a chance.

The second hypothesis seems more plausible, because just two years later, Mao Wenlong established a military organization centering on an island off the northwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. The island was called Pidao 皮島 (or Kado 椴島 in Korean) and the defense command was named Dongjiang 東江. Once Dongjiang was established, some 100,000 Liaodong people soon went to Mao Wenlong for refuge and hence inhabited Pidao and nearby islands.⁴⁹ At its peak, there were over 150,000 people of all sorts living on Dongjiang under Mao's command.⁵⁰ Why did Mao Wenlong leave the mainland and wind up on an island? And

⁴⁸ Mao Chengdou 毛承斗 ed., *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao* 東江疏揭塘報節抄, in *Mingmo Qingchu shiliao xuankan* 明末清初史料選刊 ed. Jia Naiqian 賈乃謙 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1986), 82.

⁴⁹ *Mingxizong shilu* 明熹宗實錄, Tianqi 2/7/16 (1622/8/22).

⁵⁰ Wang Ruchun 汪汝淳 and Li Shangying 李尚英 ed., “Mao dajiangjun haishang qingxing” 毛大將軍海上情形, *Qingshi yanjiu tongxun* 清史研究通訊 2 (1990): 40.

why did so many people follow Mao? This chapter argues that it was the wartime population management of the Ming, the Manchus, and Chosŏn that drove many Liaodong people into a corner, and Mao Wenlong in Pidao happened to provide them a way out of it. Essentially it is a story about population movement, and it starts with the Manchu annexation of Liaodong.




Figure 2.1 Liaodong and Surrounding Areas (made with [Harvard WorldMap](#))

2.1 The Manchu Annexation of Liaodong

The prolonged Ming-Qing wars started in 1618. In that year, the Ming dynasty lost its first battle to the Manchus⁵¹ at Fushun 撫順, followed by a second at Sarhu 薩爾滸. Failures on the battlefield continued into next year when the Ming lost two northern cities of Kaiyuan 開原 and Tieling 鐵嶺. The Manchus plundered these two cities and sent the captured booty back to their capital of Hetu Ala 赫圖阿拉 (Figure 2.1). The resources plundered, however, provided only fleeting satisfaction. The destruction of Fushun and Kaiyuan terminated the horse markets there. From the fifteenth century onward, the Ming court had allowed the Manchus to trade horses and local products with the Chinese for salt, grain, and textiles, the commodities that the Manchus were poor at making.⁵² The Manchus' victories on the battlefield, however, cut off this steady sources of daily necessities. The sequela of the wars soon manifested when a famine resulting from the low temperature and poor harvest hit Hetu Ala. Starting from the summer of 1620, the capital barely had enough food and resources for the growing population and Ming captives.⁵³ Now the Manchus were ready for more conquest not only for territorial aspiration but for survival.

A full-fledged campaign required preparation. Hence, the year 1620 witnessed no major clashes, but small military operations.⁵⁴ From time to time, small groups of Manchu cavalry

⁵¹ Though the Manchus only became “Manchu” after 1635, I will use “Manchu” uniformly to refer to the early-seventeenth-century Jurchens. I adopt this admittedly anachronistic shorthand in order to minimize possible confusion with the Jurchens of the twelfth-century Jin dynasty.

⁵² Yang Yulian 杨余练, “Mingdai houqi de Liaodong mashi yu Nüzhen zu de xingqi” 明代后期的辽东马市与女真族的兴起, *Minzu yanjiu* 民族研究 5 (1980): 28.

⁵³ Gertraude Roth Li, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618-1636,” in *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, ed. Jonathan Spence et al. (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1979), 14; “State Building Before 1644,” in *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 9: The Ch'ing Dynasty, Part 1: To 1800*, ed. Willard Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2002), 42.

⁵⁴ Perhaps for this reason, 1620 has been regarded as a transitional period between the wartime 1619 and 1621 and has been barely documented by historians. For example, see Kenneth Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming*

entered the Liaodong area and attacked Ming fortifications, plundering and looting as they went. Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼 (1569-1625), then Military Affairs Commissioner of Liaodong (*Liaodong jinglüe* 遼東經略), detailed many, if not all, such aggressions in a lengthy memorial submitted on September 11, 1620.⁵⁵ These accounts, however, left no trace in the Manchu records. The only exception is an entry for September 17, 1620 in the *Old Manchu Archives* (hereafter MWLD)⁵⁶, and this record shows that Manggūltai 莽古爾泰 (1587-1633), Nurhaci's fifth son and one of the four *Hosoi beile* (senior princes)⁵⁷, led 100 cavalymen to approach Shenyang 沈

Dynasty, 1618-44 (London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 32; Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building Before 1644," 41-42. In both works, the analyses on the Manchu conquest jump from 1619 directly to 1621 and skip 1620. Perhaps another reason for the small battles instead of a major campaign was that Nurhaci was then making efforts to form an alliance with the Chakhar Mongols, who received stipends from the Ming and hence stood by Chinese side. This could have involved sending out envoys, repatriating Mongol outcasts and captives, and persuading Ligdan Khan of the Mongols (1588-1634, r.1604-1634) to unite and together to go against the Ming dynasty, or at least not to provide military aid to the Ming in the event of a Manchu attack. See *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔 (hereafter MWLD) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), 127, 129, 131, 139-145, 166-167. Ligdan Khan is known as Chahan 插漢, Huqiu 虎酋, Huduntu 虎墩兔, and Huduntuhan 虎墩兔憨 in Chinese sources. The Manchu-Mongol relationship is, of course, beyond the scope of this dissertation. But at the risk of oversimplification, the history is that the relation between Ligdan Khan and Nurhaci, in fact, deteriorated after 1620, but many clan tribes led by Ligdan began to defect to the Manchus, probably because Ligdan pursued a centralizing policy that stripped many chieftains of the rights over their tribes. This Mongol issue, for the Manchus, was finally settled in 1632, when Hong Taiji achieved a decisive victory against Ligdan, who later retreated westward to Gansu and died there.

⁵⁵ Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼 and Li Hongquan 李紅權 ed., *Xiong Tingbi ji* 熊廷弼集 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2011), 578-597.

⁵⁶ In order to solve the needs to transmit written messages and make government records, in 1599, Nurhaci ordered Erdeni and others to create a written language for the Manchu, based on the Mongolian alphabetic system and combined with Jurchen phonetics. This early form of Manchu, derived from Mongolian and without punctuation, was called old Manchu. In 1632, Dahai was ordered to create diacritics (circles and dots) in order to improve the form and phonetics of Manchu, which became known as new Manchu, or standard Manchu. The current 40-volume collection of what is known in Chinese as *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔 (MWLD) and in Japanese as *Manbun rōto* 滿文老檔 is composed of the Manchu records from 1607 to 1636, representing the early years of the Manchu government before they conquered the Ming dynasty and established the Qing. The writing in the archives, however, is not all old Manchu, but includes Mongolian, unpunctuated old Manchu, semi-punctuated transitional Manchu, and fully punctuated new Manchu. In most cases, I use MWLD.

⁵⁷ These are known as *Heshuo beile* 和碩貝勒 in Chinese. Named by Nuarchi in 1615, the four senior *beile*, according to the aged-based hierarchy, were Daišan (1583-1648), Amin (1586-1640), Manggūltai (1587-1633), and Hong Taiji (1592-1643). Each of them controlled one banner under the name of Khan/ Nurhaci and played an important role in Nurhaci's banner system, which retained a fair degree of collective decision. After Hong Taiji ascended the throne in 1626, the three *beile* continued to hold sway together with the new Khan until Hong Taiji consolidated his absolute rule by convicting Amin and Manggūltai in 1630 and 1631 respectively. Daišan was pardoned because he supported Hong Taiji's claim to the throne and was able to keep the title until his death in

陽, killed some 100 Ming soldiers at the north gate of the city, and returned. The compiler of the entry rendered Manggūltai a heroic vanguard who was only forced to retreat due to a lack of reinforcements. This entry ended with Nurhaci's punishment of some officers for not sending out extra soldiers or going to the final victory of capturing Shenyang, as well as an enumeration of the rewards to Manggūltai for the venture.⁵⁸ Given that the early Manchu records often tended to be official propaganda, this entry might be an exaggeration that does not reflect what really happened. Perhaps it was not a landslide victory over the Ming, but rather, for the Manchus, a tentative attack, the real purposes of which were to scout the area, feel out the Ming defenders, and prepare for the next strike. That is, this entry showed that the Manchus coveted, perhaps for the first time, a significant walled city in Liaodong, and Shenyang would be Nurhaci's next target.

However, such an alarm for a potential attack from the Manchus on Shenyang did not enter into the Ming records, though it may have been lost. Xiong Tingbi seems to have never reported this incident to Beijing, although, as mentioned, he spared no effort to report any and all Manchu aggressions earlier that year. A relapse of dysentery that Xiong had been long suffering might partially explain this, but the main reason was probably that he was involved in political turmoil and besieged with political strife.⁵⁹ Starting from August 28, the day after the death of the Wanli Emperor (r.1572-1620) who had given Xiong his full backing, Xiong Tingbi began to be impeached. Pure personal revenge as it was, the political attack was initiated by Yang Yuan

1648. However, he was repeatedly denounced by Hong Taiji for miscellaneous crimes and was therefore edged out of the highest political circle.

⁵⁸ MWLD, 152-154.

⁵⁹ Xiong's memorials at the time repeatedly suggested that his incompetency was due to illness. For example, see *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 475-476, 485-486, 513, 516. For Xiong's responses to the impeachments, see *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 517-527, particularly the "Renyan lüzhi shu" 人言屢至疏 submitted on 1620/10/26 (*Xiong Tingbi ji*, 522-525).

楊淵, uncle of Yang Hao 楊鎬 (?-1629), who conducted the disastrous Battle of Sarhu in 1618. After succeeding Yang Hao as the military commissioner, Xiong personally ordered Yang Hao be sent to prison in Beijing instead of showing leniency, and so Yang Yuan held a grudge. He took advantage of the timing when Xiong Tingbi lost the Wanli Emperor's patronage and connived with several censors, with whom Xiong had long soured relations.⁶⁰

Many impeachments were therefore groundless, but one did strike a nerve of the Tianqi 天啟 Emperor (1605-1627, r.1620-1627), who just ascended the throne in haste on October 1 after his father's reign (Taichang 泰昌) of merely 30 days (August 28-September 26). The accusation was that Xiong's plan to recover Liaodong had no short-term success. Admittedly, during his tenure of some one and a half years as Liaodong Military Commissioner, Xiong Tingbi had been able to rebuild walls, defenses, and cities including Liaoyang and Shenyang.⁶¹ However, the spending on rearmament must not have looked good on paper, at least to the eyes of an irritable fifteen-year-old such as Tianqi. The result was the removal of Xiong Tingbi and the appointment of a more radical official, Yuan Yingtai 袁應泰 (?-1621), in November of 1620.

Modern readers are often more familiar with Yuan Yingtai's glorious image as a martyr who committed suicide after the Manchu took Liaoyang in 1621,⁶² but are less likely to know that he was a professional bureaucrat and a savvy politician but had little military experience. In contrast to Xiong Tingbi's progressive plan, probably to cater to the Tianqi Emperor, Yuan Yingtai took a more radical stance and planned an expedition against the Manchus at Hetu Ala, despite the

⁶⁰ Yao Zongwen 姚宗文 and Liu Guojin 劉國縉 among others. Wang Zaijin 王在晉, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu* 三朝遼事實錄, in *Xianqing shiliao* 先清史料 vol. 4, ed. Li Shutian 李樹田 (Jilin: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1990), 100.

⁶¹ *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 523-524, 547-548. Also, Peng Sunyi 彭孫貽, *Shanzhong wenjianlu* 山中聞見錄, in *Qing ruguanqian shiliao xuanji* 清入關前史料選輯 vol. 3, ed. Pan Zhe 潘喆 et al. (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1991), 28. Xiong's achievements are also reflected in the Manchu records. See MWLD, 187.

⁶² Ji Liuqi 計六奇, *Mingji beilue* 明季北略 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 30.

fact that Ming finances could ill afford such a costly campaign. Such an expedition never happened, simply because the Manchus came first. Yuan's ignorance of military affairs, however, became evident in the early stages of planning, particularly when Yuan asked for the provision of 3,000 copper pots from Chosŏn Korea early in 1621, a request which the Chosŏn court received on March 22. Yuan's idea was to equip the expedition army with better cooking utensils suitable for marching, as he argued that Korean cooper pots were much more light-weight than Chinese iron pots.⁶³ The idea of cooking with an open flame on the march defied military common sense: conceal your tracks and pack light. The typical way of supplying an expedition army at the time was to use fried powdered grain and, occasionally, dehydrated meat.⁶⁴

Besides his lack of practical military experience, Yuan Yingtai seemed not to have a strategic vision either. The mistake that Yuan made was to ally with the Uryanghai Mongols, whom he deemed more competent and reliable than the people of Liaodong. Settled in the strategic area roughly coinciding with the jurisdictions of present-day Chifeng 赤峰 and Chengde 承德 (Figure 2.1),⁶⁵ the Uryanghai indeed had been long-term allies since the late

⁶³ *Imun tŭngnok* 吏文騰錄, vol. 15 (Changsŏgak, K2-3497), 999-1000. *Imun tŭngnok* is a collection of transcribed records of Ming-Chosŏn official correspondences from 1593, the early stages of the Imjin War, to 1621, right after the Manchu occupation of Liaoyang. It provides a direct look at China-Korea wartime diplomacy and social conditions. There can be various possible interpretations of Yuan's request—Liaodong might have lacked the material and/or time to cast the copper pots, or simply that Yuan tried to use the opportunity to reinforce the Ming suzerainty over Chosŏn Korea by ordering the vassal state to make a contribution.

⁶⁴ Chen Jianhong 陳建宏, "Junliang gongxu yu Ming-Qing Liaodong zhanzheng (1618-1642)" 軍糧供需與明清遼東戰爭 (PhD diss., Taiwan Normal University, 2018), 108.

⁶⁵ The Uryanghai's settlement was caught in between the Oirat Mongols (who brought about the Tumu Debacle 土木之變 in 1449) and the Manchus, sheltering the capital region and the Liaoxi corridor 遼西走廊 (the coastal pathway between the Shanhai Pass 山海關 and Ningyuan 寧遠, which linked North China and Northeast China) in the south.

fourteenth century,⁶⁶ but were also infamous for their shifty attitudes towards the Ming state. During several Mongol attacks previously in the dynastic history, the Uryanghai often served as spies and guides. Some of Yuan's associates were against this policy, fearing that the Mongols would once again turn their backs on the Ming.⁶⁷ But Yuan managed to persuade the Tianqi emperor to spare some 3 million taels worth of supplies for the Uryanghai. His proposal for winning over the Mongol cavalymen was to somehow convince enough of them to please the hawkish emperor. Consequently, many Mongols came to the Ming territory seeking supplies and asylum, and Yuan Yingtai welcomed them with open arms without strict scrutiny, presuming that the grateful Mongols would readily submit and fight on the battlefield on the Ming dynasty's behalf. At Yuan's behest, Liaoyang and particularly Shenyang, as well as some other military forts, became designated locales to receive the coming Mongols and so witnessed the biggest concentration of Mongols in a short span of time.⁶⁸

Yuan's strategy backfired. The Manchus began to attack Shenyang on May 1, 1621. The Ming defenders took a defensive stance and held their ground around the city, hoping the walled city could help ward off the enemies. After ten days of confrontation, the deadlock was broken as the Mongols in the city, whom Yuan Yingtai had previously received as allies, rebelled. They cut the ropes that suspended the bridges to the city's north gate, and the Manchus took the

⁶⁶ Three major tribes of the Uryanghai received military titles from the Hongwu Emperor in 1389, and so the Uryanghai Mongols, for the contemporaries living in the Ming, were divided into three *wei* 衛 (guards): Duoyan 朵顏, Taining 泰寧, and Fuyu 福餘. Consequently, the Uryanghai has been known in Chinese history as *Duoyan sanwei* 朵顏三衛 (Duoyan Three Guards), or simply *Sanwei* 三衛 (Three Guards). For a comprehensive and probably the best study on the Uryanghai to date, see Sei Wada 和田清, *Tōa shi kenkyū. Mōko hen* 東亞史研究.蒙古篇 (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1959), 107-400. A recent study by Chiu Chung-lin focusing on Ming-Uryanghai economic relations sheds some light on the late Ming military finance. See Chiu Chung-lin 邱仲麟 "Mingdai de wuliangha sanwei fushang jiqi jingfei zhi choucuo" 明代的兀良哈三衛撫賞及其經費之籌措, in *Mingdai yanjiu* 明代研究 27 (2016).

⁶⁷ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 93.

⁶⁸ MWLD, 178-181; Ji, *Mingji beilüe*, 27-28, 30-31; Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 100.

opportunity to breach the Ming defenses. Outnumbered by the enemies, the Ming forces were slaughtered and Shenyang was lost. Following up the victory, the Manchus marched south and began to attack Liaoyang on May 10. After Yuan Yingtai died as a martyr during the battle, the Ming army forfeited the city by the end of the day. As for Yuan's Mongol "allies," who were present all the way, they did not fight, but looted some supplies and fled.⁶⁹

Victory or defeat were, of course, ultimately decided on the battlefield, but several changes that happened in 1620, as have been shown, had already predicted the Manchu victories: the changing power on the throne in Beijing, which stirred up political strife; the removal of Xiong Tingbi, who managed, at least judging from his tenure, to stabilize the situation in Liaodong; and the appointment of an incompetent official Yuan Yingtai, who had little military experience and made a strategic mistake of allying with the Uryanghai Mongols. On May 31, 1621, Nurhaci proclaimed Liaoyang as the new capital. From May to October, the Manchus continued the attack, moving to take over 70 fortified towns and garrisons.⁷⁰ By then, they managed to annex all the territory east of the Liao River, and Manchu rule over Liaodong officially began.

2.2 The Manchus' Population Management

As the Manchus gradually set up their own administrations and consolidated their rule over Liaodong, one important issue that surfaced was how to manage the newly conquered Liaodong

⁶⁹ Sun Wenliang 孫文良 and Li Zhiting 李治亭, *Ming-Qing zhanzheng shilue* 明清戰爭史略 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2012), 81-97; Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 32-37.

⁷⁰ *Qingtaizu shilu* 清太祖實錄, Tianming 6/3/20 (1621/5/11), *juan* 7 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 103. First published in 1655, the *Qing Veritable Records of Taizu* provided a concise description of the Manchu conquests in 1621 in one entry for May 11, 1621. However, according to MWLD, on which the writing of the veritable records was based, the Manchu conquest continued until October when more reinforcements and weapons were sent to the south of the peninsula to complete the occupation there. For example, see MWLD, 228, 229, 232.

people⁷¹. The Manchus were outnumbered, but not by much. It has been estimated that there were some 64,000 adult Liaodong males under Manchu control, and the Manchu soldiers numbered over 30,000.⁷² This made an iron rule not technically impossible. In addition, as Pamela Crossley has convincingly argued, the early Manchu social stratification was essentially a social relationship between “master/lord” and “slave.” Nurhaci as a khan, for instance, was a primary owner of slaves, and his previous campaigns depended strongly on control of conquered populations through enslavement.⁷³ Hence, coercion, if not enslavement, had been a long-standing character of the Manchus’ management of conquered population, and their treatment of the Liaodong people in the 1620s was no exception. As mentioned, the Manchu annexation of Liaodong was greatly motivated by economic reasons. Therefore, the question of how to best extract resources in a sustainable way from the Liaodong people guided population management.

The initial management was lenient. After taking Liaoyang on May 10, Nurhaci forbade his soldiers from killing or looting the Liaodong people or destroying any civilian property.⁷⁴ A vivid example is an entry for May 19, 1621, in MWLD. On that day, Nurhaci made a tour of

⁷¹ The “Liaodong people” is used here to replace the Manchu original *nikan* (Han Chinese) in MWLD, because I am not sure how important Han ethnicity was in 1621, as the ethnic boundary between and the ethnicities of the Manchus and the Han were constructed along the way until the 18th century. What can be confirmed, however, is that the references in MWLD to *nikan* in the 1620s signified the Other: the Liaodong people who had been formerly ruled by the Ming state and hence were different from the Manchus. In addition, using the “Liaodong people” here is to reconcile the references to the same group in Chinese and Korean sources. The focus of this chapter is squarely on these people after all.

⁷² Wei Gang 魏剛, “Mingdai Liaodong yanhai diqu de renkou bianhua jiqi yuanyin chutan” 明代遼東沿海地區的人口變化及其原因初探, in *Zhongguo gudai shehui yu sixiang wenhua yanjiu lunji* 中國古代社會與思想文化研究論集 vol. 3, ed. Ge Zhiyi 葛志毅 (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2008), 230. I find this estimate convincing, because the author has relied on the sources that contain the observations of the day. He uses *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/3/25 (1621/5/16); *Kwanghaegun ilgi* 光海君日記, Kwanghaegun 13/3/25 (1621/5/16).

⁷³ Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2000), 100-101, 140. It is important to note here that one should not shy away from depicting the brutality of the Manchus. Lynn Struve has criticized such a phenomenon as a “sanitization” often seen in the historical writing of the Manchu conquest. See Lynn Struve, *Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tigers’ Jaws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 2-3.

⁷⁴ MWLD, 184, 185-186, 187-188, 189.

inspection to Haizhou two days after the Ming commanders there had voluntarily surrendered.⁷⁵ Before entering the city, Nurhaci ordered all his accompanying men to spend the night on the city walls and not to enter civilians' homes, so as not to incite public fear. When some soldiers who robbed the Liaodong people were caught during the tour, Nurhaci personally ordered that they be arrested and punished by piercing of their noses and ears as signs of stigma.⁷⁶

Conducting a critical reading, one can interpret this case as one recorded to establish the glorious image of Nurhaci as *Genggiyen han*, the brilliant khan, self-proclaimed in 1616. As in many biographies of monarchs, there are not a few examples in the Manchu records about the auspicious omens bestowed on Nurhaci, suggesting that he received the mandate of heaven.⁷⁷ Mark Elliot has argued, from a historiographical perspective, that the Manchu figuration of historical process was internally a political act.⁷⁸ By selecting certain facts, composing the historical records was to lend legitimacy to the Manchu rule. Consequently, one can perhaps argue that the Manchus' self-restraint in handling the Liaodong population, as indicated by their own records, in fact ran counter to the reality of brutality and maltreatment.⁷⁹

However, the grain reserves in coastal Liaodong might help to explain this lenient policy. Such garrisons as Haizhou, Fuzhou 復州, Gaizhou 蓋州, and Jinzhou 金州 (Figure 2.1) in

⁷⁵ MWLD, 182.

⁷⁶ MWLD, 185-186. Mao Wenlong then had left Haizhou for Beijing.

⁷⁷ For example, see MWLD, 40-43.

⁷⁸ Mark Elliot, "Whose Empire Shall It Be? Manchu Figurations of Historical Process in the Early Seventeenth Century," in *Time and Temporality in the Ming-Qing Transition*, ed. Lynn Struve (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 31-72.

⁷⁹ References to the Manchus' atrocities are scattered in Korean and Chinese records. However, many were composed by Ming loyalists living long after 1644 and contain pronounced anti-Qing sentiments. Some appalling details, which are strikingly detailed, such as the massacre of 50,000 civilians in Liaoyang after the Manchus entered the city, may not stand up to scrutiny. For instance, see Peng Sunyi 彭孫貽, *Shanzhong wenjianlu* 山中聞見錄, in *Qing ruguanqian shiliao xuanji* 清入關前史料選輯, vol. 3, ed. Pan Zhe 潘喆 et al. (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1991), 31; Ji Liuqi 計六奇, *Mingji beilüe* 明季北略 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 28-29.

southern Liaodong then had considerable amounts of rice and beans stored in local granaries. Starting from 1618, to prepare for the Sarhu Battle and subsequent military operations, the Ming court ordered Shandong to ship grain by sea to the frontier in Liaodong. The shipping quotas increased from a little over 10,000 *shi* in 1618 to 600,000 *shi* in 1620.⁸⁰ Shandong's coastal administrations overcame great financial hardship and managed to deliver the quotas every year. But Liaodong's coastal administrations could not transship the grain overland to the frontier in time. In 1619, even unloading the Shandong ships after coming ashore became a problem. For instance, by July of that year, among a total of 30,000 *shi* of grain that arrived at Jinzhou's coast in May, only 1,500 *shi* had been unloaded from the ships.⁸¹ Since Liaodong could not organize overland transshipment efficiently and Shandong did not want their ships to keep waiting, the compromise was to send the grain to local granaries for temporary safekeeping. One memorial sent in October 1620 from Shandong reported that of the more than 600,000 *shi* of grain that reached the Liaodong coast that year, 400,000 *shi* had yet to be stored and was heaped up on shore.⁸² Consequently, the grain was never delivered to the Ming soldiers in need, and it would never be, for the Manchus were coming. On several occasions, Nurhaci ordered to distribute the grain to his own soldiers and sent troops there to feast on the reserves. In addition, a good amount was ordered to be sent back to Liaoyang.⁸³ Clearly, these timely grain reserves relieved the Manchus from famine and made possible a relatively more disciplined force. In this light, the story about Nurhaci's leniency towards the Liaodong people may have some credibility.

⁸⁰ *Haiyun jishi* 海運紀事 (hereafter HYJS), in *Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan* 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊, vol. 56. (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1988), 16, 212.

⁸¹ HYJS, 83.

⁸² HYJS, 355.

⁸³ MWLD, 194, 215, 230, 234.

Some firsthand accounts of the day show a more nuanced picture: the Manchus did keep their promise of lenient treatment, but only to certain people and on certain conditions. Two groups were particularly vulnerable to maltreatment and, sometimes, killing: literate people, mostly Confucian students and gentries, and people of means, usually merchants. One illustrative example was Wang Yining's 王一寧 (?-1621) correspondence with the Chosŏn king in July 1621. This Confucian student claimed to lead an uprising and asked Chosŏn Korea for reinforcements and supplies. One of Wang's letters told that the Manchus had killed or imprisoned many gentries and Confucian students in Liaoyang. He was among the few who managed to escape before the Manchus occupied the city and was elevated to leadership by 1,300 of his men, who he termed *tunmin* 屯民 (village folks)⁸⁴—probably because he was the only one who could write and so was considered resourceful enough to seek external help. Another example is an intelligence report sent from Ŭiju to Seoul in June. Accordingly, the Manchus registered all the merchants in Liaoyang, and confiscated their goods. One merchant named Li Yushan 李玉山, who was then well known for his wealth, committed suicide eventually because of the Manchus' extortion.⁸⁵ The nomadic practice favoring raids for booty remained in place as the Manchus did not bother to conceal their hunger for resources. The supposed reason is that the merchants were deemed valueless in the long run because they would not produce under the new Manchu regime. On the other hand, the hostility to the literate seemed to be well reasoned, for those who could read and write were often considered to be resourceful and so could possibly lead a resistance—Wang Yining was one such man.

⁸⁴ *Imun tŭngnok*, vol. 15, 1039-1040.

⁸⁵ Cho Kyŏngnam 趙應男, *Nanjung chamnok* 亂中雜錄, in *Qing ruguanqian shiliao xuanji* 清入關前史料選輯, vol. 3, ed. Pan Zhe 潘喆 et al. (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1991), 286.

By contrast, the Manchus were more restrained in managing commoners, particularly farmers. In the case of Liaoyang, according to Wang Yining's letter, three days after the occupation, the civilians were allowed to leave the city on the condition of living on their property and being committed to agricultural work.⁸⁶ A more subtle observation can be found in a report sent by Chǒng Chun 鄭遵 (1580-1623) to Seoul in June 1621. The Ŭiju Prefectural Governor described an encounter between a group of Manchu cavalymen and the local farmers near Fenghuangcheng 鳳凰城, a Ming postal relay station west of the Yalu River, which had been used to host Chosŏn envoys. Although the station had been made obsolete since 1620, many Koreans remained there, including Chǒng, who was able to make this firsthand observation. "The farmers who were ploughing the field rose and greeted (the Manchus)," Chǒng wrote, and then "they continued to work in the field as usual." 耕田農人群起而謁...仍耕作如常.⁸⁷ As the Manchus had controlled all the territory of the Liao River, their presence in the area, though distant from the central area of Liaoyang and Shenyang, was not uncommon. But probably to Chǒng's surprise, there was no violence that he would have expected from the "barbarians," and so he reported this miscellaneous detail to the king. Similarly, this case shows that even in such remote areas, beyond significant political influence from Liaoyang, where plundering and killing random civilians would probably never be known, the Manchus remained in control when encountering some farmers there. The obsequious farmers described in Chǒng's report, as well as the Liaodong farmers in general, probably were deemed harmless in the eye of the Manchus, and so were left alone without being harmed, at least temporarily.

⁸⁶ *Imun tǔngnok*, vol. 15, 1039.

⁸⁷ *Imun tǔngnok*, vol.15, 1032.

The main purpose to pacifying the Liaodong farmers was to ensure a sustainable food supply for the Manchus in the future. The grain reserves in Liaodong, as mentioned, provided immediate relief for the food shortage among the Manchus early in 1621. But feasting on the reserves could not last, nor was the Manchus' agriculture efficient enough to produce adequate food for the whole population.⁸⁸ Over time when the reserves ran low, the problem of food shortages resurfaced. As Liaodong had now become their territory, more Manchus living in the far north, in Hetu Ala, for instance, began to move to the more environmentally pleasant south. On several occasions, such migration was conducted at the behest of Nurhaci.⁸⁹ Higher population meant more food consumption, which in turn aggravated the food crisis. Without action, as the winter approached, the food shortage would hit the Manchus hard. This threat led them to turn to the Liaodong people for food supplies.

The first harvest of rice after the Manchus occupied Liaodong came in August. On the 26th of the month, Nurhaci issued two decrees on the same day in order to accelerate the harvesting process. Specific instructions were given regarding how to reap, thresh, dry, mill, and store, although many other important details remained unknown, such as the total yield and the amount of grain to be paid, presumably, as tax. The whole process was to be operated around the clock in haste—milling and storing the rice was to be conducted at night,⁹⁰ probably because the food already ran low, and the rice should be ready soon for immediate use. Moreover, Nurhaci

⁸⁸ The traditional Manchu way of life was a blend of the pastoral and sedentary, combining hunting and fishing with limited nomadism and agriculture, supplemented by trade with Ming China and Chosŏn Korea. The Manchus began to keenly develop agriculture starting from the late 15th century, but hunting remained the backbone of their livelihood. See Mark Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001), 48-51.

⁸⁹ MWLD, 258.

⁹⁰ MWLD, 217-219.

ordered that all rice harvests and their contributors be registered,⁹¹ of whom most, if not all, were presumably the Liaodong people. Hence, a demographic census, in disguised form, was conducted, and so the Manchu authority took a count of the Liaodong population.

All these laid the foundation for food rationing for the coming winter. Nurhaci prioritized the needs of his own people, reasoning that the Manchus coming from afar had not fully settled and so the Liaodong people were obliged to supply them. This was a euphemism for exploitation. All the Liaodong households were ordered to report their current grain reserves and the aforementioned demographic census made sure that most of them would do so. Consequently, most of the Manchus⁹² received a monthly quota of 0.4 *shi* of grain taken directly from the possession of the Liaodong households,⁹³ but whether there was enough left for the consumption of the locals is unknown.⁹⁴

⁹¹ MWLD, 218.

⁹² What should be noted here is that in MWLD, the food rationing was applied to *jušen*, that is, those of free or semi-free status, hence excluding the slaves and the elites. The majority of the Manchu population fell into the category of *jušen*, which was also supplemented by a small number of Han Chinese and Koreans. The “Manchus” used here is just to simplify the narrative.

⁹³ MWLD, 268.

⁹⁴ The exploitation of the Liaodong people for food seemed to be facilitated by Nurhaci’s policy, which Gertraude Roth Li has called the “Manchu-Chinese co-occupancy living experiment.” The only detailed reference to this policy, as far as I know, is one entry in MWLD for Tianming 6/11/22 (1622/1/3; MWLD, 260). Accordingly, on that day, Nurhaci reinforced the importance of cohabitation with the Manchus and Han Chinese in the *tokso*, that is, villages, suggesting that the cohabitation had started earlier—the starting time remains unknown. The Manchus were allowed to enter and live in Chinese villages, so that, as Nurhaci claimed, the Manchus and the Han could share grain yield, fodder, and draft animals (MWLD, 260). The cohabitation of the Manchus and the Han in a village was, for the Manchus, important, because their traditional way of living was one of ethnic segregation, which would be inherited later in the Qing—the Manchus and the Han lived in separate closed quarters until the end of the 18th century. The key point here, I believe, is the small area, a village for instance, where the Manchus lived close to the Han—hence the Han Chinese were within reach for the Manchus to exploit. Li’s analysis, however, suggests that the Manchus and the Han lived literally under one roof, sharing one house. This might be the case, yet cannot be substantiated by the sources, and it is important to note that Roth Li has also and solely relied on MWLD. See Li, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship,” 16-17; and “State Building Before 1644,” 47. The only explicit reference to the cohabitation under one roof in MWLD (p.348) nevertheless only involved the Han Chinese. This happened in 1622 when the Han Chinese were relocated from Guangning to the south of the peninsula, and the local Han Chinese were ordered to share their houses with the newcomers. The cohabitation issue needs further exploration.

The food rationing was, after all, an attentive plan—it was to be ended the next fall,⁹⁵ and Nurhaci promised to allot land to all adult males, Liaodong males included, to help them secure long-term food and wealth. The distribution of land was part of the enclosure movement initiated on August 30, 1621. A total of 1.8 million *mu*⁹⁶ of land was to be encircled in the areas of Liaodong and Haizhou. The geographic scope, specified later in another decree issued on November 13⁹⁷, encompassed a flat and low-lying region suitable for agriculture and lying between the Liao river and the Qianshan Mountain 千山 (a large southerly bulge of the Changbai Mountain 長白山) from west to east and between Liaoyang and the peninsula's tip from north to south.⁹⁸ Nurhaci argued that the enclosure would have no impact on the Liaodong people residing in this region and they could cultivate their fields as usual; the land to be encircled, Nurhaci claimed, contained the large estates abandoned by the Ming ministers and wealthy people. By condemning the Ming elites for their land speculation, Nurhaci rendered himself as virtuous and selfless monarch, willing to reclaim and distribute the surplus land to those in need.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ MWLD, 268.

⁹⁶ The measuring unit used in MWLD is *cimari*, meaning “morning, tomorrow,” and so in many Qing sources, the veritable records for instance, written in Chinese, *cimari* was often translated directly from the Manchu original as *ri* 日 (day). *Cimari* was equivalent to the Chinese measure *shang* 晌/墒 (both characters are interchangeable), which was then and still is commonly used in North and Northeast China. One *cimari/ri/shang* equalled six *mu* 畝 in the Ming-Qing dynasties. See Elliot, *The Manchu Way*, 448. However, Elliot has not provided the Chinese characters and has mistaken the Chinese pronunciation as “*xiang*.”

⁹⁷ MWLD, 244.

⁹⁸ That is, as recorded in MWLD, the jurisdictions of five guards surrounding Liaoyang (*Dingliao zhongwei* 定遼中衛, *Dingliao zuowei* 定遼左衛, *Dingliao qianwei* 定遼前衛, *Dingliao houwei* 定遼後衛, and *Dingliao youwei* 定遼右衛) and the four guards in the south of the peninsula (Haizhou 海州, Giazhou 蓋州, Fuzhou 復州, and Jinzhou 金州).

⁹⁹ MWLD, 219-220.

But the reality was that most of the Liaodong people who originally owned the land were stripped of their ownership. The most recent land survey in 1565 conducted before the take-over suggested that the enclosed region contained a total size of arable land of some 2.16 million *mu*.¹⁰⁰ Much of the land was devastated during the war and the arable land decreased in size thereafter.¹⁰¹ Hence, one can argue that the 1621 enclosure movement, in fact, encircled at least 83% of the arable land available in the designated region, and so, presumably, much land owned by the Liaodong people was taken. This can be further confirmed by the following order by Nurhaci to redistribute the land: one adult man was promised to be given 36 *mu* of land, including 30 *mu* for cultivating grain and another 6 for growing cotton.¹⁰² About 100,000 *mu* was reserved as official land for government revenue, and hence there were 1.7 million *mu* left to be redistributed. If the redistribution was perfectly implemented, it would have involved some 47,000 adult males. How many adult males were there in the encircled region at that time? It has been estimated that there were at least 30,000 Manchu soldiers and some 64,000 adult Liaodong males.¹⁰³ All the Manchu soldiers were adult males, of course, and presumably they would have been prioritized in the land redistribution. Hence, after distribution of land to Manchu soldiers, 17,000 Liaodong men would have been eligible for the remaining land. Even if all the remaining land was distributed equally among only Liaodong males, 47,000 would remain landless, that is, approximately 73% of the Liaodong people in the encircled region. Although no records show

¹⁰⁰ Li Fu 李輔, *Quanliao zhi* 全遼志 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2016), 76-79.

¹⁰¹ Chen Yue 陳躍, “*Qingdai dongbei diqu shengtai huanjing bianqian yanjiu*” 清代東北地區生態環境變遷研究 (PhD diss., Shandong University, 2012), 42, 45-46, 63-64.

¹⁰² MWLD, 220. Gertraude Roth Li contends 5 *cimari* (30 *mu*), which is not correct. Without too much explanation and interpretation, Roth Li’s analysis of Nurhaci’s decree (1621/8/30) is quite brief. She has only mentioned the land distribution but hasn’t touched upon the previous land enclosure and the impacts of the implementations of these policies. See Li, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship,” 15; “State Building Before 1644,” 48.

¹⁰³ Wei, “Mingdai Liaodong yanhai diqu de renkou bianhua jiqi yuanyin chutan,” 230.

the actual implementation of the polices, the 1621 enclosure movement, by simple mathematical reasoning, involved a process of drastic ownership restructuring and produced many landless Liaodong people.

Nurhaci probably predicted the result. In the decree issued on August 30, “if the encircled land is not enough for redistribution, he advised people to move beyond the encircled region and to take the land in the northeast part of Liaodong, and even outside the borders.¹⁰⁴ This was not good advice, of course. The northeastern region of Liaodong where the Qianshan Mountain lay was a mountainous area unsuitable for agriculture and so had been barely populated. Moreover, the territory outside of the borders, unprotected by the Great Wall, was often subject to Mongol raids.¹⁰⁵ More importantly, Nurhaci’s advice was nothing but a euphemism: the landless Liaodong people were to be displaced and relocated to the far north.

Peng Sunyi 彭孫貽 (1615-1673), a Ming loyalist, recounted this 1621 forced migration later in the Qing dynasty: the Manchus “compelled 200,000 village people, both men and women, to go north. Men were not allowed to bring any belongings. Women were not allowed to bind their feet. They died en route one after another.” 驅屯民男女二十萬北行，男子不得挾貲，婦女不得纏足，道死相屬。¹⁰⁶ Exaggerated as it may be—given the author’s political stance—this recounting does confirm the relocation of the Liaodong people stripped of their land and belongings. What Peng’s recount reflects, in general, is the Manchus’ extra-economic coercion of the Liaodong people in 1621 despite Nurhaci’s promise of fair treatment to all his subjects.

¹⁰⁴ MWLD, 219.

¹⁰⁵ *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 457-458.

¹⁰⁶ Peng, *Shanzhong wenjianlu*, 35.

2.3 Depopulation of the Area West of the Liao River

The Manchus' extra-economic coercion on the Liaodong people proved effective in the long run. Chen Jianhong's research on the food supply during the Ming-Qing wars has convincingly argued that the Manchu estates worked by the Liaodong people boosted the agricultural yields and by 1624 the Manchus were by and large self-sufficient. Before 1624 however, *dacaogu* 打草穀, a term coined in the Ming records, that is, looting the Ming forts and cities for supplies, still served an important way to supplement the economy.¹⁰⁷ This motivated the Manchus to cross the Liao River in early 1622. The target was the fertile Liaoxi Corridor (*Liaoxi zoulang* 遼西走廊), a thin strip of low-lying flood plain sandwiched between the Songling Mountain 松陵山 and the Bohai Sea coast. It spans 185 km from the Shanhai Pass in the south to Guangning 廣寧 in the north (Figure 2.1).

Guangning was a Ming stronghold where Wang Huazhen 王化貞 (?-1632), the Liaodong Grand Coordinator (*Liaodong xunfu* 遼東巡撫), was stationed. However, the Manchus took it with ease on March 5, 1622 because of Wang's misplaced trust in Sun Degong 孫德功, a Liaodong native. It is said that Sun had already cut a deal with Li Yongfang 李永芳 (?-1634), another Liaodong native who had surrendered to the Manchus in 1618. The moment Sun engaged the incoming Manchus at Fort Xiping 西平堡 (Figure 2.1) on the outskirts of Guangning, Sun, commanding the elite forces in the area, fled without offering any resistance. A few days later, Sun paid allegiance to the Manchus. The Manchus then successfully seized all the forts encompassing Guangning. News of defeat coming from the frontlines to Guangning incited

¹⁰⁷ Chen, "Junliang gongxu yu Ming-Qing Liaodong zhanzheng," 145-146.

widespread fear and panic within the city, as well as a round of rumors about a mutiny of the Ming soldiers. In light of the situation, Wang Huazhen, who was apparently timid in nature, deserted the city and ran away under the cover of darkness. Hence, when Nurhaci arrived at the city wall, Guangning was nearly empty.¹⁰⁸

Xiong Tingbi, however, came out and saved the day. As mentioned, in 1620, Xiong Tingbi was dragged into political turmoil and was replaced by Yuan Yingtai, but Yuan's death and the Manchu annexation of Liaodong resulted in Xiong's comeback in late 1621; he was reappointed as the military commissioner, stationed in the Shanhai Pass. On the night when Wang ran away, Xiong intercepted Wang en route near the city of Dalinghe 大凌河, west of Guangning.

Disgusted that Wang Huazhen's recklessness and credulity had cost the Ming an important stronghold, Xiong, however, did not venture to engage the Manchus but instead brought Wang back to the Shanhai Pass. Xiong set fires along the road, hoping as few properties as possible would fall into Manchu hands. Meanwhile, the local people were alarmed; they now knew the Manchus were coming.¹⁰⁹

Shortly after, there were an estimated 150,000¹¹⁰ Liaodong people and 70-80,000¹¹¹ soldiers flocking around the Shanhai Pass, waiting to enter. It is notable that the Shanhai Pass was one of the most heavily fortified military installations of the day. Besides an inner city (*guancheng* 關

¹⁰⁸ MWLD, 304, 306; Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 34; Peng, *Shanzhong wenjianlu*, 33. For a detailed account of the battling process, see Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 44-45.

¹⁰⁹ Sun Chengzong 孫承宗 and Li Hongquan 李紅權 ed., *Sun Chengzong ji* 孫承宗集 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2014), 763, 794; Ji, *Mingji beilue*, 37.

¹¹⁰ The number of these refugees reported in the Ming records of the day greatly varies, ranging from 100,000 to 2,800,000. After comparing various sources, Zhang Shizun has estimated the number at 15,000. See Zhang Shizun 張世尊, "Qingdai dongbei yimi yu shehui bianqian 1644-1911" 清代東北移民與社會變遷 (PhD diss., Northeast Normal University, 2003), 29-30.

¹¹¹ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 164.

城), there was an outer city (*luocheng* 羅城) around the pass.¹¹² Receiving these people became a thorny issue, not only because the sheer number of the population posed a challenge to the capacity of the Shanhai Pass, but also due to security concerns: wartime refugees fleeing back were nothing but factors of uncertainty. This concern made Wang Xiangqian 王象乾 (1546-1630), Supreme Commander of Ji-Liao, stationing in the Shanhai Pass refuse to let in the coming population. But Xiong Tingbi insisted on opening the gate, reasoning that the Ming soldiers outside the Pass would either rebel or desert to the Manchus, causing more trouble in the long run. After a three-day confrontation, Wang gave priority to the soldiers entering the outer city on the condition that they surrendered their weapons. As for the Liaodong people, while some deemed unsuspecting were allowed in, most remained outside waiting for clearance.¹¹³

Soldiers in the city were entitled to a share of the grain, but the Liaodong people were left on their own. With no access to food or accommodation, the Liaodong people suffered during the wait. Meanwhile, a rainstorm, heavy enough to damage part of the city, worsened the situation. An on-site observation recorded by a local official provides an illustrative image:

I did not expect that rain could cause so much trouble. For days and nights, the torrential rain kept pouring. From the night of March 27 to April 2 (1622), the water rose and formed drains in and around the city. The city of Shanhai is in a low-lying place at the foot of Huanxi Mountain¹¹⁴. The location is where water pools. Every time there is a torrential flood, the water will break the water gate (on the east corner of the city). Facing the fierce water, thousands of soldiers, and one hundred to two hundred thousand Liaodong people, along their straw mats and bamboo huts, went with the wind and rain. Soldiers didn't have one rain cape to cover their bodies, nor did refugees have one inch of tile to make shelters... The Liaodong people had no rice to eat for three to four days, no stove to cook on, and no firewood to burn. I finally bought them some naan. It would be luck that there would

¹¹² *Sun Chengzong ji*, 760.

¹¹³ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 161, 163, 250; Peng, *Shanzhong wenjianlu*, 41.

¹¹⁴ *Huanxi ling* 歡喜嶺, 2 li east of the Shanhai Pass.

be one or two temporarily not dead. Alas! How could heaven make the Liaodong people go to extremes like this?!

孰意雨師為梗，連宵累旦，滂沱傾注。自十七晚至二十二日，而城內外水溢成渠矣。山海一城原落于角山歡喜嶺下山之窪處，水之聚處也。山水一發，衝壞水門，建瓴直下。數萬將軍，一二十萬遼民，席舍蓬蘆隨風逐雨。防兵無一笠之遮身，流民無寸瓦之蔽壘。。。遼人三、四日無米可食，無灶可炊，無薪可爨。臣乃買胡餅給之，得一二可幸須臾之不死。嗟乎！天何使遼人一至此極也！¹¹⁵

The suffering of the Liaodong people in the Shanhai Pass is well depicted.¹¹⁶ The cold reception from the Ming drove some of them, of which the number is unknown, to the Manchus to seek refuge.¹¹⁷

When such news about “defection” reached Beijing, it added fuel to the already heated debate over how best to manage the Liaodong people. Some officials focused on the financial cost of receiving them. However, more worried about national security. The Liaodong people were then stigmatized for their apparently shifty attitude to the Ming dynasty. This stigma was based on the fact that Liaodong was conquered, and many surrendered to the Manchus. Some officials even blamed the loss of Guangning entirely on the two Liaodong turncoats, Li Yongfang and Sun Degong. But almost all the ministers in Beijing shared a consensus that these people should be placed inland (*ancha neidi* 安插內地), otherwise they would either impair the defense of the Shanhai Pass or defect to the Manchus, making more enemies in the long run. They only disagreed in terms of where and how they should be relocated.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 251.

¹¹⁶ Some fragmented records suggest that some Liaodong people lived on fetching firewood and fodder outside of the Shanhai Pass—both items were needed by the Ming military. Others were reported to have been involved in the trade with the Mongols, as Balipu 八里鋪, where a Ming-chartered border market was located, was just 8 *li* away from the Shanhai Pass. See Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 248; *Sun Chengzong ji*, 772.

¹¹⁷ MWLD, 316; Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀 *Dushi jilüe* 督師紀略 (1621-1644?), *juan* 1, 8b.

¹¹⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/1/29 (1622/3/10), 2/2/2 (1622/3/13), 2/2/6 (1622/3/17); Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 200.

While the Ming court hesitated about receiving the Liaodong people, the Manchus were enthusiastic about recruiting them. Those flocking around the Shanhai Pass were only a fraction of the local population; there were more of them sitting in situ. Soon after the Manchus took Guangning on March 5, 1622, Nurhaci issued an edict: “To those outside the Shanhai Pass. Your emperor is foolish. He is condemned by heaven. If you enter the Shanhai Pass, the emperor will not provide you with clothing, food, land, or houses.” To call for surrender, Nurhaci made a promise: “If you go to the area east of the Liao River, the wise Khan (that is, Nurhaci) will prepare clothing, food, land, and houses for you. I will treat you with justice. I am blessed by heaven. Can all of you not see this?”¹¹⁹ Central to Nurhaci’s call was the migration from west of the river to the east. One reason for the relocation was that the Manchus were then *57ongping57g* to build a new capital north of Liaoyang to accommodate the Manchu royal house and elites. The construction would formally begin in August 1622, but the planning had started in late 1621.¹²⁰

The volunteer migration, however, soon became forced removal, as Nurhaci decided to retreat to the east of the Liao River. Following the victory at Guangning, the Manchus continued to march forward. After taking Yizhou 義州 and Chinchow¹²¹ 錦州, the advance force approached Ningyuan 寧遠 (Figure 2.1), the Ming’s last stronghold outside of the Shanhai Pass. At the time, Nurhaci seemed to have been undecided as to whether it was worth the risk of launching a full-scale war against the Ming dynasty. Yao Nianci has convincingly argued that by no means did the early Manchu rulers consider conquering the central plain feasible or necessary. Even after 1629 when Hong Taiji reached the outskirts of Beijing, the idea of taking

¹¹⁹ MWLD, 315

¹²⁰ MWLD, 231, 238.

¹²¹ “Chinchow,” an old romanization of 錦州, is here used to differentiate Jinzhou 金州, the southernmost guard in Liaodong.

the throne in the Forbidden City probably never occurred to him.¹²² Perhaps Nurhaci was then thinking about marching forward, but an apocalyptic incident soon stopped him in his tracks. A prince mysteriously fell from his horse and immediately died soon after he left Xingshan 杏山 (Figure 2.1), a postal relay station south of Chinchow. If Nurhaci had not been deterred, his associates surely were.¹²³ Nurhaci now ran into a dilemma. On the one hand, he had to take public opinion into consideration. On the other hand, by no means did he want to want to relinquish hope for attacking the Ming in the future, nor was he willing to give up the newly conquered territory west of the Liao River. The compromise then was to relocate all the civilians from the west to the east of the river.¹²⁴ Once the area was depopulated, with a small number of soldiers stationed there, Nurhaci could maintain his rule. In addition, the coming people could enlarge the labor pool.

What followed was a hectic, forced relocation between March and April. In the process, Nurhaci issued several edicts to accelerate the relocation, which was completed in less than one month.¹²⁵ Such migration mainly took place in the Manchus' conquered area in Chinchow, Yizhou, and Guangning. Most, if not all, of the population there would be relocated to the respective designated locations in the east (Table 2.2). Although the extant records do not contain all the details about the population involved, from the Chinchow area alone, a total of 56,463 people were relocated (Table 2.3).

¹²² Yao Nianci 姚念慈, *Diding zhongyuan zhi lu: cong Huang Taiji ruguan dao Xuanye qinzheng* 定鼎中原之路：從皇太極入關到玄燁親政 (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 2018), 16-33.

¹²³ This incident has been recorded not just in MWLD, 314, but also in Chinese sources. See Mao, *juan* 1, 9a; Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 234; Peng, *Shanzhong wenjianlu*, 33.

¹²⁴ The initial arrangement on March 14 was to relocate the civilians in Chinchow to Guangning and to order the rest to cross the Liao River. On the second day, Nurhaci somehow changed his mind, requesting all to be relocated to the east. See MWLD, 314, 317.

¹²⁵ MWLD, 320, 324, 336.

Table 2.1 Forced Relocation from Chinchow, Yizhou, Guangning, March-April, 1622		
Origins		Destinations
Chinchow Area	Guangning Youtun Guard 廣寧右屯衛	Jinzhou 金州 & Fuzhou 復州
	Guangning Zhongtun Guard 廣寧中屯衛*	Liaodong (unspecified)
	Guangning Zuotun Guard 廣寧左屯衛*	Liaodong (unspecified)
Yizhou Area	Yizhou Guard 義州衛	Gaizhou 蓋州
	Guangning Houtun Guard 廣寧后屯衛	Weining Brigade 威寧營 (current-day Benxi 本溪)
Guangning Area	Guangning Guard 廣寧衛	Fort Fengji 奉集堡 (southeast of Shenyang)
	Guangning Zhong Guard 廣寧中衛	Shenyang
	Guangning Zuo Guard 廣寧左衛	Shenyang
	Guangning You Guard 廣寧右衛	Shenyang

Source: MWLD, 317.

*The initial arrangement was relocating the people from these two guards to Guangning. Nurhaci changed his mind on March 15 and ordered the population move to Liaodong, though the destination was not specified.

Table 2.2 Population Relocated from the Chinchow Area*, March-April, 1622			
Locations	Adult Men	Other Population	Subtotal
Chinchow City 錦州城	6,150	7,634	13,784
Guangning Youtun Guard City 廣寧右屯衛城	4,537	8,864	13,401
Rest of the Chinchow Area	8,728	20,550	29,278
Subtotal	19,415	37,048	Total: 56,463

Source: MWLD, 319, 323, 333.

*The Chinchow area encompassed the jurisdictions of three guards: Guangning Zhongtun 廣寧中屯衛, Guangning Zuotun 廣寧左屯衛, and Guangning Youtun 廣寧右屯衛. The *yamen* of the first two guards were located in the Chinchow City 錦州城, while the Guangning Youtun had its own walled city 廣寧右屯衛城.

In addition, after they occupied the Chinchow area, the Manchus seized at least one million *shi* of grain in Guangning Zuotun 廣寧左屯 and Guangning Youtun 廣寧右屯. Upon the implementation of the depopulation policy in the area, these grain reserves were also to be transported on the Daling River up to Guangning. Although Manchu records suggest that

Nurhaci seemed to have paid special attention to the grain transport, apparently the Manchus were not familiar with water transport, and so Nurhaci ordered to conscript boatmen and boats from the coastal areas of Haizhou, Gaizhou, Fuzhou, and Jinzhou. However, the transport was still conducted inefficiently and seemed to have been continued during the winter between 1622 and 1623 at the behest of Nurhaci.¹²⁶

Not all of the Liaodong people were willing to be forcibly relocated. Upon the issue of the depopulation policy, 3,000 Liaodong people deemed rebellious were executed.¹²⁷ Deterred by such brutality, many people hence hid themselves in the nearby mountains, and some even formed guerilla forces. Commemorated as “righteous subjects” (*yimin* 義民) in the Ming records, one known group, perhaps consisting of over 20,000 people of all sorts,¹²⁸ was based in Yizhou. In March 1622, under the leadership of a Confucian student named Chen Tianmin 陳天民, they rejected the call for surrender and killed several Manchus.¹²⁹ Fearing retaliation, they fled to the nearby postal relay station atop Shisanshan 十三山,¹³⁰ the main peak of Yiwulü Mountain 醫巫閭山. This locale hence became a stronghold helping them ward off enemies, at least temporarily. Thereafter, references to these people, though fragmented, repeatedly appeared in the Ming records in 1622, during which the Ming officials called for providing them with

¹²⁶ MWLD, 319, 321, 351.

¹²⁷ MWLD, 316.

¹²⁸ Records on the number of these people greatly vary. The largest number is 100,000 contended by Mao Yuanyi (*Dushi jilüe*, *juan* 13, 11b). This must be an exaggeration, considering that the number of people relocated from the Chinchow area was only 56,463. I here take the minimal number 20,000, recorded by Wang (*Sanchao liaoshi shilu*), 249.

¹²⁹ That Manchus sent troops to Yizhou to mobilize the residents there twice in March (3/15 & 3/18). MWLD, 318, 322.

¹³⁰ Hence these people are known as *Shisanshan nan/yi/shan min* 十三山難/義/山民 in the Ming records.

military and material aid, but no record shows that any substantial aid was provided.¹³¹ A small number of people managed to escape from the Manchus' surveillance. At the foot of the Shisan Mountain is the Daling River 大凌河 running east to the Bohai Sea, and after a short sail down the coast, the Juehua Island 覺華島 off the coast of the Shanhai Pass is reachable. This island served as a Ming offshore granary guarded by a navy. On November 1, Marine Brigade Commander (*Shuibingying youji* 水兵營游擊) Jin Guan 金冠 received 34 people from Shisanshan, and another 100 came late that year.¹³² Many more however stayed in situ, putting up a desperate struggle. The Manchus took the stronghold in October, and most of the people there were, presumably, either taken captive or killed.¹³³ These perhaps were the last remaining Liaodong people in the Manchu's controlled area west of the Liao River (the northern part of the Liaoxi Corridor). After destroying their resistance, Nurhaci achieved his aim of depopulating the area.

On the other end of the Liaoxi Corridor, the Liaodong people were eventually allowed to enter the Shanhai Pass. In May 1622, Ye Xianggao 葉向高 (1559-1627), Senior Grand Secretary (*Shoufu* 首輔), made the final decision to open the Pass' gate, but the Liaodong people were required to stay in the jurisdictions of Yongping 永平, Jizhou 薊州, and Tianjin (Figure 2.1). To create sedentary inhabitants instead of mobile refugees prone to social unrest, Ye ordered the organization of the Liaodong people into the *baojia* 保甲 communal surveillance system and to

¹³¹ *Sun Chengzong ji*, 768, 934; Mao, *Dushi jilüe*, *juan* 1, 9b-10a; Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 234, 249.

¹³² *Sun Chengzong ji*, 810, 1015.

¹³³ *Sun Chengzong ji*, 810, 1015; Peng, *Shanzhong wenjianlu*, 36. There is no record about the *Shisanshan nanmin* in 1622 in MWLD, because the archives between Tianming 7/7-Tianming 7/12 are lost, otherwise we would expect some related sources. The earliest record of Shisanshan in 1623 is one entry for Tianming 8/1/4 (1623/2/3; MWLD, 392). On that day, Nurhaci forbade the soldiers stationed at Shisanshan to go down the mountain to collect fodder. In addition, he gave a specific instruction to the troops in Guangning about how to supply those in Shisanshan. All these suggest that by then, the Manchu had fully occupied the mountain area.

allot them vacant land exempted from taxation for the first two to three years. The Ming court also set aside 100,000 taels of silver and ordered Dong Yingju 董應舉 (1557-1639), Chief Minister of the Court of Imperial Stud (*Taipuqing* 太僕卿), to station in Tianjin, overseeing the process.¹³⁴

The decision made by the court nevertheless created backlash in Tianjin. Only one month after Ye Xianggao issued his order, Tianjin stopped receiving the Liaodong people. Tianjin Grand Coordinator (*Tianjin xunfu* 天津巡撫) Bi Ziyang 畢自嚴 (1569-1638) made it happen because Manchu spies were caught among the Liaodong people coming to the place. According to Bi's memorial, on May 26, the night patrols (*yebushou* 夜不收) captured one Liaodong man named Zhao Guangyu 趙光裕 and another two Manchus named Baiyandai 擺言代 and Momuken 摩木措. The Manchus were traveling under the pseudonyms He Er 何二 and He San 何三. They claimed to be Zhao Guangyu's nephews and managed to go through the Shanhai Pass by buying Zhao over with 400 taels of silver, which were seized in Zhao's residence later. Bi made use of this case to elaborate how the coming Liaodong people would lead to social unrest. He highlighted Tianjin's strategic location as a trilateral hub on the Grand Canal and as a prime location for the storage of goods and grain used to supply the capital. Hence, Tianjin's security should never be compromised. Bi suggested to stop receiving the Liaodong people in Tianjin and to send those who had already come to the remote areas in Shandong and Henan.¹³⁵ On June 20, Sun Chengzong 孫承宗 (1563-1638), Minister of War, approved Bi's suggestions

¹³⁴ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 204-205.

¹³⁵ Bi Ziyang 畢自嚴, *Fujin shucao* 撫津疏草 (1621-1627), *juan* 3, 55-61.

on behalf of the Ming court. Thereafter, the Liaodong people were limited to the areas of Yongping and Jizhou.¹³⁶

Nevertheless, the situations there were discouraging. In Yongping, Yue Hesheng 岳和聲, Circuit Intendant of Yongping and Yanjian (*Fenxun 63ongping yanjian biingbeidao* 分巡永平、燕建兵備道), placed all the coming Liaodong people in the local guards and garrisons. By doing so, he contended that the “shifty” people had been put under surveillance. To prevent any competition for local resources, the Liaodong people were to be registered separately as attached households (*jijihu* 寄籍戶) and hence were not entitled to rights such as sitting for the imperial examination to which locals were entitled.¹³⁷ Undoubtedly, the Liaodong refugees fell into a lower class in the hosting prefecture. The situation was worse in Jizhou. Sun Chengzong recorded his encounter with the Liaodong people in Yutian 玉田 (Figure 2.1), a county in Jizhou, when traveling to the Shanhai Pass in July 1622:

The other day, I went by Yutian, and there was a Liaodong man driving a cart pulled by a calf, carrying several women. He cried out along the road: “my property is exhausted, so the calf-pulled cart is just a burden.” I gave him enough money to feed his family for several days. However, after going a little further, I saw thousands of people leaning by their carts and crying out loud. In Yutian alone, there were 532 refugees. One Confucian student pulled my cloth and asked for food, saying: “We have been long in the rain and haven’t eaten for three days.” I wept for them but had nowhere to get any food. I told the situation to those responsible for cooking the porridge as relief food. My tears ran down as I spoke. After I entered the county seat Judge Lin happened to come to meet. I therefore asked him, along with the magistrate, to count the number of refugees and give each of them 3 *dou* (that is, 0.3 *shi*) of grain. Each Confucian student was to get an extra 2 *dou*, and officers, an extra 1 *dou*. This would cost about 200 *shi* of grain to help the refugees survive the rain. However, I dare not take the liberty to preside over the local officials’ affairs.

¹³⁶ Bi, *Fujin shucaos*, juan 3, 62-63.

¹³⁷ *Sun Chengzong ji*, 772.

臣傾行玉田，有擁犢車載婦女者，號于道曰，資斧罄，而犢車為累。臣稍給之，可以哺數日。而又稍前，則擁與而號者，時有數千人。獨玉田道中五百三十二人，其青矜攀衣索食，曰，久雨中，三日不食矣。臣亦為之泣下，而又無所得食。其高煮粥者，言與淚俱下。臣入城，適林推官來見，因令與縣官計其數人，給穀三斗，而青矜益二，官弁益一。蓋可費二百石以為雨中之費，非敢擅地方官之事。¹³⁸

Apparently, the Liaodong people, lacking food and shelter, were destitute. The conditions were the same all over Jizhou, as well as Yongping, and Dong Yingju was the one to blame. As the official overseeing the peoples' relocation and placement, Dong was reported to have appropriated the 100,000-tael stipend for receiving the Liaodong people to cover his bureau's deficit.¹³⁹ In addition, the Yutian Magistrate confessed that the local people had a deep-rooted hostility towards the Liaodong people. Jizhou and Yongping had often been subjugated to Mongol raids, and the Liaodong people were reported to have connived with the invaders.¹⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the discouraging prospect of entering the Pass (*ruguan* 入關) did not stop the Liaodong people from doing so, partly because the Manchus might have been too frightening in their eyes. More importantly, a new commander-in-chief compelled them to do so. Sun Chengzong took over leadership in September 1622 and began to strengthen the Ming forces. Too many refugees flocking around the Shanhai Pass did nothing but harm the military. Administrative orders were hence issued to accelerate human mobilization. By the end of the

¹³⁸ Sun Chengzong *ji*, 771. For a similar but less detailed account about the refugees in Jizhou, also see Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 192.

¹³⁹ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 205. According to Dong's own memorial, he spent 22,698 taels to manage the coming Liaodong people. Dong Yingju 董應舉, *Chongxiangji* 崇相集, in *Siku jinshuhui congkan* 四庫禁燬書叢刊, *Jibu* 集部 102 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2000), 57.

¹⁴⁰ Sun Chengzong *ji*, 771.

year, it was reported that Yongping and Jizhou had received a total of 215,890, leaving the area outside the Pass, by and large, depopulated.¹⁴¹

2.4 Leaving the Mainland for the Islands

By the end of 1622, the Ming and the Manchus had co-constructed a depopulation zone in the Liaoxi Corridor, which served as a de facto border between the two states. Both held their defense line on either end of the corridor, bristling in a strategic stalemate. The stalemate brought a temporary peace—the next major clash, the Battle of Ningyuan 寧遠之戰, would not happen until 1626. However, the stalemate also meant that it was almost impossible for the Liaodong people under Manchu rule to flee to Ming territory. As has been shown, by no means was Manchu rule benevolent, and hence desertions would be expected. What made things worse is that starting from the summer of 1622, a grain shortage again hit Liaodong, and Nurhaci once again prioritized the needs of his own people over those of the Liaodong people. Consequently, in 1623, starvation became a grievous issue among the Liaodong people and caused desertions in large numbers.¹⁴² As the entrance in the west to the Ming territory was closed, one logical choice would have been to move eastward, crossing the Yalu River into Chosŏn Korea. However, as contemporaries observed in 1623, the Liaodong people in large numbers managed to seek refuge on various islands off the east coast of the Liaodong peninsula. In October of 1623, for instance, when a Chosŏn envoy Cho Chip 趙澱 (1568-?) was sailing to the Ming dynasty, he witnessed a group of Liaodong people escaping to Shicheng Island 石城島 (Figure 1.1). Under the shadow of night, several small junks carrying the escapees sailed to the island, while officer-like individuals

¹⁴¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/9/16 (1622/10/20); *Sun Chengzong ji*, 1110.

¹⁴² Li, “State Building Before 1644,” 48.

helped coordinate the process.¹⁴³ How did these islands become such popular destinations for escapees?

Chosŏn Korea also became a destination for deserters. The flight to Chosŏn Korea often took place in the Liaodong-Chosŏn border area. Geographic proximity was the main reason. There are documented cases of small-scale escape soon after the fall of Liaoyang in May 1621. In June of that year, for instance, Wang Zhaoxun 王詔勳, Assistant Regional Commander of Fort Kuandian (*Kuandian canjiang* 寬甸參將), conscripted some 30 men and crossed the Yalu River. One month later, two low-ranking officers in Fort Zhenjiang 鎮江 (present-day Dandong 丹東, Figure 2.1)), Han Gongzong 韓功宗 and Li Runan 李汝楠 also led a total of 90 people to Ŭiju. Both Kuandian and Zhenjiang were Ming forts along the border, and the people involved, as we can see, were not many in number. In contrast, there were more references to the surrender of Ming officials in the area after Nurhaci sent Tong Yangzhen 佟養真 (?-1621) and Li Yongfang 李永芳 (?-1634), two Ming turncoats, to Zhenjiang to call for surrender. Once they arrived, the local commander Zhu Shichang 祝世昌 (?-1650) immediately led his 3,000 men to pledge allegiance to the Manchus. Zhu also managed to persuade Chen Yijing 陳一敬 to compromise. A Zhenjiang native, Chen was returning from Seoul as a Ming envoy and stopped by his hometown. Senior officials like Zhu and Chen set examples for the masses. In addition, Tong and Li managed the resisters with no mercy; many were killed immediately.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, there appeared many individuals whom the Koreans identified as *kadal* 假獐

¹⁴³ Cho Chip 趙澗, *Yŏnhaeng-nok* 燕行錄, in *Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip* 燕行錄全集, ed. Im Kijung (Seoul: Tongguk Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 2001), vol.12, 263, 265.

¹⁴⁴ Yi Kŭng'ik 李肯翊, *Yŏllyŏsil kisul* 燃藜室記述, in *Qing ruguanqian shiliao xuanji* 清入關前史料選輯, vol. 1, ed. Pan Zhe 潘喆 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1984), 432-433; MWLD, 205, 206.

(fake barbarians)¹⁴⁵, or Liaodong males who shaved the front of their scalps and wore the Manchu queues as a sign of surrender. It was also recorded that many *kadal* in Zhenjiang and Kuandian helped *chindal* 真獾 (real barbarians), that is, the Manchus hunt down the locals unwilling to shave their heads.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the scale of those escaping to Korea early in 1621 remained small in scale.

Large-scale escape to Chosŏn Korea happened after Mao Wenlong's raid on Zhenjiang in late 1621. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Mao Wenlong spent the first fifteen years of his career in mediocrity as a low-ranking officer in Haizhou. The Manchu annexation of Liaodong unexpectedly became a turning point in his career. After the fall of Liaoyang, Mao somehow managed to reach Beijing. His maternal uncle Shen Guangzuo 沈光祚 (?-1623) was then an official in the Ministry of War. Shen recommended his nephew to one of his old acquaintances, Wang Huazhen. This was before Wang had lost Guangning in 1622; he still held the power to appoint his own men. He gave Mao some 200 men, a title of Brigade Commander of Training Soldiers (*Lianbing youji* 練兵游擊), and dispatched Mao back to Liaodong. Mao was given some vague directives: doing spy work, recruiting any "righteous subject" (*yimin* 義民) he could find, and recovering the Liaodong territory. It seems that Mao Wenlong was, in fact, brushed off—Wang probably had no expectations for his success.¹⁴⁷

However, to Wang Huazhen's surprise, Mao Wenlong was able to take Fort Zhenjiang with merely 197 men on the night of September 4, 1621. Several factors contributed to the

¹⁴⁵ According to Jing Liu, the term *kadal* was only used during the reigns of King Kwanghae and King Injo from 1621 to 1645. Likewise, the term *chindal* 真獾 (real barbarians) was also intensively used in this period to refer to the Manchus. See Liu, "Beyond the Land," 257.

¹⁴⁶ *Imun tŭngnok*, vol. 15, 1034.

¹⁴⁷ Chen, *Dongjiang shilüe*, 1-5; Mao Qiling 毛奇齡, *Dongjiang yishi* 東江遺事, in *Mingmo Qingchushiliao xuankan* 明末清初史料選刊 ed. Jia Naiqian 賈乃謙 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1986), 213-214.

success of Mao's night raid. For one thing, Mao managed to incite the defections of two local officers: Chen Liangce 陳良策 and his brother Chen Lianghan 陳良漢. Liangce opened the gate for Mao's men and Lianghan knocked out the commander Tong Yangzhen during the night raid. In addition, there were only about 400 defenders at the fort, much fewer than usual, for a timely anti-Manchu uprising in the surrounding area had diverted 600 men.¹⁴⁸ As a result, Mao Wenlong took Zhenjiang with ease.¹⁴⁹

Described as a great victory (*dajie* 大捷) in the Ming records, Mao's triumph excited many. Fort Zhenjiang had come to prominence in the late sixteenth century. At that time, the Japanese invasion of Korea, which is historically known as the Imjin War (1592-1598) compelled the Ming court to dispatch reinforcements. Located at the mouth of Yalu River, Zhenjiang was on the only way that Ming soldiers and provisions could pass. Hence, a new fort was built, and a new position called Zhenjiang Brigade Commander, which the aforementioned Zhu Shichang held, was created.¹⁵⁰ At the time Mao Wenlong took it, Zhenjiang was still a strategic pass to Chosŏn Korea. More importantly, Mao's victory was the first time that a Ming force managed to take a Manchu-controlled locality since 1619. It inspired the Liaodong people in large numbers to take refuge with Mao Wenlong. It was reported that on the second day of the battle, some 10,000 Liaodong people in the neighboring area came to Mao; seven days later, the number had increased to 40,000.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ These uprisings took place at Huangzuibao 黃嘴堡 and Yashan 鴨山.

¹⁴⁹ Liu, *Beyond the Land*, 253-254; Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 40-42.

¹⁵⁰ Zhao Shuguo 趙樹國, *Mingdai beibu haifang tixi yanjiu* 明代北部海防體系研究 (Shandong: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2014), 424.

¹⁵¹ MWLD, 222-223; *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/7 (1621/9/22); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 9.

However, not everyone was pleased with Mao's victory. A hot debate erupted between Wang Huazhen and Xiong Tingbi and their followers respectively over whether this victory was beneficial to the overall military strategy. Wang took credit for discovering Mao and winning the victory, while Xiong accused him of being too radical. Their relationship soon deteriorated, which in turn effected a subsequent operation: when the Tianqi emperor ordered Deng-Lai 登萊 (Dengzhou 登州 and Laizhou 萊州, Figure 3.1) to send reinforcements to help Mao secure the victory, Tao Langxian 陶朗先 (1579-1625), the Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator (*Deng-Lai xunfu* 登萊巡撫) and ally to Xiong, found every excuse to delay.¹⁵²

The Manchus could not have been happy, either. For Nurhaci, a faraway fort might not have been that important, but he took great offense at the “defection” of his people in large numbers. On September 11, he dispatched 3,000 cavalymen to take back the fort, followed by another 2000 the next day. The Manchus recaptured Zhenjiang on September 16, and the Ming reinforcements never came.¹⁵³ Consequently, Mao Wenlong fled to Chosŏn Korea.¹⁵⁴ He was only able to bring along a small number of people to cross the Yalu River—he then had only six ships, and so the majority of Liaodong people who came for refuge were left behind.¹⁵⁵

Nevertheless, over time, more Liaodong people followed Mao Wenlong into Chosŏn Korea. Mao's presence there certainly was a pulling force; as he contended, he recruited many to come.¹⁵⁶ What should not be forgotten, however, is that the Manchus' increasingly despotic policy pushed many to cross the Yalu River as well. Soon after the Manchus reoccupied

¹⁵² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/7 (1621/9/22), Tianqi 2/6/4 (1622/7/11).

¹⁵³ MWLD, 223.

¹⁵⁴ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 7.

¹⁵⁵ MWLD, 222.

¹⁵⁶ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 10.

Zhenjiang, they captured 12,000 Liaodong people and sent them to Liaoyang.¹⁵⁷ Presumably these people would fall into the category of *boo aha*, that is, the bond servants of slaver status. In addition, the Liaodong people living along the east coast of the Liaodong peninsula were ordered to move at least 60 *li* away from the coastline. Meanwhile, those living along the Yalu River were to be relocated to the nearby towns and forts where the Manchu troops were stationed.¹⁵⁸ As the Manchus kept tightening their control over the population, more escapes ensued. Desertions to Korea in large numbers entered into the Manchu records. On October 30, 1621, for instance, 3,000 Liaodong people were caught trying to cross the Yalu River from Zhenjiang.¹⁵⁹ Thereafter, another 15,000 were intercepted by the end of 1621.¹⁶⁰ These, it should be remembered, were the number of people intercepted by the Manchus; the number who were trying to flee to Chosŏn Korea, though unknown, would have numbered many more.

The desertion of Liaodong people to Korea created diplomatic tensions between the Manchus and Chosŏn. The Manchus treasured them as good laborers and, more importantly, as mentioned, the khan's slaves, who contributed to his assets. For Nurhaci, however, Chosŏn's attitude towards the Liaodong people tested the Manchu-Chosŏn relationship—Chosŏn's reception or repatriation of these people was a litmus test of its support for either the Ming or the Manchus. Consequently, on several occasions, Nurhaci sent letters to King Kwanghae 光海君

¹⁵⁷ MWLD, 224.

¹⁵⁸ MWLD, 227, 250-251, 261.

¹⁵⁹ MWLD, 241.

¹⁶⁰ MWLD, 283, 300.

(1575-1641, r. 1608-1623)¹⁶¹, requesting these people be returned.¹⁶² These requests presented a dilemma for Chosŏn Korea. On the one hand, as a vassal state of the Ming, the Chosŏn court was morally and politically obliged to protect subjects of the Ming, which of course did not entail repatriating them to the suzerain's enemy state. On the other hand, receiving the Liaodong people would provide the Manchus an excuse for invasion, and the Koreans were certainly no match for the Manchus' military prowess.

However, unlike previous and subsequent Chosŏn kings, King Kwanghae promoted a neutral foreign policy that tried to avoid being dragged into the confrontation between the Manchus and the Ming.¹⁶³ To be prudent, his first action was to dispatch Chŏng Ch'ungshin 鄭忠信 (1576-1636), Manp'o Commander (*Manp'o ch'ŏmsa* 滿浦僉使) to Liaoyang. The purpose was to assess the Manchus' attitude towards Korea. Chŏng was reported to have done a good job of convincing the Manchus that Chosŏn sought cordial neighborly relations (*kyorin* 交鄰).¹⁶⁴ In the meantime, King Kwanghae acquiesced to the sojourn of the Liaodong people but limited their stay in Ŭiju on the condition that the local government would provide food and shelter.¹⁶⁵

The purpose of limiting the Liaodong people's stay within a certain locale was to relocate them to nearby islands. This was a plan devised by Pak Sŭngchong 朴承宗 (1562-1623), Chief

¹⁶¹ His personal name is Yi Hon 李瑄. Kwanghae 光海 is not his posthumous temple name. In 1623, he was dethroned by a coup and hence never received a temple name. In Chosŏn history, he was simply called by his princely name Kwanghaegun 光海君. I use the term King Kwanghae to address the fact that he was a king during his reign. For a comprehensive study of Kwanghaegun, see Kye, "In the Shadow of the Father."

¹⁶² MWLD, 181-182, 216-217, 279-280, 337-338.

¹⁶³ For a general account of Chosŏn-Ming and Chosŏn-Manchu diplomatic relations, see *Myung-gi Han*, "The Inestimable Benevolence of Saving a Country on the Brink of Ruin' Chosŏn-Ming and Chosŏn-Later Jin Relations in the Seventeenth Century" in James Lewis ed. *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence and Memory, 1591-1598* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2015), 277-293.

¹⁶⁴ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 13/9/10 (1621/10/24).

¹⁶⁵ *Imun tŭngnok*, vol. 15, 1065.

State Councilor (*Yŏngŭijŏng* 領議政) and one of King Kwanghae's most trusted ministers. Pak's reasoning was that if the Liaodong people penetrated inland into Korea, the Manchus would follow and invade, but if they were on islands, the Manchus would be diverted, and the Chosŏn mainland could be preserved. In addition, Pak questioned, "will these barbarians give up their saddles and horses, and struggle with paddles and boats?" 此虜豈肯捨鞍馬, 而爭舟楫乎?¹⁶⁶ As the Manchus did not have a navy, the thinking was that they would likely put off the idea of hunting down the Liaodong people from the sea. King Kwanghae endorsed Pak's plan and hence ordered Pak Yŏp 朴燁 (1570-1623), Provincial Governor of P'yŏngan (*P'yŏngan kamsa* 平安監司), to negotiate with Mao Wenlong, urging him to lead the Liaodong people to a nearby island.¹⁶⁷

Before this relocation plan could be initiated, however, the Manchus attacked first. On the night of January 26, 1622, an army of 5,000 crossed the Yalu River and entered Yongch'ŏn 龍川, a county (*kun* 郡) at the mouth of the River. Overnight, they pushed 90 *li* southeast. On the next day, they reached Impan 林畔, a posthouse in Sŏnchŏn 宣川 (Figure 2.1), where they encountered Mao Wenlong followed by a large number of Liaodong people. The Manchus attacked and won a landslide victory, historically known as the Battle of Impan 林畔之役. They killed about 1,500 of Mao's soldiers, acquired all their belongings, and brought back 5,440 captives, whereas Mao and a few of his subordinates managed to escape by disguising themselves as Chosŏn civilians.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 13/12/5 (1622/1/16).

¹⁶⁷ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/1/4 (1622/2/13).

¹⁶⁸ MWLD, 283; *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 13/12/18 (1622/1/29).

The Manchus' march into Chosŏn territory was unexpectedly smooth. There was no resistance put up by Chosŏn officials, although they seemed to have monitored the whole process as indicated by Chosŏn records. The alleged reason contended by the local officials, which was later forwarded to the Ming to shirk the Chosŏn's responsibility in this incident, was that the Manchus moved too fast to follow. Yongch'ŏn Magistrate (*Pusa* 府使) Yi Sanggil 李尚吉 (1556-1637), for example, was reported to have chased the Manchus. However, when Yi reached Impan, the Manchus, as Yi reported on January 29, had already returned.¹⁶⁹ However, such an explanation does not stand up to scrutiny. Admittedly, the Manchus were able to move at a quick speed at first, covering 90 *li* overnight. However, with some 5,000 captives in the group, who presumably moved on foot, the marching speed became much slower. According to Manchu records, the group retreated to Zhenjiang on February 3. That is, they sojourned in Korea for at least 6 days after the battle.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, if it was not the case that Chosŏn officials were too slow to act, it may have been that they acquiesced to the Manchus' attack.

Some Chinese accounts of the Battle of Impan criticized Chosŏn officials for not intervening and even charged that they helped the Manchus chase down the Liaodong people. Typical of such criticism was the following by Mao Wenlong, whose military report submitted to the Tianqi Emperor in 1622 detailed how Chosŏn officials played the role of accomplice:

After seeing me recruiting so many Liaodong people, the Chosŏn border officials worried that the barbarians would vent anger on them; hence they informed the barbarians about my situation... On January 24, the Chosŏn border officials had already received a Jurchen interpreter Huang Lianhai and provided him with food. Instead of reporting back to me, the Chosŏn border officials sent three men surnamed Kim to lead the way for the barbarians... When the barbarians entered a remote village on January 27, chasing down

¹⁶⁹ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 13/12/18 (1622/1/29).

¹⁷⁰ MWLD, 283.

hidden men and women, the Koreans were reported to capture and give these people to the barbarians. 71 people of all sorts were killed, 13 were held captive, and Xu Yaoxiang, a Confucian student, fought to the death. The Koreans then led the barbarian cavalymen to besiege the Ch'aryŏn Station¹⁷¹...the Koreans tied up 145 of my soldiers and gave them to the barbarians. All the soldiers were killed in front of the station and another 32 women were held captive...The Koreans thereafter guided over 1,000 barbarian cavalymen to Impan. Many of my soldiers scattered to the remote villages trying to purchase grain and beans. I commanded my adjutant Ding Wenli and other officers and soldiers to confront the enemies. After seven battles within a day, my victories offset my defeats.

且朝鮮邊官，見職招民太多，恐虜移怨，以情形通之。。。十三日，已有女直通事黃連海過送食物，不報卑職，更令金姓者三人為之引路。。。入遠村搜殺避亂男婦，更傳鮮民拿獻於虜。其被害者軍民老幼七十一名，被虜男女十三名，生員許堯香戰死。即引虜騎圍車輦館。。。鮮民仍綁就食鄉兵一百四十五名獻虜。殺於館前，被虜婦女三十二口。。。復引虜騎一千餘騎，直犯林畔。官兵皆散遠村尋買米豆。卑職率領中軍丁文禮等官兵拒敵，一日七戰，勝敗相當。¹⁷²

Mao Wenlong's military report could very well be full of disinformation. Reading it critically, one could argue that many details were fabricated to shift responsibility for failure from Mao Wenlong to Chosŏn officials.

Yet, evidence from Korean sources confirms that Chosŏn officials cooperated with the Manchus. Some local officials then overseeing the border were held accountable for the Battle of Impan. P'yŏngan Provincial Governor Pak Yŏp and Ŭiju Prefectural Governor Chŏng Chun, among others, were executed in April 1623 allegedly for leading the Manchus into Korea.¹⁷³ The execution of these two officials happened against the backdrop of the Injo Coup in 1623, during which King Kwanghae was deposed partly for his pragmatic diplomacy unfavored by the Westerners Faction (*Sŏin* 西人). Consequently, the pro-Ming King Injo supported by the

¹⁷¹ Ch'aryŏngwan 車輦館 was a post station 27 li north of Ch'ŏlsan County 鐵山郡.

¹⁷² Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 10-11.

¹⁷³ *Sŏngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 承政院日記, Injo 1/3/13 (1623/4/12).

Western faction ascended the throne (for details, see Chapter 4.1). Under these circumstances, therefore, it is hard to judge whether or not the executions were simply a result of a political struggle; Pak and Chǒng were King Kwanghae's trusted subordinates after all. Nevertheless, the recount by Yi Kwi 李貴 (1557-1633), Prince Yǒnp'yǒng (*Yǒnp'yǒng puwǒngun* 延平府院君), provides irrefutable proof. In 1626, he confessed that "in the incident of Impan a couple of years ago, it was our country's border officials who tempted the enemies to come. Their target was not our country. Hence, they did not kill Korean people, and soon crossed back over the river." 頃年林畔之變，我國邊臣誘賊而來，其意不在於我國，故不殺東人，而便即渡江。¹⁷⁴

The Battle of Impan provides a penetrating look at the Chosŏn officials' attitudes towards the Liaodong people and Mao Wenlong. Although the Manchus' main target was the Liaodong people, the Battle of Impan was the largest incursion into Korea in 1621 and 1622. It was Chosŏn Korea that was subjugated to the Manchus' incursion. However, at the risk of national security, some Chosŏn officials chose to cooperate with the Manchus and led them to chase down the Liaodong people and Mao Wenlong. For Chosŏn officials, the Manchus perhaps were regarded as a solution to the increasing concentration of Liaodong people sojourning within their jurisdictions. This mindset continued to play a role in the following year. In 1622, small-scale Manchu incursions into Chosŏn territory repeatedly occurred. Over the course of these incursions, both Chosŏn local officials and King Kwanghae, apart from monitoring the Manchus' movements, avoided any intervention.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ *Sŭngjǒngwǒn ilgi*, Injo 4/4/8 (1626/5/3). This paragraph benefits from Wang Guidong 王貴東, "Caiji de tongmengzhe: Chaoxian wangchao yu Ming Dongjiangzhen jiaosheshi kaolun (1621-1637)" 猜忌的同盟者: 朝鮮王朝與明東江鎮交涉史考論, in *Yuanshi ji minzu yu bianjiang yanjiu jikan*, 元史及民族與邊疆研究集刊, vol. 32, ed. Liu Yingsheng 劉迎勝 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2017), 119-121. Besides the analysis of Chosŏn's role in the Battle of Impan, the author includes detailed discussions of different Korean records of the battle, as well as King Kwanghae's attitude toward the Manchu invasion.

¹⁷⁵ MWLD, 31, 380; *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/1/5 (1622/2/14).

Nevertheless, the Chosŏn court's cold reception and the Manchus' sporadic attacks did not stop the Liaodong people from fleeing to Korea. By the end of 1622, it was estimated that about 100,000 Liaodong people had crossed the Yalu River. Most of them resided in the area between Ŭiju and Yongch'ŏn, constituting 60-70% of the local population. Resentment gained ground as the number of Liaodong refugees kept surging. In the eyes of local residents, these people were nothing but mobs, plundering villages and harassing locals. Besides violence, what fueled resentment was the limited resources that both the locals and the newcomers were fighting for—clearly there was not enough food for all. In the mountainous northwest of P'yŏngan Province, the Chosŏn farmers worked on small paddy fields utilizing the slash and burn method. The productivity was so low, according to Pak Sŭngchong, that the grain collected every year was not sufficient to feed local troops,¹⁷⁶ not to mention supplying the increasing number of Liaodong people.

A chance to get rid of the Liaodong people came in May 1622 when a Ming envoy named Liang Zhiyuan 梁之垣 came to Chosŏn Korea.¹⁷⁷ Liang came with a mission of negotiating a military cooperation with the Chosŏn court. This was part of the grand strategy proposed by Xiong Tingbi when he was recalled to service after the demise of Yuan Yingtai. Reiterating his progressive plan of prioritizing defense and recovering Liaodong gradually, Xiong's current plan, known as the "three-pronged advance" strategy,¹⁷⁸ *sanfang buzhi* 三方佈置, was to besiege Liaodong by deploying Ming forces in three strategic locations: Tianjin in the west, Guangning in the center, Deng-Lai in the east. Finally, a military commissioner would be

¹⁷⁶ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/5/2 (1622/6/10).

¹⁷⁷ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/4/18 (1622/5/27).

¹⁷⁸ Here I use Kenneth Swope's translation. See Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 41.

posted at the Shanhai Pass to coordinate all activities.¹⁷⁹ This initial arrangement was later improved by incorporating Chosŏn Korea as a strategic military ally. Chosŏn was expected to send troops to the Yalu River to distract the Manchu forces and cover the Deng-Lai Navy landing at Ŭiju. If the Chosŏn could cooperate, the Ming troops could march north and outflank the Manchus' hinterland, including its capital of Hetu Ala. To coordinate these military activities, “a wise and resourceful minister” (*yi zhilüe chen* 一智略臣) should be dispatched to Korea to negotiate the military cooperation.¹⁸⁰ At the recommendation of Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Tao Langxian 陶朗先, the Ming court hence dispatched Liang Zhiyuan, a native of Dengzhou, to Chosŏn Korea.¹⁸¹

News about Liang's coming had reached Seoul long before he arrived in the capital. While Liang was on his way to Seoul, King Kwanghae had made a clear stand that he would refuse military cooperation. Rather, he demanded three things from Liang: immediate withdrawal of Mao Wenlong and his people from the Chosŏn mainland, prohibition of Ming ships from entering Chosŏn ports, and the cancellation of Liang's scheduled tour of the southern shore of the Yalu River.¹⁸² In addition, he dispatched several officials to urge Liang to take Mao and his people to an island—the plan he had previously envisioned.¹⁸³

To King Kwanghae's relief, after Liang Zhiyuan arrived in Seoul on May 17, 1622, he did not even breach the topic of military cooperation. Instead, Liang made efforts to sell the local

¹⁷⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/6/1 (1621/7/19)/ *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 619.

¹⁸⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/1 (1621/9/16)/ *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 628-629.

¹⁸¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/13 (1621/9/28). Liang Zhiyuan's incompetence and corruption eventually encumbered Tao Langxian 陶朗先, who was impeached and then resigned in May 1622. Yuan Keli 袁可立 succeeded Tao. *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/3/12 (1622/4/22), 1008-1009.

¹⁸² *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/4/26 (1622/6/4).

¹⁸³ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/4/2 (1622/5/11).

people his personal commodities purchased with his allotment of 30,000 taels of silver, which was paid by the Ming government and was supposed to be used to subsidize Chosŏn militarization. Selling the goods at above-market rates, Liang managed to double his fortune.¹⁸⁴ One thing Liang did decide to negotiate with the Chosŏn court, however, was the matter of ships. He chartered to purchase warships from Korea on behalf of Tao Langxian, who was then training navy in Dengzhou. The warships were not in stock of course; they were built upon request. The Chosŏn court initially declined Liang's request for shipbuilding, claiming the difficulty of transporting the pine for shipbuilding from the hinterland.¹⁸⁵ Liang pushed forward through the negotiation by playing the Liaodong refugee card. The final negotiation took place on June 10, 1622. On Liang's behalf, Brigade Vice Commander (*Dusi* 都司) Ma Cong 馬驄¹⁸⁶ conversed through "brush talk" (筆談) with Pak Sŭngchong:

That the Liaodong people have lived here for a long time does cause you inconvenience. Some among them are harassing your local people and causing trouble, so we must carefully deal with them. The imperial edict that Lord Liang is respectfully holding reads that "for those who are willing to return mainland, Liang Zhiyuan can allow them either to be repatriated or to stay." Sending them back to the mainland cannot be done without warships, but only soldiers can board the warships, which cannot be used to carry civilians. What we originally wanted to pay in silver to purchase were warships, not barges that can carry civilians...If your country is willing to build a hundred warships for us, we could buy these ships on behalf of Grand Coordinator Tao and carry the Liaodong people to leave. This is indeed a method convenient for both of us.

久住原是不便，況中有騷擾生事，不可不為處之。梁老爺遵奉勅旨內，有言願歸內地，聽憑遣留。然遣之內地，非舡不可來，舡只可粧兵，不堪度民。原欲發銀買舡，

¹⁸⁴ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/4/18 (1622/5/27), 14/4/20 (1622/5/29), 14/4/23 (1622/6/1), 14/4/25 (1622/6/3).

¹⁸⁵ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/4/22 (1622/5/31).

¹⁸⁶ Ma Cong's name is not revealed in the Chosŏn records. I know his name from Yang Haiying 楊海英, "Shanyin shijia yu Ming-Qing yidai" 山陰世家與明清易代, *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究 4 (2018): 45.

非買船。。。如貴國肯爲買舡百隻，便可以登撫所買之舡，卽載遼民以去，是誠一舉兩便之術也。¹⁸⁷

A Ming navy ship is a sharp-bottomed (*jiandi* 尖底) vessel with a keel (*longgu* 龍骨) that sticks out below the base and holds the ship in a vertical position when sailing.¹⁸⁸ Naval use meant that the ships could be deemed weapons that should not fall into civilians' hands.¹⁸⁹ Ma Cong's stratagem was to go around the rule by sending the ships southwards to Shandong while carrying the Liaodong people before the Ming navy could use them.

The Chosŏn court eventually agreed to the shipbuilding request on the condition that the Liaodong people sojourning in Korea would leave Chosŏn territory. By the end of July, 72 warships were delivered.¹⁹⁰ On August 3, King Kwanghae ordered that every Liaodong person who had come to Korea in the last year be registered.¹⁹¹ However, the transportation was not done under unified management. At the behest of Liang Zhiyuan, the ships built at 50 taels of silver each were resold to the few Liaodong people with enough wealth for 100 taels each. In so doing, Liang managed to pay off the debt to the Chosŏn court while making money for himself.¹⁹² Some of these ships did sail to Ming territory later—remains of the Chosŏn ships have been unearthed in Dengzhou.¹⁹³ But many more remained in Chosŏn.

¹⁸⁷ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/5/2 (1622/6/10).

¹⁸⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/10/5 (1621/11/17).

¹⁸⁹ Shen Shixing 申時行 et al., *Minghuidian* 明會典 (1587), *juan* 200, 9b.

¹⁹⁰ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/5/15 (1622/6/23).

¹⁹¹ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/6/27 (1622/8/3).

¹⁹² *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/9/18 (1622/10/22); Wang Zaijin, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 210.

¹⁹³ Pak Hyŏngyu 朴現圭, "Myŏng kamgun Yang Chiwŏn Chosŏn ch'ulsa sigi haesang hwaldong e kwanhan punsŏk" 명監軍梁之垣朝鮮出使시기해상활동에 관한분석, *Hanjung inmunhak yŏngu* 한중인문학연구 39 (2013): 380-381.

The ships that remained in Chosŏn eventually fell under the control of Mao Wenlong, and Mao was able to organize his force on the sea. Starting from mid-August 1622, Mao led his men and began to sail along Liaodong's east coast. In September, his force came ashore and attacked two forts near Zhenjiang: Yintaoguo 櫻桃塢 and Tangzhan 湯站.¹⁹⁴ Both were isolated forts now safeguarded by a handful of Manchu soldiers, and the area was scarcely populated.¹⁹⁵ After inflicting minor casualties and capturing some supplies, Mao's men went back to sea. This would emerge as a pattern in the years to come, as Kenneth Swope has keenly observed, "Mao would lead small units of guerrillas against isolated Jin (i.e., Manchu) fortresses or settlements" and his operations were mere "pinpricks."¹⁹⁶

But these pinpricks were alarming enough for the Manchus. The Manchus did not have a navy and Mao's guerilla force coming and going between land and sea was too elusive to catch. The situation drove the Manchus to seek to solve the issue through diplomacy. On several occasions, Chosŏn envoys coming to Liaoyang were ordered to discipline Mao's men, and Nurhaci also sent letters to King Kwanghae threatening that the cordial relation between the two states would go sour if the Chosŏn court did not arrest Mao Wenlong.¹⁹⁷

Whether the tension between the Manchus and Chosŏn had an impact on Mao Wenlong was unknown. But what subsequently happened was what King Kwanghae had wished for early in 1622. Late that year, after consulting with his associates, particularly one named Li Jingxian 李景先 who was said to be familiar with the littoral, Mao led his men to enter and garrison in

¹⁹⁴ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/9/1 (1622/10/5); Peng, *Shanzhong wenjianlu*, 44.

¹⁹⁵ *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 458.

¹⁹⁶ Swope, "Postcards from the Edge," 153.

¹⁹⁷ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/9/1 (1622/10/5); MWLD, 400, 409.

Pidao.¹⁹⁸ Known as Kado in Korean, the island had been used by the Chosŏn court as a horse ranch. For humans, it was a wind-swept and rocky island, not conducive to comfortable living. Mao, however, valued Pidao for its strategic location: 30 *li* away from the port in Ch'ŏlsan 鐵山 County in P'yŏngan Province and 80 *li* east of the Sino-Chosŏn border, making it easy to come ashore or sail along the coast.¹⁹⁹ In addition, Mao dispersed his men to the nearby islands, which, like Pidao, were barely inhabited or cultivated. To the east of Pidao, there was an island called Sinmin 身彌, which was later renamed into Yuncong 雲從. To the west, there were Ludao 鹿島, Xiaosong 小松, Shicheng 石城, Changshan 長山, Guanglu 廣鹿/祿, and Sanshan 三山 (Figure 1.1). These islands thus constituted the jurisdiction of Mao Wenlong's military organization, Dongjiang.

In mid-1623, Yi Minsŏng 李民晟 (1570-1629), a Chosŏn envoy sailing to the Ming dynasty, passed by Pidao and some of the nearby islands en route. According to his travelogue, in Pidao, the construction of shacks was on-going. A few roofs were covered by tiles and more by grass. In Shicheng, there were originally some seventy households living there, and now twice the number of the Liaodong households had arrived. In Changshan, there were then about one hundred Liaodong households and a few of Mao's soldiers stationed there. In Guanglu, the Liaodong households numbered to almost three hundred and there were six warships, anchored off the coast.²⁰⁰ Clearly, as Mao and his men retreated to the islands, the Liaodong people followed, and over time they increased in number. In 1630, when another Chosŏn envoy Chŏng

¹⁹⁸ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/11/11 (1622/12/13).

¹⁹⁹ *Tanjong sillok* 端宗實錄, Tanjong 1/7/16 (1453/8/20).

²⁰⁰ Yi Minsŏng 李民晟, *Kyehae Choch'ŏllok* 癸亥朝天錄, in *Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip*, vol. 14, 286, 296, 299, 301-302, 304.

Tuwǒn 鄭斗源 (1581-?) passed by Changshan and Guanglu, the numbers of households, by Chǒng's count, were “several hundred 數百” and “five to six hundred 五六百” respectively.²⁰¹

But the Liaodong people did not leave for the islands simply because Mao was there, but also because Mao endeavoured to recruit them. Among the incoming Liaodong people, males also contributed to Mao Wenlong's armies. To recruit more soldiers, Mao promised that each would be entitled to 0.3 *shi* of grain rations per month (3.6 *shi* per year)²⁰² Not only did he try to recruit soldiers from the Liaodong households fleeing to Chosŏn Korea, but he also sent men to call for their surrender in the eastern littoral of the Liaodong peninsula. The Manchus intercepted Mao's men recruiting the Liaodong people onshore on several occasions.²⁰³ It was on this occasion that, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, Cho Chip was able to see people leaving the mainland for Shicheng.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the establishment of Dongjiang. The key question this chapter has aimed to answer is why the Liaodong people deserted their homelands in large numbers and followed Mao Wenlong to settle on islands and hence give rise to Mao's island-based military organization. Existing studies provide a broad-stroke answer that these Liaodong people, as wartime refugees, ran from the Manchus, who occupied Liaodong in 1621. But this explanation

²⁰¹ Chǒng Tuwǒn 鄭斗源, *Choch'ŏn'gi chido* 朝天記地圖, in *Hanguo hanwen yanxing wenxian xuanbian* 韓國漢文燕行文獻選編, ed. Fudan daxue wenshi yanjiuyuan, Chengjunguan daxue dongya xueshuyuan dadong wenhua yanjiuyuan 復旦大學文史研究院, 成均館大學東亞學術院大東文化研究院 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2011), vol.7, 78, 80.

²⁰² Wang and Li, ed., “Mao dajiangjun haishang qingxing,” 45.

²⁰³ MWLD, 428, 431, 442, 443, 444, 509.

cannot justify the pattern of population movement. Rather than settling on barren islands, they could have fled west to Ming territory or east to Chosŏn Korea.

The Manchus' rule in the newly conquered Liaodong certainly played an essential role in driving the Liaodong people away. The economy of the Manchu state, which was then based on extra-economic coercion, required the conquered people to produce economic surpluses. This became a pretext for insisting on racial discrimination, placing the Liaodong people in a low-status social group, and enslaving them in the encircled land. Besides, the Manchus upheld a demographic imperative: being a minority, they lived in fear of being swamped by the natives who outnumbered them. When there were rebellions against Manchu rule, massive killings took place. Consequently, the Manchus' policies of managing the Liaodong people created large numbers of refugees.

At the beginning, most of these refugees left Liaodong and sought asylum from the Ming state or Chosŏn Korea. The Ming court had mixed feelings about the Liaodong people. On the one hand, it saw them as potential spies and traitors plotting with the enemies. On the other hand, it sought to control them to prevent their defection to the Manchus. As a result, the Ming court soon depopulated the area west of the Liao River and stopped more people from entering Ming territory.

A good number of the Liaodong people hence entered Chosŏn Korea. There are too many references to their wrongdoings in Korean sources to enumerate here. However, as a Ming vassal state supposedly dedicated to serving the Ming Great State, Chosŏn was obliged to pardon and nourish the Ming subjects. For Chosŏn Korea, the Liaodong people were nothing but a burden, putting the country in an awkward position between the Ming and the Manchus. Efforts were made to dispatch the emigrants to the Ming, but as the speed of sending them back was much

slower than their coming, these efforts were in vain. In addition, some Chosŏn officials conspired with the Manchus, serving as guides, to chase down the Liaodong people within Korea, while King Kwanghae acquiesced in these operations to avoid hitting a nerve with the Manchus. The Manchus, for their part, repeatedly claimed the Liaodong people as their subjects.

Mao Wenlong, who retreated to Chosŏn Korea to avoid the Manchu attack, hence became a possible lifeline for the Liaodong people driven into a corner. As Mao and his soldiers occupied the offshore islands, the isolated environment of which prevented external attacks, the Liaodong people followed. More importantly, Mao promised to offer food rations and hence provided an inspiring prospectus for those in desperate need. However, the barren islands were unlikely to have provided enough resources to sustain a large population. How did the people in Dongjiang lead a life by sea? The answer will be revealed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3: Investment from the Ming Dynasty

Wang Yining 王一寧 (?-1621), the Confucian student, whose letter to King Kwanghae we read in the previous chapter, sailed back to Dengzhou in late 1622 (probably by taking a ship that Liang Zhiyuan had asked Chosŏn to build). Wang was a native of Zhenjiang. In 1619, he joined Mao Wenlong's force and helped plan the successful raid on the fort. However, after Mao retreated to Pidao, Wang saw no prospects for further development of Mao and his island-based organization. For those who merely sought survival, Pidao was a haven, but for ambitious people like Wang Yining, it was too small a stage. Soon after Wang arrived in Dengzhou, he was well received by Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Yuan Keli 袁可立 (1562-1633) and worked as Yuan's personal counsellor in the capacity of Assistant Prefect of Dengzhou (*Dengzhou tongpan* 登州通判). The first mission delivered by Yuan was to sail back to Pidao and deliver 50,000 taels of silver. It was part of the military provision that the Ming court promised to provide.²⁰⁴ By the end of 1622, the Ming court shipped a total of over 110,792 *shi* of grain, over 73,000 taels of silver, and other provisions of all sorts. At that time, ocean voyaging was never an easy task. The ships crossing the Bohai Sea were caught in a windstorm. Eventually, only about 70% of the goods were delivered to Mao Wenlong.²⁰⁵ Yet, this seaborne logistic line was maintained in the years to come, and the shipping quotas saw an increase over time.²⁰⁶

Why was the Ming court willing to invest so much in Mao Wenlong's force stationed far across the sea, a force based on islets, which Wang Yining deemed insignificant? In fact, Wang

²⁰⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/7 (1621/9/22), Tianqi 2/3/29 (1622/5/9), Tianqi 2/9/29 (1622/11/2), Tianqi 2/10/4 (1622/11/6).

²⁰⁵ Bi Ziyuan 畢自嚴, *Duxiang shucaos* 督餉疏草 (1621-1627?), *juan* 1, 32ab, *juan* 2, 23b, 32a, 35b.

²⁰⁶ For an empirical study of the seaborne logistic network, see Wang, "Mingmo Dongjiang haiyun yanjiu."

Yining was not alone. Once Dongjiang was established, many in the court in Beijing began to voice opposition to sending supplies. This chapter argues that the Ming kept investing in Dongjiang because Mao Wenlong and his force gained renewed importance in the Ming's changing military strategy. Mao's activities in the following years assured the Ming court that Dongjiang was a blue-chip stock worthy of investment and hence maintained the seaborne logistic network.

3.1 Structural Problems of Sea Shipping

By any standard of the day, shipping mass goods by sea was a formidable task. The Ming dynasty began to organize such shipping across the Bohai Sea in the wake of the Ming-Qing wars in 1618. The major goods involved were grain. The Ming court was then mobilizing troops to Liaodong preparing for what was later known as the Battle of Sarhu 薩爾滸之戰. This created a huge demand for grain. Such demand could have been met by using the local grain reserves, but bad harvests in Liaodong between 1616 and 1618 had already exhausted the reserves and caused a dearth of grain in the local market, inflating the price.²⁰⁷ Consequently, grain had to be transported from places outside of Liaodong. At first, the traditional way of overland transport from the capital region through the Shanhai Pass was preferred. The task was entrusted to an official named Li Junzhan 李君湛, but Li proved to be incompetent in his work, and many cart drivers abandoned their routes, causing delayed delivery and loss of grain.²⁰⁸ In the meantime, Censor Guan Yingzhen 官應震 (1568-1635) memorialized the throne to propose shipping grain

²⁰⁷ Quan Hansheng 全漢昇, "Mingdai Liaodong meishi mijia" 明代遼東每石米價, in *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu, xiace* 中國經濟史研究, 下冊 (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1991), 667-688; *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 213-219.

²⁰⁸ *Xiong Tingbi ji*, 831.

from Shandong's north coast to Liaodong's southern ports. Guan used Wang Zongmu's 王宗沐 (1524-1592) sea shipping experiment as a point of reference. Back in 1571, when blockages of the Grand Canal stopped the supply line between the Yangzi delta and Beijing, Wang devised an alternative way of shipping supplies from Dengzhou 登州 to the north by sea, but the shipwrecks caused by deep currents and windstorms soon forced Wang to give up. Dengzhou was a prefecture on the north coast of Shandong, facing the south coast of the Liaodong peninsula across the Bohai Sea. Guan Yingzheng contended that Wang previously failed because the shipping had been mismanaged, and the key to the success was to appoint the right person. Guan's proposal caused doubts in the Ming court, but nevertheless interested the Wanli emperor, who granted the conducting of a pilot program in Shandong.²⁰⁹

At the recommendation of Shandong Grand Coordinator Li Changgeng 李長庚 (1572-1641), Dengzhou Prefect (*Dengzhou zhifu* 登州知府) Tao Langxian 陶朗先 (1579-1625) was promoted to be Vice Commissioner of Deng-Lai Circuit (*Deng-Lai dao fushi* 登萊道副使), presiding over maritime transport. Because the sea shipping was essentially a pilot program, there were no details about how exactly the task should be carried out or how much grain should be shipped. This left great flexibility for administrative operation, and for many officials of the

²⁰⁹ HYJS, 2. HYJS is collection of 113 official documents composed between 1618 and 1621, all of which are focused on the 1618-1620 maritime transport. Although the editor and the publication date remain unknown, "The Dengzhou Circuit (*Dengzhou dao* 登州道)" in the middle of the folio shows that it was published during the Tianqi Reign (1621-1627) and may suggest that the book was block-printed at the behest of Tao Langxian. The editing work seems to have been conducted in haste, and hence there are some "inappropriate" ways of writing the dates, for instance, Wanli 48/9/2. Because the last 5 months of Wanli 48 were allotted to the short-lived Taichang reign in 1621, the "correct" way of dating should be Taichang 1/9/2. The editor's haste nevertheless helped preserve the raw documents. Some of them scatter in other sources, for example, the *Veritable Records*, in which the documents are heavily edited. An abridged version of HYJS edited by Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉 is entitled *Haiyun zhaichao* 海運摘抄 and collected in Luo's *Mingji liaoshi congkan* 明季遼事叢刊. For a comprehensive study on Wang Zongmu's 1571 experiment, see Fan Hua 樊鐸, *Zhengzhi juece yu mingdai haiyun* 政治決策與明代海運 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008), 116-146.

day, this could be used as an excuse for being indolent. However, Tao Langxian proved to be responsible and efficient. In merely 13 days after he assumed the office, he successfully organized the first shipment. 13,373 *shi* of grain carried by 33 ships of all sorts was delivered to the southern coast of Liaodong. The total expenditure was 7,087 taels of silver, at a unit price of 0.53 tael/ *shi*, which was lower than the overland transport rate of 0.6 tael/*shi*.²¹⁰

Tao Langxian's initial success became a starting point for the continuation of this seaborne logistic network. The Ming forces' humiliating failure during the Battle of Sarhu led to an expansion in militarization in Liaodong, and hence an increase in demand for grain. Considering this, the Ming court created a new position in the Ministry of Revenue at the rank of vice minister overseeing military logistics (*Duxiang shilang* 督餉侍郎). Taking credit for the successful sea shipping during his tenure in Shandong, Li Changgeng became the first man to hold that office. In the following years, cooperation between Li Changgeng and Tao Langxian continued, and this long-term superior-subordinate relationship smoothed the way to higher shipping quotas—when Li, on behalf of the Ming court, asked Tao to ship more and more grain over time, the latter could not refuse. Consequently, between 1619 and 1620, Shandong's annual shipping quota increased from 100,000 *shi* to 600,000 *shi*. To meet the quotas, all the coastal prefectures in Shandong began to be involved over time, including Dengzhou 登州, Laizhou 萊州, Qingzhou 青州, and Jinan 濟南 (Figure 3.1).²¹¹

²¹⁰ HYJS, 11, 12, 16, 31.

²¹¹ HYJS, 84, 85, 137, 148, 212.



Figure 3.1 Ming Shandong (made with [Harvard WorldMap](#))

However, the successful sea shipping across the Bohai Sea could not gloss over some structural problems. First, its operation relied heavily on a handful of “good officials.” As has been shown, the relationship between Tao Langxian and Li Changgeng was crucial to the successful expansion of sea shipping. Others would have potentially evaded the increasingly demanding duty. For example, as will be shown later, when Yuan Keli was asked to ship grain to Pidao, he found every excuse to evade the duty. In addition, Tao Langxian’s own personality should not be neglected. Wu Sheng 吳牲, Weixian 濰縣 Magistrate in Laizhou (Figure 3.1), described Tao as ruthless, treating his subordinates and others with an iron fist. In 1619 when Wu petitioned Tao to cut down Weixian’s shipping quota, Tao took offense and increased the quota by another 40,000 *shi* to punish Wu.²¹²

²¹² Wu Sheng 吳牲, *Yiji* 憶記 (1635 manuscript copy), *juan* 1, 5a.

Second, the north coast of Shandong had no easy access to such large amounts of grain ready for shipping. The aforementioned overland transport was initially favored because the capital region was where grain from the south was stored—every year 4,000,000 *shi* was sent along the Grand Canal to supply the capital. In contrast, procuring grain in Northern Shandong, particularly in Deng-Lai 登萊 (Dengzhou and Laizhou), was difficult. The grain shipped from Deng-Lai initially came from the local granaries. When that resource ran low while the demand increased, Tao Langxian had to purchase grain from afar, entailing more costs of purchasing and shipping them to the designated ports. One illustrative example is purchasing grain from Jiaozhou 膠州, where there was a vibrant grain market. Jiaozhou was on the south coast of Shandong peninsula, so ships leaving there for the north coast would have to bypass the Cape of Chengshan 成山角, the peninsula's eastern tip (Figure 3.1). The unpredictable currents and tides there made navigation difficult. Consequently, Tao Langxian had to pay extra, as special personnel were hired to guide the ships to bypass the Cape.²¹³

Third, the shipping across the Bohai Sea was seasonal. In autumn and winter, the Black Current 黑潮, originating from the Sea of Japan, would come down to the Bohai, making navigation extremely difficult. The ships then used were barges with flat bottoms, and many of them did not have watertight compartments built to reduce flooding. Once the fierce ocean current breached the hull, flooding occurred and could easily sink the ship. Moreover, the prolonged winter froze the sea. Consequently, the operation of sea shipping was scheduled between Qingming 清明 and Chongyang 重陽, that is, a system whereby the first ship should put

²¹³ HYJS, 141-143, 248, 333, 339; Cheng Shujun 成淑君, *Mingdai Shandong nongye kaifa yanjiu* 明代山東農業開發研究 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2006), 307; Ray Huang, "The Grand Canal During The Ming 1368-1644" (PhD diss., Michigan University, 1964), 74.

out to sea after the third lunar month and the last should return by the end of eighth lunar month.²¹⁴

Last and most importantly, there was no central funding that helped pay the shipping cost; the local governments singlehandedly covered the expenditure. In 1620, for example, the prefecture of Dengzhou alone was ordered to manage 225,000 *shi* of grain. Considering Dengzhou's annual land tax assessed in grain was 236,654 *shi*, this entailed a total expenditure of 171,800 taels of silver. To pay the cost, Dengzhou levied a surtax (*Liaoxiang* 遼餉) amounting to 68,920 taels, which overburdened the local residents. Sun Changling 孫昌齡 (?-1649), the prefecture judge (*Tuiguan* 推官), then observed that many people deserted their homes to evade the surtax. In addition, Dengzhou's regular tax income was appropriated, including 32,320 taels for Annual Military Subsidies (*Jingbian nianli yin* 京邊年例銀) and 70,560 taels for the land tax.²¹⁵ Apparently, Tao Langxian was able to meet the shipping quotas at the cost of exhausting local finance, making the sustainable operation of the shipping in the long run impossible. These structural problems would have huge impacts on the future sea shipping to supply Dongjiang.

²¹⁴ HYJS, 34, 53, 67; Angela Schottenhammer, "Connecting China with the Pacific World?" *Orientierungen* 31 (2019): 111.

²¹⁵ HYJS, 316, 322; Shi Runzhang 施閏章, *Shunzhi Dengzhoufu zhi* 順治登州府志 (1694 printed edition), *juan* 9, 3a, 4b. The *shi* of grain remained the standard measure for taxation over the course of the Ming dynasty. Its official value assessed in silver depended on the fluctuations in the commutation rates and hence remained unknown until the end of the dynasty. The Qing dynasty started to collect a fixed amount of silver as land tax after 1652. For example, Dengzhou's land tax assessed in silver amounted to 81,767 taels. See Zhang Zuoli 張作礪, *Shunzhi Zhaoyuan xianzhi* 順治招遠縣志 (1846 printed edition), *juan* 6, 14-16. The cultivated land on which the land tax was levied decreased in size after the Ming-Qing transition, and so the land tax assessed in silver, if commuted at the same rate, would amount to more in the Ming than in the Qing. The current amount of silver was based on the land area measured in 1652. The land tax in the late Ming was based on the land survey carried out across the country in 1581.

3.2 Mao Wenlong's Forces in the Ming Military Strategy

By this time, Tao Langxian had accumulated enough political capital to advance further in his career. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the Manchus annexed all the Ming territory east of the Liao River in 1621. They took Liaoyang and Shenyang on May 1 and May 10 respectively (Chapter 2.1). But before then, preparation for sea shipping in Deng-Lai was still ongoing. The stop order issued by the Ministry of Revenue came late on May 18.²¹⁶ By then Tao Langxian had already procured 600,000 *shi* of grain to meet that year's quota.²¹⁷ Taking credit for his success in sea shipping and being recommended by Xiong Tingbi, late in July, Tao Langxian was promoted to be the inaugural Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator.

As was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, Deng-Lai was one of the tripartite defense commands (*junzhen* 軍鎮) in Xiong Tingbi's "three-pronged advance" strategy 三方布/建置 (Chapter 2.4, Figure 3.2). The Ming forces' failure in Liaodong and the demise of Yuan Yingtai compelled the Tianqi emperor to call Xiong back to service. Xiong took the opportunity to propose a defense strategy that worked progressively toward recovering lost territory. The general idea was to deploy and strengthen military forces in three strategic places. Guangning 廣寧 outside the Shanhai Pass would be the center of the Ming defense line, from which probing operations would be launched to test the Manchu strength. West of Guangning, Tianjin served another launching pad for both offensive and naval relief operations. In the east, Deng-Lai, that is, a defense command combining both the jurisdictions of Dengzhou and Laizhou, would serve

²¹⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/3/27 (1621/5/18).

²¹⁷ Bi Ziyuan 畢自嚴, *Shiyinyuan canggao* 石隱園藏稿, in *Yingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* 影印文淵閣四庫全書, *jibu* 集部 422 (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 503.

as a navy base. From there, the warships would cross the Bohai Sea and attack the Manchus from the rear when the time was ripe.²¹⁸




Figure 3.2 “Three-Pronged Advance” Strategy (made with [Harvard WorldMap](#))

The elevation of the strategic importance of Deng-Lai in the Ming military strategy brought in government funding and reinforcements and so empowered Tao Langxian. In October 1621, the Ming court allowed Tao Langxian to retain 400,000 taels of tax income from Dengzhou and Laizhou prefectures, which was supposedly turned in to the Ministry of Revenue.

²¹⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/7/22 (1621/9/7), Tianqi 1/8/1 (1621/9/16).

The Ming court also promised to allot another 100,000 taels from the central treasury and relocate reinforcements of 50,000 soldiers and 500 horses to Deng-Lai.²¹⁹ Although the Ming court's promise eventually fell short, what can be assured is that the total strength in Deng-Lai increased from some 27,00 to about 30,000 soldiers of all sorts by the end of 1621.²²⁰

The hectic militarization in Deng-Lai incited mixed reactions in Beijing. Some hawkish officials, such as Yang Daoying 楊道寅, urged Tao Langxian to send out the navy immediately to cross the Bohai Sea. According to Yang, the Ming force could come ashore at Lüshun 旅順, the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula, and attack the Manchus from there.²²¹ Such a proposal for rash advance was soon dismissed and replaced by more pessimistic views. Censor Su Yan 蘇琰 (1569-1639) keenly observed that Deng-Lai did not have enough warships. Admittedly, there were enough barges there used previously for the sea shipping, but the maneuverability and strength of the barges sailing on the deep could not compete with that of the warships. "A thousand warships are needed for carrying soldiers, so I am afraid that there is no date for going to sea." 當以千艘為載，恐出海無期也。²²² What was at issue, as Sun Yan so aptly pointed out, was that Deng-Lai, at least for now, did not have the ability to launch a cross-sea attack. The lack of this ability obliterated the strategic importance of Deng-Lai in the "three-pronged advance" strategy. After all, the navy from Deng-Lai was expected to cross the Bohai Sea and attack the Manchus from the rear. Otherwise, the Ming court's investment in Deng-Lai would be in vain.

²¹⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/25 (1621/10/10).

²²⁰ Wang, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, 21; *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/1/20 (1622/3/1).

²²¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/7/13 (1621/8/29).

²²² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/10/5 (1621/11/7).

Savvy as Tao Langxian was, he clearly understood this fatal problem. In a memorial submitted early in October, he contended that “if the officials wholeheartedly want to recover the territory east of the Liao River, they must be of one true heart, contribute together, deploy soldiers and plan marching routes, and make sure to achieve the collective victory of the three-pronged advance.” 如諸臣而果真心慾恢復河東也，即須失一片真心，出一番公力，計兵計路，務收三方進取之路。²²³ On the surface, Tao was stressing the importance of cooperation and coordination of a tripartite advance. The implication, however, was that the time was not ripe for Deng-Lai to make any military action. Whether he was thinking strategically about the strategy of recovering Liaodong or not, Tao evaded the very question of whether Deng-Lai could function as it was supposed to. He was trying to maintain Deng-Lai’s significance in the Ming military layout against the Manchus.

However, that significance was subsequently challenged by Mao Wenlong’s successful raid of Fort Zhenjiang in early September 1621. As has been introduced in the previous chapter, Liaodong Grand Coordinator Wang Huazhen was the one who dispatched Mao Wenlong back to Liaodong. Although there was no evidence showing that Wang was involved in this raid, he credited himself with achieving a long-awaited victory (Chapter 2.4). In addition, Mao’s triumph gave Wang key leverage to negotiate for power. In the capacity of Liaodong Grand Coordinator, Wang did not possess the corresponding right of commanding military as other Grand Coordinators did, for the Ming court deliberately undermined his authority so that he would not be able to compete with Xiong Tingbi, the commander-in-chief in the northeast. Hence, Wang held a grudge. More importantly, Wang never endorsed Xiong’s gradualist strategy but favored a proactive plan, seeking a head-on confrontation with the Manchus in the Liao River area.

²²³ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/9/3 (1621/10/17).

Consequently, Wang contended that Mao's occupation of Zhenjiang provided a golden opportunity for the Ming forces to engage the Manchus. Once the Ming court could send out reinforcements helping Mao secure a strong hold in the rear, the Manchus would be distracted, and the Ming forces could take the opportunity and strike first in the front.²²⁴

Wang Huazhen's forward plan won some support in the Ming court, particularly that of Minister of War Zhang Heming 張鶴鳴 (1551-1635). Nevertheless, it was strongly opposed by Xiong Tingbi. On the surface, Xiong's opposition was based on the fact that the military preparation was far from ready for a showdown with the Manchus. What really mattered was that Wang Huazhen's forward plan, in fact, squashed his own strategy. Initially, Deng-Lai was in charge of outflanking the Manchus from the rear. If Mao Wenlong could shoulder the task, Tao Langxian and his Deng-Lai would be replaced, rendering Xiong's strategy obsolete.²²⁵

The disagreement between Xiong and Wang soon expanded into a competition between Xiong's allies and Wang's supporters, and the latter soon had the upper hand. The imperial edict issued in late September showed that the court's policy had inclined to Wang Huazhen's side. Xiong Tingbi was ordered to relocate his headquarters back to the Shanhai Pass and relinquish Guangning, the center in his strategy, as well as the commandership there, to Wang Huazhen, which foreshadowed the subsequent loss of the city in early 1622 (Chapter 2.3). In addition, the Ming court ordered Tianjin and Deng-Lai to send out reinforcements to help Mao Wenlong open a second front at Fort Zhenjiang.²²⁶ Li Banghua 李邦華 (1574-1644), Tianjin Grand Coordinator, did dispatch an officer named Guan Dafan 管大藩 to support Mao Wenlong, but

²²⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/7 (1621/9/22).

²²⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/9/26 (1621/11/9).

²²⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/8/7 (1621/9/22).

Guan and his men never reached Mao—due to the alleged reason of lack of food, they stopped midway and fled back to Tianjin.²²⁷ As for Tao Langxian, he understood clearly that a second front led by Mao Wenlong, behind whom was Wang Huazhen, would doom Deng-Lai to oblivion and hence never sent out reinforcements.²²⁸ Instead, what Sun Yan had previously questioned about Deng-Lai's ability to wage cross-sea combat reminded Tao to procure more warships. At the recommendation of Tao, Liang Zhiyuan, as has been examined in the previous chapter, was then dispatched to Chosŏn Korea to negotiate a military alliance, and so Tao Langxian asked him to purchase warships on his behalf.

With no reinforcements, Mao Wenlong soon relinquished Zhenjiang and retreated to Chosŏn Korea. News about the subsequent Battle of Impan also reached Beijing in early February 1622. Mao's consecutive failures consequently gave rise to calls for impeachment against Tao Langxian. Censor Hou Zhenyang 侯震暘 (1569-1627), for instance, directed venom at Tao, blaming the loss of such a stronghold as Zhenjiang on Tao's non-action. Perhaps Mao Wenlong's rapid string of failures, especially at Impan, had shaken the Ming court's faith in him, but the Ming court neglected Hou's impeachment, suggesting that no action would be taken against Tao Langxian.²²⁹ However, the subsequent loss of Guangning in March shook Beijing and led to the removal of the entire military leadership: Zhang Heming was dismissed from office, and both Wang Huazhen and Xiong Tingbi were imprisoned and later executed. Tao, as Xiong's ally, was also implicated. The return of Liang Zhiyuan from Chosŏn Korea without any achievement became the last straw. Censor Chen Baotai 陳保泰 made a fuss about Liang's futile

²²⁷ Li Banghua 李邦華, *Li zhongsugong ji* 李忠肅公集 (1736-1795?), *juan* 3, 66b-67b.

²²⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/1/12 (1622/2/21).

²²⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/1/12 (1622/2/21).

mission, accusing Tao Langxian, together with Liang, of encroaching on the government funding allotted to the cooperation with Chosŏn Korea.²³⁰ With no person on the Ming court supporting him, Tao was emasculated and voluntarily resigned in May 1622, leaving his office to Yuan Keli 袁可立 (1562-1633).²³¹

As Mao Wenlong kept sojourning in Korea in 1621 and 1622, many Ming officials in Beijing proposed to give up on him. Censor Xia Zhiling 夏之令 (?-1625) was the first to voice such an opinion, reasoning that Mao's men were "orphan warriors"²³² (*gujun* 孤軍) unable to make waves, and that provisioning a few men across the sea was difficult. Grand Coordinator Ye Xianggao 葉向高 (1559-1627) agreed with Xia's opinion, suggesting that the Ming court should withdraw Mao and his men from Chosŏn. Ye's argument was firmly grounded in the fact that the Ming court was then running an annual deficit of some 1,620,000 taels, and hence no budget could be spared for supplying Mao.²³³ Wu Sheng, the aforementioned magistrate participating in Tao Langxian's sea shipping and now a censor, understood clearly the difficulty of seaborne transport and so echoed the view of withdrawing Mao's men.²³⁴ Perhaps having learnt a lesson from his predecessor, the newly appointed Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Yuan Keli made a more nuanced argument. He contended that upon his assuming office, he had dispatched 5,000 soldiers as Mao Wenlong's reinforcements, but not even one managed to reach the other side of the Bohai Sea. No extant sources today can confirm that Yuan indeed sent out soldiers.

²³⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/3/12 (1622/4/22).

²³¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/4/10 (1622/5/19).

²³² I take the masterfully translated term "orphan warriors" 孤軍 from the following work: Pamela Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

²³³ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/12/22 (1623/1/22), Tianqi 3/7/3 (1623/7/29).

²³⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/10/18 (1622/11/20).

Nevertheless, what he contended enabled him to argue that supplying Mao across the sea was an impossible mission. Yuan's argument boiled down to emphasizing Xiong Tingbi's "three-pronged advance" strategy, suggesting the strategic importance of Deng-Lai.²³⁵

However, these voices calling for abandoning Mao Wenlong could not trump the idea of new military leadership. After Zhang Heming, Wang Huazhen, and Xiong Tingbi were gone, the Ming court readjusted its military organization and filled the offices with new personnel. To preempt a conflict between the grand coordinator (*Xunfu* 巡撫, i.e. Wang Huazhen) and the military commissioner (*Jinglüe* 經略, i.e. Xiong Tingbi), the Ming court abolished the previous office and Wang Zaijin 王在晉 (?-1643) was appointed as new Liaodong Military Commissioner. Back in Beijing, Sun Chengzong 孫承宗 (1563-1638) succeeded Zhang Heming as Minister of War (*Bingbu shangshu* 兵部尚書), and Zhang Jingshi 張經世 (?-1624) was promoted to junior vice minister (*Bingbu youshilang* 兵部右侍郎). Although there was an internal conflict within the new leadership regarding the management of the Shanhai Pass, which was then the Ming's outermost defence post, the new leadership shared the consensus that Xiong Tingbi's progressive strategy was still the most viable strategy for the current situation. The previous center Guangning had been lost, pushing the Shanhai Pass to fill in the gap, meanwhile undermining the strategic importance of Tianjin due to its short distance to the Pass. Consequently, the tweak to be done was to find another strategic place to fill in the tripartite defense commands, and so Mao Wenlong's force in Chosŏn Korea re-entered the military leadership's collective vision. In June 1622, on the advice of Zhang Jingshi, the Ming court decided to relocate 3,000 soldiers from

²³⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/7/3 (1623/7/29).

Fujian, 3,100 from Zhejiang, and 8,000 from Huai-Yang 淮陽²³⁶ to Chosŏn as Mao Wenlong's reinforcements.²³⁷ Exactly how many soldiers reached Mao has never been revealed.

Nevertheless, that total of 14,100 would become the basis for determining how many soldiers would be transported by sea later that year.

3.3 Initiating Sea Shipping

As the Ming court had decided to dispatch reinforcements across the sea, the logistic planning ensued. The Ministry of Revenue soon came up with a budget plan mainly divided into two parts: one-off stipends and wages. One-off stipends (*anjiayin* 安家銀), paid to redeployed soldiers, was set at 10 taels per person, much higher than the usual price of 6 taels, for the men involved were required to cross the sea. The annual wage was set according to the standard in the Shanhai Pass: each soldier was to receive 16.8 taels of silver and 6 *shi* of grain, or, calculated in grain, about 20 *shi* every year. The Ministry rounded up the total number of soldiers to 15,000, and hence 150,000 taels of silver and 300,000 *shi* of grain were to be shipped.²³⁸

The shipping duty, as expected, was initially assigned to Yuan Keli, given that Deng-Lai had successfully managed the sea shipping in previous years. A timely rebellion within Shandong, however, provided a pretense for Yuan to evade the duty. In July 1622, Xu Hongru 徐鴻儒 (?-1622), leader of the White Lotus Sect 白蓮教, led his followers in rebellion in Juye County 巨野 in Yanzhou 兗州 Prefecture. Crushing the rebellion was in the charge of Shandong

²³⁶ The Huai-Yang area covered approximately present-day Anhui Province and the area north of the Yangzi River in current Jiangsu Province.

²³⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/5/3 (1622/6/11).

²³⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/7/7 (1622/8/13); Bi, *Duxiang shucaos*, *juan* 1, 5a; Bi Ziyuan 畢自嚴, *Duzhi zouyi* 度支奏議, vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008), 332.

Grand Coordinator Zhao Yan 趙彥, who also left a collection of memorials and military reports documenting the rebellion. According to this collection, the rebellion burst out menacingly, involving several thousand rebels in Juye and over 1,800 in Yuncheng 鄆城, a neighboring county. But until Xu Hongru was captured on December 3, 1622, the rebels remained, by and large, within Yanzhou and Dongchang 東昌 Prefectures in west Shandong (Figure 3.1).²³⁹ Zhao Yan's records provide no evidence that Yuan Keli made any tangible contribution to ending the rebellion, although almost all the provincial-level officials in Shandong received rewards from the Ming court in the end—Yuan was given the title Vice Minister of War (*Bingbu youshilang* 兵部右侍郎).²⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Yuan used this rebellion as a reason to refuse shouldering the task of sea shipping, claiming that Deng-Lai's forces needed to be constantly on the alert against the rebels. What he was willing to do was to pay 50,000 taels, and Wang Yining, as has been shown at the beginning of this chapter, was the one to take the silver to Mao Wenlong.²⁴¹

Bi Ziyang 畢自嚴 (1569-1638) eventually took over shipping duties. He was then Vice Minister of Revenue overseeing military logistics in Tianjin, the position Li Changgeng had once held. Back in 1620, when Li Changgeng was in office, Li had managed to ship 200,000 *shi* of grain from Tianjin to the Shanhai Pass by sea.²⁴² Offshore sailing along the coast was not challenging and the short distance between Tianjin and the Pass made the transport easier than the one crossing the deep. More importantly, Tianjin was a transport hub on the Grand Canal, making it easy to retain the tribute grain sent to Beijing. In principle, retaining tribute grain

²³⁹ Zhao Yan 趙彥, *Pingyao zouyi* 平妖奏議 (1621-1627?), 1b, 60a.

²⁴⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/10/7 (1623/10/30).

²⁴¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/9/29 (1622/11/2), Tianqi 2/10/4 (1622/11/6); Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 205.

²⁴² HYJS, 137.

(*jiecao* 截漕) was not allowed, of course—meeting the sea shipping quota could not be achieved at the cost of jeopardizing the capital's food security. In practice, however, when Tianjin could not afford to procure grain elsewhere, usually by purchasing grain from the local market, retaining tribute grain was conducted by default.²⁴³ This happened during Li Changgeng's tenure, and this also applied to the sea shipping conducted in 1622.

When Bi Ziyang took over the shipping duty, it was already the end of June.²⁴⁴ The sea shipping across the Bohai Sea, as mentioned, was a seasonal business. The preparation, particularly procuring grain, usually started from the previous winter and the first ships would put out to sea in the spring. Considering the temporal frame, Bi set the departure for mid-July, leaving him only half a month for preparation.²⁴⁵ The stringent time constraint did not allow him to do things from scratch.

Fortunately, the legacy of Tao Langxian made it possible for Bi's work to be completed on time. In 1620, Tao Langxian had used at least 635 ships of all sorts.²⁴⁶ Many remained in Deng-Lai after sea shipping was stopped the next year. Bi Ziyang managed to borrow 143 barges, constituting most of the ships leaving Tianjin—a total of 160.²⁴⁷ More importantly, the experienced personnel previously participating in Tao's shipping joined Bi's team. There were prominent escort officers such as Huang Yin'en 黃胤恩 and Meng Yangzhi 孟養志, as well as experienced sailors such as Wang Daolong 王道隆.²⁴⁸

²⁴³ HYJS, 137, 212.

²⁴⁴ Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 5a.

²⁴⁵ Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 7b.

²⁴⁶ HYJS, 217-219.

²⁴⁷ Bi, *Shiyinyuan canggao*, 503; *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 36a.

²⁴⁸ Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 12a, *juan* 2, 23a; HYJS, 16, 67. Huang Yin'en and Meng Yangzhi were two capable officials who won Tao Langxian's great trust at the beginning of sea shipping in 1618. Wang Daolong was a man full of drama. He was originally a fisherman in Fushan County 福山縣 in Dengzhou. Poverty drove him to

Still, the 1622 sea shipping was full of twists and turns. Initially, the Ministry of Revenue forbade Bi Ziyang to ship tribute grain. It was not because the tribute grain could not be retained, but because the Ming forces in the Shanhai Pass took priority, and the tribute grain was reserved for them. Alternatively, the Ministry promised to provide 100,000 taels for Bi Ziyang to procure grain by purchase (*zhaomai* 召買). However, the first payment came late on July 29, and there were only 30,000 taels. The first eighty ships carrying almost all the reserves from local granaries, amounting to 40,000 *shi*, had already left Tianjin on July 26. The first shipment had already been delayed, and the second shipment had to be made soon before autumn came.²⁴⁹ The current funding was insufficient to purchase enough grain to meet the shipping quota—the rice price at the time was over 0.5 tael/*shi*. Moreover, purchasing grain from afar, as has been shown before, would entail more expenditure and certainly require extra time for transshipment. Consequently, Bi Ziyang took the liberty of retaining some 70,000 *shi* of tribute rice (*caomi* 漕米) that had recently arrived in Tianjin—he was pardoned for doing so later. He also ordered the local administrations to purchase cloth, which brought in 20,000 *pi* 匹 of various types at the cost 4,500 taels. Before it was too late, the second group of eighty ships left Tianjin on August 12.

participate in Tao's shipping in 1618. Over time he was promoted within the transportation team, working closely with Huang Yin'en. In 1629, Wang was shipwrecked on Chindo 珍島, an island south off the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula. After being caught by the local people, Wang was sent to Seoul and even granted an audience with King Injo in 1630. Whether Wang eventually left Chosŏn Korea was unknown. According to the family genealogy, he is heirless. Nevertheless, his sailing experience contributed financially to his family. The Wang Clan of Fushan 福山王氏 became a magnet in the Qing dynasty, producing many degree-holders, including Wang Zhi 王鷲, Daolong's nephew, who became Minister of Revenue during Kangxi, as well as Wang Yirong 王懿榮, a 16th-generation son, who discovered the oracle bone script in 1899 during his tenure as Directorate of Education in Beijing.

²⁴⁹ Consider an ideal schedule planned by Bi Ziyang: the 3rd month, load ships; 4th, ships depart; 5th, ships reach destination; 6th, ships leave for Tianjin. See Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 3, 2b.

Eventually, Bi Ziyang managed to ship a total of some 110,000 *shi* of grain of all sorts as well as other supplies, including cloth and weapons²⁵⁰ (Table 3.1).²⁵¹

Table 3.1 Inventory of 1622 Sea Shipping Goods		
Item	Quantity	
Tribute rice 漕米	70,997 <i>shi</i> 石	
Millet 小米	2,189 <i>shi</i>	
Sorghum 高粱	5,906 <i>shi</i>	
Wheat 小麥		
Black beans 黑豆	31,700 <i>shi</i>	Total of Grain 110,792 <i>shi</i>
Yellow beans 黃豆		
Cloth 布	20,000 <i>pi</i> 匹	
Three-barrel guns 三眼槍	1,330	
Four-barrel guns 四眼槍	170	
Bamboo guns 攢竹箭	500	
Cannons 滅虜炮	200	
Bullets 鉛子	60,000	
Saltpeter 硝	10,000 <i>jin</i> 斤	
Sulphur 硫磺	2,000 <i>jin</i>	
Gunpowder 火藥	2,000 <i>jin</i>	
Axes 大斧	1,000	
Bows 大稍弓	200	
Iron arrows 大鐵箭	2,000	
Broadswords 腰刀	500	
Cattle skins 牛皮	1,000	
Horse skins 馬皮		
Ramie 苧麻	400 <i>jin</i>	

²⁵⁰ One thing worth mentioning is that the Ming court provided firearms to Mao Wenlong. After Mao died, these firearms fell into the hands of Mao's subordinates, including Kong Youde 孔有德, Geng Zhongming 耿仲明, and Shang Kexi 尚可喜. After these three surrendered to the Manchus, they turned in the weapons and greatly empowered the Manchu forces. See Huang Yi-Long 黃一農, "Wuqiao bingbian: Ming-Qing dingge de yitiao zhongyao daohuoxian" 吳橋兵變：明清鼎革的一條重要導火線, *Taiwan Qinghua xuebao* 台灣清華大學學報 42.1 (2012): 105.

²⁵¹ Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 26b, 28a, 31b, 32a, 36b; *Shiyinyuan canggao*, 531, 533.

Fish glue 魚鰾	100 <i>jin</i>	*Made from fish maw, used as an adhesive
Moso bamboo sticks 貓[毛]竹	15	
Cauldrons 大鍋	1,000	

Source: Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 29a, 31a-32b, 36ab.

Nevertheless, not all the goods were delivered. Due to delayed departures, the weather on the deep brought trouble to the ships; many were caught in windstorms. Over 17,000 *shi* of grain and about 30% of other goods were lost during shipping, while 48 ships, according to Bi's memorial, were damaged to varying degrees. The less than satisfactory result frustrated Bi Ziyang, but still the Ministry of Revenue hoped that sea shipping could be continued.²⁵²

The Ministry also hoped that the original quota could be met the next year. The amount of grain shipped in 1622 was well below the planned amount: 300,000 *shi*. The central issue, however, was financial solvency. According to Bi Ziyang's auditing, the shipping costs (*jiaojia* 腳價) alone, that is, the wages and stipends paid to the personnel and ships involved²⁵³ and the cost of materials necessary for shipping²⁵⁴, amounted to 46,910 taels. Tianjin eventually received a total of 70,000 taels from the Ministry of Revenue, leaving a remaining balance of 23,090 taels. This amount however could not cover the cost of grain and cloth used in shipping— at least 59,500 taels.²⁵⁵ Without more funding, Tianjin would not be able to continue shipping the next year.²⁵⁶

²⁵² Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 2, 23b-24a, 25b-26a, 29a, 30a, 33ab.

²⁵³ Wage refers to *gongshi* 工食, or monthly payment, the amount of which varied based on the payee's rank. Stipend refers to *chuanhuyin* 船戶銀, a one-time payment to a ship owner, the amount of which varied according to the type of ship.

²⁵⁴ For instance, *xi* 席 (straw mats) were placed under grain to keep the grain from becoming damp.

²⁵⁵ 110,000 *shi* of grain= 55,000 taels; 20,000 *pi* of cloth= 4,500 taels.

²⁵⁶ Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 1, 32b.

In light of this, Bi Ziyān tried to shift the burden to Yuan Keli, not only because Deng-Lai had more experience in sea shipping than Tianjin did, but also because Deng-Lai held a more advantageous geographic location. Ships leaving Tianjin for Chosŏn Korea had to first sail east to Dengzhou and then continue north. In the late sixteenth century, sea shipping between the Ming dynasty and Chosŏn Korea had proved extremely difficult. During the prolonged Imjin War (1592-1598), the possibility of shipping military supplies by sea had been repeatedly mentioned, but it was only implemented briefly between 1597 and 1598.²⁵⁷ Its legacy was the sea route between Dengzhou and the northwest coast of the Korean peninsula, and hence became the only option that the Ming could choose in 1622. By Bi Ziyān's calculation, cutting off the transit route between Tianjin and Dengzhou would cut shipping costs by 60% from 0.42 tael/*shi* to 0.17 tael/*shi*— after all, the one-way distance could be shortened, according to Bi, by 1,500 *li*. Based on the above reasoning, in February 1623, Bi Ziyān memorialized the throne about transferring the shipping duty from Tianjin to Deng-Lai.²⁵⁸

Yuan Keli, as expected, opposed Bi's plan. The previous Xu Hongru's rebellion was again used as an excuse. He also contended that Deng-Lai had no easy access to grain while Tianjin could retrain tribute grain,²⁵⁹ which probably was also a subterfuge because, as mentioned, Tao Langxian had already secured 600,000-*shi* of grain before sea shipping was stopped in 1621. Nevertheless, Yuan provided a reason that the Ming court could not neglect: "Deng-Lai's main focus is on military; it is not like Tianjin, whose task is to exclusively handle military logistics...and if Deng-Lai is to send troops across the sea, it cannot simultaneously ship

²⁵⁷ For a study on sea shipping during the Imjin War, see Liu, "Beyond the Land," Chapter 3.

²⁵⁸ Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 2, 38b; *juan* 3, 5b; Bi Ziyān 畢自巖, *Xiangfu shucao* 餉撫疏草, in *Siku jinhuishu congkan* 四庫禁毀書叢刊, *Shibu* 史部 75 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2000), 60; *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/1/17 (1623/2/16).

²⁵⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/1/17 (1623/2/16), Tianqi 3/3/13 (1623/4/12).

grain.” 所重尤在兵，若非津之所事專在餉...渡兵則不能運餉。²⁶⁰ Clearly, Yuan reemphasized the strategic importance of Deng-Lai in the Ming military strategy.

This reemphasis became convincing against the backdrop of Tianjin transforming into a supply station after the fall of Guangning in early 1622. The provisions shipped to Dongjiang were a mere fraction of the goods leaving Tianjin, which was also responsible for supplying the Ming forces in the Shanhai Pass. By the end of 1622, Tianjin shipped a total of 1,123,000 *shi* of grain to the Pass.²⁶¹ Tianjin’s functional transformation also meant that its offensive ability had been greatly undermined. Voices for abolishing the office of Tianjin Grand Coordinator began to be raised, and a good number of soldiers there were redeployed. Previously in 1621 Tianjin had a total strength of 20,000 soldiers; that number went down to some 4,000 in late 1622.²⁶² Tianjin’s demise meant that there would be more pressure on the Shanhai Pass. Sun Chengzong, now stationed there, hence urged Deng-Lai to shoulder more offensive responsibility in the Ming military strategy. On several occasions, Sun emphasized Deng-Lai’s strategic importance, expecting Yuan Keli could contribute his part to the war against the Manchus.²⁶³

In this vein, when Yuan Keli played the military card, the Ming court did not hesitate to relieve Deng-Lai of shipping duties. Tianjin was ordered to continue to be responsible for supplying Dongjiang in the years to come. The only leeway that the Ming court allowed was that Tianjin was able to retain tribute grain for shipping.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/1/17 (1623/2/16).

²⁶¹ Bi, *Shiyinyuan canggao*, 523.

²⁶² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/4 (1624/1/23); Bi, *Shiyinyuan canggao*, 503.

²⁶³ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/7 (1624/1/26).

²⁶⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/3/13 (1623/4/12); Bi, *Duxiang shucao*, *juan* 3, 72b.

3.4 Competition for Strategic Importance between Deng-Lai and Dongjiang

Yuan Keli understood clearly that actions speak louder than words. To convince the Ming court of Deng-Lai's strategic importance, in April 1623, Yuan dispatched Regional Commander (*Zongbing* 總兵) Shen Yourong 沈有容 (1557-1628) to cross the Bohai Sea. The target was Lüshun, the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula.²⁶⁵ Ever since the Ming court lost all its territory in Liaodong, Lüshun had been repeatedly brought up at the Ming court as a breakthrough point to penetrate the Manchu defences.²⁶⁶ This reasoning was grounded on the idea that Lüshun was easily accessible from the sea and its geography provided a natural shelter from land-based attack, because this southern tip, with the sea on three sides, was attached to the mainland by a slender bottleneck—only 10 *li* at its widest (Figure 3.3).²⁶⁷ From this vantage point, Yuan Keli was determined to take Lüshun.²⁶⁸

Yuan was not alone, however; Mao Wenlong, too, was inspired to come ashore and take Lüshun. Back in late October 1622, when Huang Yin'en eventually met Mao Wenlong, the latter and his people were sojourning in Sŏnch'ŏn 宣川, a county on the Chosŏn's northwest coast (Figure 1.1). At that time, Mao Wenlong's base was still on the mainland, and Pidao was used as an island warehouse.²⁶⁹ Mao Wenlong then had his own vision for Lüshun. In a memorial he

²⁶⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/4/8 (1623/5/6).

²⁶⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 1/5/12 (1621/7/1), Tianqi 1/7/13 (1621/8/29), Tianqi 1/10/5 (1621/11/17), Tianqi 1/12/5 (1622/1/16), Tianqi 2/8/6 (1622/6/14).

²⁶⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/2/29 (1625/4/6).

²⁶⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/4/8 (1623/5/6).

²⁶⁹ Bi, *Duxiang shucuo*, juan 2, 27a, 29a. Huang Yin'en's report kept in Bi Ziyang's memorial clarifies that Mao did not officially retreat to Pidao after October 20, 1622, the date on which Huang met Mao. Some later records contend that Mao established the defense command in Pidao earlier than that date. For example, Ji Liuqi's 計六奇 *Mingji beilue* 明季北略 claims the 5th month, and Cho Kyŏngnam's 趙應男 *Nanjung chamnok* 亂中雜錄 records the ninth month; however, neither is correct. The report about Mao's retreat to Pidao reached Seoul on December 13, 1622, suggesting that the Chosŏn local officials had been keeping an eye on Mao Wenlong the whole time. By using Ji Liuqi's record, Zhang Jinkui argues that the Chosŏn court was slow to follow Mao Wenlong's activities, but this

submitted in September 1622, he made a blueprint for further military deployment along the northeast coast of the Liaodong peninsula. The starting point was two forts, Kuandian 寬甸 and Aiyang 靉陽 west of the Yalu River, the middle part was a series of offshore islands, and the ending point was Lüshun (Table 3.2, Figure 3.3).

Table 3.2 Mao Wenlong's 1622 Military Deployment Plan			
Location	Commanding Officer	Number of Soldiers	Number of Ships
Kuandian 寬甸	Zhang En 張恩	-	-
Aiyang 靉陽	Zhang Jishan 張繼山	-	-
Ludao Island 鹿島	Cheng Zhen 程倣	1,000	20
Xiaosong Island 小松島	Lin Maochun 林茂春	1,000+	20
Shicheng Island 石城島	Liu Keshen 劉可紳	2,000	50
Changshan Island 長山島	Song Peng 宋鵬	2,000	50
Guanglu/Huanglu Island 廣/黃鹿島	Wang Xueyi 王學易	2,000	50+
Sanshan Island 三山島	Chen Dashao 陳大韶	2,000	60-70
Lüshun 旅順			

Source: *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/8/6 (1622/9/10).

seems to be incorrect. See Zhang Jinkui 張金奎, *Mingdai Shandong haifang yanjiu* 明代山東海防研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2014), 425.



Figure 3.3 Mao Wenlong's 1622 Military Deployment Plan (made with [Harvard WorldMap](#))

It was an odd deployment plan because Mao and his men had no place in it. All the commanding officers he mentioned were either from Deng-Lai or the original Ming officers in Liaodong, and the key position in Lüshun was to be held by Chen Dashao 陳大韶, Brigade Vice Commander (*Dusi* 都司) under Yuan Keli. By laying out his military vision, Mao was simply selling himself as an informed military man to the Ming court. Whether he was aware that there had been many voices at the court calling for his abandonment is unknown, but Mao

certainly did not expect too much from the Ming court. As he concluded by the end of the memorial, he was able to “recruit Liaodong soldiers...for every man I get the enemies will lose one...I beg for over 300,000 taels worth of provisions soon to be given and an official escorting and delivering them in time.” 招練遼兵...而我得一人，賊即失一人...乞速給臣餉三十餘萬，差官刻期押送。²⁷⁰ Except for the exorbitant demand in the end, this memorial was a plea for survival. Huang Ying'en brought with him provisions that Mao and his men desperately needed and, presumably, the message from military leadership that Mao and men were expected to contribute their part to the Ming military.

Stomachs full and weapons in hands, Mao and his men were ready to open a second front on the Manchus' rear. Their offshore islands were easy to occupy; they were barely inhabited and there were no Manchus stationed there. The old Ming forts near Zhenjiang were almost impossible to take, for after Mao's raid on Zhenjiang, the surrounding area began to be heavily fortified. Consequently, there was one target remaining: Lüshun. According to Mao Wenlong's military report, Mao and his men approached Lüshun several times between April and May 1623, but all attempts wound up in failure due to rough seas. Mao did however successfully incite the defection of Wang Shijie 王世傑 (aka. Wang Bing 王丙), a Ming turncoat officer who was working with the Manchus at Jinzhou Garrison 金州衛 (Lüshun was a fort in Jinzhou) (Figure 3.4). Mao requested a collaboration from within and planned a raid some day in June. An officer named Tang Yaoqing 唐堯卿 somehow uncovered the plot and leaked the information to the Manchus.²⁷¹ Jinzhou happened to be inhabited mainly by Liaodong people, whom the

²⁷⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/8/6 (1622/9/10).

²⁷¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/4/8 (1623/5/6). Mao's report was later confirmed by Yuan Keli. See *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/7/26 (1623/8/21).

Manchus had forcibly relocated from the area west of the Liao River in 1622 (Chapter 2.3). Rumors about an uprising and the escape of Liaodong people in the area soon went around and resulted in a Manchu retaliation. Between June 9 and June 28, 1623, the Manchu troops led by Nurhaci's second son Daišan 代善 (1583-1648) slaughtered almost all the adult men in Jinzhou and Fuzhou 復州 (south of Jinzhou), numbering to about 20,000, and brought back many women, children, and other draft animals to Liaoyang.²⁷² Soon after, the remaining population in the area, as well as all the people in Gaizhou 蓋州, were ordered to move north to Haizhou 海州, closer to Liaoyang for better surveillance.²⁷³ Consequently, the southern part of coastal Liaodong (Jinzhou, Fuzhou, and Gaizhou) was generally depopulated and Lüshun was left defenseless. Mao Wenlong and his men hence took the opportunity. Zhang Pan 張盤 (?-1625), one of Mao's senior officers, raided Lüshun and took it with ease.²⁷⁴

It was after Zhang Pan took Lüshun that Shen Yourong reached his destination. Negotiations over further actions began. Zhang was eager to follow up his recent victory, march north, and occupy the entire area of Jinzhou. He hoped Shen could lend him a helping hand. In contrast, Shen took pride in himself as a Regional Commander (*Zongbing* 總兵) and by no means was he willing to take commands from Zhang Pan, who held the low-rank official title of Assistant Brigade Commander (*Shoubei* 守備). Moreover, Shen foresaw that the Manchus would

²⁷² Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., *Neige cangben manwen laodang* 內閣藏本滿文老檔 (Shenyang: Minzu chubanshe, 2009), 187. Some studies suggest that the 1623 massacre by the Manchus was also related to Liu Xingzuo 劉興祚 (aka. Liu Aita 劉愛塔), a Han Banner officer overseeing southern Liaodong, because Nurhaci suspected Liu of participating in Mao Wenlong's plot. For instance, see Jiang Shoupeng 姜守鵬, "Liu xingzuo shiji bukao" 劉興祚事跡補考, *Dongbei shifan daxue xuebao* (*zhexue shehui kexue ban*) 東北師範大學學報 (哲學社會科學版) 5 (1984): 79; Zhang, *Mingdai Shandong haifang yanjiu*, 406.

²⁷³ MWLD, 520, 525-526.

²⁷⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/10/4 (1623/10/27); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 15.

not let go of the insult, and their forces combined were not enough to control the whole area of Jinzhou. Disagreement between the two resulted in Shen Yourong's retreat to Shuangdao 雙島 (Figure 1.1), an island off Lüshun's coast.²⁷⁵

However, Shen Yourong's retreat did not frustrate Zhang Pan's plan for aggression. On the night of July 29, 1623, Zhang led his force to raid Jinzhou 金州 (Figure 3.4), where there were only 500 men stationed. Mao Wenlong's military report portrayed this victory as a big triumph, highlighting the booty his men acquired: 138 Manchu soldiers' heads and many firearms.²⁷⁶ What Mao downplayed was the fact that Zhang Pan soon deserted Jinzhou and retreated to Lüshun. According to Shen Yourong's report, on September 25, the Manchus in large numbers came to Jinzhou, killed 200 of Mao's men, and burnt down the city.²⁷⁷ Clearly, the Manchus were implementing a scorched-earth policy. While they temporarily gave up the littoral and chose to focus on control of the core Liaodong region, the Manchus certainly did not want their enemies to be able to extract coastal resources and establish strongholds, causing trouble in the long run.²⁷⁸

The setback in Jinzhou led to an open quarrel at the Ming court. Mao Wenlong memorialized the throne to blame the nonaction of Shen Yourong and Yuan Keli. The latter, in

²⁷⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/7 (1624/1/26).

²⁷⁶ Specifically, 1,014 various types of guns and cannons, 560 *jin* of gunpowder, and 1,302 bullets. See Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 15.

²⁷⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/10/4 (1623/10/27).

²⁷⁸ Depopulation and scorched-earth policy were what the Manchus implemented to manage the Liaodong littorals. Geography certainly played a role. The core area of Liaodong that the Manchus controlled was a low-lying plain sandwiched between the Liao River in the west and the Qianshan Mountain in the east. For the Manchus then, the southern and western coasts of Liaodong were neither easily accessible nor as fertile as the core area they controlled. Before they had their own navy and eliminated the potential threat from the sea, giving up and depopulating the littoral perhaps was the most administratively economical choice to make. Hence, once they subjugated the Chosŏn and destroyed Dongjiang, the borders were extended closer to the coast and the population was relocated to staff the area.

contrast, denounced the rash advance of Mao Wenlong's forces. Eventually in late October 1623, the Ming court picked Mao's side, rewarding him with 100 tael of silver and an embroidered robe (*mangyi* 蟒衣) and promising to allot 30,000 taels to subsidize his force.²⁷⁹ On the other hand, Shen Yourong was ordered to go back to Deng-Lai and was subsequently dismissed from office.²⁸⁰

The Ming court did so not without a rationale. The setback in Jinzhou could not gloss over the fact that Lüshun was now under Ming control. Lüshun, as mentioned, had often been regarded as a breakthrough point to the Manchu defense in Liaodong. Since Mao Wenlong managed to take it, an accomplishment that no one else could achieve, although the Manchus should be credited for depopulating the area, it would make no sense to discourage Mao and his men. More importantly, that Mao Wenlong's forces proved their ability to get a foothold in the Manchu-controlled region refashioned their strategic importance in the Ming military. Zhang Jingshi's previous advice of making Mao Wenlong's forces in Chosŏn Korea as one of the tripartite in the Ming strategy was no longer an illusory hypothesis, but rather a feasible plan that could stand the test, as least in the foreseeable future.

After Mao Wenlong took Lüshun, Sun Chengzong, who was then commander-in-chief of the Ming military, made it explicit that the total strength of Mao Wenlong's army "should be increased to 20,000, or 12,000, so that they could form a defense command." 務足二萬，或萬二千，以成一鎮. Sun officially recognized the candidacy of Mao's force in the tripartite organization. In addition, in response to the criticism of Shen Yourong and Yuan Keli, Sun Chengzong made a compromise. Previously Deng-Lai had been expected to launch cross-sea

²⁷⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/10/4 (1623/10/27).

²⁸⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/8 (1624/1/27).

combat, but now its function was to “ward off the enemies attacking southwards” 備賊南寇.²⁸¹ Deng-Lai’s function thus was transformed from offense to defense. This was the new “three-pronged advance” strategy, in which the Shanhai Pass was the center responsible for frontal assault, Deng-Lai played the defensive role protecting the Ming mainland, and Mao Wenlong’s forces were to outflank the Manchus from the rear.

What the Ming court failed to foresee was that their faith in Mao Wenlong was misplaced. Soon after the battles of Lüshun and Jinzhou, on August 31, 1623, Mao submitted another military report regarding an alleged triumph. Mao contended that between July 13 and July 17, Mao Chenglu 毛承祿 (?-1632), his adopted son, led 5,000 men to engage the Manchus at Manp'o 滿浦 and Ch'angsöng 昌城, two Chosön counties near the Yalu River (Figure 1.1). Greatly outnumbered by the Manchus numbering 50,000, Mao’s forces achieved a landslide victory, causing a death toll of over 20,000 soldiers and 30,000 horses.²⁸² The Chosön local reports to Seoul, in contrast, suggested that Mao’s alleged triumphs were merely small skirmishes. Accordingly, in Manp'o, eleven of Mao’s men came ashore and killed five Manchus who happened to be in the area. In Ch'angsöng, it was reported that a group of Mao’s men numbering 800 appeared in the area and some of them were captured by the Manchus when they were roaming along the border.²⁸³ What was reported to King Injo certainly would not be forwarded to the Ming court. At the time, King Injo, who ascended the throne through a palace coup, was trying to please Mao Wenlong, hoping that Mao could lobby on his behalf at the Ming

²⁸¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/7 (1624/1/26).

²⁸² Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 16-19.

²⁸³ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 1/9/4 (1623/9/27), Injo 1/9/5 (1623/9/28), Injo 1/10/6 (1623/10/29). It is worth mentioning that as far as I know, there is no record about any military clashes in Manp'o or Ch'angsöng in the extant Manchu archives.

court for political support (for details, see Chapter 4.1). However, what was reported in Mao's military report was so exaggerated that anyone with common sense would doubt it.

Yuan Keli was among those who became suspicious. He already took offense at Mao's occupation of Lüshun—he could have taken credit for that achievement if Zhang Pan took Lüshun before Mao did. Hence this time, he did not hesitate to impeach Mao, for making a false report. In a tactful way, he contended that “As for the matters in Manp'o and Ch'angsōng, the real achievements should be measured based on the acquired booty, including the enemies' heads, reports of spies, enemies' weapons, and so on. Mao Wenlong did not engage the enemy and cause the deaths of over 20,000 enemies and 30,000 horses; these numbers cannot be verified after all.” 至於滿浦、昌城之舉，當以趕殺首級、獲奸細、夷器等項為實功，而不交一鋒，致奴死二萬餘人、馬三萬匹，其數終有不可靠。²⁸⁴

However, Yuan's impeachment did not lead to his intended result—the Ming court somehow did not push for a further investigation, probably because Sun Chengzong supported Mao and valued the strategic importance of his force.²⁸⁵ Rather, it incurred retaliation from Mao Wenlong. Mao bribed and instigated Censor Fang Youdu 方有度 to impeach Yuan.²⁸⁶ Mao was able to do so because Fang and Yuan had borne grudges against each other since 1622. In that year, Yuan publicly denounced an officer named Wang Chongxiao 汪崇孝, whom Fang recommended to Mao Wenlong.²⁸⁷ How exactly Fang impeached Yuan remains unknown, but

²⁸⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/10/4 (1623/10/27).

²⁸⁵ Sun's support for Mao can be shown in his letter to Mao, as well as in the letter to Senior Grand Secretary Ye Xiangao 葉向高. See *Sun Chengzong ji*, 688, 707.

²⁸⁶ Wang Duo 王鐸, *Nishanyuan xuanji* 擬山園選集, in *Beijing tushuguan guji zhenbencongan* 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊, vol. 111 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2000), 701; Lu Shihua 陸時化, *Wuyue suojian shuhualu* 吳越所見書畫錄, in *Xuxiu siku quanshu* 續修四庫全書, vol. 1383 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 264.

²⁸⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/8/24 (1622/9/28), Tianqi 2/9/29 (1622/11/2).

the result is that Yuan Keli was dismissed from office in April 1624 and Wu Zhiwang 武之望 (1552-1629) succeeded him.²⁸⁸ Yuan Keli's futile impeachment and the subsequent indulgence of the Ming court in the summer of 1623 fueled his greed and emboldened Mao to make more false reports in the future.

3.5 Sea Shipping Expanded in Scale

Before long, in late 1623, the second instance of Mao's selfish desire appeared. Between September and November, Mao Wenlong submitted several memorials, asking for more provisions to be delivered. Judging from his memorials, the provisions he had received that year frustrated him. Bi Ziyang had shipped some 123,000 *shi* of grain, 20,000 *pi* of cloth, and other goods, but the goods that were actual delivered were fewer: 109,361 *shi* of grain and 17,750 *pi* of cloth; presumably some were lost at sea. From Bi Ziyang's perspective, this was the best he could do. The shipping cost had to be paid off before departure, and he only received 50,000 taels from the Ministry of Revenue that year. Given that the shipping price was 0.42 tael/*shi*, the silver was only enough for shipping 119,000 *shi*. In addition, only 80,100 *shi* of tribute rice was available for this shipping; the rest of the grain and cloth were paid by local finance.²⁸⁹

But Mao Wenlong did not know about Bi Ziyang's difficulties. Even if he did, however, he likely would not have cared. He was more interested in attracting investment from the Ming. According to his memorials, a total of over 370,000 Liaodong people had come to him for refuge. By the end of 1623, he had a total of 36,039 soldiers, and there were over 6,000 horses and mules. Mao contended that he would like to conscript more soldiers from the Liaodong

²⁸⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 4/3/3 (1624/4/20), Tianqi 4/3/17 (1624/5/4).

²⁸⁹ Bi, *Duxiang shucaoyuan*, juan 3, 72b-75b; Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 106.

people, expanding the total strength to 50,000. Consequently, by his calculation, one million taels worth of provisions were needed every year.²⁹⁰

Mao Wenlong's exorbitant demand put the Ministry of Revenue in a difficult position. Over the course of 1623, natural disasters never stopped hitting the north China plain. In March and April, two earthquakes hit Shandong.²⁹¹ During the summer, rainstorms drenched North and Northeast China, as well as Northwest Korea.²⁹² The subsequent disaster relief and tax exemption further strained the already stringent central finance. For instance, the Liaodong Surtax (*Liaoxiang* 遼餉) collected in grain from Dongchang and Yanzhou (Figure 3.1) in 1623 was cut down by 90%.²⁹³ Nevertheless, the Ministry of Revenue could not turn a deaf ear to Mao's request; after all Mao's forces were now part of the tripartite strategy. While the Ministry could not afford to pay one million taels as requested, the bottom line was to ensure the survival of Mao's soldiers. 4.8 *shi* of grain was deemed sufficient to feed a soldier for a whole year. Considering Mao's plan of having a total strength of 50,000, the Ministry decided that the shipping quota for 1624 was 200,000 *shi*.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁰ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 20, 28, 30. Also see Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 55.

²⁹¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/2/6 (1623/3/6), Tianqi 3/3/16 (1623/4/15).

²⁹² *Sun Chengzong ji*, 888; *Injo sillok*, Injo 1/6/29 (1623/7/26); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 13.

²⁹³ Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 83. Levied to pay the rising military cost in Liaodong, the Liaodong Surtax was a series of land tax increases assessed in most areas of the country starting from November 1618. The total area of the registered land was then 7 million *mu*. The Liaodong Surtax involved twelve provinces and two capital regions. Guizhou 貴州 was excluded due to the rebellion of the Mao 苗 people. The land tax increases were put into effect through three successive orders from 1618 through 1620 and each new increase overrode the old. The initial surtax rate in 1618 was 0.0035 tael per *mu*, 2 million tael of silver was to be extracted nationwide. The rates followed were 0.0035 and 0.002, and the surtax amounts were 4 million and 5 million. Thereafter, the Liaodong Surtax continued to be collected until the early eighteenth century; it was known as the *Jiuliyin* 九釐銀 in the Qing dynasty. For a comprehensive study, see Lin Meiling 林美玲, *Wanming Liaoxiang yanjiu* 晚明遼餉研究 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2007).

²⁹⁴ Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 94. It is worth mentioning that this amount of food ration was lower than that in the Shanhai Pass: 6 *shi* per year. How the Ministry of Revenue came up with 4.8 *shi*/year is unknown.

Although the shipping quota, from the perspective of the Ministry of Revenue, had been cut down to the lowest amount, Bi Ziyān found it impossible to complete. More goods to be shipped meant more ships and personnel would be needed, as well as more shipping costs to be paid. The sea shipping in the previous two years had drained the resources and talents in Tianjin. 17 ships were destroyed en route and another 40 needed repairs. Huang Yin'en, the leading escort officer, fell sick from overwork and was too ill to serve. Besides, the payments from the Ministry of Revenue never came in time or in full, delaying the shipping schedule and draining local finances.²⁹⁵

Compared to the issue of grain, however, these were trivial problems. The aforementioned natural disasters in 1623 caused a huge decrease in the amount of tribute grain sent to Tianjin in 1624. Previously, the amount was 700,000 *shi*. Priority was given to supply the Ming soldiers in the Shanhai Pass, hence 600,000 *shi* was transshipped there, leaving 100,000 *shi* for sea shipping. The amount of tribute grain reaching Tianjin in 1624 was estimated to be 500,000 *shi*— the decrease was mostly due to the tax arrears in Dongchang and Yanzhou. Bi Ziyān had worked hard to secure 100,000 *shi* for sea shipping, but a 100,00-*shi* shortfall remained.

To fill this gap, Bi Ziyān devised a method called *huikong eryun* 回空二運. That is, after delivering the goods shipped from Tianjin, the empty ships would go to Dengzhou, pick up the grain procured there, and make a second shipment. Hence, each ship was responsible for two shipments, hence fewer ships in total were needed and the cost of the second shipment was cut down, due to the shortened distance, by 0.25 tael/ *shi* (59.5%; the shipping cost for the first shipment was 4.2 tael/ *shi*). This would save a total of 25,000 taels on shipping costs, and this

²⁹⁵ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 57, 66.

amount could in turn be used to procure 50,000 *shi* of rice in Deng-Lai, as the market price there was 0.5 tael/ *shi*. The remaining grain, according to Bi Ziyang, could come from three sources: over 10,000 *shi* which fell from ships and washed up on the Deng-Lai shores in the previous years; 31,000 *shi* of tribute grain on the Huitong Canal 會通河, the part of Grand Canal in Shandong; and some 4,500 *shi* of wheat stored in Caicun 蔡村 (Figure 3.3), a locale in Yanzhou²⁹⁶—all could be shipped from ports in Deng-Lai. Through this strategy, Bi Ziyang was able to scrape together enough grain to meet the shipping quota.²⁹⁷

Considering the previous reluctance of Yuan Keli, who was then still in office, to be involved in shipping duties, Bi Ziyang wrote specifically to Yuan and specified that he would only be required to send administrative orders, urging local functionaries to purchase grain from the market; the actual coordination work would be done by an official named Zhu Kongshao 朱孔韶 dispatched from Tianjin. Moreover, all the operations and shipping costs would be shouldered by Tianjin; Yuan Keli would not be bothered.²⁹⁸

Still, purchasing grain from Deng-Lai did not go well. The Ministry of Revenue ordered the Shandong Provincial Administration Commission to provide the funding allocated from tax revenue that the Commission was expected to submit for that year. However, the Commission could not afford to pay in full. In addition, the aforementioned three sources of grain were somehow never shipped. Eventually, only some 13,766 *shi* of grain left Deng-Lai, and Tianjin shipped 181,498 *shi*—the amount in excess of the 100,000-*shi* limit, 77,300 *shi*, was borrowed

²⁹⁶ Bi Ziyang did not specify this source; presumably it was part of the grain tax that Yanzhou owed to the Ministry of Revenue in 1623.

²⁹⁷ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 57-61.

²⁹⁸ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 60.

from the tribute grain expected to be shipped to the Shanhai Pass.²⁹⁹ The less grain was shipped from Deng-Lai, the higher the shipping costs would be. By Bi Ziyang's calculation, the shipping cost for 1624 amounted to 71,500 taels, which could have been limited to 59,000 taels if Shandong shared more responsibility.³⁰⁰ By the end of 1624, Bi only received a total of 48,500 taels from the Ministry of Revenue, running a deficit of 23,000 taels.³⁰¹

Bi Ziyang was much annoyed by the situation, which, by every standard, made sea shipping unsustainable. He sought to find a way to secure more resources for future tasks. In November 1624, he memorialized the throne partially as a response to Sun Chengzong's earlier memorial indirectly criticizing him for not preparing the military logistics in advance and appropriating the tribute grain reserved for the Shanhai Pass.³⁰² The real purpose, however, was to discuss the possibility of pursuing payments of the tax balances that Dongchang and Yanzhou had accrued over the years. According to Bi's memorial, these two prefectures had accumulated debts to the Ministry of Revenue since 1616. For the years between 1616 and 1619, there were tax arrears assessed in silver of over 20,000 taels. For the period from 1620 to 1623, tax arrears assessed in grain amounted to 120,000 *shi*. Bi Ziyang hoped that Dongchang and Yanzhou could provide 200,000-*shi* of grain for sea shipping the next year.³⁰³ Admittedly, as mentioned, Dongchang and Yanzhou were troubled by Xu Hongru's rebellion in 1622 and the consecutive natural disasters in 1623, both of which caused huge economic losses in Shandong. The subsequent grain purchase went well, because Bi Ziyang was generous enough to allow a mark-up

²⁹⁹ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 90-93, 169, 188. The borrowed amount was paid by the grain tax that Dongchang and Yanzhou owed in 1623. See Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 129.

³⁰⁰ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 155.

³⁰¹ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 256.

³⁰² For the full memorial, see *Sun Chengzong ji*, 1084-1086.

³⁰³ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 169-171.

of 0.3 tael/*shi* on top of the local market price at 0.7 tael/*shi*. With this price incentive, Dongchang and Yanzhou managed to meet the quota by the end of 1624.³⁰⁴

The newly procured grain could have made the 1625 sea shipping easier, but the increased grain demand in the Shanhai Pass added a new twist. Ever since Sun Chengzong took over the Ming military commandership in late 1622, he sought to adopt a new forward plan and tried to push the Ming defence line beyond the Shanhai Pass. One important result of this plan was the construction of the Guan-Ning Defence Line 關寧防線. It was the Maginot Line of the Ming dynasty, which involved the construction and renovation of 9 cities and 45 fortresses in the area between the Shanhai Pass to Ningyuan 寧遠 (Figure 2.1).³⁰⁵ As the construction of this defensive line was expected to be completed in 1625, there would be a troop increase from 113,000 to 134,000, and hence more grain was needed. The newly procured grain from Dongchang and Yanzhou was consequently reserved, and Bi Ziyang had to come up with a new method of putting together the provisions that Mao Wenlong and his people direly needed.³⁰⁶

Tao Langxian again became a solution to Bi Ziyang's difficulties. Ever since Tao had been dismissed from office, impeachments against him were unrelenting. The main sticking point was the 30,000-tael fund that Liang Zhiyuan had previously received for his mission to Chosŏn Korea (Chapter 2.4). Since Liang came back without any achievement, the fund he received should have been remitted to the Ming court. This financial affair wound up in disorder and no one knew where the silver went. Nevertheless, Tao Langxian was implicated in the affair; it was after all he who recommended Liang Zhiyuan to go to Chosŏn. The initial impeachment against

³⁰⁴ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 205.

³⁰⁵ Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., *Mingshi* 明史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), *juan* 250, 6472.

³⁰⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/8/20 (1626/10/9); Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 181; *Shiyinyuan canggao*, 531.

Tao claimed that he together with Liang embezzled 200,000 taels in military funding from Deng-Lai.³⁰⁷ After Tao was imprisoned, the alleged amount that supposedly Tao embezzled topped 400,000 taels.³⁰⁸ All of the intrigue seemed as if the Ming court was simply finding more scapegoats for the loss of Guangning in 1622; after all Tao had been a close ally of Xiong Tingbi. In this environment, a cloud of corruption seemed to follow Tao wherever he went. Almost all the offices that he had served were left trying to recover the illicit money he had embezzled. Even in his home province of Zhejiang where he briefly held a position in Wuhu 蕪湖 between 1611 and 1613, Zhejiang Grand Coordinator Pan Ruzhen 潘汝禎 (1573-1627) turned in Tao's allegedly ill-gotten gains amounting to 23,416 taels.³⁰⁹ Deng-Lai, the origin of all the fuss, was no exception, of course. Consequently, endorsed by both the Ministry of Revenue and Punishment, Bi Ziyang demanded Deng-Lai to recover the illicit funds and use them to purchase 100,000 *shi* of grain for sea shipping. This was a demand that Grand Coordinator Wu Zhiwang could not find an excuse not to fulfill.

Tao Langxian's embezzlement had always been a false event. Hence, Deng-Lai could not afford to pay the grain that Bi demanded. Following an audit, Wu Zhiwang scraped together a sum of 13,250 taels, only enough to purchase 24,570 *shi* of rice. For the remaining grain, the Ministry of Revenue then ordered Wu Zhiwang to borrow the tax revenue that Dengzhou and Laizhou were expected to turn in that year and to repay the loans with more illicit money to be recovered. The Ministry warned that "The local official (Wu Zhiwang) must not prevaricate or

³⁰⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/3/12 (1626/4/22).

³⁰⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/3/5 (1625/4/11).

³⁰⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/6+/21 (1628/8/12).

evade his duty and hence delay the shipping task any further.” 該地方官自不得枝梧推諉，以誤運務。³¹⁰

Eventually, Deng-Lai fell short of its quota. Wu Zhiwang managed with an effort to put together 67,000 *shi* of various grain.³¹¹ Later, Wu memorialized the throne to ask for a relief of the shipping duty only to be ruthlessly refused by the Ming court. The rationale was that Deng-Lai was only to be responsible for preparing the grain, while all the other matters related to the shipping were in the charge of Tianjin. The only leeway the Ming court allowed was that Qingzhou 青州 (Figure 3.1), the prefecture west of Laizhou, was ordered to share the task of preparing grain. This was to revive the precedent that Tao Langxian initiated in 1620, during which Qingzhou alone contributed 93,000 *shi* for sea shipping.³¹² Thereafter, the distribution of labor between Tianjin and Deng-Lai remained unchanged until 1627 when Yuan Chonghuan decided to impose an economic sanction on Pidao in order to get rid of Mao Wenlong (for details, see Chapter 5.2).

3.6 Competing for Control of Lüshun

Before Bi Ziyang could deliver provisions in the summer of 1625,³¹³ Mao Wenlong and his people were facing hunger. Mao repeatedly sent letters and dispatched officials to Seoul urging King Injo to provide food aid. The starving Liaodong people in large numbers would come ashore, looking for food and causing trouble (for details, see Chapter 4.3). This was not only because the

³¹⁰ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 254-257.

³¹¹ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 106; Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 304.

³¹² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/11/2 (1625/12/1); HYJS, 281.

³¹³ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 305.

grain shipped from the Ming dynasty barely made ends meet, but also because the grain delivered to Mao's force in the previous year had been, by and large, lost to the Manchus.

It was at Mao Wenlong's behest that the grain shipped by sea in 1624 should be delivered first to Lüshun. By July 1624, Zhang Pan stationed there had received at least 180,000 *shi* of grain, 20,000 *pi* of cloth, a considerable number of weapons, and other provisions.³¹⁴ The concentration of resources in Lüshun was due to the on-going military construction there. Soon after Zhang Pan took Lüshun in June 1623, Mao Wenlong aspired to reconstruct the city there into a fortified stronghold and even thought about moving his base from Pidao to Lüshun. Priority was given to strengthening the defenses. The specific plan was first to dig a canal stretching over the bottleneck that linked Lüshun with the Liaodong peninsula. The canal would fill in with sea water, turning it into a moat defending against attacks from the north. Watchtowers and military fortifications would be set up along the canal for better defence. In addition, an outer city would be constructed. This was to utilize the geography south of the Lüshun city: a funnel-shape space with a hooper opening (*hulukou* 葫蘆口) to the sea. The outer citadel would be a heavily fortified walled space built of brick and stone, and there would be an attached channel to the seaport in the south. The idea was that once enemies breached the defence in the north, Mao's people could find a shelter in this outer city or flee into the sea.³¹⁵

Mao Wenlong's plan of the military constructions pleased the emperor. What was at stake then was funding. Mao certainly did not want to pay for construction from his own pocket and hence urged the Ministry of War to allocate extra funding. In light of this, the Ministry made a decision that Deng-Lai should pay the bill. Therefore, starting from 1624, at the behest of Sun

³¹⁴ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 93.

³¹⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/2/29 (1625/4/6); Chen Renxi 陳仁錫, *Chen taishi wumengyuan chuji* 陳太史無夢園初集, in *Siku jinhuishu congkan* 四庫禁燬書叢刊, *Jibu* 集部 59 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2000), 251-252.

Chengzong, Deng-Lai's military funding was increased by 200,000 taels so that more soldiers could be recruited. But the change of personnel—Yuan Keli was succeeded by Wu Zhiwang—in the middle of the year meant that the further recruitment was never initiated, and, from the perspective of the Ministry of Revenue, the stipend was left unused. The newly appointed Grand Coordinator Wu Zhiwang took offense at the Ministry's decision. For Wu, that Deng-Lai paid the construction not only encroached on its own revenue, but also placed Deng-Lai in a subordinate role *vis a vis* Mao Wenlong's forces. However, Wu Zhiwang eventually compromised—why he did so is unknown, but by the end of 1624, Deng-Lai delivered a total of 20,000 taels.³¹⁶

Construction officially began in November 1624 and soon attracted the attention of the Manchus.³¹⁷ On February 10, 1625, Manggūltai, the fifth son of Nurhaci, led a force of 6,000 and attacked Lüshun. Zhang Pan was captured alive, but Zhu Guochang 朱國昌, another of Mao's officer in Lüshun, fought to the death. The Manchus slaughtered the city and then left. Four days after the initial attack, the Manchus came again, took away all the provisions accumulated there and other booty that could be seized, and burnt down all the structures before leaving.³¹⁸

Mao Wenlong's setback gave rise to Deng-Lai's renewed interest in Lüshun. As mentioned, Yuan Keli's failed attempt at controlling Lüshun led to his demotion and the functional transformation of Deng-Lai from offense to defense. Wu Zhiwang saw Mao's failure as an opportunity to fulfill his own ambition as well as to revive the glory of Deng-Lai. Besides, Deng-Lai had already invested 20,000 taels in Lüshun, it was about time to harvest what was

³¹⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/2/29 (1625/4/6); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 106.

³¹⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 4/9/29 (1624/11/9).

³¹⁸ MWLD, 624; *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/2/29 (1625/4/6); Mao blamed the setback in Lüshun on spies, but this contention cannot be verified. See Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 46-47.

invested. In April 1625, Wu Zhiwang memorialized the throne to propose a redeployment in Lüshun and the coastal islands. Central to the proposal was that Deng-Lai should send forces to garrison in Lüshun, while Mao's men should retreat to the islands in the southwest focusing on controlling the littoral between Guanglu Island and Pidao.

Wu's alleged rationale was the long distance between Mao's base in Pidao and Lüshun, making correspondence and the shipping of reinforcements time consuming and difficult. In contrast, the straight-line distance, as Wu contended, between Dengzhou and Lüshun was much shorter. In addition, Deng-Lai could use Huangcheng Island 皇城島 midway between the two locales as a transitional hub and a communication station. If Lüshun was in danger, Deng-Lai would be notified immediately and be able to send reinforcements from Dengzhou or Huangcheng in time.³¹⁹ Wu Zhiwang's rationale was not wrong. The sea route between Lüshun and Pidao covered over 650 *li*, but the distance between Dengzhou and Lüshun was only 560 *li*. More importantly, Huangcheng was 230 *li* south of Lüshun, while one needed to travel 350 *li* from Lüshun to Guanglu 廣鹿, the nearest island that Mao Wenlong controlled (Figure 3.4).³²⁰

³¹⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/3/7 (1625/4/13).

³²⁰ Liu, "Beyond the Land," 163, 165.




Figure 3.4 Location of Dengzhou, Huangcheng, Lüshun, Guanglu, Jinzhou, and Pidao (made with [Harvard WorldMap](#))

A consideration of geography, however, was not the sole reason that both Ministries of Revenue and War swiftly approved Wu Zhiwang's proposal. The crucial incentive was finance. Not only did Wu propose to garrison soldiers in Huangcheng and Lüshun, but also promised to continue the military constructions that Mao Wenlong had failed to complete. All the expenditures entailed, as Wu promised, would be charged to the regular military budget of Deng-Lai, amounting to 400,000 taels.³²¹ From the perspective of the Ming court, Wu Zhiwang's generosity was in sharp contrast to Mao Wenlong's greediness. Soon after the defeat in Lüshun, Mao began to send several military reports reporting captures and booty from small-scale clashes with the Manchus, asking the Ming court to send rewards. On other occasions, Mao would unabashedly complain about the dearth of provision. In a military report submitted in April, for

³²¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/4/6 (1625/5/11).

instance, Mao told a dramatic story about how a windstorm caused fires that burnt down many of his barracks and resulted in huge losses of grain and other military provisions. Mao hoped that the Ming court would provide relief and aid immediately.³²² These stories could have been true, but nevertheless could not be verified. Hence, seen from the Ming court, Mao was simply finding every excuse to request more provisions and supplies. A worse scenario was that if Lüshun continued to be in the charge of Mao Wenlong, he could use the military reconstruction and redeployment there as a bargaining chip to press for more investments from the Ming court. But now, since the Ming court did not need to allocate extra funding for defending Lüshun, it was more than happy to approve Wu Zhiwang's proposal and let Deng-Lai take over the defense of Lüshun.³²³

After receiving the Ming court's approval in May 1625, Wu Zhiwang began to dispatch his own men to garrison in Lüshun in replacement of Mao's forces stationed there. The subsequent transitional period however went disastrously wrong. Although a group of Mao's forces were stationed at Lüshun, Wu's forces would not arrive for another month. Consequently, how to manage Mao's soldiers became a thorny issue. The Manchus scorched the area, making Lüshun a deserted wasteland. Hence, without external provisions, Mao's men could hardly survive. On the one hand, from the perspective of Mao Wenlong, since the defense of Lüshun was now to be conducted by Deng-Lai, supplying the Ming forces there became Wu Zhiwang's responsibility. On the other hand, Wu Zhiwang contended that the current Ming soldiers in Lüshun were Mao's subordinates. Moreover, shipping supplies by sea took time. Hence, he

³²² Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 46-48.

³²³ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/4/6 (1625/5/11).

memorialized the throne in June, hoping that Mao could continue his supply. This memorial was approved by the Ming court.³²⁴

What Wu Zhiwang did not foresee was that Mao Wenlong would make use of the court's approval to take back control of Lüshun. In July, under the pretense of supplying his force, Mao dispatched Zhang Jishan 張繼善 and three other officers to garrison at Lüshun. Mao's forces should have withdrawn from Lüshun, but by the end of the month when Wu's officer Zhang Pann 張攀 (cf. Zhang Pan 張盤, Mao's officer in Lüshun who was captured by the Manchus) leading a group of 2,000 arrived, the number of Mao's soldiers increased instead.³²⁵

Confrontation between the two sides burst out in Lüshun and soon extended to Beijing. Initially there were more supporters of Wu Zhiwang. Censor Ye Yousheng 葉有聲 (1583-1661), for instance, impeached Mao Wenlong for changing the existing plan of the Ming court, jeopardizing the safety of Lüshun,³²⁶ but what Zhang Pann subsequently did helped to sway the opinion of the court. In order to isolate Mao's men in Lüshun, Zhang took the liberty of leading his force to retreat to Huangcheng Island (Figure 3.4). This recklessness provided ammunition to Mao, who severely attacked Zhang for "deserting the military zone, leaving it defenseless, and flouting the law as if it was useless." 棄信地為赤地，藐王法為弁髦。"On whose order did you withdraw?" 奉何明文撤調? Mao interrogated, directing particular venom at Wu Zhiwang.³²⁷ Wu's subsequent response furtherer added another twist. In October, Wu Zhiwang proposed to establish a fourth defense command in Lüshun. Both Deng-Lai and Mao Wenlong would

³²⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/5/11 (1625/6/15).

³²⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/7/3 (1625/8/5).

³²⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/9/9 (1625/10/9).

³²⁷ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 57.

dispatch forces coordinated by a new Grand Coordinator.³²⁸ Wu's proposal was to fight for Deng-Lai's place in Lüshun, but it lost sight of the very reason why the Ming court had allowed Deng-Lai to take over Lüshun at the beginning of the drama: finance. Establishing a fourth defense command required investments from the Ming court and hence by no means would the Ming court deem Wu's proposal as an option.

However, before the Ming court could make a clear stand, in September 1625, the Manchus attacked Lüshun again, which forced Mao Wenlong to withdraw all his soldiers to nearby islands.³²⁹ After so many twists and turns, things went back to where they had started: the Ming was still struggling to secure a foothold in Liaodong. The final result of the confrontation between Mao Wenlong and Wu Zhiwang was that the latter was transferred to another post in Nanjing in January 1626, and Li Song 李嵩 became the new Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator.³³⁰ As for Lüshun, the Ming court decided that the locale was in Dongjiang's jurisdiction and expected Mao Wenlong to re-establish it as a stronghold, from which the Ming force could launch a counter-offensive against the Manchus. But clearly, Mao Wenlong never managed to meet that expectation. In the following years, there emerged a pattern whereby some of Mao Wenlong's troops would garrison in Lüshun but retreat when the Manchus came to force them out, holding only nominal control of this locale.

³²⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/9/6 (1625/10/6).

³²⁹ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 61.

³³⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/12/22 (1626/1/28), Tianqi 5/12/24 (1626/1/30).

3.7 Conflicts between Mao Wenlong and Wu Zhiwang

The competition for control of Lüshun was only one case of conflicts between Mao Wenlong and Wu Zhiwang. Their long-soured relationship could be traced back to the beginning of Wu's tenure as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator, when he discovered Mao's false reporting of military triumphs. For Mao Wenlong, making a false report was, of course, not new. He had no scruples about doing so especially after he found out that there was no serious consequence. Mao's false reporting could also have had nothing to do with Deng-Lai, but the Ming institution required turning in the captured personnel so that one could claim rewards. The only route that could be passed for sending the captives was the passage between Pidao and Dengzhou. This was how Wu Zhiwang was implicated in Mao Wenlong's misdeeds. In July 1624, Dengzhou received several prisoners from Pidao, all of whom, curious enough, lost the ability to speak. These captives were the alleged evidence of Mao's military triumphs, but the fact that none of them had the ability to talk aroused suspicion. After taking medicine, some captives recovered their voices, saying that they were just ordinary Liaodong farmers whom Mao captured to press for rewards and provisions from the Ming court.³³¹ Wu Zhiwang did not then push a furtherer investigation, probably because he had just assumed office and wanted to avoid unnecessary trouble before seizing a solid stand in Deng-Lai.

However, Mao pushed further. In November of that year, Mao memorialized the throne to report his military triumphs over the past year, claiming that he had beheaded 726 enemies and captured 130 Manchu men and women. This memorial was followed by the arrival of 125 captives in Dengzhou in April 1625—Mao's escort officers claimed that 5 had already drowned in the sea. Another accident happened on the night the prisoners reached Dengzhou: 20 of them

³³¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 4/5/4 (1624/6/19).

broke out of prison and sparked great fear in Deng-Lai. Eventually, 11 were captured alive and the rest of the fugitives were hunted down and killed. While Wu Zhiwang was busy dealing with prison breaks, Mao Wenlong's officers were causing extra trouble in Dengzhou. They were reported to use Mao Wenlong's documentation to blackmail the local officials for silver and to procure grain in the local market, contending that Deng-Lai would shoulder the payment. What was worse, among all the captives from Pidao, half of them were Liaodong people. As for the other half, a good number of them were under 15 and hence, by Ming law, were not counted as legitimate war booty on which rewards were assessed.³³²

By then Wu Zhiwang had already accumulated a reservoir of resentment toward Mao. The last straw came in July 1625 when Mao memorialized the throne to ask for silver to be provided as soldiers pay. The soldiers pay in the late Ming usually consisted of two parts: food ration (*yueliang* 月糧) and silver wage (*xiangyin* 餉銀). These two parts, however, were usually interchangeable, and so there was no specific distinction between the two. Oftentimes, the food ration was cashed into silver (*zheseyin* 折色銀) and paid to the soldiers so that the payees would have more flexibility in making purchases in the local markets according to their own needs. Meanwhile the government could be relieved of the duty of preparing and sending enough grain to the designated locations. On other occasions when the local market economy was less developed or feeding the soldiers took priority, the silver wage was paid in grain (*benseyin* 本色銀).³³³ As mentioned, due to stringent finances, the Ming court only shipped grain to keep Mao's

³³² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 4/9/29 (1624/11/9), Tianqi 5/3/14 (1625/4/20); Tianqi 5/12/1 (1625/12/29).

³³³ For a general study on soldiers pay, see Zhang Jinkui 張金奎, *Mingdai weisuo junhu yanjiu* 明代衛所軍戶研究 (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2007), Chapter 2. The conversions of soldiers' pay were complicated and changed with time and location. For a study, see Hu Tieqiu 胡鐵球, "Mingdai jiubian shisanzhen de yueliang zhejia yu liangjie guanxi kaoshi" 明代九邊十三鎮的月糧折價與糧價關係考釋, *Shixue yuekan* 史學月刊 12 (2017): 14-36.

soldiers fed. From Mao's perspective, only the food ration was provided, but this was not entirely true. Between 1622 and 1624, the Ming court had also provided considerable amounts of silver as rewards (*shangyin* 賞銀) for Mao's numerous alleged military triumphs—40,000 taels in 1622, 69,989 in 1623, and 110,286 in 1624. Nevertheless, Mao pressed for the silver wages he thought were owed. Based on the standard in the Shanhai Pass of 6 taels every year per capita, Mao asked for the “modest” amount of 200,000 taels every year (4 taels per capita). But silver alone was useless without a market economy. Mao hence asked the Ming merchants to be allowed to take the grain ships to Pidao, bringing goods for his soldiers to purchase.³³⁴

All these requests were not necessarily related to Deng-Lai, but Mao asked Deng-Lai to pay the silver wage. As mentioned, Deng-Lai's military funding had been increased by 200,000 taels since 1624, and Mao was coveting that amount. At that point, Wu Zhiwang's suppressed resentment burst forth. In a strongly worded memorial submitted in October 1625, Wu bluntly denounced Mao Wenlong for “implementing a despotic rule overseas, wasting provisions and fabricating victories, and acting in a domineering and arrogant fashion.” 專制海外，糜餉飾功，擅權橫恣. Moreover, Wu asked the Ming court to dispatch a supervisory official to make an on-site inventory of Mao's funding, grain, and other provision so that Mao's contributions and errors could be verified.³³⁵

Wu Zhiwang's impeachment did not lead to the punishment of Mao Wenlong. Instead, in November 1625, the Ming court approved all of Mao's previous requests: 200,000 taels allocated from Deng-Lai's funding would be paid evenly by season, and commercial goods amounting to

³³⁴ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 20, 53, 105-106; *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/10/5 (1625/11/4).

³³⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/9/6 (1625/10/6).

no more than 20% of the total shipping weight could be onboarded.³³⁶ This happened because Mao had allied with the eunuch faction holding sway over Ming politics (for details, see Chapter 5.1). In April 1625, two eunuch envoys Wang Minzheng 王敏政 and Wu Liangfu 吳良輔 came to Chosŏn Korea (for details, see Chapter 4.4). They brought Mao 40,000 taels as reward for his purported military victories, as well as another 50,000 taels paid by the Court of the Imperial Study for Mao's previous claim that he needed funds for purchasing horses from Chosŏn Korea. By the end of 1625, by Mao's calculation, he had received a total of 279,380 taels of silver from the Ming dynasty.³³⁷

After Li Song, an official from the eunuch faction, was appointed to be the new Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator in January 1626, more support was provided to Mao Wenlong and smoothed the way for preparations of grain and silver from Deng-Lai. In 1627, the silver sent from Deng-Lai to Dongjiang hit a record high. The increase was mainly due to the relocation of soldiers from Deng-Lai to Juehua Island 覺華島 (Figure 2.1). Juehua Island had been used as a granary offshore from the Shanhai Pass. In the Battle of Ningyuan in early 1626, although the Ming military achieved a strategic victory against the Manchus, the enemies set fire to Juehua Island, which was then barely defended, and caused a huge loss of grain and provisions. Thereafter, the Ming court began to strengthen Juehua Island's defences. Tianjin was the first to send reinforcements there right after the Battle of Ningyuan, and in mid-1626, Deng-Lai sent another 1,600 soldiers and 80 warships. This relocation produced a savings for Deng-Lai amounting to 66,000 taels, and much of this fund was later sent to Dongjiang.³³⁸ In addition, in late 1626,

³³⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/10/5 (1625/11/4); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 107.

³³⁷ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 106.

³³⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/5/24 (1626/6/17), Tianqi 6/11/10 (1626/12/28).

another 207 captives arrived in Dengzhou from Pidao, which brought in another infusion of rewards to Mao Wenlong.³³⁹ Eventually, a total of 331,891 taels of silver was delivered to Dongjiang (Table 3.3).³⁴⁰ However, things would take a sudden turn in the following year as Yuan Chonghuan took over the commandship of the Ming military, a story to be told in the following chapters.

Table 3.3 Quantities of Supplies Received by Dongjiang, 1622-1627			
Year	Silver (tael)	Grain (<i>shi</i>)	Cloth (<i>pi</i>)
1622	40,000	83,000	20,000
1623	69,989	109,361	17,750
1624	110,286	195,265	19,651
1625	279,380	147,378	17,894
1626	207,121	199,845	32,860
1627	331,891	199,730	18,753

Source: Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 105-107.

* The quantities of grain and cloth received were fewer than the quantities shipped due to losses at sea.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the seaborne logistic network that the Ming dynasty operated to supply Dongjiang. The key question this chapter seeks to answer is why the Ming court was willing to do so. Existing studies have shown that the mass of goods shipped by sea laid the foundation for the sustainability of Dongjiang based on barren islands. Some such studies have revealed that from the perspective of the Ming court, these material supports were provided at huge costs. However, none of these studies explain under what conditions the Ming dynasty made this seemingly irrational decision to supply Dongjiang.

³³⁹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/8/12 (1626/10/1).

³⁴⁰ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 107.

This chapter first shows some structural problems regarding the sea shipping of the day, including the demand for individual capacity, the difficulty of organizing transport, the dangers of navigation, and most importantly, the stringent financial conditions that the Ming dynasty was facing. It then shows that Mao Wenlong and his men were remnants of a defeated force longing for help in Chosŏn Korea, and the overwhelming voices on the Ming court were to eventually give up on them. However, the “timely” loss of Guangning, a strategic locale in the Ming military strategy, gave rise to a renewed strategic importance for Mao’s force overseas. The new leadership of the Ming military rationalized their decision to supply Mao’s force by arguing that this force had the potential to open a second front on the Manchus’ rear. Consequently, Dongjiang became one of the three defense commands in the Ming “three-pronged advance” strategy against the Manchus.

Dongjiang’s existence relied on empowerment from the Ming court both politically and materialistically. It is in this context that Mao Wenlong’s subsequent activities can be fully understood. These activities include his endeavour to control Lüshun, the repeated false reports of military triumphs, and his alleged increases in total strength. All of them were to show that Dongjiang was a blue-chip stock worthy of continuous investment from the Ming. Nevertheless, they were done at the cost of falling afoul of two Deng-Lai Grand Coordinators and other senior officials on the Ming court. The eunuch faction, with which Mao allied, temporarily protected him, but as changes in Ming high politics soon ensued, Mao Wenlong came close and closer to his fateful end. But before his demise, Mao had still to struggle for survival. Although the Ming shipped large volumes of supplies and provisions by sea, these material supports could not sustain the whole population in Dongjiang. Especially in the winter, when the weather halted sea

shipping, famine often occurred. Consequently, Mao Wenlong turned to Chosŏn Korea for help, which will be the topic for the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Grain Supply from Chosŏn Korea

On the Winter Solstice in 1623, Kim Yŏngjo 金榮祖 (1577-1648) was dispatched to Pidao to send greetings to Mao Wenlong on King Injo's 仁祖 (1595-1649 r. 1623-1629) behalf. Once he reached the island, he witnessed the pitiful sight of many people starving to death. He saw a ten-year-old boy, the only one left in his family, sobbing sadly. Kim, too, could not help but cry.³⁴¹ As examined in the previous chapter, the Ming court shipped considerable volumes of supplies and provisions to Dongjiang by sea. The quantities were calculated based on the number of soldiers under Mao Wenlong's command. However, in Dongjiang, there were almost twice as many civilians as soldiers. Consequently, the goods provided by the Ming court were not enough to sustain the whole population. The next ships dispatched by the Ming would not come until spring. To survive the prolonged winter, Mao Wenlong had no choice but to turn to the Chosŏn court for help. Indeed, Chosŏn Korea became a steady supplier of grain to Dongjiang. In 1623, 60,000 *sŏm* was delivered; in 1624, 38,690 *sŏm*; in 1625, 40,000 *sŏm*; and in 1626, the amount spiked to 150,000 *sŏm*.³⁴² The task of supplying Dongjiang overburdened Chosŏn Korea. Local grain reserves were exhausted, a special surtax was established to procure grain, and the relationship between Mao Wenlong and King Injo soon deteriorated due to conflicts over grain supply.

Why was the Chosŏn court willing to supply Dongjiang at the cost of overburdening its people and economy? The historical process seems to have developed abnormally. As the

³⁴¹ Kim Yŏngjo 金榮祖, "Sŏjŏngnok" 西征錄, in *Mangwa chip* 忘窩集, fasc. 5 (MKSDB).

³⁴² Chosŏn Korea had its own units of measure of grain, 碩 and 石. These two units romanized the same as *sŏm* were used interchangeably and were essentially equivalent to the Chinese unit 石 romanized as *shi*. See J. L. Maclean et al., *Rice Almanac: Source Book for the Most Important Economic Activity on Earth* (Oxon, U.K.: CABI Pub, 2002).

relationship between Mao Wenlong and the Chosŏn court deteriorated, the amount of grain provided by Chosŏn did not decrease. Instead, there was a sudden spike in 1626. This chapter argues that King Injo's political legitimacy based exclusively on the Ming suzerainty made the Chosŏn adopt a firm pro-Ming policy without flexibility and hence continue to supply Dongjiang which embodied Ming authority. Meanwhile, Mao used the events resulting from King Injo's ascendance to the throne through a coup to his advantage. However, Mao's exploitation was rooted in the Ming-Chosŏn relationship, and his successful procurement of grain from Chosŏn Korea essentially relied on the geopolitics of the day.

4.1 Mao Wenlong's Retreat to Pidao and Chosŏn High Politics

The direct cause of Mao's retreat to Pidao in 1622 was that the Manchus' military presence in the northwest part of Chosŏn Korea threatened Mao's stay in the same area. The defeat at Impan in January 1622 showed that Mao's men were no match for Manchu soldiers on the battlefield so that Mao was forced to make a strategic shift (for details, see Chapter 2.4). At the advice of one of his subordinates named Li Jingxian 李景先, who had once been a leader of local fishermen and was reportedly familiar with the surrounding geography, Mao decided to establish his base of operations on Pidao, a windswept barren islet. The rationale for the choice was based on the island's location. At the mouth of the Yalu River, Pidao was an offshore island of Ch'ŏlsan 鐵山 County in P'yŏngan Province and was merely 80 *li* east of the Ming-Chosŏn border (Figure 2.1). Pidao's location provided a convenient connection with the mainland, while the non-freezing sea that surrounded it kept the navy-less Manchu at bay.³⁴³

³⁴³ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 13/9/10 (1621/10/24).

Mao's retreat to Pidao struck a nerve with the Chosŏn court. Soon after Mao Wenlong barely escaped from the Battle of Impan (for details, see Chapter 2.4), the Manchus had been pressing for Mao's extradition,³⁴⁴ putting the Chosŏn court in a dilemma. Mao's sojourn in Korea provided the Manchus an excuse for further invasion, while delivering Mao Wenlong to the Manchus meant an open betrayal of the Ming dynasty. Yet again, King Kwanghae 光海君 (1575-1646, r. 1608-1623) showed his practical stand in the trilateral relations between the Manchus and the Ming. What he ordered to do was to pay lip service to the Manchus, telling them that Mao Wenlong had moved to an island ready to leave Ming territory on the one hand.³⁴⁵ On the other hand, he ordered that no provisions be provided to Mao and meanwhile sent out a memorial asking the Ming court to relocate Mao Wenlong to Ming territory on the pretext that Chosŏn could not afford to supply Mao's forces.³⁴⁶ King Kwanghae calculated meticulously, only to find out in December 1622 that Mao had moved his base of operations to Pidao and showed no sign of leaving Korea.³⁴⁷ The timely arrival of Ming provisions—40,000 taels of silver, 83,000 *shi* of grain, and 20,000 bolts of cloth by the end of 1622³⁴⁸—enabled Mao to survive the initial stage of his retreat (for details, see Chapter 3.2 & 3.3).

In April 1623, King Kwanghae was deposed, and King Injo ascended the throne. This incident provided Mao Wenlong a chance to empower Dongjiang. King Injo rose to power through a coup d'état emerging from a factional struggle and so was eager to gain political

³⁴⁴ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 13/12/22 (1622/2/2), 14/7/17 (1622/8/23).

³⁴⁵ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/8/8 (1622/9/12).

³⁴⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/11/9 (1622/12/11).

³⁴⁷ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/11/11 (1622/12/13).

³⁴⁸ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 105-106.

legitimacy from Ming investiture.³⁴⁹ Mao Wenlong, a Ming general sojourning in Korea, naturally came to mind and was trusted as a political broker between the Chosŏn and Ming courts.³⁵⁰ Mao Wenlong forwarded King Injo's first credential to the Ming, which described the power change in Seoul. The credential reached Beijing on May 27, 1623³⁵¹ and stirred up quite a controversy at the Ming court. Many officials, mostly from the Ministry of Rites, deemed this power change an usurpation because King Injo was the nephew of King Kwanghae and hence not an immediate successor to the throne. Some officials even went further to suggest sending troops to Korea to hold the usurpers accountable.³⁵² In comparison, Mao Wenlong, as well as some of Mao's supporters in the Ministry of War, interpreted this power change as a political reaction to King Kwanghae's betrayal of the Ming dynasty. There were, of course, many alleged crimes committed by King Kwanghae, who executed his two half-brothers, had his legal mother placed under house arrest, and negotiated peace terms with the Manchus. But by highlighting King Kwanghae's attitude to the Manchus as a betrayal to the Ming, Mao Wenlong presented King Injo as an obedient monarch loyal to the Ming state. The act, though morally flawed, was out of the greater good of "serving the great."³⁵³

³⁴⁹ The 1623 coup has attracted much scholarly attention. See for example, Han Myŏnggi 韓明基, "17·18 segi Han-Chung kwan'gye wa Injo panjŏng—Chosŏn hugi ūi Injo panjŏng pyŏnmu munje" 17·8 세기 韓中關係와 仁祖反正—조선후기의 '仁祖反正 辨誣' 문제, *Han'guksa hakpo* 한국사학보 13 (September 2002); Zong Ling 宗玲, *Chaoxian renzuzheng yu mingting fengdian wenti yanjiu* 朝鮮仁祖反正與明廷封典問題研究 (Master's Thesis, Beihua University, 2019); Kim Hanshin 김한신, "Injodae chŏnban'gi wanggwŏn kwa chŏngch'i chilsŏ chaep'yŏn (1623-1636)" 仁祖代 前半期 왕권과 정치질서 재편, *Han'guksa hakpo* 78 (February 2020).

³⁵⁰ Yi Myŏngha 李明漢, "Panjŏngch'o sagwanchŏn t'ongguk sinmin chŏngmun" 反正初查官前通國臣民呈文, in *Paekchu chip* 白洲集, fasc. 12 (MKSDB); *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 1/4/13 (1623/5/11).

³⁵¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/4/29 (1623/5/27).

³⁵² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/8/19 (1623/9/13).

³⁵³ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 12.

Mao's nominal support for King Injo brought in substantial provisions. By the end of 1623, the Chosŏn court had provided a total of 60,000 *sŏm* of grain.³⁵⁴ The amount was considerable given that Chosŏn Korea was suffering grievous economic hardship due to natural disasters. Starting from May 1623, heavy rains began to hit Chosŏn Korea and continued for months until August.³⁵⁵ The rains caused the most severe damages, including mud slides and inundations, to Hwanghae and Kangwon Provinces in the middle part of the Korean Peninsula. Only such provinces as Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla in the south were less affected.³⁵⁶ A direct result of the disasters was a poor autumn harvest, leading to tax exemptions in most provinces of the country—in Hwanghae, for instance, the land tax was reported to have been cut by one third³⁵⁷—and so considerably reduced the country's tax revenue to the extent that the Chosŏn court did not even have enough reserve at the beginning of 1624 to pay spring grain wages to its officials in the capital.³⁵⁸ There were only 880 *sŏm* of rice and 230 *sŏm* of beans in the granary of the Department of Taxation (*Hojo* 戶曹). The extant reserve was far less than the amount required (10,500 *sŏm* of rice and 4,600 *sŏm* of beans). The solution was that officials in Seoul were to take a 50% cut in pay and part of the payment was to be borrowed from military rations.³⁵⁹ It was in the midst of such hardship that the Chosŏn court somehow managed to deliver 60,000 *sŏm* of

³⁵⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/10/16 (1624/11/26).

³⁵⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 1/6/29 (1623/7/26), 1/7/1 (1623/7/27), 1/7/3 (1623/7/29).

³⁵⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 1/6/22 (1624/7/19).

³⁵⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 1/6/12 (162/7/9).

³⁵⁸ A Chosŏn official was usually paid four times a year in accordance with the four seasons. See Ch'oe Hang 崔恆 et al., *Kyŏngguk taejŏn* 經國大典 (1661), vol.1, fasc.2, 2a.

³⁵⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/1/4 (1624/2/3)

grain to Mao Wenlong, that is, about one third of the total annual wages paid to Chosŏn's civil officials.³⁶⁰

The Chosŏn court's substantial material aid assured Mao Wenlong's continued political support. By the end of 1623, Mao Wenlong had forwarded a total 12 Chosŏn credentials attached to his memorials to the Ming court.³⁶¹ His efforts to help King Injo acquire the Ming investiture were finally achieved on January 27, 1624. On that day, Injo was officially recognized as the king of Chosŏn Korea.³⁶² Mao Wenlong, in the meantime, had received credit, which he would continue to exploit for long-term returns.

Regardless of his own perception, Mao Wenlong's contribution to conferring the kingship on Injo was actually marginal.³⁶³ Some officials in the Ministry of Rites suspected that Mao's own self-interest was involved in his support of King Injo,³⁶⁴ which was, indeed, partly true, as has been shown above. What should not be denied, however, is the proactive role that King Injo's administration played in the process. Besides trusting Mao Wenlong as a political broker, the Chosŏn court also assigned two missions in May and August respectively to lobby for the investiture.³⁶⁵ Nevertheless, what ultimately motivated the Ming state to recognize King Injo was the strategic role that Chosŏn Korea was expected to play in the Ming strategy of handling the Manchus. Three people tipped the scale in the process—Minister of War Zhao Yan 趙彥 (?-

³⁶⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 5/4/19 (1627/6/2).

³⁶¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/8/19 (1623/9/13).

³⁶² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/8 (1624/1/27).

³⁶³ Some historians have overestimated Mao's contribution to King Injo's investiture. For instance, see Chen, *Dongjiang shiliu*, 94-95.

³⁶⁴ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/8/19 (1623/9/13). There was then a rumor in Beijing that the Chosŏn court bribed Mao with 400,000 taels of silver. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/6/21 (1626/7/14).

³⁶⁵ Yi Yŏngch'un 이영춘, "Injo panjŏng hu e p'agyŏndo en ch'aekpong chuch'ŏngsa ūi kirok kwa oegyo hwaltonᅡ" 仁祖反正 후에 파견된 冊封奏請使 의 기록 과 외교 활동, *Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo* 조선시대사학보 59 (December 2011).

1625), Minister of Rites Lin Yaoyu 林堯俞 (1558-1626), and Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Yuan Keli 袁可立 (1562-1633). Aside from the disagreement over granting Injo a regentship or a kingship, these three ministers reached the consensus that Chosŏn Korea would be an indispensable ally in the anti-Manchu campaign, and that now was the chance to compel the Chosŏn court to recalibrate its diplomacy. Chosŏn was not intended to stand by. It had done most of the time during the reign of King Kwanghae, but to provide tangible support to Ming forces.³⁶⁶ Specifically, as Zhao Yan suggested in his memorial submitted on January 10, 1624, Chosŏn Korea should dispatch military reinforcements to Mao Wenlong, launch unexpected strikes to the Manchus from time to time, and monitor the enemies' movements closely to attack their rear area when the time was ripe. "These are the preparations necessary to contain the Manchus overseas." 此海外牽制之當豫者.³⁶⁷ Zhao's specific suggestions were put into vague directives of "submissively endorsing the Ming state and assisting by sending troops and providing provisions" 翼戴恭順，輸助兵餉³⁶⁸ in the empirical edict granting the kingship of Injo. Nevertheless, the gist that the Chosŏn court intended to take a pro-Ming stance was self-explanatory.

Hence, it is fair to argue that King Injo's loyalty to the Ming Dynasty was enough to establish the legitimacy of his rule. One way to prove his loyalty was to support Mao Wenlong's sojourn in Korea. The support remained true to the extent that the Chosŏn court continued to give Mao courteous receptions. In April 1624, for instance, King Injo ordered to set up a

³⁶⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/4/29 (1623/5/27), 3/8/19 (1623/9/13), 3/11/20 (1624/1/10), 3/12/8 (1624/1/27).

³⁶⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/11/20 (1624/1/10).

³⁶⁸ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/12/8 (1624/1/27).

monument in Anju 安州 (Figure 4.2-I) to glorify Mao's alleged virtues.³⁶⁹ In terms of material support, however, soon after King Injo was recognized by the Ming, the Chosŏn court tried to cut the amount of grain to be sent to Mao. In February 1624, several officials were dispatched to Pidao to sound out Mao Wenlong about repatriating Ming civilians, of which the number was estimated to be over ten thousand, to Shandong. The argument from the Korean side was that since not many of the civilians whom Mao had recruited were suitable to be placed on the battlefield, trimming down the redundant personnel would better prepare Mao's force to fight the Manchus.³⁷⁰ The real intention was, of course, to cut down the number of people whom the Chosŏn court was to supply.

Nevertheless, before the real intention came to any conclusion, the negotiation was dropped, for an internal rebellion broke out and distracted all the attention of the Chosŏn court. Yi Kwal 李适 (1587-1624), Assistant Supreme Commander (*Puwŏnsu* 副元帥), who had participated in the 1623 Injo coup, was not satisfied with the reward he received after the coup, nor was he pleased with the current drudgery of defending against the Manchus in Nyŏngbyŏn 寧邊. The grudge against King Injo reached its peak on March 11, 1624. On that day, Yi Kwal proclaimed an open rebellion. The rebel force drove straight to the south without too much resistance, and occupied Seoul on March 28. Only a day later, however, the occupying force was evacuated from the capital after Yi Kwal's main force was defeated by King Injo's army led by Chang Man 張晩 (1566-1629), Chief Supreme Commander (*Towŏnsu* 都元帥). On March 30,

³⁶⁹ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 備邊司謄錄, vol.1, Injo 2/3/8 (1624/4/25), (Seoul: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 1982), 192. For the monumental writing, see Kim Ryu 金鑾, "Hŭmch'a p'yŏngnyo p'yŏnŭihaengsa ch'ongjin chwaguntodokpu todoktongji Mokong Munyong kongdŏkpimyŏng pyŏngsŏ" 欽差平遼便宜行事總鎮左軍都督府都督同知毛公文龍功德碑銘並序, in *Pukjŏ chip* 北渚集, fasc. 8 (MKSDB).

³⁷⁰ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/1/4 (1624/2/22), Injo 2/1/7 (1624/2/25), 141, 145.

Yi Kwal was killed in infighting during retreat, and the rest of the rebels either surrendered to King Injo or defected to the Manchus, marking an end to the rebellion.³⁷¹

The early victory of the rebels was mainly due to the lagging pace of war mobilization. It was not until March 18, one week after the breakout of the rebellion, that Chang Man assembled enough men in Pyongyang to chase down the rebels who had already gone south. Chang Man's physical condition further slowed down the troop's moving speed—Chang could no longer ride a horse but sat in a sedan chair, and on one occasion he even passed out from the physical exertion of a march.³⁷² When Chang Man's troop finally confronted Yi Kwal's force on March 29 however, the latter was soon defeated. Hence, in hindsight, one can fairly argue that the Chosŏn court was capable of singlehandedly suppressing the rebellion. However, this was not what the Chosŏn court could have foreseen. On the contrary, what happened at the beginning of the rebellion when the rebels had the upper hand led to a widespread pessimism among the officials in Seoul. On March 25, King Injo requested reinforcements from Mao Wenlong and then fled the capital the next night.³⁷³

King Injo's request for Mao Wenlong's help led to an unexpected result that he could not have predicted. Yi Sangkil 李尚吉 (1556-1637), P'yŏngan Provincial Governor (*P'yŏngan kamsa*

³⁷¹ The short-lived rebellion had far-reaching impacts on Chosŏn Korea. On the one hand, the Chosŏn military was badly impaired in the process of suppressing the rebellion. On the other hand, after the rebellion, King Injo's administration devoted great efforts to the investigation and surveillance of any potential rival factions and so plunged the government into an abyss of political struggles. The rebellion was recorded chronologically in *Injo sillok*. For some key junctures in the rebellion, see Injo 2/1/24 (1624/3/13), 2/1/26 (1624/3/15), 2/2/8 (1624/3/26), 2/2/11 (1624/3/29), 2/2/15 (1624/4/2). For a detailed recounting by a witness, see Chang Man 張晩, "Sŏjŏngnok" 西征錄, in *Naksŏ chip* 洛西集, fasc. 7 (MKSDB). For a contemporary study, see Han Myŏnggi 韓明基, "Yi Kwal ūi nanŭi Injodae ch'oban taenaec chŏngch'aek e mich'in yŏp'a" 李适의 亂이 仁祖代 초반 대내외 정책에 미친 여파, *Chŏnbuksahak* 전북사학 48 (April 2016).

³⁷² Chang, "Sŏjŏngnok," in *Naksŏ jip*, fasc. 7. Chang Man's long-term health issues are clearly shown in his several memorials written between 1623 and 1624, particularly "In chŏngpyŏng chŏng ch'ep'yŏng p'an ch'a" 引情病請遞兵判箭, in *Naksŏ chip*, fasc. 3.

³⁷³ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/2/7 (1624/3/25), 175; *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/2/8 (1624/3/26).

平安監司), was dispatched to forward the king's request. On his way to Pidao, Yi Sangkil was notified of the end of the rebellion and so returned to Py'öngyang.³⁷⁴ As a result, King Injo's request for help had never been officially delivered to Mao Wenlong but nevertheless reached Mao through his own intelligence network on April 3.³⁷⁵ Despite Mao's knowledge that the rebellion had been suppressed, Mao sent out soldiers. The force led by Mao's subordinate Wang Fu 王輔 went ashore through Sap'o 蛇浦, an inlet in Ch'ölsan County and took over the local defense. By April 11, it was estimated that about 20,000 men had arrived in Ch'ölsan (Figure 1.1), a majority of who were actually civilians.³⁷⁶ It was now clear that Mao's intention was not to help suppress the rebellion. Officials were then dispatched to negotiate with Mao, asking him to pull back his force.³⁷⁷ The negotiation nevertheless ended up without a solution, and the presence of Mao's forces on the Chosön mainland would become a haunting issue that the Chosön court had no choice but to acquiesce to.

4.2 The Presence of Dongjiang Forces on the Chosön Mainland

What happened after Mao sent his force ashore to the Chosön mainland was a gradual process of enlarging his sphere of influence. This was done not by pure coercion, but by utilizing several incidents that led to results in Mao's favour. The first opportunity came in May 1624 when

³⁷⁴ Song Siyöl 宋時烈, "Kongjo p'ansö Yi Kong sintopimyöng pyöngsö" 工曹判書李公神道碑銘並序, in *Songja taejön* 宋子大全, fasc. 159 (MKSDB).

³⁷⁵ Kim Tökham 金德誠, "Sa kongjo ch'amüi so-kapcha samwöl" 辭工曹參議疏-甲子三月, in *Söngong yugo* 醒翁遺稿, fasc. 2 (MKSDB).

³⁷⁶ *Pibyönsa tūngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/2/24 (1624/4/11), 181.

³⁷⁷ *Pibyönsa tūngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/2/15 (1624/4/2), 178.

Secretariat Drafter (*Zhongshu sheren* 中書舍人) Xu Lili 許立禮³⁷⁸ arrived in Pidao. Xu was a Ming envoy carrying the imperial edict granting Mao Wenlong the honorific title of Junior Mentor of the Heir Apparent (*Taizi shaofu* 太子少傅),³⁷⁹ for a series of self-proclaimed victories against the Manchus.³⁸⁰ The original plan the Chosŏn court had received was that Xu Lili would remain on Pidao over the course of his visit. It nevertheless changed on May 12, where Xu went ashore to Sapo to inspect the troops stationing there at the invitation of Mao Wenlong. Xu's party was a large group consisting of many soldiers, attendants, and horses. Mao Wenlong deliberately ordered the group to carry no food and turned to the local government for supply instead. Chŏng Tuwŏn 鄭斗源 (1581-?), the official managing the military provision in P'yŏngan Province (*Kwanhyangsa* 管餉使), sent some 600 *sŏm* of grain from Ŭiju. However, Chŏng's graceful gesture led to Mao's further request for 10,000 taels' worth of supplies that he promised to pay for in silver and goods. On May 16, the Border Defense Council (*Pibyŏnsa* 備邊司) deemed Mao's request a major diplomatic matter and suggested that it be met at all costs, reasoning that

on the day the Secretariat Drafter (i.e., Xu Lili) inspects the troops, if our country does not provide every measure to sustain the military supply, this will not merely incur the anger of the Commander-in-chief (i.e., Mao Wenlong). If instead he smears our country with an embargo on grain and then informs the Secretariat Drafter, what will the celestial dynasty say about our country?

³⁷⁸ Most of Xu's activities in Chosŏn Korea were recorded in *Injo sillok* and *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*. In both sources, he is addressed as Secretariat Drafter Xu (*Xu Zhongshu* 許中書). His first name Lili is revealed in Yi Ch'angjin 李昌鎮, "Haengsang" 行狀, in Yi Ŏnyŏng 李彦英, *Wanjŏng chip* 浣亭集, fasc. 7 (MKSDB), for Yi Ŏnyŏng was the official responsible for welcoming and accompanying Xu during his visit to Sap'o.

³⁷⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/3/28 (1624/5/15); *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/3/29 (1624/5/16), 202.

³⁸⁰ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 13-19, 22-27.

中書點兵之日，我國專無接餉之舉，則非但都督一時嗔怒而止。若反以過糴之謗，先布于中書，則天朝亦將謂我國何如也？³⁸¹

Bound by his pro-Ming stance, King Injo approved the council's suggestion and ordered Chǒng Tuwǒn to solve the issue. Chǒng wound up sending another 2,000~3,000 *sǒm* of grain for free without taking any of Mao's silver or goods in return.³⁸² In addition, many gifts were sent to Xu Lili during his stay in Sap'o.³⁸³ The Chosǒn court's fawning gesture helped defuse the situation that could have led to serious diplomatic conflicts. Until Xu left for Pidao on May 27, there was no complaint.³⁸⁴

Several far-reaching results emerged from this short episode. First, Xu Lili's visit to Sap'o represented the Ming endorsement of Mao's presence on the Chosǒn mainland and so emboldened Mao to set up a permanent base there. Soon after Xu's visit, Mao established barracks near the western port of Sap'o and travelled between Pidao and Sap'o on a regular basis.³⁸⁵ Moreover, a stationed force consisting of over 700 soldiers, officers, and servants was created and its designation was Ch'ōlsan.³⁸⁶ Furthermore, Mao's successful request for supplies set a precedent for future cases. Whenever there was a military operation on the Chosǒn mainland, Mao would turn to the Chosǒn court with a supplies request which the court had no choice but to comply with in most cases.

³⁸¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/3/29 (1624/5/16).

³⁸² *Pibyǒnsa tǔngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/4/1 (1624/5/17), 205; *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/4/2 (1624/5/18).

³⁸³ For some gift items, see Yi Ŏnyǒng, "Yu Ch'ōlsanbu changgye" 留鐵山府狀啓, in *Wanjǒng chip*, fasc. 2.

³⁸⁴ Yi Ŏnyǒng, "To Sap'o chǒptae Hǒch'ǒnja changgye-chǒn'gye sanyǒn sawǒl sipilil" 到蛇浦接待許天使狀啓-天啟四年四月十一日, in *Wanjǒng chip*, fasc. 2.

³⁸⁵ Chǒn Sik 全湜, *Ch'ahaeng nok* 槎行錄, in *Yǒnhaengnok chǒnjip* 燕行錄全集 vol. 10, ed. Im Kijung (Seoul: Tongguk taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2001), 353; Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 48.

³⁸⁶ Sin Talto 申達道, "Sawǒl sipoil-Kado pongsasi munkyǒn'gye" 四月十五日-椴島奉使時間見啓, in *Mano chip* 晚悟集, fasc. 5 (MKSDB).

The second case came up even before Xu Lili's departure. On May 20, the Chosŏn court was notified that Mao was planning a northward military expedition. The planned destination was Hoeryŏng 會寧, one of the six garrisons (*yukchin* 六鎮) in the northeast of Hamgyŏng Province.³⁸⁷ 5,000 soldiers were to be divided into two armies led by Wang Fu and Shi Keda 時可達 respectively. To prepare for the expedition, Mao required the Chosŏn court to have 150 *sŏm* of grain stored in each postal station along the line of march in Hamgyŏng Province. In other words, a total of some 4,000 *sŏm* would have to be prepared. The target was Jurchens in the Hoeryŏng area.³⁸⁸ These people became known to Mao through intelligence from a Shandong merchant surnamed Zhu 朱, who had escaped from these Jurchens the previous year. According to Merchant Zhu, the Jurchens had captured some 40 Han people and would occasionally cross the border for farming.³⁸⁹ Zhu's intelligence thus provided Mao Wenlong a reason, or more precisely a pretext, to launch an expedition.

However, the expedition targeted at the Jurchens led to no military clash. The expeditionary force set out on May 23, reached the provincial seat of Hamhŭng 咸興 on June 1, and then spent the rest of the days sojourning in the area before leaving on July 22. At the

³⁸⁷ The six garrisons in the lower reaches of the Tumen/Tuman River 圖們江/豆滿江 were established during Sejong's reign (1418-1450) to better manage the Jurchens living in the area and to consolidate Chosŏn rule over its northeast frontier. Besides Hoeryŏng, the rest were Kyŏngwŏn 慶源, Chongsŏng 鐘城, Kyŏnghŭng 慶興, Onsŏng 穩城, and Puryŏng 富寧.

³⁸⁸ The Jurchens concerned here were what Chosŏn Korea called the *pŏnho* (藩胡, Fence-Jurchens or Border-Jurchens), who had long lived on Chosŏn Korea's northeast frontier since the dynasty's inception in 1392. The Chosŏn king began to claim control over these Jurchens during Sejong's reign (1418-1450), but nevertheless forfeited that claim to Nurhaci after 1607, who asserted his own control and relocated most of the *pŏnho* from the region. There are many studies on the *pŏnho*, see, for example, Kim Sunnam 김순남, "Chosŏn Yŏnsangundae Yŏjun ūi tonghyang kwa taech'aek" 조선燕山君代 여진의 동향과 대책, *Han'guksa yŏn'gu* 韓國史研究 144 (2009); Kenneth Robinson, "Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular Northeast During the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in Sun Joo Kim ed., *The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 18-36; Adam Bohnet, *Turning toward Edification: Foreigners in Chosŏn Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2020), 76-87.

³⁸⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/4/4 (1624/5/20).

beginning, reports from the Chosŏn side suggested that Wang Fu did send some men to search for the Jurchens in the northeast frontier, but the act turned out to be futile.³⁹⁰ The Chosŏn court was concerned that the attack against the Jurchens would bring about retaliation and so there was a debate in Seoul about how to avoid a conflict with the Manchus while maintaining its pro-Ming stance.³⁹¹ It turned out that the Chosŏn court was worried about the wrong thing. The expeditionary force showed no intention to search for the Jurchens but were more interested in looting and pillaging wherever they went. The violence and brutality committed by the expeditionary force led to widespread local resistance. There even occurred one incident on June 20 when six of Shi Keda's men were beaten to death by the local people. This incident was soon reported to Seoul. The Chosŏn court ordered the local governments to stop the expeditionary force from entering residential areas, only to see more reports about conflicts and casualties rolling in.³⁹²

Whether or not Mao Wenlong had authorized entry into residential areas, Chosŏn Korea blamed him for such violence. From the perspective of the Chosŏn court, they had made great efforts to supply the expeditionary force. Two officials had been appointed to preside over the military supplies (*Kwanhyangsa* 管餉使) in Hamgyŏng Province. Aside from the local reserve, additional grain was shipped from Yŏngdong 嶺東, the coastal region of Kangwŏn Province, first by sea and then transshipped by land after coming ashore at Tŏgwŏn 德源.³⁹³ The expeditionary force's misconducts consequently sorely disappointed the Chosŏn court. On July

³⁹⁰ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/5/18 (1624/7/3), 225-226.

³⁹¹ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/4/16 (1624/6/1), 211.

³⁹² *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/5/11 (1624/6/26), Injo 2/5/12 (1624/6/27), Injo 2/5/15 (1624/6/30), 223-225.

³⁹³ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/4/18 (1624/6/3).

1, King Injo dispatched officials to Pidao to demand Mao Wenlong to pull back the force.³⁹⁴ On July 6, Mao claimed that he had already sent out the order to withdraw, but nevertheless the Chosŏn court suspected that Mao was trying to put them off with a vague and baseless claim.³⁹⁵ The expeditionary force unexpectedly kept sojourning in place for another two weeks, and it was not until July 22 that they began to march back to Ch'ŏlsan, while looting again en route.³⁹⁶

If it were not for Mao Wenlong's intelligence that predicted the Manchus would soon attack Zhongjiang (Kr. Chunggang 中江), his expeditionary force would have stayed in place much longer. Originally designated as a Ming-Chosŏn border market that had been abolished in 1613,³⁹⁷ the Zhongjiang concerned here consisted of two islands on the lower part of the Yalu River separating Zhenjiang 鎮江 and Ŭiju 義州, where the border market had been located. Specifically, the islands were named Lanzi 蘭子 (Kr. Nanja, Figure 4.1-A) and Tizi 替子 (Kr. Ch'eja, Figure 4.1-B), and these two combined were called Qiantong 黔同 (Kr. Kōmdong, Figure 4.1-B) when the water in between sometimes ran dry.³⁹⁸ Formed by the alluvial river, the islands

³⁹⁴ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/5/16 (1624/7/1), 225.

³⁹⁵ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/5/21 (1624/7/6), 227.

³⁹⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/6/8 (1624/7/22).

³⁹⁷ For studies on the Zhongjiang/Chunggang market, see Sim Chaekwŏn 심재권, "'Chamun' ŭl t'onghan Chosŏn kwa Myŏng ŭi chunggang kaesi kaesŏl kwa hyŏkp'a kwajŏng punsŏk" '咨文'을 통한 朝鮮과 明의 中江開市 開設과 革罷과정 분석, *Komunsŏ yŏn'gu* 고문서연구 45 (2014); Tsuji Yamato 辻大和, "17 seiki shotō Chōsen no tai Mei bōeki: Shoki Nakae Hirakushi no sonpai o chūshin ni" 17世紀初頭朝鮮の対明貿易: 初期中江開市の存廃を中心に, *Tōyōgaku* 東洋学報 96.1 (June 2014). Both analyze the abolishment of the market in 1618. Sim focuses on the diplomatic documents concerning the issue, while Tsuji provides a general analysis of the Chosŏn court's attitude towards the border trade.

³⁹⁸ The name of Kōmdong was interchangeable with Ch'eja in the Korean records and could also be used as a general term to refer to the Nanja Island (and vice versa) during the Chosŏn dynasty. See Jing Liu and Piao Yan, "Expansion, Contestation, and Boundary Making: Chosŏn Korea and Ming China's Border Relations over the Yalu River Region," *International Journal of Korean History* 25.2 (August 2020): 125. Also see *Shinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam* 新增東國輿地勝覽 (Keijo: Fuchigami shōten, 1906), fasc. 53, 9-10. For a detailed analysis of the historical geography, see Chang Tsun-Wu 張存武, *Qinghan zongfan maoyi* 清韓宗藩貿易 (1637-1894) (Taipei: Zhongyangyanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1985), 168-169.

had land that could be easily turned into paddy fields. Starting from the spring of 1624, Mao Wenlong sent soldiers and civilians to the islands to cultivate rice.³⁹⁹ The effort proved quite successful. By the end of summer, it was reported that “the cultivated crops cover all the fields,” 屯穀蔽野,⁴⁰⁰ but this success attracted Manchus as well. Mao’s spy coming from Liaoyang warned about a potential attack early in July,⁴⁰¹ and by the end of the month, a report from Ūiju showed that over 10,000 Manchu soldiers were stationing on the other side of the Yalu River waiting to cross when “the water level lowers, and shallows emerge.” 水落灘淺.⁴⁰² After some spasmodic fights in the area starting from October 1, the final battle burst out at dawn on October 4 and continued until the next day. Both sides, judging from their records, claimed victory. The Manchus claimed to have killed 500 of Mao’s men, while Mao Wenlong boasted about the success of holding back the enemy from entering Ūiju. Nevertheless, one common result shown in both records was that the paddy fields on the islands, the defense of which was in the charge of Wang Fu and Shi Keda, were set on fire by the Manchus.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁹ There are two important studies on the military farm in Dongjiang. Matsuura, “Mō Bunryū no Katō senkyo to sono keizai kibān”; Wang, “Mingmo Dongjiang tuntian yanjiu.” Matsuura’s article is, by and large, a source interpretation of “Mao dajiangjun haishang qingxing” 毛大將軍海上情形 by Wang Ruchun 汪汝淳, of which the original copy is stored in the National Archives of Japan (Kokuritsu kōbun shokan), and so only reflects the situation in 1623. Wang’s study includes more sources, but nevertheless the analysis is quite general.

⁴⁰⁰ *Pibyōnsa tūngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/6/16 (1624/7/30), 235.

⁴⁰¹ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 39.

⁴⁰² *Pibyōnsa tūngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/6/1(1624/7/30), 235.

⁴⁰³ *Qingtaizu wuhuangdi shilu* 清太祖武皇帝實錄 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmen daxue chubanshe, 1984), 381; Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 40-41. Also see *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/9/3 (1624/10/14); *Changgye tūngnok* 狀啟謄錄, in *Kyebon tūngnok* 啟本謄錄 (Kyujanggak 古 4255-17, 1943), vol.1, Tianqi 4/9/1 (1624/10/12), 6a.



Figure 4.1 Location of Chunggang

Adapted from Kim Chŏngho 金正浩, *Tongyodo* 東輿圖 (Kyujanggak 10340). <https://kyudb.snu.ac.kr/book/view.do>
 Accessed 2021/05/13.

Whether or not the burning resulted in any substantial loss,⁴⁰⁴ Mao Wenlong claimed that all the harvests were burnt to ashes.⁴⁰⁵ This supported his decision to relocate more of his people to the Chosŏn mainland to seek food.⁴⁰⁶ Hundreds of thousands of civilians hence came ashore through Sap'o and soon scattered themselves across Ch'ŏlsan, sacking local residences.⁴⁰⁷ Moreover, a good many of the civilians followed the regular armies led by Mao's generals, and those armies were dispatched to locales beyond Ch'ŏlsan to acquire food from the local governments. One route that Mao's generals took was to go upstream along the Yalu River. Qu Cheng'en 曲承恩 and Zhang Kui 張魁, for instance, led over 3,500 soldiers to Ch'angsŏng 昌城 (Figure 4.2-B), and attracted some 6,500 civilians of all sorts to come. Meanwhile, Ma Yingkui 馬應魁, along with 1,500 soldiers, arrived in Sakchu 朔州 (Figure 4.2-A) and drew some 8,500 civilians.⁴⁰⁸ Another route was to go down the coast and then along Ch'ŏngch'ŏn'gang 清川江 (Figure 4.2-C), the river that divided P'yŏngan Province into south and north. Mao himself led troops to Nŭnghan sansŏng 凌漢山城, a fortress in Kwaksan 郭山 (Figure 4.2-D), and ordered the Chosŏn troops there to hand in their surplus grain. Shortly thereafter, Mao's forces pushed

⁴⁰⁴ The exact result of this burning remains a hanging issue. Chosŏn Korea paid particular attention to the incident and was worried that Mao would use this incident as an excuse to require more grain. An official report submitted to the Royal Secretariat (*Sŭngjŏngwŏn* 承政院) on November 20 suggested that what had been burnt to ashes were straws and weeds and Mao's men had already harvested most of the crops before the Manchus came. Nevertheless, the Chosŏn report cannot be verified by other sources. See *Changgye tŭngnok*, Tianqi 4/9/22 (1624/10/30), Tianqi 4/10/10 (1624/11/20), 10ab, 24b. It is worth mentioning that to my knowledge, no current studies have ever questioned the result of this 1624 burning and presume that there was a great loss of grain. They, of course, have not included the records from *Changgye tŭngnok*, a collection of the hand-written copies of reports written between Tianqi 4/8/20 and Tianqi 4/12/25 by an official given an ad hoc assignment of inspecting P'yŏngan and Hwanghae Provinces.

⁴⁰⁵ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 41.

⁴⁰⁶ *Changgye tŭngnok*, Tianqi 4/10/10 (1624/11/20), 25b.

⁴⁰⁷ *Changgye tŭngnok*, Tianqi 4/11/24 (1625/1/2), 48ab.

⁴⁰⁸ *Changgye tŭngnok*, Tianqi 4/12/1 (1625/1/9), 50a-51b.

further along Ch'öngch'ön'gang near the east border of P'yöngan Province.⁴⁰⁹ Wherever Mao's forces went, the civilians followed. By the end of the year, it was reported that many had settled in Kusöng 龜城 (Figure 4.2-E) and T'aech'ön 泰川 (Figure 4.2-F).⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁹ *Changgye tŭngnok*, Tianqi 4/12/23 (1625/1/31), 60a. Also see *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/12/24 (1625/2/1), Injo 3/1/9 (1625/2/15). Nünghan sansöng was then a major base for defense in the north. Soldiers and civilians living in the area kept themselves on a self-sufficient basis, for Nünghan sansöng, as a local administration, had the jurisdiction over a large tract of arable land and all the harvests were allowed to be retained locally.

⁴¹⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/1/17 (1625/3/9).




Figure 4.2 North P'yŏngan Province

Adapted from Google Map. <https://www.google.ca/maps/@40.0040954,125.3918167,9.26z> Accessed 2021/05/13.

As a result, Mao's people roamed across the northern part of P'yŏngan Province, doing nothing but causing social unrest. More importantly, this process happened against the backdrop of the coming winter when part of the Yalu River would freeze, so that the Manchus could easily

cross the border. The Chosŏn court was particularly worried that Mao's sojourning hordes on the mainland would become the Manchus' targets and bring about an invasion.⁴¹¹ This would eventually happen, but not until 1627. The most pressing issue, however, was to ask Mao Wenlong to pull back his people to Pidao, and the key to the issue was grain.

4.3 Conflicts over the Grain Supply

Mao's men being left stranded on the Chosŏn mainland should be fully attributed to the lack of grain in Dongjiang. Evidence about the food crisis can be traced back to early 1624 when Kim Yŏngjo, who has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, was dispatched to Pidao. On March 20, 1624, Kim reached the island and recounted the following on his way to Mao Wenlong's *yamen*:

There was a lack of food on the island, and some people were eating each other. Most of the passersby along the way looked famished. There was an empty house by the roadside. A son about ten years old flung himself to the ground, sobbing sadly. I asked about it and got the reply that his parents intended to go inland to the Chosŏn mainland to seek food. They had already absconded, and the child had been left alone. This situation was so miserable that I could not bear seeing it.

島中乏食，人相食。道路之人，多有菜色。路傍空家，有兒年可十歲者，仆地悲啼。問之，則其父母欲就食內地，潛爲逃去，其兒獨存云。慘不忍見。⁴¹²

Kim's account suggested that Mao's people on Pidao were then under surveillance and could not leave the island for the Chosŏn mainland, but some did manage to escape. On May 17, the Border Defense Council reported the capture of four runaways from Pidao (Table 4.1). Although these people differed from each other in social rank, they shared the same motivation for escape:

⁴¹¹ *Changgye tŭngnok*, Tianqi 4/10/10 (1624/11/20), Tianqi 4/12/5 (1625/1/13), 21ab, 53ab.

⁴¹² Kim Yŏngjo 金榮祖, "Sŏjŏngnok" 西征錄, in *Mangwa chip* 忘窩集, fasc. 5 (MKSDB).

hunger. After coming ashore, they sojourned briefly in Ŭiju, Pyongyang, and Kaesŏng 開城 (Figure 4.3-B) before they were finally captured in P'aju 坡州 (Figure 4.3-A) on May 7.⁴¹³ These people entered into the report of a top-level bureau as a criticism of social control at the local government level—after all, they managed to travel all the way to Kyŏnggi Province, but revealed that Chosŏn Korea also had a travel embargo on Mao's people coming from Pidao. The four runaways were sent back to Ŭiju later in winter and were held in custody, waiting for Mao Wenlong's order to repatriate them to Pidao. Meanwhile, thousands of hungry people were coming ashore, and Mao Wenlong now acquiesced in it.

Table 4.1 Dongjiang Runaways Captured by Chosŏn Authorities, May 1624					
Name	Age	Native Place	Date of Arrival in Pidao	Date of Capture	Location of Capture
Wang Tingzhao 王廷趙	47	Liaoyang 遼陽	The 10 th month, 1623	5.7, 1624	P'aju 坡州
Ma Youcai 馬有才	27	Shenyang 沈陽			
Wang Tingyou 王廷有	29	Tieling 鐵嶺			
Ding Youchuan 丁有傳	38	Shenyang			

Source: *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/4/1 (1624/5/17), 204-205.

⁴¹³ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/4/1 (1624/5/17), 204-205.




Figure 4.3 Locations of P'aju, Kaesŏng, and Haeju

Adapted from Wikimedia-OpenStreetMap. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haeju#/map/0> Accessed 2021/05/13.

One obvious reason for the food crisis was that Dongjiang was under-supplied. The Ming dynasty provided the majority of the provisions shipped from Tianjin by sea. This supply line known as *Xianyun* 鮮運⁴¹⁴ (which literally means Chosŏn transport) was initiated in 1622 as a temporary policy and became formalized in 1624 as Mao's base on Pidao had become a long-

⁴¹⁴ For a study of *Xianyun*, see Wang, "Mingmo Dongjiang haiyun yanjiu." The article includes some data about the maritime transport but provides quite a sketchy analysis about the politico-economic mechanism from which these data emerged. For instance, the author has never explained how the Ming court came up with a shipping quota.

term settlement. In 1624, the Ming court set the annual shipping quotas: 200,000 *shi* of rice, 20,000 bolts of cloth, and 200,000 taels of silver. Actually, the taels of silver were cut by half, but the cloth and rice had been delivered in full to Dongjiang by the end of autumn of that year.⁴¹⁵ The quantities of the provisions were calculated based upon the number of soldiers that Mao himself reported in September 1623: a total of 36,039.⁴¹⁶ Bi Ziyang, the official presiding over the military supply, deemed the goods delivered to Dongjiang more than sufficient, with the rice alone being able to sustain the annual consumption of 400,000 soldiers.⁴¹⁷ However, the quantities of the goods shipped from Tianjin were well below the expectation of Mao Wenlong. Mao claimed that besides the soldiers, he was also responsible for feeding over 370,000 civilians and hence required a total of one million taels worth of provisions each year.⁴¹⁸ The number of civilians which Mao claimed was an exaggeration made to ask for more provisions. A more accurate number was revealed after Mao's death: about 90,000.⁴¹⁹ Nevertheless, the provisions that the Ming dynasty provided were far from enough to supply Mao's people. (For details, see Chapter 3.3)

Conditions worsened when there was a big drop in the amount of grain provided by the Ming dynasty in 1625. This drop resulted from a change in the Ming maritime supply line: Deng-Lai began to be involved in the transport and was to share half of the 200,000-*shi* quota with Tianjin. It was a result of years of political negotiation between Bi Ziyang and Deng-Lai

⁴¹⁵ Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 90-94, 187-191. Mao Wenlong confirmed that in 1624, Dongjiang received 195,264 *shi* of rice, 19,651 bolts of cloth, and 110,286 taels of silver. See Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 106.

⁴¹⁶ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 20. Also see Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 56.

⁴¹⁷ Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 94.

⁴¹⁸ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 30.

⁴¹⁹ *Chongzhen changbian* 崇禎長編, Chongzhen 3/2/30 (1630/4/12). The exact number of Mao's people was then a puzzling issue, and various people claimed various numbers. For sound research, see Wang, "Mao Wenlong yanjiu xianyi santi," 30-34.

Grand Coordinators, first Yuan Keli and then Wu Zhiwang. Besides supplying Dongjiang, Tianjin was also providing provisions for Ming troops in the Shanhai Pass. Hence, for years, Bi Ziyang had been wanting Deng-Lai to share part of the logistical undertaking, only to be rejected on the basis of Tianjin's more favourable conditions: the shorter distances to the destinations and the easy access to the tribute grain that accounted for most of the military provisions.⁴²⁰ The breakthrough in negotiations came in early 1625 when the case of a corruption allegation against Tao Langxian had been closed. After the Battle of Guangning in 1622, Tao was impeached for taking a bribe of 400,000 taels and so was jailed in 1623.⁴²¹ It was, in fact, a political persecution that Tao Langxian was among the ministers scapegoated for the defeat in 1622. Tao died in jail in 1625 before being convicted, but an ongoing investigation done by the Ministry of Revenue claimed that Tao embezzled 149,800 *shi* of grain and 25,000 taels during his tenure as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator. Whether or not this claim was true, it was used by Bi Ziyang to prove that Deng-Lai could afford to ship 100,000 *shi* once the stolen assets were recovered, and the Ministry of Revenue approved Bi's suggestion of task distribution. However, the result of the ministry's investigation proved to be an oversight. The assets concerned were what Tao had prepared for supplying the Ming troops in Liaodong before the Battle of Guangning terminated the maritime supply line. They were used to pay back the debts which the maritime transport had incurred, and there were, as Wu Zhiwang claimed, 13,254 taels left, only enough for purchasing some 26,000 *shi* of rice.⁴²² As a result, Deng-Lai fell short of the quota. By the end of 1625,

⁴²⁰ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 3/1/17 (1623/2/16), Tianqi 3/3/13 (1623/4/12); Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 55, 205.

⁴²¹ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 2/3/12 (1622/4/22), Tianqi 2/7/3 (1622/8/9), Tianqi 3/2/11 (1623/3/11), Tianqi 3/9/15 (1623/10/8), Tianqi 5/3/5 (1625/4/11).

⁴²² Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 252-254.

Deng-Lai and Tianjin had shipped a total of 167,000 *shi* of grain, but for an unknown reason, only 147,378 *shi* arrived in Pidao.⁴²³ (For details, see Chapter 3.5)

The insufficient supply from the Ming dynasty drove Mao Wenlong to turn to Chosŏn Korea for provisions. As mentioned, the Chosŏn court delivered 60,000 *sŏm* of grain in 1623. This amount was half of the annual military grain tax collected from Hwanghae and P'yŏngan Provinces (i.e., the Yangsŏ area 兩西).⁴²⁴ The taxation system nevertheless underwent great difficulty in 1624 due to the rebellion of Yi Kwal, which not only exhausted the military grain reserve in pacifying the rebellion, but also made it impossible to collect the tax in full thereafter.⁴²⁵ One result emerging from this situation was that the Chosŏn court decided to reduce the amount of grain provided for Mao by half to 30,000 *sŏm* in 1624.⁴²⁶ Yet, the delivery was long delayed. It was not until January 1625 that Nam Iung 南以雄 (1575-1648), the official responsible for collecting the military grain in the Yangsŏ area (*Yangsŏ kwanhyangsa* 兩西管餉使), sent the first batch amounting to 12,090 *sŏm* to Dongjiang. Mao Wenlong had already been offended by the Chosŏn court's unilateral decision on grain reduction, and he became more furious about the current amount that was delivered.⁴²⁷ Consequently, to allay Mao, Nam managed a second delivery of 26,600 *sŏm* in February.⁴²⁸ A total of 38,690 *sŏm* of grain was sent to Dongjiang for the 1624 fiscal year.

⁴²³ Bi, *Xiangfu shucao*, 306; Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 106.

⁴²⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/12/25 (1626/1/22).

⁴²⁵ One telling example is that Nam Iung even suggested enlarging the tax base—he suggested taxing Princess Chŏngmyŏng's 貞明公主 (1603-1685) manor in P'yŏngan Province, which was supposed to be exempted from taxation. Nam's suggestion was eventually vetoed by the Chosŏn court. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/3/23 (1625/5/10).

⁴²⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/10/16 (1624/11/26).

⁴²⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/11/28 (1625/1/6).

⁴²⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/1/18 (1625/2/24).

Probably because the task of supplying Dongjiang overburdened the Yangsŏ area, in November 1625, the Chosŏn court adjusted the tax system and involved more provinces to shoulder the task. First, the tax rate of military grain levied in the Yangsŏ area was lowered from 5 *tu* per *kyŏl* to 3. Second, *moryang* 毛糧, a land surtax assessed in rice at 1 *tu*, 5 *sŭng* per *kyŏl*⁴²⁹ was to be collected in Ch'ungh'ŏng, Chŏlla, and Kyŏngsang Provinces (i.e., the Samnam area 三南, Figure 4.4).⁴³⁰ Not all the surtax would be sent to supply Mao's people. The local administrations in the coastal area of Kyŏngsang Province were to send the rice to Hamgyŏng Province, and some locales in the mountain area were allowed to pay the surtax in timber. The amount of rice to be sent to Mao was estimated to be 20,000 *sŏm*. This amount was to be shipped to the granaries in Haeju 海州 (Figure 4.3-C), and Mao Wenlong was to be responsible for any further transshipment.⁴³¹ The main purpose of such a policy design was to save in shipping costs. As Haeju was close to Seoul, most of the transportation could be done by utilizing the existing tribute grain transport system (*chounjee* 漕運制), through which the tribute grain collected from the Samnam area was shipped to the capital granaries by sea and/or by canal every year.⁴³² In

⁴²⁹ 100 *sŭng* 升=10 *tu* 斗= 1 *sŏm* 石. *Kyŏl* 結 was a unit of arable land that was calculated for tax purposes on the basis of yield and varied in six ranks. For details, see *Kyŏngguk taejŏn*, vol.1, fasc.2, 1ab.

⁴³⁰ *Moryang* 毛糧 was also known as *Tangnyang* 唐糧 or *sŏryang* 西糧 in the Chosŏn records. My understanding of this surtax has benefited a lot from Ch'oe Chuhŭi, "16 segi mal~17 segi chŏnban Tangnyang ŭi sŏnggyŏk e taehan kŏmt'o" 16 세기 말~17 세기 전반 唐糧의 성격에 대한 검토, *Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo* 89 (June 2019). Choe's article has provided an overview of the history of this surtax. Its origin can be traced back to the Imjin War, during which grain from the Samnam area was transported to the northern frontier. Mao's demand for supply revived this surtax, which continued to be collected after Mao's death in 1629. It became formalized as a regular tax called *samsuryang/mi* 三手糧/米 and was finally abolished in the mid-17th century. It is worth mentioning that yet again we find similarities between the history of Chosŏn Korea and that of late imperial China. *Moryang* was in nature similar to the Liaodong surtax (*Liaoxiang* 遼餉) that also continued to be collected after 1644 and became a regular tax known as *Jiuliyin* 九釐銀 in the Qing dynasty.

⁴³¹ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 3/10/26 (1625/11/25).

⁴³² For comprehensive research on the Chosŏn tribute grain transport system, see Kim Saesalm 김세삼, "Chosŏn chŏn'gi chogunje e kwanhan il koch'al" 朝鮮前期 漕運制에 관한 一考察(Master's thesis, Dong-A University, 1977), especially 29-31.

addition, Haeju was a coastal special county (*mok* 牧) in Hwanghae Province, so that storing rice there could stop Mao's people from entering Kyōnggi Province (Figure 4.4), where the capital was located.



Figure 4.4 Eight Provinces of Chosŏn Korea (made with [Harvard WorldMap](#))

However, there was a huge gap between policy design and the practice. On the one hand, the local governments in the Samnam area showed a wide-spread resistance to the surtax, nor were they motivated to send the rice to Haeju. It is reported that not one single grain of rice had been delivered by the end of April 1626, by which the 20,000-*sŏm* quota should have been

met.⁴³³ Eventually, in the following years, an unknown amount of rice shipped to Haeju. However, none was used to supply Mao's people, but some was transhipped to Namhan sansŏng 南漢山城, as this mountain fortress was then under hectic construction as part of King Injo's national defense plan.⁴³⁴ On the other hand, Mao Wenlong showed no intention of sending his people all the way down to Haeju to fetch rice. Immediacy perhaps was what Mao took as priority, and so he continued pushing the local governments in P'yŏngan Province for provisions.

Hence, all the provisions that Chosŏn Korea provided in 1625 came from P'yŏngan Province. The task of supplying Dongjiang was no longer in the charge of Nam Iung, but that of newly appointed Provincial Governor Yun Hwŏn 尹暄 (1573-1627),⁴³⁵ suggesting that the task had been extended beyond military affairs to civil administration. This also meant that Mao's demand for provisions had not only exhausted military grain but also encroached on the province's regular tax revenue. By the end of 1625, Yun had managed the delivery of 40,000 *sŏm* of rice and beans. Among the total, at least 16,571 *sŏm* was the local reserves of the land tax (*chŏnse* 田稅) paid in grain (Table 4.2). Yun could afford to do so by taking advantage of the taxation system—P'yŏngan was one of the only two provinces where all the land tax revenues were allowed to be retained locally.⁴³⁷ Nevertheless the expenditure incurred from supplying

⁴³³ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 4/3/21 (1626/4/17).

⁴³⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/2/20 (1626/3/17). It is reported that much of the grain that King Injo consumed in 1636 when he was taking shelter in Namhan sansŏng during the second Manchu invasion (*Pyŏngja horan* 丙子胡亂) was in fact from Haeju. See Ch'oe, "16 segi mal~17 segi chŏnban Tangnyang ūi sŏnggyŏk e taehan kŏm't'o," 102. For the change in national defense during King Injo's reign, see Hŏ T'aegu 許泰玖, "Injodae tae Hugŭm (tae Ch'ŏng) pangŏch'aek ūi ch'ujin kwa hangye: Susŏng chŏnsul ūl chungsim ūro" 仁祖代 對後金(對清) 방어책의 추진과 한계 - 守城 전술을 중심으로, *Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo* 朝鮮時代史學報 61 (June 2012), especially 91-99.

⁴³⁵ Yun Hwŏn succeeded Yi Sangkil in August 1625. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/7/21 (1625/8/23).

⁴³⁷ Another province was Hamgyŏng. See Kim, "Chosŏn chŏn'gi chogunje e kwanhan il koch'al," 25. For a concise history of taxation in P'yŏngan Province, see Kwon Naehyun, "Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P'yŏngan Province During the Late Chosŏn Period," 44-46.

Dongjiang undermined the stability of Chosŏn’s finance, and so recorded complaints continued to mount.

Location	Quantity of rice (<i>sŏm</i>)	Quantity of beans (<i>sŏm</i>)	Total
Anju 安州	2,600	931	16,571 <i>sŏm</i>
Kwaksan 郭山	600		41.4% of
Chŏngju 定州	500		40,000 <i>sŏm</i>
Sŏnch'ŏn 宣川	10,940		

Source: *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/12/13 (1626/1/10), Injo 3/12/25 (1626/1/22).

As a result, the relationship between Chosŏn Korea and Mao Wenlong soured. The situation worsened at the beginning of 1626 when Mao Wenlong reported to the Ming dynasty about a conspiracy between Han Yun 韓潤 and Yun Ŭirip 尹毅立 (1568-1643).⁴³⁸ Han Yun was the son of Han Myŏngnyŏn 韓明璉 (?-1624) who participated in the Yi Kwal rebellion and defected to the Manchus after his father was killed in 1624.⁴³⁹ Yun Ŭirip succeeded Yi Sangkil in December 1623 as the Chosŏn official to receive Mao Wenlong (*Chŏppansa* 接伴使).⁴⁴⁰ The cooperation was reported to be very unpleasant, for Yun often reported on the misconduct of Mao and his subordinates and interfered with Mao’s attempts to procure provisions from Chosŏn

⁴³⁸ This episode has also been analyzed in Tagawa, “Mō Bunryū to Chōsen to no kankei ni tsuite,” 94-95. He has also detected the mistake about Yun Ŭirip’s official title by using *Mingshi* 明史, in which the title is “左議府.” I believe it now has been widely acknowledged that the *Mingshi* could serve as a general history of the Ming dynasty, but nevertheless is not a reliable source for studying it. I use the veritable records, and accordingly Yun’s title is “左議政府” (*chwaui chŏngbu*). On another note, Tagawa hasn’t noticed the mistake in Yun’s name. Jing Liu also analyzes this episode in brief in her dissertation, but the author has generally glossed over these details. See Liu, “Beyond the Land,” 286-287.

⁴³⁹ Lee Meng Heng, “*Ukanju* and the Changing Political Order of Northeastern Asia in the 17th Century,” *International Journal of Korean History*, 23:1 (February 2018): 15.

⁴⁴⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 1/11/9 (1623/12/30). Yun Ŭirip is remembered today usually as a painter.

Korea.⁴⁴¹ Out of a personal grudge, Mao wrote to the Ming dynasty that Han Yun was helping the Manchus prepare an invasion into Chosŏn Korea, and Yun Ŭirip was a planted agent in Seoul.⁴⁴² Although the accusation only involved individuals, this implicated the oversight of King Injo and threw into question loyalties to the Ming dynasty. Yet Mao's accusation was so crudely fabricated that even some basic facts were wrong. The most obvious mistake was that Yun Ŭirip's name was miswritten as “尹義立” (not “尹毅立”) in Mao's report submitted to the Ming dynasty. Second, Yun was identified as “左議政府.” Such a title did not exist in the Chosŏn bureaucracy. Even if the intention was to write “左議政” (*Chwaŭijŏng*, Second State Councillor), Yun had never been in such a high position. Besides, he was dismissed from his regular post of Second Director of the Department of Taxation (*Hojo ch'amp'an* 戶曹參判) in early 1625, because his nephew Yun Inpal 尹仁發 had once been a subordinate of Yi Kwal.⁴⁴³ Mao's accusation was so untenable that Chosŏn was cleared of all blame after sending the Ming court a memorial, claiming that Yun was not *Chwaŭijŏng* and had already been removed from office due to his incompetence in receiving Mao.⁴⁴⁴ Ironically, almost at the same time, the Chosŏn court promoted Yun Ŭirip to be the highest official in Kaesŏng (*Kaesŏngbu yusu* 開城府留守), perhaps in a fit of pique.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴¹ See *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/11/29 (1625/1/7); *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 3/2/11 (1625/3/19), especially Injo 4/3/26 (1626/4/22).

⁴⁴² *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/12/4 (1626/1/1).

⁴⁴³ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 3/3/20 (1625/4/26); *Sukchong sillok* 肅宗實錄, Sukchong 15/7/18 (1689/9/1).

⁴⁴⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/4/14 (1626/5/9).

⁴⁴⁵ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 4/3/16 (1626/4/12).

4.4 Silver Loan and Repayment

It is no doubt that the relationship between Chosŏn Korea and Mao Wenlong was deteriorating. Yet, against such a backdrop, there was a spike in the quantity of grain that Chosŏn delivered to Pidao in 1626. By the end of the year, Chosŏn Korea had provided at least 160,000 *sŏm* of grain, 4 times the previous year's amount.⁴⁴⁶ This sudden spike was mainly due to the repayment of silver that the Chosŏn court borrowed from Mao Wenlong between 1625 and 1626. The silver was loaned to cover the cost of hosting two Ming delegations (Table 4.3). The first delegation came in April 1625 to deliver the imperial edict that formally granted kingship to Injo.⁴⁴⁷ Hosting a Ming delegation had been an expensive undertaking, but the cost incurred this time was beyond the expectation of the Chosŏn court. The Ming envoys Wang Minzheng 王敏政 and Wu Liangfu 吳良輔 demanded large quantities of silver, ginseng, and other gifts wherever they went during their visit, and so the silver alone Chosŏn paid amounted to 155,182 taels.⁴⁴⁸

Chosŏn Korea had limited circulation of silver throughout the country⁴⁴⁹ and the Department of Taxation at that time only had a reserve of some 120,000 taels. Consequently, the

⁴⁴⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4), Injo 4/10/8 (1626/11/26).

⁴⁴⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/2/27 (1625/4/4).

⁴⁴⁸ Consider an 18th-century record: "the amount of silver presented to the Qing envoys was 68,557 taels." See Kwon Naehyun, "Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P'yŏngan Province During the Late Chosŏn Period," 47. Wang and Wu were eunuchs and members of the clique of Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 (1568-1627). Complaints about their misconduct are scattered in *Injo sillok*. For a telling example, see Injo 4/6/2 (1626/6/25). Accordingly, these two requested the construction of a bridge over the capital city wall because, as they claimed, the imperial edict must not go through the city gate. They eventually gave up this request after receiving large amounts of silver and ginseng. After returning to Beijing, they were impeached and demoted for taking the so-called bribes from the Chosŏn court. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/6/26 (1626/7/19).

⁴⁴⁹ Although silver was produced, for instance, in the Tanch'ŏn area in P'yŏngan Province starting from the 16th century, the domestic production was quite limited. In the 17th century, Chosŏn Korea heavily relied on the silver import from Tsushima, a result of the Kiyu Agreement in 1609, which re-established international trade with the Japanese after it had been suspended due to the Imjin War and reintroduced Japanese silver until the mid-18th century. Exactly how much Japanese silver circulated in Chosŏn Korea in the 1620s is unknown, yet the Chosŏn records have suggested that there was a drop in the amount of silver that the government taxed from the trade with the Japanese. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/3/21 (1626/4/17). For a concise history of silver over the course of the Chosŏn

department borrowed 30,000 taels of silver from Mao Wenlong, who procured most of the silver from the Ming and promised to pay it back in grain after the collection of a land surtax in autumn. What the department failed to foresee, however, was that the total expenditure was so large that the revenue from the land surtax, together with Mao's silver loan, could barely make ends meet.⁴⁵⁰ Hence, the debt to Mao Wenlong was kept, only to be expanded in 1626 when a second delegation came to inform the Chosŏn court of the birth of the Tianqi emperor's son.⁴⁵¹ As per the previous experience, the Department of Taxation borrowed another 40,000 taels from Mao Wenlong.⁴⁵² Nevertheless, the Ming envoys Jiang Yueguang 姜曰廣 (1584-1649) and Wang Mengyin 王夢尹 were unexpectedly "upright and simple" (*ch'ōnggan* 清簡) and turned down almost all the unnecessary offerings that most envoys would have taken.⁴⁵³ As a result, the expenditure was greatly reduced this time and the Chosŏn court was able to pay off the debt owed to Mao Wenlong in grain.

dynasty, see Doo Hwan Oh, "The Silver Trade and Silver Currency in Chosŏn Korea," *Acta Koreana* 7:1 (January 2004).

⁴⁵⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/2/24 (1626/3/21).

⁴⁵¹ Jiang Yueguang 姜曰廣, *Youxuan jishi* 輶軒紀事, in *Congshu jicheng chubian* 叢書集成初編, series 1, vol. 3240, ed. Wang Yunwu 王雲五 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1937), 1. The prince concerned here was Zhu Cijong 朱慈炅, the third and last son of the Tianqi emperor. All three died as infants. The Tianqi emperor wound up heirless and so was succeeded by his half-brother Zhu Youjian 朱由檢, the Chongzhen emperor (1611-1644, r.1627-1644).

⁴⁵² *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/2/24 (1626/3/21), Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4).

⁴⁵³ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/6/26 (1626/7/19). Jiang was Junior Compiler in the Hanlin Academy 翰林院編修, and Wang was Supervising Secretary in the Ministry of Work 工科給事中. Their frugality greatly impressed Chosŏn Korea and so after they left, the Department of Rites established a monument to commemorate their visit. See Ch'oe Myōnggil 崔鳴吉, "Chosa Kang Wang yanggong kōsabi" 詔使姜王兩公去思碑, in *Chich'ōn chip* 遲川集, fasc.19 (MKSDB).

Table 4.3 Financial Summary of Hosting the Ming Delegations, 1625-1626

	Expenditure		Income		Loan	
	Silver (tael/ yang 兩)		Ginseng (kǔn 斤)	Land surtax assessed in cloth (p'il 匹)*	Mao's silver (tael)	
1625	P'yŏngan	28,182	?	170,000+	30,000	
	Hwanghae	20,000				
	Seoul	107,000+	2,100+			
	Subtotal	155,182+	>2,100+			
1626	?		501**	Mountain area	21,000	40,000
				Others	≈79,593***	
				Subtotal	≈100,573	

* The land surtax was levied in Ch'ungch'ŏng, Ch'ŏlla, Kyŏngsang, and Kangwŏn Provinces. The Chosŏn court established two tax rates: 1 p'il of cloth to be collected from every 4 kyŏl of land, applicable to 86 counties in the mountainous regions; 1 p'il from 3 kyŏl, applicable to the rest. In practice, however, the rate could be as high as 1 p'il from 2 kyŏl or as low as 1 p'il from 6 kyŏl. Although the surtax was assessed in cloth, the mountain counties were allowed to pay in timber.

** This amount of ginseng was then worth 16,530 p'il of cloth.

*** This number is a projected income estimated in April 1626. The tax collection was to be completed by the end of autumn, but no record has shown the result.

Source: *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/6/23 (1625/7/26), Injo 3/7/25 (1625/8/27), Injo 4/2/24 (1626/3/21), Injo 4/3/20 (1626/4/16), Injo 4/6/26 (1626/7/19), Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4).

The Chosŏn court had wished to repay the loan at a rate of 1 tael per sŏm,⁴⁵⁴ which was the current price for the official trade rice related to the Japanese envoys and the Japan House (*Waegwan* 倭館) in Pusan in Kyŏngsang Province (Figure 4.4).⁴⁵⁵ This rate was also kept in line

⁴⁵⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4). This rate was, in fact, a nominal price, because silver was legally forbidden to be used in the market. Only in international trade was the use of silver allowed as an intermediary currency. The market price for rice was usually assessed in cloth. On May 7, 1626 (*Injo sillok*, Injo 4/4/12), for instance, it was reported to be 1 p'il per sŏm. Yet, in practice, silver came to be widely used in the market, and so the Chosŏn court kept records of the tael/sŏm ratio on some occasions. See, for instance, *Hyŏnjong sillok* 顯宗實錄, Hyŏnjong 2/1/23 (1661/2/21), which records 2 taels per sŏm in Seoul. The rice price began to be assessed in copper cash starting from the 18th century when copper coins dominated daily transactions. Jun Seong Ho's study has shown the trend of copper cash prices for rice converted to their silver equivalents from six sites in Ch'ŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces between 1713 and 1900. Accordingly, 1 tael per sŏm was at the lower end of the price range. This perhaps can suggest that the rate the Chosŏn court proposed in 1626 was, at least to them, reasonable. See Seong Ho Jun et al., "Korean Expansion and Decline from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century: A View Suggested by Adam Smith," *The Journal of Economic History* 68.1 (2008): 254-255.

⁴⁵⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/3/21 (1626/4/17). For an economic history of the *Waegwan*, see James B. Lewis, *Frontier Contact Between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan*, (London: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2003), especially 107-145.

with the later market price in Shandong. The price had almost doubled since a drought hit the province early in 1626.⁴⁵⁶ Regardless of the price increase, Mao insisted on using the price at which Deng-Lai procured the rice to supply Dongjiang, that is, 0.5 tael per *shi/sǒm*.⁴⁵⁷ Some sporadic records have shown that the officials dispatched to negotiate with Mao were greatly insulted,⁴⁵⁸ but nevertheless the Chosŏn court eventually fulfilled Mao's wish. His 70,000 taels of silver were converted into 140,000 *sǒm* of rice and were paid off by September 1626.⁴⁵⁹

The Chosŏn court procured most of the grain in barter by using the land surtax paid in cloth. The projected surtax revenue was estimated to be a total of 100,573 *p'il* of cloth in 1626. Among the total, 16,530 *p'il* had already been deducted to pay the 503 *kŭn* of ginseng used to host the Ming delegation that year, and there was 84,043 *p'il* left if the surtax could be collected in full.⁴⁶⁰ Given that the exchange rate reported on May 7 was 1 *sǒm* equivalent to 1 *p'il*,⁴⁶¹ even without considering an expected rise in the price of rice after bulk purchasing, the remaining surtax revenue was not enough to pay off the debt owed to Mao Wenlong. Hence, a good portion of the rice paid back to Mao came from local grain reserves. Not much is known about this portion of rice, but some sporadic records can confirm that it came from various sites in the

⁴⁵⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/7/8 (1626/8/29).

⁴⁵⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4); *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/7/8 (1626/8/29). Also see Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 302. The rice for shipping was usually prepared in advance, the 0.5 tael per *shi* concerned here was the official purchase price in 1625 before the drought hit the province. Between 1624 and 1625, the market prices for rice in Shandong were reported to be quite low, ranging from 0.375 to 0.6. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 2/5/15 (1624/6/30); *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/7/8 (1626/8/29).

⁴⁵⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/4/12 (1626/5/7).

⁴⁵⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4).

⁴⁶⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/3/20 (1626/4/16), Injo 4/6/26 (1626/7/19).

⁴⁶¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/4/12 (1626/5/7).

Yangso area and included not only the land tax revenue but also the *nobi* tribute tax (*Nobi sin'gong* 奴婢身貢) paid in grain.⁴⁶²

During the winter of 1626, Chosŏn continued to deliver grain to Dongjiang. Mao Wenlong insisted that the previous 140,000 *sŏm* was gained through “trade” (*maoyi/ muyŏk* 貿易)⁴⁶³ and the Chosŏn court should provide another 50,000 *sŏm* as offerings.⁴⁶⁴ The request was endorsed by the Tianqi emperor’s order to provide more supplies to Pidao after receiving a memorial by Jiang Yueguang and Wang Mengyin. The memorial well depicted the food crisis among Mao’s people.⁴⁶⁵ The Chosŏn court evaded providing the full amount per Mao’s request, reasoning that the shipping line could not be operated in winter, and wound up delivering over 10,000 *sŏm* by the end of 1626.⁴⁶⁶ In summary, in 1626, Chosŏn delivered over 150,000 *sŏm* of grain to Dongjiang.

⁴⁶² *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4). *Nobi sin'gong* was a tax levied on *nobi*, who paid cloth, grain, and/or other tributes as substitutes for corvee. See *T'aejong sillok* 太宗實錄, T'aejong 7/1/12 (1407/2/19), T'aejong 8/8/28 (1408/9/17). The part of *nobi sin'gong* paid in grain in the Yangso area amounted to 110,000 *sŏm* in 1626. The term “*nobi*” is usually glossed as “slave,” but this term is misleading because a *nobi* in Chosŏn Korea had more legal rights than a slave, by general definition, had. For a detailed comparison, see Hyong-in Kim, “Rural slavery in antebellum South Carolina and early Chosŏn Korea” (Ph.D. diss., The University of New Mexico, 1990). For a 17th-century analysis of *nobi* and *nobi sin'gong*, see Yu Hyŏngwŏn 柳馨遠, “Norye” 奴隸, “Norye kosŏl” 奴隸攷說, in *Pan'gyesurok* 磻溪隨錄, fasc.26.

⁴⁶³ It is worth noting that some studies have argued that Mao Wenlong received grain from Chosŏn Korea through fair trade based on the records about silver loans without looking into the political-economic dynamics in the background. See, for instance, Wang Guidong 王桂東, “Caiji de tongmengzhe: Chaoxian wangchao yu mingDongjiangzhen jiasheshi kaolun (1621-1637)” 猜忌的同盟者：朝鮮王朝與明東江鎮交涉史考論, in *Yuanshi ji minzu yu bianjiang yanjiu jikan* 元史及民族與邊疆研究集刊, vol.32, ed., Liu Yingsheng 劉迎勝 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2017), 124. On the other hand, Tagawa Kōzō argues that Mao’s requests for grain overburdened Chosŏn Korea by simply listing the related historical records without interpretation. He has otherwise overlooked the “trade” in between. See Tagawa, “Mō Bunryū to Chōsen to no kankei ni tsuite,” 81-84.

⁴⁶⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/7/14 (1626/9/4), Injo 4/10/22 (1626/12/10); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 75.

⁴⁶⁵ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 6/9/5 (1626/10/24); *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/10/22 (1626/12/10). During his visit to Chosŏn Korea in 1626, Jiang Yueguang encountered many starving Liaodong people and had several conversations with Mao Wenlong about the food supply. See his *Youxuan jishi*, 12, 28, 53, 61-62.

⁴⁶⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/11/16 (1627/1/3).

4.5 The Food Crisis Continued and Worsened

No evidence has shown that the increase in grain supply in 1626 relieved the food crisis among Mao's people. Instead, the issue became more grievous. The main reason was that Mao's civilians were not entitled to food rations that were only given to the regular soldiers.⁴⁶⁷ They were expected to seek food on their own on the Chosŏn mainland, and hence, besides looting, the only option left was to grow their own food. Yet, the north part of P'yŏngan, where most of Mao's civilians settled, was perhaps the least ideal place for agriculture. In normal years, the yields could barely make ends meet.⁴⁶⁸ What worsened the situation was an unexpected increase in civilians in the area starting from late 1625. This increase was mainly due to the brutality of Manchu rule, driving the Liaodong people to go to Mao Wenlong to take shelter. Nurhaci launched his own *Kristallnacht* on November 3, 1625. On that day, he issued an edict that denounced the Liaodong people under Manchu rule as spies and traitors.

Thereafter, those who were literate were seized and massacred in large numbers⁴⁶⁹, and the rest were reorganized on bannermen's manors working as serfs.⁴⁷⁰ Thus, what followed was a mass exodus. Most of the Liaodong people who managed to cross the Manchu-Chosŏn border were received by Mao Wenlong, and like other civilians, they were relocated to north P'yŏngan

⁴⁶⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/10/25 (1626/12/13).

⁴⁶⁸ *Kwanghaegun ilgi*, Kwanghaegun 14/5/2 (1622/5/2).

⁴⁶⁹ A few somehow survived and made great contributions to the Qing conquest of the Ming dynasty, such as, Fan Wencheng 范文程. See Yang Yimao 楊益茂, "Fan wencheng yu qing ruguan juece" 范文程與清入關決策, in *Ming-Qing luncong* 明清論叢, vol.17, ed., Zhu Chengru 朱誠如 et al. (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2017), 216-224.

⁴⁷⁰ MWLD, 643-647. For a current study, see Zhu Chengru 朱誠 and Bai Wenyu 白文燧 ed., *Qingchao qianshi* 清朝前史 vol.2 (Dalian: Liaoning shifan daxue chubanshe, 2016), 307-315. The analysis, however, is quite Han-centric. Curiously, although this ignominious episode appears here and there in Anglophone studies of the Qing dynasty (e.g., Mark Elliot, *the Manchu Way*, 76; Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building Before 1644," 48), to my knowledge, it has never been analyzed in detail, not even in David Porter's dissertation on the Hanjun Banners. See David Porter, "Ethnic and Status Identity in Qing China: The Hanjun Eight Banners" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2018), 5.

and were left alone. Chosŏn records at the time painted a picture of extreme hunger. For instance, on November 26, 1626, after he finished inspecting the border defense in P'yŏngan and returned to Seoul, Chang Man told King Injo:

There were almost three thousand refugees in Kaech'ŏn 价川 (Figure 4.2-G) and other places living by begging. They used blue cloth, hats, and other goods to trade for rice and grain. There was a stream of such people on the road carrying the food on their backs or on their heads.

流民之行乞於价川等處者，幾三千人，而以青布、帽子等物，貿得米穀，負戴絡繹於道路云矣。⁴⁷¹

What was unusual was that the food crisis even affected the armies. On October 18, 1626, for instance, Yun Hwŏn reported that “Mao’s soldiers are starving to death and the stiff corpses pile one on top of another.” 毛兵飢死，僵屍相枕。⁴⁷² Per the regulation of the Ministry of Revenue, the standard of ration was set at 4 *dou* of rice per month,⁴⁷³ but in practice, Mao Wenlong embezzled 0.5 *dou* of each monthly payment.⁴⁷⁴ Such treatment to ordinary soldiers was in sharp contrast to Mao’s behavior toward the personnel in his inner circle. It was reported that a door keeper at Mao’s manor in Pidao received a monthly ratio of 5 *dou* and other benefits including silver, cloth, cotton, hats, and boots,⁴⁷⁵ not to mention the lavish life that Mao, as well

⁴⁷¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/10/8 (1626/11/26). Chang Man had been exiled to Puyŏ County 扶余郡 in Ch'ungch'ŏng Province after the Yi Kwal rebellion for not stopping the rebels from entering Seoul. He was reinstated in late 1625 because there were reports that the Manchus were going to invade Chosŏn Korea, which became reality in 1627. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/9/1 (1625/10/1).

⁴⁷² *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/9/18 (1626/10/18).

⁴⁷³ Bi, *Xiangfu shucaos*, 94.

⁴⁷⁴ Sŏng Haeŭng 成海應, “Tonggang kisa” 東江記事, *Yŏn'gyŏngjae chŏnjip* 研經齋全集, fasc.44 (MKSDB).

⁴⁷⁵ Cho Kyŏngnam 趙慶男, *Sok chamnok* 續雜錄, in *Taedong yasŭng* 大東野乘, vol.6 (Keijō: Chosŏn kosŏ kanhaenghoe, 1910), 2.

as his cronies, led.⁴⁷⁶ Such corruption had already driven some of Mao's generals away. In early 1625, for instance, Xu Gucheng 徐孤臣 (?-1627), along with his son and some 50 soldiers, left Mao Wenlong and established a base in the Ch'angsŏng (Figure 4.2-B) area along the Yalu River.⁴⁷⁷ However, the corruption became so serious in 1626 that Mao personally informed against several embezzlers in a memorial submitted on September 28. Accordingly, among the officers presiding over military provisions, Mao Yingshi 毛應時 and Wu Zongwu 吳宗武 embezzled a total of 290,000 taels' worth of provisions that year. Whether or not such a charge was true, Mao claimed that these "national moths" (*guodu* 國蠹) were responsible for the current tragedy: "The armies are running out of food. They are chewing barks and eating grass roots. Ditches overflow with their bones." 三軍絕食，嚼樹皮，啖草根，骸骨俱填溝壑。⁴⁷⁸

These hungry civilians and soldiers were treated as leverage that Mao had been using to procure provisions from Chosŏn Korea, and from the Ming dynasty as well. Hence, in December 1626, to stop the country from falling into an endless financial abyss, the Border Defense Council devised a plan to bypass Mao Wenlong and to send envoys to negotiate with the Ming dynasty directly about repatriating some of Mao's people.⁴⁷⁹ Censor-General (*Taesagan* 大司諫) Yi Sik 李植 (1584-1647) drafted the memorial in advance,⁴⁸⁰ but it was never sent to the Ming court, for Chosŏn Korea was soon weighed down with the Manchu invasion (*Chŏngmyo horan*

⁴⁷⁶ For vivid descriptions, see Cho, *Sok chamnok*, 2-3; Kim, "Sŏjŏngnok" in *Mangwa chip*, fasc. 5.

⁴⁷⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/1/12 (1625/2/18), Injo 3/3/26 (1625/5/2).

⁴⁷⁸ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 79.

⁴⁷⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/10/25 (1626/12/13).

⁴⁸⁰ That is why the memorial has not been dated. Yi Sik 李植, "Ch'ŏng soachwan yomin chumun" 請刷還遼民奏文, in *T'aektang chip* 澤堂集, fasc.1 (MKSDB).

丁卯胡亂) in the coming year.⁴⁸¹ Hong Taiji had just succeeded Nurhaci in late 1626, and this was the first campaign the new Khan launched during his reign.⁴⁸² The alleged reason for the war was to kill Mao Wenlong for he had been receiving the Liaodong people fleeing from Manchu rule.⁴⁸³ The results of the war, however, were first a peace negotiation between the Manchus and Chosŏn Korea signed on Kanghwa Island 江華島 on April 18 and then a more humiliating treaty in Pyongyang on May 3, which compromised Chosŏn Korea's independence vis-à-vis the Manchus and opened border trade.⁴⁸⁴

As for Mao Wenlong, he had already retreated to Yuncong Island 雲從島, (Figure 4.5-A) west of Pido (Figure 4.5-B) in December 1626, long before the Manchus came the following March.⁴⁸⁵ Originally called Sinmin 身彌, the island was the largest one in North Korea and had been used as a horse ranch. Mao's men, of which the number was no more than one hundred, first arrived there in early 1625 and began to settle the land.⁴⁸⁶ However, it was not until June

⁴⁸¹ Historians from Korea and China have, of course, written extensively on *Chŏngmyo horan*, but for a concise yet comprehensive study, see Suzuki Kai 鈴木開, "Chōsen teibō uron kō: Chōsen kōkin kankei no seiritu wo megutte" 朝鮮丁卯胡亂考: 朝鮮・後金關係の成立をめぐって, *Shigaku zasshi* 史學雜誌 123.8 (August 2014). Kenneth Swope has also written about this episode at some length in his *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*. However, there are many errors. For instance, Swope writes: "On 14 January, the Jurchen army advanced into Uiju where Mao Wenlong was stationed, and Mao quickly fled with his men into the Bohai Sea. (p.23)" First, it was on the night of the 13th day of the first month of 1627 (1627/2/28) that "the Jurchen army advanced into Uiju," not "on 14 January." Second, Mao had a base in Ch'ōlsan, not Ūiju, and it was on the 15th day (1627/3/2) that the Manchus attacked Ch'ōlsan. Third, Mao had already moved to Yuncong before the Manchus came, not "Mao quickly fled with his men into the Bohai Sea" after the Manchu attacked.

⁴⁸² On September 30, 1626, Nurhaci died of complications from an arrow wound from the Battle of Ningyuan 寧遠之戰, during which the Manchus were defeated by the Ming military commanded by Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥, but managed to sack Juehua Island 覺華島 and burn the grain reserves there.

⁴⁸³ MWLD, 825. In fact, there were several reasons for the war, which resulted from both the domestic and international situation of the Manchu state. For a comprehensive explanation, see Kim Chongwŏn, "Chŏngmyo horan shi ūi hugŭm ūi ch'ulpyŏng tonggi," *Tongyangsahak yŏn'gu* 8 (1978).

⁴⁸⁴ Suzuki, "Chōsen teibō uron," 1452-1456.

⁴⁸⁵ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 85-86; *Injo sillok*, Injo 5/4/1 (1627/5/15); *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 4/11/15 (1627/1/2).

⁴⁸⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/2/9 (1626/3/17); *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 3/8/9 (1625/9/10).

1626 that Mao began to relocate his troops from Ch'ölsan to Sinmin on a large scale, and the island's name was changed into Yuncong, a pun on Mao Wenlong's name.⁴⁸⁷ The correlation between the relocation and the retreat is unknown, but one thing is certain that Mao's early retreat was the result of received intelligence about a pending Manchu invasion. The original intelligence that surfaced in July 1626 was provided by the aforementioned Xu Gucheng who turned his back on Mao but somehow kept a collaborative relationship with the Chosŏn court.⁴⁸⁸ In the following months, there emerged several versions of the intelligence reported by the local officials in P'yŏngan, as well as by Mao Youjun 毛有俊, Mao Wenlong's intelligence chief (*Boye dusi* 撥夜都司).⁴⁸⁹ Toward the end of the year, it had become almost certain that the Manchus were coming. The questions that remained were how many and what time.⁴⁹⁰ The Chosŏn court perhaps took the intelligence to mean another round of routine harassment that the Manchus usually perpetrated during the winter, and it turns out that no real action was taken except for the repetition of preparation for winter defense in the official records.⁴⁹¹ In contrast, Mao took the intelligence seriously and, departing from his usual routine of spending the winter in Ch'ölsan, Mao timely retreated to Yuncong Island, and most of his effective strength, some 20,000 men as he claimed, was preserved.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁷ “雲從龍.” Sin, “Sawöl sipsamil- Kado pongnasi munkyŏn'gye” 四月十三日-椴島奉使時聞見啓, in *Mano chip*, fasc. 5; *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/12/4 (1626/1/1).

⁴⁸⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/6/17 (1626/7/10).

⁴⁸⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/9/21 (1626/11/9), Injo 4/10/24 (1626/7/10); Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 85.

⁴⁹⁰ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 4/11/28 (1627/1/5).

⁴⁹¹ For example, see *Injo sillok*, Injo 4/8/12 (1626/10/1), Injo 4/10/8 (1626/11/26), Injo 4/12/26 (1627/2/11).

⁴⁹² Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 86.



Figure 4.5 Locations of Yuncong/Sinmin (A) and Pido (B)

Adapted from Kim Chŏnggho 金正浩, *Tongyŏdo* 東輿圖 (Kyujanggak 10340). <https://kyudb.snu.ac.kr/book/view.do>
 Accessed 2021/05/13.

As Mao and his men were away from mainland, the problem of food recurred after six months of isolation. Groups of Mao’s soldiers began to navigate along the northwest coast, targeting the coastal granaries and the ships loaded with refugees fleeing from the Manchus. On June 2, 1627, a group of Mao’s soldiers, sailing 5 ships, sacked the granary in Anju (Figure 4.2-1) and captured three boats off the coast. They slaughtered all the men aboard and brought back the women and the goods.⁴⁹³ Mao Wenlong justified such brutality with the rhetoric of “the

⁴⁹³ There are several similar records, but the Anju incident perhaps was a most vicious one and hence has been recorded in detail. See *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 5/4/19 (1627/6/2); Sin, “Sawŏl sipkuil- Kado pongsasi munkyŏn’gye” 四月十九日-椴島奉使時間見啓, in *Mano chip*, fasc.5.

Koreans guided the barbarians” 麗民導虜, which was specifically targeted at Ŭiju Magistrate Yi Wan 李莞 (1579-1627).⁴⁹⁴ Mao had been long holding a grudge against Yi, for Yi had once expelled and punished Mao’s men for looting the locals, and more importantly he remained in office after such conduct.⁴⁹⁵ This accusation, however, appeared to be false, because Yi had already been killed, on March 1, 1627, when the Manchus took Ŭiju.⁴⁹⁶

The brutality of Mao’s soldiers greatly alarmed the Chosŏn court as a grain barge was then on the way to deliver 200 *sŏm* of grain to some 4,000 Chosŏn soldiers in the Yonggol Mountain Fortress 龍骨山城 in the Yongch’ŏn 龍川 (Figure 4.2-H) area.⁴⁹⁷ Known as the righteous army (*ũibyŏng* 義兵), these people were the guerilla force led by Chŏng Pongsu 鄭鳳壽 (1572-1645) after the Manchus occupied the area and killed the magistrate Yi Hũikŏn 李希建 (1576-1627).⁴⁹⁸ Having been cut off from supplies for a month, the grain that the Chosŏn court shipped was their last lifeline. What was unexpected was that Mao did not attack the Chosŏn barge. Instead, he provided some grain from his own reserves.⁴⁹⁹ Such a reverse resulted from

⁴⁹⁴ Sin, “Sawŏl Isipch’ilil- Kado pongsa simun kyŏn’gye” 四月二十七日-椴島奉使時聞見啓, in *Mano chip*, fasc.5.

⁴⁹⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/2/27 (1626/4/4), Injo 3/3/19 (1625/4/25).

⁴⁹⁶ MWLD, 825.

⁴⁹⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 5/3/18 (1627/5/3); *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 5/4/20 (1627/6/3).

⁴⁹⁸ Yonggol Mountain Fortress was part of the fortress defense system established during the Injo Reign. Yi Hũikŏn reorganized the defense there in September 1625. When the Manchus began to attack Yongch’ŏn, Yi retreated to the fortress, but the defense proved ineffective, and Yi died on the battlefield. Chŏng Pongsu held a degree from the military examination and was then in mourning for his father’s death in Ch’ŏlsan. Running from the Manchus, Chŏng, along with 4,000 men, took shelter in Yonggol sansŏng in April and began their guerilla fights thereafter. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 3/6/19 (1625/7/22), Injo 5/3/18 (1627/5/3), Injo 5/6/19 (1627/7/31). Also see Chang Yu 張維, “Yonggolsŏng gopusa Yikong bi” 龍骨城故府使李公碑, in *Kyegok chip* 谿谷集, fasc.14 (MKSDB); Yun Haengim 尹行恁, “Chŏng Pongsu” 鄭鳳壽, in *Sŏkchaego* 碩齋稿, fasc.9 (MKSDB). There was a rumor that Yi Hũikŏn’s death was the result of a conspiracy plotted by his subordinate Yi Ch’unggŏl 李忠傑. Nevertheless, this cannot be verified. See Sin, “Owŏl ch’ooil- Kado pongsa simun kyŏn’gye” 五月初五日-椴島奉使時聞見啓, in *Mano chip*, fasc.5.

⁴⁹⁹ Sin, “Owŏl sipch’ilil- Kado pongsa simun kyŏn’gye” 四月十七日-椴島奉使時聞見啓, in *Mano chip*, fasc.5.

the successful military operations of Chǒng's army. Over months of guerilla fighting, it was reported that they did not lose a single battle. More importantly, Chǒng sent the chopped-off heads of the enemies to Mao Wenlong, who could use the heads as war trophies to brag about his military triumphs to the Ming court. On May 24, Mao's soldiers joined Chǒng's army and conducted an operation in the Yongch'ŏn area. The Chosŏn records show that the joint force achieved a small victory: over 40 enemies were killed.⁵⁰⁰ In comparison, this operation was dubbed the Battle of Yalu River 鴨綠江一戰 in Mao's military report submitted on June 3. According to this record, his troops wounded and killed over 6,000 Manchus.⁵⁰¹

Nevertheless, Mao's military report did not bring about his expected reward. The Ming court was then occupied with the Battle of Ning-Chin 寧錦之戰 launched by Hong Taiji in June after the principal Manchu force withdrew from Chosŏn Korea in May. Yet, Inggūldai (1596-1648, aka. Yonggoltae 龍骨大 in the Chosŏn records), at the behest of Hong Taiji, still led an army stationed in Ŭiju, keeping an eye on Mao Wenlong.⁵⁰² As for Mao, however, what made things worse was that the Chosŏn court deemed Inggūldai's men now scattering between Ŭiju and Pyongyang much more dangerous than Mao's. As a result, in July, the Chosŏn court ordered to use the *moryang* collected from the Samnam area to supply the Manchus,⁵⁰³ indicating that Dongjiang was cut off from Chosŏn provisions in 1627. This situation drove Mao Wenlong to turn to the Ming dynasty for help, only to find that Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥 (1584-1630), currently the highest commander of the Ming military, decided to reduce the quantity of

⁵⁰⁰ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 5/4/26 (1627/6/9).

⁵⁰¹ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 95.

⁵⁰² MWLD, 837.

⁵⁰³ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 5/5/26 (1627/7/8).

provisions provided to Dongjiang. Conflict between Yuan and Mao soon intensified and eventually led to the death of the latter.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter examines the grain supply provided by Chosŏn Korea to Dongjiang. This support played a crucial role in Dongjiang's existence, as the provisions shipped by the Ming were not enough to sustain the whole population there. The key question this chapter aims to answer is why the Chosŏn court decided to do so. Some existing studies blame the greediness of Mao Wenlong, showing that he was bullying the Chosŏn court. Some show that Mao Wenlong used silver to procure grain from the Chosŏn, characterizing the process as a fair trade. These explanations hold a level of truth—indeed Mao craved resources, and silver was involved in the grain supply. However, neither can provide a comprehensive explanation for why the Chosŏn court supplied grain continuously and why the amount of grain delivered to Dongjiang increased over time.

The Chosŏn grain supply happened against the backdrop of worsening financial conditions in the administrative region responsible for supplying Mao, a failed nationwide taxation reform aiming to increase revenue, and a series of conflicts between Mao and Chosŏn. Yet, the grain supply made sense as it was implicated in three crises. First, the legitimacy crisis resulting from King Injo ascending the throne through a coup in 1623 compelled King Injo to win over support from the Ming at all costs. The Chosŏn court bribed Mao Wenlong with grain, hoping Mao would lobby at the Ming court on behalf of King Injo. Second, a subsequent rebellion in 1624 provided an excuse for Mao Wenlong to send alleged reinforcements to the Chosŏn mainland. Chosŏn hence used grain as a bargaining chip, hoping Mao would order a

withdrawal and discipline his men. Third, two coming Ming delegations between 1625 and 1626, particularly the first, exhausted the silver reserve in Seoul, giving the Board of Taxation no choice but to turn to Mao Wenlong for loans. Consequently, more grain was delivered to Dongjiang as repayment. All three of these crises were rooted in the Ming-Chosŏn relationship. King Injo's political legitimacy based exclusively on Ming suzerainty made Chosŏn adopt a firm pro-Ming policy without flexibility and hence supply Dongjiang that represented Ming authority.

The continual food crisis among Mao's people was at odds with the stable supply of provisions. It was Mao's tactic to deliberately keep most civilians impoverished and compel them to seek food on the Chosŏn mainland. The hungry civilians became leverage for Mao to press for more grain from Chosŏn, as well as from the Ming dynasty. The inner circle of Dongjiang lived off Chosŏn and Ming provisions. Such corruption and nonaction were highlighted in 1627 when Mao and his soldiers did not even engage the Manchus who invaded Chosŏn Korea. As Dongjiang, from the perspective of the Ming court, was created for the sole purpose of containing the Manchus, it lost its *raison d'être* and hurtled closer to oblivion, which will be examined in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: The Collapse of Dongjiang

In 1630, Minister of War Liang Tingdong 梁廷棟 (?-1636) proposed dismantling Dongjiang and moving all the people inland. Earlier that year, the Ming dynasty had been humiliated by the Manchus. The enemy bypassed the heavily fortified Shanhai Pass and marched down to the outskirts of Beijing, looting for days before retreating. The Manchus turned out in full strength, leaving its rear weakly defended. However, throughout the Manchu invasion, the forces in Dongjiang did not attempt to attack the enemies from the rear. This was the second time that Dongjiang failed to meet Ming expectations. The first time, as has been shown in the previous chapter, was in 1627, when the Manchus invaded Chosŏn Korea. Consequently, when Liang made public his proposal at the Ming court, many ministers agreed, including Sun Chengzong 孫承宗 (1563-1638), who had prevailed over all dissenting views and supported the establishment of Dongjiang in 1622 (for details, see Chapter 3.2).⁵⁰⁴ As seen by these officials, Dongjiang was of no practical use in the Ming strategy against the Manchus. This was especially true after Mao Wenlong died in 1629. Now Dongjiang was made up of a group of stragglers and civilians of all sorts, living off the provisions provided by Ming and Chosŏn. However, Dongjiang continued to exist as a military organization until 1637.

Why could Dongjiang continue to exist for another seven years after Ming officials had already agreed to implement a “withdrawal plan” in 1630? During the last years of Dongjiang, it continued to receive material aid from Ming and Chosŏn, despite a lack of evidence showing any contribution from Dongjiang to either country. This chapter argues that Dongjiang’s strategic importance in Ming politics was revived by several contingent events, including the death of a

⁵⁰⁴ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/2/30 (1630/4/12); *Sun Chengzong ji*, 1169-1170.

potential Dongjiang leader, the power struggle among Dongjiang officers, and several mutinies in and outside Dongjiang. Essentially, Dongjiang's continuous existence depended on the Ming court's evaluation of its strategic importance. But as Dongjiang continued to exist in Chosŏn Korea, it stood in the way of Manchu conquest, paving the way for its eventual collapse in 1637.

5.1 Approaching the Death of Mao Wenlong

One of the defining features of the high politics in the Tianqi 天啟 reign (1621-1627) was the factional battles. The two opponents were the seemingly righteous scholarly bureaucrats, the Donglin Faction 東林黨, and the notorious eunuch faction 閹黨, headed by Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 (1568-1627). After years of bitter struggle, the eunuchs achieved the final victory. Starting from 1626, Wei Zhongxian held sway on the court and almost all the officials in the Ming bureaucracy, including those who had been against him,⁵⁰⁵ crossed over to the side of, in Harry Miller's words, "the Wei Zhongxian administration."⁵⁰⁶

Mao Wenlong was among those who picked the eunuchs' side. As noted in the previous chapter, the Manchus invaded Chosŏn Korea early in 1627. Hence, Mao Wenlong's regime was

⁵⁰⁵ This is not to suggest that all the officials were members of the eunuch faction. For many, morality aside, flattering Wei Zhongxian was simply a means to the end of survival. For instance, in a memorial submitted in May 1627, Yuan Chonghuan speaks highly of Wen Zhongxian and proposes to build him a shrine in Ningyuan. Yuan was, of course, not a member of the eunuch faction, but an associate of Sun Chengzong who was known for his uncooperative attitude towards the eunuchs. In August, Yuan was forced to resign after the Ming force under his command had just achieved victory in the Battle of Ning-Chin. Wang Zhicheng 王之臣, a eunuch faction member, temporarily took over his duty of safeguarding the Shanhai Pass. See Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥 and Yang Baosen 楊寶森 ed., *Yuan Chonghuan ji* 袁崇煥集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2014), 102-103, 131-134.

⁵⁰⁶ Harry Miller, *State versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty, 1572-1644* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 137; for an introduction to the Donglin and eunuch factions, see 95-138. A political token in the factional battles was *shengci* 生祠, or the living shrine. While historians conventionally regarded it as a token of surrender to Wei Zhongxian, a recent study has dug up more meanings about the living shrine in Ming politics. See Sarah Schneewind, *Shrines to Living Men in the Ming Political Cosmos* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), especially 148-175.

cut off from the Korean grain supply, and he had no choice but to turn to the Ming court for help. In March of that year, the Ming court sent out four eunuchs to station in Pidao and supervise Mao's army.⁵⁰⁷ The Tianqi emperor gave the order, and perhaps it was Wei Zhongxian behind the order, because Mao Wenlong requested it. Eunuchs taking military positions can be dated back to the Han dynasty, but it only became widespread in the Ming dynasty. Such a phenomenon, in most cases, was the result of eunuchs being entrusted with more duties, which in turn encroached on the power of civil and military officials in commanding the army.⁵⁰⁸

The rationale behind Mao's request was, of course, not to share his commanding power with the eunuchs, but to inject himself into the eunuch faction. The conditions were in Mao's favor: all four eunuchs were associates of Wei Zhongxian and the man in charge, Hu Liangfu 胡良輔, was an old acquaintance of Mao, who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, received Hu as a Ming envoy coming to investiture King Injo in 1625. In August 1627, Mao met the coming eunuchs in Pidao and, according to one Chosŏn official present, Mao and Hu signed a blood oath, calling each other brother. Such a treacherous alliance, one can imagine, involved a substantial trade-off. 50,000 taels of silver that the eunuchs brought to reward Mao's men was repaid to the eunuchs as bribery.⁵⁰⁹ In exchange, Mao gained support from the eunuchs and even received Hu Liangfu's verbal offer that "as long as I fabricate some achievement for your lord,

⁵⁰⁷ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 7/2/8 (1626/3/24).

⁵⁰⁸ For the relation between eunuchs and the Ming military, see Shih-shan Tsai, *The Eunuchs in the Ming Dynasty* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 59-96.

⁵⁰⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 6/7/8 (1627/8/18). Also see, Waishishi 外史世, *Shengchao xincheng yaolie* 聖朝新政要略, *juan 9*, in *Xuxiu siku quanshu* 續修四庫全書, *Shibu* 史部 438 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 679.

and you are to be bestowed with more and more titles, why should you worry that the wealth and rank aren't long lasting?" 只要替老公祖做些功勞，多封幾個侯伯，何愁富貴不長久?⁵¹⁰

Emboldened by the eunuchs' support, Mao Wenlong submitted two similar memorials in October. He complained about the hardship of living in Pidao and asked for an increase in provisions to the value of one million taels of silver per year.⁵¹¹ Mao's memorials perhaps would have been better received if the Tianqi emperor manipulated by Wei Zhongxian had still been on the throne. The Chongzhen emperor succeeded his brother on October 1 and replied to Mao's memorials with a few perfunctory words.⁵¹² Clearly, the sixteen-year-old did not hold a positive attitude toward the eunuch faction. Unlike the eunuchs in the Tang dynasties who gained power directly from the military and sometimes stood above the emperor,⁵¹³ the Ming eunuchs were, after all, the emperors' agents and their power was delegitimized without the emperor's support. This was especially true in the case of Wei Zhongxian. Three months after the Tianqi emperor died, Wei was banished to Fengyang 鳳陽 and hanged himself en route.

Infighting within the eunuch faction soon followed and Mao Wenlong became a target for his fellow faction members so that they could distance themselves from the group deemed to be purged. In February 1628, Minister of War Yan Mingtai 閻鳴泰 (1572-?) memorialized the throne to relocate Mao Wenlong and his men to the south coast of the Liaodong peninsula. As he reiterates in his memorial the strategic importance of Pidao and suggests replacing Mao Wenlong

⁵¹⁰ Waishishi, *Shengchao xincheng yaolie*, 679. Noted that *laogongzu* 老公祖 was a conventional way of calling a local official in the Ming-Qing dynasties. The phrase often appears in private correspondence between officials.

⁵¹¹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Tianqi 7/9/5 (1627/10/13), Tianqi 7/9/11 (1627/10/19).

⁵¹² *Chongzhen changbian*, Tianqi 7/9/5.

⁵¹³ For a well-received recent study, see Huang Lou 黃樓, *Shencejun yu zhongwantang huanguan zhengzhi* 神策軍與中晚唐宦官政治 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2019).

with a more capable commander, Yan's memorial was indeed a personal attack against Mao.⁵¹⁴ The Chongzhen emperor withheld his opinions only to find the coming of more impeachments from eunuch faction members. In April, for instance, Censor Yuan Hongxun 袁弘勛 echoed Yan and went further to suggest giving up Pidao and concentrating more on recovering Liaodong from the south.⁵¹⁵

The suggestion of relocating Mao Wenlong stemmed from his perceived failure to contain the Manchus,⁵¹⁶ but nevertheless led to another thorny issue of relocating the population on Pidao. Consequently, officials with ties to Shandong, which was the most likely place to receive the people from Pidao, resisted. The first was Censor Fan Fucui 范復粹 (?-1657), a native of Huangxian 黃縣 in Dengzhou, who suggested postponing the relocation and thinking over the population management issue.⁵¹⁷ The second was Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Sun Guozhen 孫國楨, who proposed to select and retain good soldiers remaining in Pidao and relocate the rest of the population to nearby islands.⁵¹⁸ In May 1628, the Chongzhen emperor picked Sun's plan.⁵¹⁹ The reasons were first that the strategic importance of Dongjiang was undeniable, and second that streamlining the troops in Dongjiang could relieve the financial burden of supplying them. In a sense, the Chongzhen emperor was seeking a quick success. For him, the ideal result was

⁵¹⁴ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/1/19 (1628/2/23).

⁵¹⁵ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/3/14 (1628/4/18).

⁵¹⁶ In fact, the criticism of Mao Wenlong's non-action had never been silenced ever since he established the base on Pidao, while the Manchus kept winning against Ming forces. Hence, whether or not to relocate Mao Wenlong from Pidao had been a nagging question. See, for instance, Zhou Wenyu 周文郁, *Bianshi xiaoji* 邊事小紀, in *Siku jinhuishu congkan* 四庫禁燬書叢刊, *bubiance* 補編冊 16 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2005), 408-412.

⁵¹⁷ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/3/25 (1628/4/28).

⁵¹⁸ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/4/15 (1628/5/18).

⁵¹⁹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/4/19 (1628/5/22).

maximizing the military function of Mao's forces while minimizing the financial cost paid by the increasingly strained finances.

Sun Guozhen, who was then entrusted with the duty of streamlining Mao's troops, felt out the emperor's agenda and acted out of political opportunism as he always did. Just the previous year, Sun had been an enthusiastic supporter of the eunuch faction, extolling Wei Zhongxian and Mao Wenlong in a memorial reporting Mao's alleged victory in the Battle of the Yalu River (see Chapter 4.5).⁵²⁰ Now with the demise of the eunuch faction, Sun became the emperor's loyal minister and was well aware that what really mattered was cutting the costs of supplying Pidao. On August 25, 1628, he reported that the exact number of soldiers under Mao's command was 28,000 and so the annual grain supply was decided to be 80,000 *shi*.⁵²¹ Huang Zhongse 黃中色, an official from the Ministry of Revenue, conducted an on-site inspection of Mao's troops.⁵²² However, it is unknown how Huang corresponded with Sun, or how the latter did the final reporting. Nor is it clear what defined a soldier (*bing* 兵)—presumably, the males under Mao's command were more than the reported number, not to mention other populations including females, the old, and minors. Nevertheless, Sun Guozhen achieved the expected goal of cutting down the expenditure by more than a half—the previous quota was 200,000 *shi*.

Whether or not the 80,000 *shi* of grain was delivered to Dongjiang in 1628 is questionable. In August, the mutiny that burst forth in Ningyuan because the soldiers had gone four months

⁵²⁰ Gu Yingtai 谷應泰, *Mingshi jishi benmo* 明史紀事本末 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 1460.

⁵²¹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/7/26 (1628/8/25). The duty of providing grain supply, as well as other provisions, was again shared by Tianjin and Deng-Lai. For details, see Bi Ziyuan 畢自嚴, *Duzhi zouyi* 度支奏議, vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008), 322-326, 332-337.

⁵²² *Sǔngjǒngwǒn ilgi*, Injo 6/5/18 (1628/6/19).

without pay suggested that Ming military logistics underwent serious difficulty that year.⁵²³ On the other hand, Chosŏn records also show that hunger struck Mao's people. The price of rice in Pidao skyrocketed,⁵²⁴ while news about Mao's troops looting boats and coastal residences kept being reported to Seoul.⁵²⁵

The overdue payment of provisions led to a most reckless move on the part of Mao Wenlong. In September, Mao sailed in person to Dengzhou and asked Sun Guozhen for provisions.⁵²⁶ No extant record has shown the process of negotiation, but presumably it did not go well, because the economy in Pidao continued to worsen,⁵²⁷ and what happened previously in Ningyuan recurred on the island the following April.⁵²⁸ Not only did Mao's visit to Dengzhou fail to satisfy his need, but it also led to deleterious consequences. Leaving his military post without authorization was, of course, unacceptable under Ming political norms. What was worse was that it was done against the backdrop of the Battle of Huangniwa 黃泥窪, a fortress northwest of Liaoyang. On September 8, a Ming force engaged the Manchus coming back from the expedition against the Chahar Mongols.⁵²⁹ While the Manchus were attacking in Liaodong, Mao Wenlong and his men were simultaneously harassing in Shandong. Such a coincidence could have raised the question of whether Mao was compromised and was cooperating with the

⁵²³ For details about the Ningyuan mutiny, see Bi Zisu's own account. Bi was then Liaodong Grand Coordinator and was hijacked and beaten up in the mutiny. He committed suicide later. Bi Zisu 畢自肅, *Liaodong shugao* 遼東疏稿, in *Siku weishoushu jikan* 四庫未收書輯刊, *yiji* 壹輯-22, (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe), 61-62; for the inefficiency of the Ming military logistics, see 35-41.

⁵²⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 6/8/8 (1628/9/5).

⁵²⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 6/7/23 (1628/8/22), Injo 6/9/4 (1628/9/30), Injo 6/9/19 (1628/10/15), Injo 6/10/14 (1628/11/9).

⁵²⁶ Gu, *Mingshi jishi benmo*, 1460.

⁵²⁷ Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 132.

⁵²⁸ The mutiny was perhaps not too severe an incident as suggested in Mao's memorial, but nevertheless became a reason that Mao used to press for provisions from the Ming court. Mao, *Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao*, 131-132.

⁵²⁹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/8/11 (1628/9/8); MWLD, 906.

Manchus.⁵³⁰ The situation somehow did not go in that direction, but the implication was bad enough to cause a stir in Beijing. Impeachments against Mao ensued. Although some of the impeachments were purely personal, attacking Mao's non-action and corruption, the tone of the discussion over Mao at the Ming court had changed from how best to utilize Mao and his forces to reining in a man who had become "hard to control" 難馭.⁵³¹

In hindsight, the one-sided political opinion against Mao Wenlong in late 1628 had already paved the way for the Ming to get rid of him. Mao, too, was sensitive to the political winds in Beijing. In December, he memorialized the throne and offered to resign to feel out the emperor's attitude. Yet again, considering the strategic importance of Dongjiang, the Chongzhen emperor set aside his ministers' opinions and refused to accept Mao's resignation.⁵³² If Mao Wenlong was kept in place, however, there had to be one person taking political responsibility for Mao's desertion of his post. As a result, Sun Guozhen became the scapegoat—after all his decision to cut Mao's provisions was the direct cause of the current situation. The alleged crime claimed by Censor Qu Shisi 瞿式耜 (1590-1651) was that both Mao and Sun were from Zhejiang, and Sun tried to cover up his fellow countryman's (*tongxiang* 同鄉) crime of leaving Pidao for

⁵³⁰ Judging from the extant records, there is no evidence that Mao Wenlong and the Manchus were cooperating militarily. Indeed, Hong Taiji then adopted a conciliatory policy towards Mao, dispatching envoys and sending gifts to Pidao. Mao negotiated peace with the Manchus and accepted their goods with pleasure. This is shown in the seven letters that Mao sent to Hong Taiji in early 1628 (MWLD, 890-905). Yet, Meng Zhaoxin's study suggests that the last six letters are forgeries made by the Manchus to falsely accuse Mao. (Meng Zhaoxin 孟昭信, "Mao Wenlong laishu shixi" 毛文龍來書試析, *Shixue jikan fukan hao* 史學集刊復刊號 (1981), 64-68.) Whether Meng's suspicion is valid, Mao's letters in the Manchu archives cannot prove that Mao already surrendered to Hong Taiji. The Chosŏn officials, as bystanders, perhaps had the most objective judgment. In March 1629, P'yŏngan Governor Kim Hanjong 金起宗 made it clear in his meeting with King Injo that although Mao was corresponding with the Manchus, there was no sign of rebellion See *Injo sillok*, Injo 7/2/9 (1629/3/3).

⁵³¹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/8/22 (1628/9/19), Chongzhen 1/8/24 (1628/9/21).

⁵³² Tan Qian 談遷, *Guoque* 國權 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1958), 5463.

Dengzhou. Whether this was a fair allegation, at the emperor's behest, Sun was removed from his post in October 1628.⁵³³

5.2 Yuan Chonghuan's Management of Pidao

Following Sun Guozhen's removal, the office of Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator was abolished. Qu Shisi was the minister who proposed the abolition,⁵³⁴ but it was Yuan Chonghuan who most supported the proposal and persuaded the emperor to approve it.⁵³⁵ This was part of Yuan's plan of consolidating his commanding position and streamlining the leadership in the northeast military. Yuan learned his lesson from the Xiong Tingbi and Wang Huazhen affair—the conflict between them led to the Ming defeat at Guangning in 1621—but also from his own experience being forced to resign in 1627 because he was not favored by Wei Zhongxian, who in turn credited Huo Weihua 霍維華 (?-1636), Deputy Minister of War and a disciple of Wei, with winning the Battle of Ning-Chin.⁵³⁶ After Wei died, Yuan Chonghuan was recalled from his native place in Dongguan 東莞 to be responsible for the northeast military.⁵³⁷ In August 1628 when the emperor called him for consultation,⁵³⁸ Yuan made clear that “I am more than able to manage the whole realm of Liaodong, but am not able to cater to all tastes...Is there no one

⁵³³ Qu Shisi 瞿式耜, *Qu zhongxuangong ji* 瞿忠宣公集, in *Xuxiu siku quanshu* 續修四庫全書, vol. 1375 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 190.

⁵³⁴ Qu, *Qu zhongxuangong ji*, 191-192.

⁵³⁵ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/9/21 (1628/10/17). Also see, *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 154.

⁵³⁶ *Mingxizong shilu*, Tianqi 7/8/9 (2637/9/27); *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 131-134.

⁵³⁷ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 137.

⁵³⁸ Aka, the famous *Pingtai zhaodui* 平台召對. In this meeting, Yuan Chonghuan boasted that he could recover Liaodong in five years. Yuan's claim pleased the emperor, but also set the scene for his demise. In 1629, the Manchus circumvented the Shanhai Pass and reached the outskirts of Beijing (*Jisi zhibian* 己巳之變). Consequently, Yuan was held responsible and was executed later.

jealous of those with ability and merits? If one does not restrain me with force, one can upset my plan with opinions.” 制全遼有餘，調眾口不足...忌能妒功，夫豈無人？即不以權利掣臣肘，亦能以意見亂臣謀。⁵³⁹ The emperor assured Yuan of support and granted him the Sword of State 尚方劍⁵⁴⁰, and Yuan Chonghuan began his institutional reforms. Taking advantage of the mutiny in Ningyuan and the subsequent death of Bi Zisu, Yuan first dissolved the post of Liaodong Grand Coordinator;⁵⁴¹ Deng-Lai, as mentioned, became the second target; and there remained the last piece, Dongjiang.

Given what happened between 1627 and 1628, it was now universally acknowledged that Mao Wenlong was out of control. An uncontrollable military tycoon overseas was a direct threat to Yuan's authority and hence removing Mao from his post had been long planned. Since the time in late 1628 when Yuan was in Beijing, he had already talked to Grand Secretary Qian Longxi 錢龍錫 (1579-1645) about his plan of reorganizing the troops in Dongjiang. “If Wenlong is usable, then I will continue to use him. Otherwise, dealing with him is not hard at all,” 文龍可用則用之，不可用則處之亦不難, Yuan said implicitly.⁵⁴² How exactly to “deal with” Mao was later revealed in a letter that Yuan wrote to then Minister of War Wang Qia 王洽 (?-1630) in early 1629. “If Wenlong is of one mind with me, I will certainly hold no suspicions. Otherwise, I will cut off his head.” 文龍倘能協心一意，自當無嫌無猜，否則斬其首。⁵⁴³ Although there

⁵³⁹ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 141.

⁵⁴⁰ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/7/23 (1628/8/22).

⁵⁴¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 7/4/27 (1629/5/19); *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 153.

⁵⁴² *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 2/12/17 (1630/1/29).

⁵⁴³ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 274.

had been volumes of impeachments against Mao, this was the first time the explicit idea of killing him appeared.

To make that happen, Yuan made two arrangements.⁵⁴⁴ First, Yuan ordered to exclude Deng-Lai from maritime transport, and its shipping duty was to be shared by Tianjin and the Shanhai Pass. Second, Yuan established *Dongjiang xiangsi* 東江餉司, a particular office in Ningyuan responsible for supplying Dongjiang. Making these two arrangements meant that all the ships leaving for Dongjiang would stop in Ningyuan for inspection before sailing. Hence, no contraband or private goods would be shipped overseas. It also meant that as Deng-Lai was excluded from sea shipping, a maritime embargo ensued, and so the economic relationship between Deng-Lai and Dongjiang, from which Mao Wenlong was reported to gain profits, came to an end.⁵⁴⁵

Yuan's economic sanction led to backlashes from Mao, of course. He submitted two memorials to protest in May and July only to find that the emperor withheld his opinions.⁵⁴⁶ To keep up the pressure, Mao sailed to Deng-Lai again to ask for provisions but returned upon arrival because he was informed that Yuan had decided to pay him a visit.⁵⁴⁷ On July 19, the two

⁵⁴⁴ In his memorial informing the emperor of the execution of Mao, Yuan Chonghuan makes it clear that “since the 12th month last year, I have been making arrangements, and Wenlong will not live but die” 自去年十二月，臣安排已定，文龍有死無生矣。 *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 193. (Was this informing the emperor of the intended execution, or informing the emperor after Mao had been executed? If the former, it should read “intended execution.”)

⁵⁴⁵ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 170-171. The embargo also affected the Chosŏn envoys paying tribute to Beijing. They were no longer allowed to enter China through Deng-Lai, but rather had to sail along the coast of Liaodong and go ashore at Juehua Island. The new route was much longer and reportedly hard to navigate. The Chosŏn court hence made several attempts to ask for the restoration of the previous sea route, but there is no evidence that the Ming court approved the Chosŏn requests. Nevertheless, the new route seemed to have provided the Chosŏn court with more information about the military in the northeast, which is reflected in the Chosŏn *Veritable Records*. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/1/27 (1630/3/10), Injo 8/7/2 (1630/8/9), Injo 11/4/12 (1633/5/19), Injo 14/7/28 (1636/8/28).

⁵⁴⁶ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 2/4/19 (1629/5/11), Chongzhen 2/5/15 (1629/7/5).

⁵⁴⁷ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 173-176. Also see *Injo sillok*, Injo 7/4/27 (1629/5/19).

opponents met in Shuangdao 雙島, an islet off the coast of Lüshun 旅順. Days of negotiation did not resolve their conflicts and hence on July 24, 1629, Yuan killed Mao.⁵⁴⁸

Yuan Chonghuan left for Ningyuan on July 28. Before leaving, Yuan divided Mao's troops into four groups (*sixie* 四協) and made Mao Chenglu 毛承祿 (?-1632), Xu Fuzou 徐敷奏, Chen Jisheng 陳繼盛 (?-1630), and Liu Xingzuo 劉興祚 (?-1630) lead them.⁵⁴⁹ Mao Chenglu, one of Wenlong's adopted sons, was nominally the number two in Mao's army but was reported to be "a stupid and mediocre figure who attended to no business at all." 人物愚庸, 了不省事.⁵⁵⁰ Xu Fuzou was Yuan's Assistant Regional Commander (*Canjiang* 參將) and soon followed Yuan back to Ningyuan.⁵⁵¹ As for Chen Jisheng who married one of Mao's daughters, he was reported to be in awe of Liu Xingzhi⁵⁵² and due to his weak character, he was "afraid of making decisions

⁵⁴⁸ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 193-197. Also see *Injo sillok*, Injo 7/6/30 (1629/8/18). Kenneth Swope has provided a novelistic thick description about the execution of Mao Wenlong. An absorbing story, the writing is generally based on Li Qing's 李清 *Yuandushi jizhan Mao Wenlong shimo* 袁督師計斬毛文龍始末. This is a privately compiled history (*yeshi* 野史) published in the early Qing. Whether the colored details in this *yeshi* are accurate is subject to debate. See Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 80-85. For a study on the historical writing about Mao Wenlong, see Han Li, "History, Fiction, and Public Opinion: Writings on Mao Wenlong and the Early Seventeenth Century," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 134.1 (2014). Yuan Chonghuan's killing of Mao Wenlong is a topic that one cannot circumvent in studying the Ming-Qing transition. In China, numerous studies have been produced since the 1930s. Most of them focus on whether Yuan's killing was just and how Mao Wenlong's death affected the collapse of the Ming, both of which lead to a traditional craft in Chinese historiography of "appraising" 評價 historical figures. A collection of old essays reflects such a trend in the 20th century. See Luo Zhihuan 羅志歡 ed., *Yuan Chonghuan yanjiu lunwen xuanji* 袁崇煥研究論文選集 (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2005), especially 482-506. Still, the debate over Yuan's killing of Mao has not been settled to this day. For a very recent study, see Wang Ronghuang 王榮煌, *Yuan Chonghuan quanzhuan* 袁崇煥全傳 (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2020). These studies have their own merits, but I have no intention to be involved in this long-term debate. My study contextualizes Mao Wenlong's death in the then historical context and reveals that the political atmosphere at the Ming court had already paved the way for Mao's eventual demise.

⁵⁴⁹ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 202-203.

⁵⁵⁰ Cho, *Sömchamnok*, 5.

⁵⁵¹ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 209.

⁵⁵² *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 7/4/17 (1629/5/19).

on his own.”畏縮不敢自擅。⁵⁵³ Chen was the interim head keeping Mao’s official seal.

Nevertheless, it was Liu Xingzuo who held the power in Pidao.

As the de facto commander, Liu Xingzuo played an important role in pacifying Mao’s subordinates while Yuan Chonghuan was away. One report from the office of the P’yöngan Governor describes the situation in Pidao at the time in the following way: “Liu Hai (i.e. Liu Xingzuo) has taken the opportunity to do whatever he pleases. All the authority on the island belongs to him. Hai has always been talented and is equipped with tactics. The death of Wenlong and the danger and fear on the island nearly led to a riot, but things have now calmed down thanks to Hai.”劉海乘時恣橫，島中威權皆歸於海。海素多才能，挾以權數。文龍之誅，島中危懼，幾于生變，賴海鎮靜。⁵⁵⁴

Besides, Yuan Chonghuan and Liu Xingzuo were old acquaintances. A native of Kaiyuan 開原, Liu was captured by the Manchus at a young age and gradually made his way up in the military. Sun Chengzong managed to incite his defection in 1623 and Liu worked as a Ming agent until 1628 when he, along with Liu Xingzhi 劉興治 (?-1631) and another five brothers, defected to Pidao. Yuan Chonghuan started corresponding with Liu Xingzuo when he was under Sun Chengzong’s command in 1624 and by 1629 Liu had become one of Yuan’s trusted allies.⁵⁵⁵

Given all these facts, Yuan Chonghuan put much trust in Liu Xingzuo and sent for Liu in September as he was planning to reform Mao’s troops. The death of Mao Wenlong provided,

⁵⁵³ *Injo sillok*, Injo 7/7/29 (1629/9/16).

⁵⁵⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 7/7/29 (1629/9/16).

⁵⁵⁵ *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 166. Liu Xingzuo was also known as Liu Aita 劉愛塔, Liu Hai 劉海, and Liu Wu 劉五. For accounts of his activities, see Jiang Shoupeng 姜守鵬, “Liu Xingzuo shiji bukao” 劉興祚事跡補考, *Dongbei shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 東北師範大學學報 (哲學社會科學版) 5 (1984): 77-82; Huang Yi-Long 黃一農, “Liu Xingzhi xiongdi yu Mingji Dongjiang haishang fangxian de bengkuai” 劉興治兄弟與明季東江海上防線的崩潰, *Hanxue yanjiu* 漢學研究 20.1 (2002): 133-136.

perhaps for the first time, a close look at the personnel under Mao's command. According to Yuan's report submitted on August 6th after he conducted a census, the total population was about 48,000. Among them, less than 20,000 were listed as standing soldiers.⁵⁵⁶ Yuan's plan was to select 22,000 men. Among the selected, 18,000 would constitute the standing army of Dongjiang, while another 4,000 would be relocated to defend in Jizhou 薊州. The rest of the population was to move inland. A standing soldier would receive a monthly salary of 1.1 tael of silver and 0.5 *shi* of rice—previously it was 0.7 tael and 0.5 *shi*.⁵⁵⁷ The idea was to streamline while motivating the troops. Apparently, Yuan still considered Dongjiang an important part of his military strategy.

Liu Xingzuo left for Ningyuan in mid-October. He arrived on Juehua Island in early November only to find that Yuan had left for Chinchow. These two met later that month in Chinchow and Yuan ordered Liu to go back to Pidao to lead and train soldiers. While Liu remained in Ningyuan due to rough seas, Yuan was informed in December en route to the Shanhai Pass that the Manchus had managed to circumvent the Pass and were approaching the outskirts of Beijing. Yuan hence ordered Liu to come to the Shanhai Pass and planned to enlist his support in rescuing the capital. Liu wound up sojourning in the Pass with the excuse that he

⁵⁵⁶ Yuan also reported an unusually high ratio of people with official titles. These people constituted the inner circle of Mao's leadership and many of them changed their surnames to "Mao," making Wenlong their adoptive father or even grandfather. Such a group connected by alleged family ties became, in fact, a corporation that monopolized the goods and profits delivered from Ming and Chosŏn (Also see Chapter 4). Hence, the majority of people did not enjoy dividends from Mao's leadership, while Yuan was generous enough to reward them with 100,000 *taels* of silver and the grain that Mao had accumulated. This may explain why there was an uproar immediately after Mao was killed. See *Yuan Chonghuan ji*, 203-204. The Chosŏn court had been aware of this situation at least by 1628. In June of that year, Assistant Supreme Commander Chŏng Ch'ungsin 鄭忠信 (1576-1636) left his post on the northwest frontier to seek rest and recuperation in Seoul. Chŏng reported what his scouts had detected to King Injo. His report was similar to what Yuan later found, but with less detail and accuracy. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 6/5/18 (1628/6/19).

⁵⁵⁷ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 1/12/6 (1628/12/30), Chongzhen 3/2/27 (1630/4/9).

was not officially given any military power.⁵⁵⁸ While Liu Xingzuo stayed in situ in the Shanhai Pass, Yuan Chonghuan was held responsible for the Manchu invasion and hence was soon imprisoned.⁵⁵⁹ Sun Chengzong was recalled to succeed Yuan in January 1630.⁵⁶⁰ At the time, the Manchus had left Beijing and were marching east. Sun authorized Liu to lead 800 men to initiate an attack in the west of Yongping Prefecture 永平府. On February 10, Liu and his men engaged the Manchus at Qingshanying 青山營, a Ming fort 130 *li* northwest of the prefectural seat. Liu took the victory and acquired 592 Manchu heads. On February 14, on the way to the prefectural city to turn in these heads to claim battle achievement,⁵⁶¹ Liu Xingzuo and his men were attacked, and the Manchus killed Liu on site.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁸ Zhou, *Bianshi xiaoji*, 415; “Taizong wenhuangdi zhaofu pidao zhujiang yutie-Liu Xingxian jiaxin” 太宗文皇帝招撫皮島諸將論帖-劉興賢家信, in *Shiliao congkan chubian* 史料叢刊初編, ed. Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1964), 3-5.

⁵⁵⁹ Yuan Chonghuan was executed on September 22, 1630.

⁵⁶⁰ For a study on how Beijing dealt with the Manchu invasion, see Tseng Mei-Fang 曾美芳, “Jingshi jieyan yu liangxiang siying: Yi Chongzhen jisi zhibian wei zhongxin de taolun” 京師戒嚴與糧餉肆應：以崇禎己巳之變為中心的討論, *Mingdai yanjiu* 明代研究 23 (2014). For a sound study that connects the incident with the grand strategy of the Manchus, see Yao Nianci 姚念慈, “Huang Taiji ruguan jiyuan yu deshi—Ming Jin Jisi zhiyi ruogan wenti kaobian” 皇太極入關機緣與得失——明金己巳之役若干問題考辨 in Yao Nianci 姚念慈 ed., *Dingdin zhongyuan zhilu: Cong Huang Taiji ruguan dao Xuanye qinzheng* 定鼎中原之路：從皇太極入關到玄燁親政 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2018), 15-150.

⁵⁶¹ Using heads to claim battle achievement can be traced back to the era of Shang Yang 商鞅. See his, *Shangjun shu* 商君書, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012), 141-143. This tradition led to several negative consequences in the Ming including false claims and killing of the innocent. These problems were related to the supervision system in the Ming military. Hence, there were many voices supporting an institutional form, but the “flawed” institution had never been fully reformed by the end of the Ming dynasty. For an interesting case study, see Zhao Andong 趙安東, “Mingdai Hongzhi Zhang Tianxiang ‘maogong’ an yanjiu” 明代弘治張天祥‘冒功’案研究 (Master’s Thesis, Jilin University, 2017). In his *Guoque*, Tan Qian comments on the death of Liu Xingzuo not without pity, claiming that, had Liu not craved such trivial profits from the enemies’ heads, he would have become an asset to the Ming military. Tan, *Guoque*, 5529.

⁵⁶² For this battle, see Zhou Wenyu, *Bianshi xiaoji*, 415-416; *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 8/3/3 (1630/4/15); *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/4/4 (1630/5/15); MWLD, 1007; *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/4/19 (1630/5/30). For the location of Qingshanying, see Wu Jie 吳傑 et al., *Hongzhi Yongping fuzhi* 弘治永平府志 (1501), *juan* 5, 69a. Liu Xingzuo was attacked in a place called Lianghuikou 兩灰口. I have yet to find any geographic information about it, despite the fact that the 1630 battle that happened there appears in many records. Presumably it was a mountain pass, like the famous Xifengkou 喜峰口, on the Great Wall.

5.3 Twists and Turns of the Withdrawal Plan

The unexpected Manchu invasion in late 1629 stopped Yuan Chonghuan's plan regarding Dongjiang from being put into practice. It was reported that due to inefficiency in selecting soldiers and the delay in sailing caused by the winter, civilians had yet to be relocated inland.⁵⁶³ As the Manchus gradually retreated in early 1630 however, the issue of Dongjiang resurfaced. Unlike Yuan Chonghuan who never explicitly denied its importance, Minister of War Liang Tingdong deemed Dongjiang useless and decided to move all the people there to Ningyuan and Chinchow.⁵⁶⁴ The new plan made sense because, throughout the Manchu invasion, the troops in Dongjiang did not work to help contain the enemies at all—at least no such news had been reported to Beijing.⁵⁶⁵ Hence, the plan of “withdrawing from the sea” (*chehai* 撤海) gained support from leaders in the Ming military, including the commander-in-chief Sun Chengzong.⁵⁶⁶

Starting from May 1630, Liang Tingdong's plan seemed to be unfolding in an orderly fashion. Sun Chengzong meticulously calculated the ships and time used to transport people from Pidao and discussed how best to deploy them once they arrived.⁵⁶⁷ Sun Yuanhua 孫元化 (1582-1632), the official supervising the military affairs in Ningyuan and Chinchow, was to be

⁵⁶³ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/2/27 (1630/4/9).

⁵⁶⁴ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/2/30 (1630/4/12).

⁵⁶⁵ The Chosŏn records have revealed that in fact, in April 1630, Chen Jisheng deployed some men at the mouth of the Yalu River to intercept the Manchus crossing the river. The Chosŏn court feared that a military clash would lead to Manchu revenge because, per the 1627 agreement between Chosŏn and the Manchus, the Chosŏn court should not allow the people in Pidao to enter the Chosŏn mainland. Hence, the Chosŏn court sent people to guide the Manchus to bypass Chen's men. The Chosŏn intervention was later known to Chen Jisheng and led to a direct confrontation between Chen and the Ŭiju Magistrate. This confrontation ended up with Chen's men beating up the magistrate and looting the warehouses in Ŭiju. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/3/6 (1630/4/18), Injo 8/3/20 (1630/5/20), Injo 8/4/5 (1630/5/16).

⁵⁶⁶ *Sun Chengzong ji*, 1169-1170.

⁵⁶⁷ *Sun Chengzong ji*, 1171-1173.

responsible for receiving the Pidao people,⁵⁶⁸ and Liang Tingdong had recalled the troops outside the Shanhai Pass to return, expecting the coming soldiers to form an outer defense.⁵⁶⁹

However, a mutiny erupting on Juehua Island overshadowed the withdrawal plan. Per Liang Tingdong's order, the Middle Troops of Longwu Maritime Army 龍武營中協 stationed there would be relocated to the Shanhai Pass. To prevent soldiers from fleeing en route, the commander Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀 (1594-1640)⁵⁷⁰ withheld the soldiers' pay for three months. The soldiers would receive the remaining balance only if they reached the destination. Well-intentioned as the policy may have been, the result backfired. On May 21, the mutineers tied him up and threatened to kill him. Zhou Wenyu 周文郁 happened to arrive on the island on the same day and saved Mao Yuanyi. Zhou came to Juehua Island in the capacity of Vice Regional Commander of the Right Troops of Longwu Maritime Army 龍武營右協副總兵. The original purpose was to receive the coming soldiers from Dongjiang and, together with Chen Jisheng, to establish a new army after Mao Yuanyi's troops were gone.⁵⁷¹ Now due to the mutiny, the original soldiers remained in place and hence receiving new ones became a pending issue.

⁵⁶⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/4/5 (1630/5/16). Sun's official title was *Ningqiandao bingbei* 寧前兵備道副使, or Vice Surveillance Commission of Ningqian Military Circuit. Like his teacher Xu Guangqi 徐光啟, Sun became a Catholic and collaborated with the Jesuits in importing and making Western-style cannons. For details, see Yi-Long Huang, "Sun Yuanhua: A Christian Convert Who Put Xu Guangqi's Military Reform Policy into Practice," in Catherine Jami et al., eds., *Statecraft and Intellectual Renewal in Late Ming China: The Cross-Cultural Synthesis of Xu Guangqi (1562–1633)* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 225–259.

⁵⁶⁹ Zhou Wenyu, *Bianshi xiaoji*, 361.

⁵⁷⁰ Mao Yuanyi's military thoughts recorded in his military encyclopedia *Wubeizhi* 武備志 has attracted some scholars' attention recently. See Sarah Basham, "The Book Multiple: *Treatise on Military Preparedness* (1621) and Encyclopedic Practice in Seventeenth-Century China" (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 2019); Masato Hasegawa, "Measuring Reliability in the Wartime Transport of Provisions: The Case of Mao Yuanyi (1594-1641)," *Ming Studies* 80 (2019). However, Mao Yuanyi as a mediocre officer involved in some major events in the Ming-Qing transition has yet to gain attention.

⁵⁷¹ Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀, *Shimin sishiji* 石民四十集, in *Siku jinhuishu congkan* 四庫禁燬書叢刊, *Jibu* 集部 109 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2005), 25-26; Zhou, *Bianshi xiaoji*, 372.

This issue soon went away as the death of Chen Jisheng ensued. Ever since the demise of Liu Xingzuo in February, conflict between Liu Xingzhi who filled the vacancy left by his brother and Chen Jisheng kept rising. Chen Jisheng suspected Liu Xingzhi's loyalty to the Ming as the latter kept corresponding with the Manchus,⁵⁷² while Liu Xingzhi thought that Chen Jisheng was framing him to gain the command of Dongjiang. The grudge ended on May 24 when Liu Xingzhi trapped and killed Chen Jisheng, which nevertheless led to a new crisis.

The killing was done without just cause, and hence not many people recognized Liu Xingzhi's leadership. The troops that Liu Xingzhi sent out to Guanglu 廣鹿 and Changshan 長山 Islands were attacked by the soldiers stationed there. He himself also led men to nearby islands to call for surrender.⁵⁷³ On July 9, Liu Xingzhi arrived at Xiaopingdao 小平島, an island 50 *li* south of Lüshun, where he met Zhou Wenyu the next day. It was not, of course, an accidental meeting. At the behest of Sun Chengzong, Zhou was coming to offer amnesty to Liu Xingzhi.⁵⁷⁴ The negotiation between Zhou and Liu went well and resulted in Liu Xingzhi being officially granted the title of Vice Regional Commander 副總兵. On September 3, Liu Xingzhi went back to Pidao. He subsequently raised a red flag embroidered with four big characters “奇功大捷” (extraordinary merit and great triumph), claiming that his killing of Chen Jisheng was legitimate and his leadership was now authorized by the Ming.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷² The correspondence between Liu Xingzhi and the Manchus can be found in MWLD, 1007-1008, 1029-1030, 1040, 1064-1064, 1067-1068, 1070-1073, 1087, 1094-1096, 1098. However, this is not to suggest that Liu Xingzhi surrendered to the Manchus, for detailed analysis, see Huang, “Liu Xingzhi xiongdi yu Mingji Dongjiang haishang fangxian de bengkui,” 136-144.

⁵⁷³ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 8/5/8 (1630/6/18); *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/5/9 (1630/6/19); MWLD, 1060.

⁵⁷⁴ Zhou, *Bianshi xiaoji*, 372.

⁵⁷⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/10/7 (1630/11/10).

The return of Liu Xingzhi to Pidao was the result of Beijing's appeasement policy. The Ming court was worried that if punished, Liu Xingzhi would surrender to the Manchus.⁵⁷⁶ Against that backdrop, military provisions were sent to Pidao and even the maritime embargo that Yuan Chonghuan previously imposed was lifted.⁵⁷⁷ This meant that Liang Tingdong's withdrawal plan was put on hold. Before long, Liang was prosecuted on charges of favoritism in appointments and was removed from office in July the following year.⁵⁷⁸

However, Liang Tingdong's plan was not abandoned. Sun Yuanhua continued to implement the existing withdrawal plan after he reopened the office of Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator in August 1630. The restoration of the office resulted from the Liu Xingzhi incident. Liu Xingzhi received amnesty but did not gain the full trust of the Ming court. Shandong Grand Coordinator Shen Xun 沈珣 (1565-1634) hence suggested there should be one official stationed in the coastal region and keeping an eye on Pidao.⁵⁷⁹ At that time, as per Yuan Chonghuan's previous military reforms, the coastal defense was in the charge of the Shandong Grand Coordinator stationed in Dezhou 德州, over 1,000 *li* west of Dengzhou. The distance between the two locations impeded efficient information exchange and quick response to military affairs. Consequently, not only was a new Deng-Lai Grand Coordination appointed, but Dongjiang was now under his jurisdiction.⁵⁸⁰

Right after he assumed office, Sun Yuanhua successfully incited an internal conflict in Dongjiang. According to Huang Yi-Long, Sun drove a wedge between the surrendered Manchus

⁵⁷⁶ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/5/15 (1630/6/25).

⁵⁷⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/6/28 (1630/8/6).

⁵⁷⁸ Xiong Mingyu 熊明遇 (1579-1649) succeeded Liang. *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 4/6/21 (1631/7/19). For an account of the whole process, see Zhang, *Mingshi*, *juan* 257, 6628.

⁵⁷⁹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/6/19 (1630/7/28).

⁵⁸⁰ Tan, *Guoque*, 5539.

(*xiangda* 降鞦) who followed the Liu brothers to defect to Pidao in 1628 and the Han people on the island. The Manchu-Han discord resulted in armed conflict on April 17, 1631, and Liu Xingzhi, the leader of the surrendered Manchus, died in the incident.⁵⁸¹ Hence, for Sun Yuanhua, the death of Liu Xingzhi cleared all obstacles to placing a trusted subordinate in Dongjiang.

On June 4, 1631, Regional Commander Huang Long 黃龍 (?-1633) arrived in Pidao.⁵⁸² Huang's main task was to implement Sun Yuanhua's withdrawal plan. Sun's plan has not been revealed in full in the historical records, but what is known is that Sun ordered that the plan be implemented in stages, and by the end of 1631, 3,000 standing soldiers, along with their families, should have been moved to Ningyuan and Chinchow.⁵⁸³ Nevertheless, Huang Long did not live up to Sun Yuanhua's expectations. The only clear record of movement was that in late October, when 1,300 men sailed to Dengzhou.⁵⁸⁴ These men chose Dengzhou because Sun Yuanhua was then reported to put trust in the Liaodong people and incorporate them in his Deng-Lai troops.⁵⁸⁵ As a result, besides the aforementioned 1,300 men, a few officers in Pidao, including Kong Youde 孔有德 (?-1652), came to Dengzhou and took refuge with Sun Yuanhua. In contrast, almost no soldier was reported to have arrived at the original destination north of the Shanhai

⁵⁸¹ Huang, "Liu Xingzhi xiongdi yu Mingji Dongjiang haishang fangxian de bengkui," 144-156. Records about this incident are scattered in Manchu/ Qing, Chosŏn, and Ming records, and Huang is able to gather most, if not all the records and make a detailed analysis. One thing that may further consolidate the conclusion is Sun Chengzong's comment. In one memorial submitted probably in mid-1631, Sun reports the issues surrounding Liu Xingzhi and explicitly claims that Xingzhi's death resulted from Sun Yuanhua's stratagem of sowing dissension (*weijian* 為間). This may suggest that Sun Yuanhua's stratagem was then an open secret in the Ming military leadership. See *Sun Chengzong ji*, 1183.

⁵⁸² Guan Xiaolian 關孝廉 ed., "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (er)" 天聰五年八旗值月檔 (二), *Lishi dang'an* 歷史檔案 1 (2001): 12. In fact, Sun Yuanhua had picked up a candidate the previous December. *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 3/11/2 (1630/12/5).

⁵⁸³ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 4/11/9 (1631/12/1).

⁵⁸⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/10/3 (1631/10/27).

⁵⁸⁵ Tan, *Guoque*, 5578.

Pass.⁵⁸⁶ Moving to the north of the Shanhai Pass meant living in the frontier adjacent to the Manchus. This partially explained the slow progress of the withdrawal.

However, a mutiny that burst forth on November 26 stopped the progress entirely. On that day, the rebelling soldiers in Pidao detained Huang Long and severely injured him. According to Xue Ge's research, it was Shen Shikui 沈世魁 (?-1637) that incited the mutiny. It was also him who ended it on December 20th after killing some leaders of the mutineers. An old associate of Mao Wenlong as well as Mao's father-in-law, Shen became the biggest beneficiary of this incident. He saved Huang Long from being killed, pacified the crowds by distributing silver in reserve, and became the de facto commander of Dongjiang after Huang Long was injured.⁵⁸⁷

Immediately after he was informed of the mutiny, Sun Yuanhua memorialized the throne about the incident on December 18th and claimed that Huang Long was entirely to blame because he had embezzled the soldiers' pay.⁵⁸⁸ Sun's charge of embezzlement against Huang was not groundless. A Chosŏn envoy reported Huang's corruption to King Injo in early November after he returned from a mission to Pidao.⁵⁸⁹ However, when the incident was over, Sun had already jumped to a hasty conclusion, pointing fingers at Huang. It seemed that Sun had decided to sacrifice his trusted subordinate and shirk his responsibility for the mutiny, because after all Dongjiang was within his jurisdiction. As he may have expected, Sun Yuanhua's memorial immediately drew criticism from Ming officials accusing him of entrusting the wrong person.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁶ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 5/4/12 (1632/5/30).

⁵⁸⁷ Xue Ge 薛戈, "Cong Shen Shikui kan wanming zhongchao guanxi" 從沈世魁看晚明中朝關係 (Master's Thesis, Shandong University, 2013), especially 21-28, 30-35. The judgment that Shen Shikui was behind the mutiny was, in fact, initiated by Chosŏn Korea. There were then several explanations for the mutiny. Xue is able to make a comprehensive survey of these explanations and so his conclusion seems persuasive.

⁵⁸⁸ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 4/11/26 (1631/12/18).

⁵⁸⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/10/11 (1631/11/4).

⁵⁹⁰ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 4/11+/23 (1632/1/4).

Meanwhile, suffering from humiliation—it was reported that the mutineers cut off his nose and ears,⁵⁹¹ Huang Long memorialized the throne on the first day of the lunar new year (1632/2/20). He pleaded for a thorough investigation of the mutiny and implicit in the plea was his discontent with Sun Yuanhua.⁵⁹² Apparently, relations between the two had soured, and hence Sun Yuanhua's withdrawal plan was suspended.

What eventually terminated Sun's plan was the mutiny led by Kong Youde.⁵⁹³ Before the mutiny, Kong was leading a reinforcement effort to support Zu Dashou's 祖大壽 (1579-1656) army in Dalinghe City 大凌河城⁵⁹⁴ besieged by the Manchus. Under-provisioned and hit by bad weather, Kong's troop reached Wuqiao 吳橋 in northernmost Shandong county on January 18 1632. The Ming military at the time was generally lacking in discipline. Fearing any trouble, Magistrate Bi Ziyin 畢自寅 (1579-?) had ordered to cease trade and avoid contact with the coming troops. One soldier in Kong's army took a chicken by force from a local residence only to find the fowl belonged to the Wang Clan of Xincheng 新城王氏, a great clan in the Ming-Qing dynasties. At the insistence of the Wang family, the culprit was punished and humiliated in

⁵⁹¹ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 4/11/26 (1631/12/18).

⁵⁹² *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 5/1/1 (1632/2/20).

⁵⁹³ There are many studies on the Kong Youde Mutiny, see Huang Yi-Long 黃一農, "Wuqiao bingbian: Ming-Qing dingge de yitiao zhongyao daohuoxian" 吳橋兵變：明清鼎革的一條重要導火線, *Taiwan Qinghua xuebao* 台灣清華學報 42.1 (2012); Zhang, *Mingdai Shandong haifangyanjiu*; Christopher S. Agnew, "Migrants and Mutineers: The Rebellion of Kong Youde and Seventeenth-Century Northeast Asia," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 52.3 (2009); Swope, *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 95-103. My intention is to describe the relation between the mutiny and Sun Yuanhua's retreat plan and hence I will not pay too much attention to the mutiny per se.

⁵⁹⁴ The Battle of Dalinghe is of great importance in Qing military history. The Manchus, for the first time, used the siege strategy, which was soon replicated in future battles against the Ming, as well as against Chosŏn Korea. Kenneth Swope has written about this battle at some length in his *The Military Collapse of China's Ming Dynasty*, 91-95. However, using Ming records and secondary sources, perhaps he has missed half the story. The other half can be found in the Manchu records. See especially Guan Xiaolian 關孝廉 ed., "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (san)" 天聰五年八旗值月檔 (三), *Lishi dang'an* 歷史檔案 2 (2001): 24; "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (si)" 天聰五年八旗值月檔 (四), *Lishi dang'an* 3 (2001): 9-10; "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (wu)" 天聰五年八旗值月檔 (五), *Lishi dang'an* 4 (2001): 10-11.

public, and Magistrate Bi acquiesced because the Bi Clan of Linzi 臨淄畢氏 had been related to the Wang family by marriage for generations. A small incident thus became the fuse for the initial mutiny in Wuqiao. After Kong's men sacked the county, they turned back to Dengzhou. Sun Yuanhua misjudged the situation, believing that, once offered amnesty, the mutineers would stop rebelling. Sun sent in people to call for surrender but ordered no troops to intercept the mutineers' march, while Dengzhou was militarily unprepared. The result was that Kong's men drove straight in and took Dengzhou on February 21. Sun Yuanhua was captured alive and was soon released. He was subsequently seized and turned over to Beijing in April and was executed in September.⁵⁹⁵

5.4 An Interlude of Peace

While Dengzhou would continue suffering warfare until the following March, Dongjiang enjoyed an interlude of relative peace in 1632. This was achieved through a smooth power transition from Huang Long to Shen Shikui. As mentioned, Shen was the interim commander after Huang was injured the previous November. After Huang felt free to move in late December 1631,⁵⁹⁶ willingly or not, he never challenged Shen's authority. In one diplomatic note delivered to King Injo on June 13, 1632, Huang specially introduces Shen Shikui, describing Shen as a commander of "plain character and righteous quality." 性魯而質直.⁵⁹⁷ Huang ends the note with the following: "The expedition ship is on the way. In the wind, I add these words, but I cannot

⁵⁹⁵ Huang, "Wuqiao bingbian," 84-92; Zhang, *Mingdai Shandong haifangyanjiu*, 496.

⁵⁹⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/11/28 (1631/12/20).

⁵⁹⁷ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 10/4/26 (1632/6/13).

concentrate.” 征帆在道，臨風附言，不勝神注。⁵⁹⁸ This could be a cliché used to end a letter, but nevertheless materialized thereafter. Huang Long soon moved to Lüshun, and Shen Shikui commanded Dongjiang alone.⁵⁹⁹

Another situation that went in Dongjiang’s favor was that its economic ties with Chosŏn began to be revitalized. This could be traced back to October 1631 when Huang Long demanded grain from the Chosŏn court.⁶⁰⁰ Since 1627 after the Manchus subjugated Chosŏn Korea, the economic ties between the Chosŏn court and Dongjiang, at least on an official level, had been suspended. In January 1631, after he was pardoned for killing Chen Jisheng and returned to Pidao, Liu Xingzhi once sent in a forged letter by Sun Yuanhua to ask for grain from Chosŏn Korea. The Chosŏn court believed that Liu Xingzhi never received an imperial edict and hence his command of Dongjiang was unauthorized. On the other hand, the forgery was revealed to Chosŏn. Hence Liu Xingzhi’s request was rejected.⁶⁰¹ In comparison, Huang Long’s request was approved mainly because the Ming authority he carried smoothed the way. He was the first after Mao Wenlong whom the Ming court granted the title “Regional Commander of Dongjiang,” and the Chosŏn court was well aware of his close relationship with Sun Yuanhua.⁶⁰² Moreover, between October and November, Huang had made at least five attempts to ask for grain from

⁵⁹⁸ *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 10/4/26 (1632/6/13).

⁵⁹⁹ Huang Long left Pidao long before September 9th, as suggested in *Injo sillok*, Injo 10/7/25 (1631/9/9). Based on *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 10/11/2 (1632/11/24), Xue Ge claims that the exact date was November 24th. This is a misreading of the source. On that day, Huang Long’s subordinate Song Youzhi 宋有智 came to Seoul to mourn for Queen Inmok. See *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi*, Injo 10/11/2 (1632/11/24); *Injo sillok*, Injo 10/10/12 (1632/11/23). This misreading makes Xue Ge’s understanding of Huang Long’s note to King Injo problematic. He suspects that due to the long interval between the delivery of the letter and Huang’s departure, this note is a forgery. See Xue, “Cong Shen Shikui kan wanming zhongchao guanxi,” 33-35. As Huang Long’s words soon materialized and there is no evidence that can confirm Xue’s suspicion, I choose to believe that the note is authentic.

⁶⁰⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/9/18 (1631/10/13).

⁶⁰¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/11/29 (1631/1/1).

⁶⁰² *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/5/2 (1631/6/1).

Chosŏn.⁶⁰³ Unwillingly, of course, the Chosŏn court eventually agreed to ship grain by sea to Dongjiang. By February 1632, about 19,000 *sŏm* of grain was reported to have been delivered.⁶⁰⁴

The mutiny in Pidao that led to the power transition then ensued and temporarily suspended the grain supply. The Chosŏn court showed no hospitality to the new command and made no correspondence with Shen Shikui after Huang Long left for Lüshun. No envoy was dispatched to Pidao, and even a routine seasonal greeting was canceled.⁶⁰⁵ Hence there was almost no new information about Dongjiang in the Chosŏn records thereafter. Nevertheless, Shen Shikui broke the ice in November 1632 by sending people to Seoul to participate in the burial of Queen Inmok 仁穆王后 (1584-1632), queen consort of King Sŏnjo 宣祖 (1552-1608, r.1567-1608), who passed away in August.⁶⁰⁶ After that, a record about grain supply reappeared in February 1633, during which the Chosŏn court allowed 1,000~2,000 *sŏm* of grain to be sent to Pidao.⁶⁰⁷ Subsequently, the Kong Youde rebellion helped expand the grain supply. In the name of intercepting the mutineers from the sea, Shen Shikui demanded support from Chosŏn and hence managed to get another 5,000 *sŏm* in May.⁶⁰⁸

The supply of grain became routine after Shen Shikui officially succeeded Huang Long and was granted the title “Regional Commander of Dongjiang” in December 1633.⁶⁰⁹ For the following two years, Shen demanded an annual supply of 30,000 *sŏm* of rice and beans. The

⁶⁰³ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/9/17 (1631/10/12), Injo 9/9/21 (1631/10/16), Injo 9/10/8 (1631/11/1), Injo 9/10/24 (1631/11/17), Injo 9/10/26 (1631/1/19).

⁶⁰⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/11/5 (1631/11/27), Injo 9/12/27 (1632/2/16).

⁶⁰⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/3/22 (1633/4/29).

⁶⁰⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 10/10/19 (1632/11/30).

⁶⁰⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/1/1 (1633/2/8).

⁶⁰⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/4/11 (1633/5/18), Injo 11/4/19 (1633/5/26).

⁶⁰⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/11/7 (1633/12/7).

Chosŏn records show that the amount of grain provided was much smaller than what Shen expected. In 1635, for instance, King Injo allowed only 2,000~3,000 *sŏm* to be sent to Pidao.⁶¹⁰ However, this amount was perhaps underreported. One entry for January 27th, 1636, in the *Manchu Archives of the Inner Historical Office* 內國史院滿文檔 records a confession made by a Han person captured in Ch'ŏlsan. According to his testimony, in the spring and autumn of every year, Chosŏn Korea used 50 boats and shipped 26,000 baskets (Manchu: *useku*) of rice to Pidao.⁶¹¹ A basket/*useku* was not a standard unit, and hence it is unclear exactly how much rice was shipped to Pidao, but presumably the real amount was much more than 2,000~3,000 *sŏm*.

The revitalized economic ties between Chosŏn Korea and Dongjiang however was conducted against the backdrop of a worsening trade relationship between Chosŏn Korea and the Manchus. After the 1627 Manchu invasion, the border markets in Chunggang (see Chapter 4.2 & Figure 4.1-A&B) and subsequently in Hoeryŏng (see Chapter 4.2) eventually opened in 1628.⁶¹²

⁶¹⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 13/9/3 (1635/10/13).

⁶¹¹ Zhongguo diyi lishi dangangan 中國第一歷史檔案館 trans., *Qingchu neiguoshiyuan manwen dangan yibian (shang)* 清初內國史院滿文檔譯編(上) (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1989), 217. This volume collects the Manchu archives for Tiancong 天聰 7-9 and Chongde 崇德 2-8. Japanese scholars have published better edited collections of archives for Tiancong 7 & 8. See Kanda Nobuo 神田信夫 ed., *Naikokushiin tō. Tensō shichinen* 内国史院檔. 天聰七年 (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 2003); Kusunoki Yoshimichi 楠木賢道 ed., *Naikokushiin tō: Tensō hachinen* 内国史院檔. 天聰八年 (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 2009). The Japanese collections contain photocopies of the original archives, the transliterated Manchu, and Japanese translations, whereas the Chinese editions only provides the modern Chinese translations, and in some cases, the Chinese translation is not precise. For instance, *udu tanggū* is translated into 百 (a hundred, p.17), but the precise meaning should be several hundred. Hence, I give preference to the Japanese collections when the archives for Tiancong 7 & 8 are cited.

⁶¹² For a concise yet revisionist account of the border markets, see Wang Yuancong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korea Relations, 1616-1911* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2018), 27. Wang argues that the border markets were part of the Manchu agenda of establishing a quasi-*Zongfan* system. For conflicts over the border markets, which particularly involved the issue of ginseng, see Seonmin Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636-1912* (Oakland, California: Universality of California Press, 2017), 41-42. The envoys from both sides played vital roles in negotiating the border markets. For detailed studies, see Suzuki Kai 鈴木開, “Chōsen-kōkinkan no shisha ōrai ni tsuite (1631-1633)” 朝鮮・後金間の使者往来について, *Sundai shigaku* 駿台史學 155 (2015); “Heishi no ran chokuzen no Chō Shin kōshō ni tsuite (1634-1636)” 丙子の乱直前の朝清交渉について, *Sundai shigaku* 159 (2017).

Business conducted in the border markets was, of course, not fair trade, but was monopolized by the Manchus. The Chunggang market received three Manchu trade groups every year from spring to autumn. Each group usually had over 1,000 people and Chosŏn was required to provide provisions during their stay.⁶¹³ In April 1631, for instance, Inggŭldai led some 800 merchants and over 600 soldiers, carrying goods worth over 40,000 taels of silver. The Manchu goods were sold later at much higher prices and the Chosŏn merchants were forced to accept the terms at the behest of the Chosŏn court.⁶¹⁴ As an increasing number of Chosŏn merchants avoided coming to Chunggang, the Manchus went south to the inland cities such as Anju (Figure 4.2-I) and Pyongyang and extorted the local merchants and officials in the name of trade.⁶¹⁵

What happened in Chunggang also applied to Hoeryŏng, only worse. As one of the six garrisons in the Chosŏn northwest frontier bordering the Manchu state (see Chapter 4.2), Hoeryŏng was much less prosperous and populated.⁶¹⁶ Nevertheless, Hong Taiji demanded an equivalent scale of trade in Hoeryŏng as in Chunggang.⁶¹⁷ Not surprising, the reality fell short of Hong Taiji's expectations. Only a handful of Chosŏn merchants came. The Manchus accused the Chosŏn court of restricting the trade and hence the local officials in Hoeryŏng were ordered to provide extra provisions to the coming Manchus to reconcile the accusation.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹³ *Injo sillok*, Injo 6/4/11 (1628/5/14); Guan, "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (er)," 5.

⁶¹⁴ Im Kijung 林基中, *Yŏnhaengnok sŏkchip* 燕行錄續集 vol. 106 (Seoul: Sangsŏwŏ 2008), 325; *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/3/4 (1630/4/16); Guan, "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (er)," 9. One telling example recorded in "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (er)" is that Inggŭldai set the unit price for *mocin* (Chinese: 毛青), one type of blue cloth, at 0.5 tael, whereas the then local market price was 0.35.

⁶¹⁵ *Injo sillok*, Injo 8/2/27 (1630/4/9), Injo 9/2/2 (1631/3/4), Injo 9/4/13 ((1631/5/13), Injo 11/2/2 (1633/3/11); MWLD, 1059.

⁶¹⁶ *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok*, vol.1, Injo 2/5/18 (1624/7/3), 226.

⁶¹⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 6/3/23 (1628/4/26), Injo 10/3/29 (1632/5/17); MWLD, 881.

⁶¹⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/2/19 (1631/3/21).

The border markets ground to a halt in 1632 because in the previous year, the Chosŏn court started to redeploy its defenses in Ch'ŏngbuk 清北, that is, the P'yŏngan territory north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River (Figure 4.2-C). The 1627 Manchu invasion had devastated Ch'ŏngbuk and destroyed many cities and fortifications there. In 1631, Assistant Supreme Commander Chŏng Ch'ungsin 鄭忠信 (1576-1636) adopted a *ch'ŏngya* 清野 strategy of evacuating Ch'ŏngbuk by relocating the population there to the area south of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River.⁶¹⁹ This strategy followed the East Asian military tradition of clearing the fields so that when the enemies came, they would gain no booty. Consequently, few Chosŏn merchants came to the border markets and there were no goods prepared for trade.⁶²⁰ On January 13, 1632, for instance, a Manchu trade group arrived in Ŭiju only to find there were no goods. The Manchus were later informed that their stored commodities were in Anju, but after they arrived there, the Chosŏn officials refused to sell any goods without being shown proof from Hong Taiji that trade was allowed. On January 28, the Manchus left for Shenyang without making any profit.⁶²¹

Such a situation enraged Hong Taiji. In May 1632, he dispatched some 170 cavalymen to Hoeryŏng to loot and harass and sent in a letter to King Injo threatening to invade if the border market was not operated as he wished.⁶²² In November 1632, on the pretense that the Chosŏn annual tributes had decreased, he refused to accept any incoming tributes and deported the envoy

⁶¹⁹ Chŏng Ch'ungsin's strategy led to a backlash among local elites in P'yŏngan. Notable opponents included Yŏngyu Magistrate 永柔縣令 Chŏng Kisu 鄭麒壽 and P'yŏngan *chinsa* 進士 Yang Chŏmhyŏng 楊漸亨. Both regarded the *ch'ŏngya* strategy as an excuse for giving up the territory. A compromise strategy that the Chosŏn court later devised was to rebuild three military settlements in Ch'ŏngbuk: Ŭiju, Yonggol Mountain 龍骨山, and Kŏmsa Mountain 劍山, so that they could be used as bases for restoring the lost territory in the future. It was unclear how the constructions in Yonggol and Kŏmsa proceeded. In Ŭiju, Paengma Mountain Fortress 白馬山城 was rebuilt in 1632. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/7/9 (1631/8/6), Injo 9/7/25 (1631/8/22); Kim Ŭngsu 金應洙, *Yongman ji* 龍灣誌 (1849), fasc.1, 20a.

⁶²⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/2/19 (1631/3/21).

⁶²¹ Guan, "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (wu)," 16.

⁶²² *Injo sillok*, Injo 10/3/29 (1632/5/17).

Pak Nanyōng 朴蘭英 (?-1636) without granting him an audience.⁶²³ Hong Taiji's discontent with Chosŏn Korea would keep accumulating and eventually led to the invasion in early 1636. However, at the time the issue of the Chahar Mongols led by Ligdan Khan took priority and hence in May 1632, Hong Taiji launched an expedition.⁶²⁴ In addition, in March 1633, a Chosŏn delegation arrived in Shenyang to propose an alternative plan for maintaining the border markets. What was proposed was that the Manchu envoys going to Seoul could carry ginseng and silver to trade in the capital.⁶²⁵ As a result, Hong Taiji took no further action to give vent to his anger, and the peace was kept in Chosŏn Korea, at least temporarily.

5.5 The Military Collapse of Pidao

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Bohai Sea, peace finally came in March 1633 after Kong Youde retreated from Dengzhou. Kong's rebellion was doomed to failure the previous October after Ming force achieved a strategic victory against the mutineers.⁶²⁶ Soon thereafter, military intelligence reported to Beijing that the provisions in Dengzhou had begun to run out and Kong Youde had made failed attempts to flee. Consequently, Huang Long, then in Lüshun, was ordered to intercept Kong Youde if he fled by sea.⁶²⁷

⁶²³ MWLD, 1357. The Manchus had been well acquainted with Pak Nanyōng. Pak had served as Chosŏn envoy since 1627 and was killed in the Manchu invasion in 1636. For an account of Pak, see Suzuki, "Chōsen-kōkinkan no shisha ōrai ni tsuite," 8-9.

⁶²⁴ MWLD, 1257. Also see *Injo sillok*, Injo 10/4/28 (1632/1/13). For an account of the early Manchu-Mongol relationship, see Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History* (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Regarding the Chahars, see 13-14, 136-137, 142-143, 163-164.

⁶²⁵ Suzuki, "Heishi no ran chokuzen no Chō Shin kōshō ni tsuite," 43-44. Suzuki published his first monograph in March 2021. However, I have yet to get access to that book. Judging from the table of contents, it seems to be an essay collection. See his *Min Shin kotai to Chosen gaiko* 明清交替と朝鮮外交 (Tokyo: Tosuishobo, 2021). The cited article is included in Chapter 7.

⁶²⁶ Huang, "Wuqiao bingbian," 102-104.

⁶²⁷ *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 5/10/5 (1632/6/15), Chongzhen 5/10/27 (1632/12/8); Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌 and Liang Songcheng 梁頌成 ed., *Yang Sichang ji* 楊嗣昌集 (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2008), 90.

After the 1632 mutiny in Pidao, the Ming court began to lose confidence in Huang Long and hence several reinforcements from Huai-Yang, Tianjin, and the Shanhai Pass were recalled to help. However, when Huang Long engaged Kong Youde's force on March 31, 1633, only a small group led by Zhou Wenyu came. Huang Long unexpectedly achieved the initial victory, and the joint forces continued to win on April 23, April 25, and May 6. The mutineers once showed a willingness to surrender to Zhou Wenyu, but Huang Long decisively refused, probably due to a personal grudge that the mutineers killed his family in Dengzhou. Driven to despair, Kong Youde and his men eventually surrendered to the Manchus in Zhenjiang in June.⁶²⁸

The surrender of Kong Youde meant that the Manchus received some four thousand men well versed in maritime warfare, several hundred ships that could carry over 12,000 people, and firearms that Kong Youde gained from Dengzhou.⁶²⁹ (Table 5.1) This was the war capital that the Manchus could use in the future attack to Pidao. For the Manchus, ever since the death of Mao Wenlong, attacking the Ming force on the sea had been a plan long in the making. Although the Manchus deemed the soldiers in Pidao and the surrounding islands useless,⁶³⁰ there was still a lingering fear that these men could cause trouble against them.⁶³¹ The Manchus made an initial attempt to attack Pidao in 1631. However, their own records avoid speaking of the result of the battle and only leave some trivial information, including sinking three small Ming vessels and drowning some enemies. On the other hand, the Chosŏn records explain that it was a battle between 11 Manchu vessels and over 100 Ming ships. Many Manchus were killed, and the Ming

⁶²⁸ The above is based on Huang, "Wuqiao bingbian," 104-105; Zhang, *Mingdai Shandong haifang yanjiu*, 500-501.

⁶²⁹ During Sun Yuanhua's tenure as Deng-Liao Grand Coordinator, he cooperated with the Jesuits and purchased and produced many Western-style firearms, which fell into the hands of Kong Youde and were in turn handed in to the Manchus. For details, see Huang, "Sun Yuanhua," 245-250.

⁶³⁰ Guan, "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (er)," 5.

⁶³¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 9/6/28 (1631/7/26).

soldiers were drowned because they were fighting against each other for the enemies' heads.⁶³² Apparently, the Manchus' military capabilities on the sea were then negligible. However, the drastic improvement in these capabilities would soon be attested following Kong Youde's surrender.

Object	Quantity	
Ships	Several hundred (Manchu: <i>udu tanggū</i>)	
Officers	107	Total Population: 12,258
Able Soldiers	3,643	
Able Seamen	448	
Other Population	8,060	
Firearms	?	
Other Weapons	?	

Source: Zhongyanyuan shiyusuo 中研院史語所, *Ming-Qing shiliao bingbian* 明清史料丙編, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), 29ab; Kanda, *Naikoku Shiin tō. Tensō shichinen*, 63.

An immediate result brought about by the surrender of Kong Youde however was the occupation of Lüshun. As Hong Taiji granted Kong Youde an audience and the latter arrived in Shenyang on July 8, many of Kong's ships were left harboring at the mouth of the Yalu River.⁶³³ These ships lured Huang Long to come and hence made Lüshun defenseless. What made things worse was that Huang Long made a splash and sent people to Seoul demanding military cooperation.⁶³⁴ Presumably the military intelligence leaked out, and the Manchu force left for

⁶³² Guan, "Tiancong wunian baqi zhiyue dang (er)," 14; *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/4/28 (1633/6/4). The Ming records include exaggerated reports of the battle result. This has been examined in detail in Dong Shaoxin 董少新 and Huang Yi-long 黃一農, "Chongzhen nianjian zhaomu pubing xinkao" 崇禎年間招募葡兵新考, *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究 5 (2009): 77-78.

⁶³³ Kanda, *Naikoku Shiin tō. Tensō shichinen*, 73, 97.

⁶³⁴ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/7/6 (1633/8/10).

Lüshun to launch a sneak attack on July 24, taking the victory on August 11.⁶³⁵ Huang Long committed suicide before he was captured alive, while Zhou Wenyu fled to nearby Guanglu Island and was subsequently interrogated and dismissed from office.⁶³⁶

The occupation of Lüshun meant that the Manchus finally gained full control of the Liaodong peninsula, and, on the flip side, the Ming lost one stronghold. As a result, the strategic importance of Dongjiang was revived. The Chongzhen emperor soon made Shen Shikui succeed Huang Long's to the title of Regional Commander and ordered Shen to restore Lüshun.⁶³⁷ One subsequent incident in December 1633 further empowered Shen Shikui. A Ming eunuch named He Chenggong 河承功, who came to Pidao presumably to bring Shen the imperial edict, was reported to run amok after landing on the Chosŏn mainland and was hence killed in a clash with local officials in Chŏngju 定州 (Figure 4.2). Making use of this incident, Shen Shikui created a big fuss. He accused the Chosŏn court of deliberately killing a Ming official and raised the incident to the level of Chosŏn Korea's disloyalty to the Ming.⁶³⁸

This incident ended with the imprisonment of the Chŏngju Magistrate⁶³⁹ and set the tone for the interaction between Shen Shikui and the Chosŏn court for the following two years. In his capacity as Ming Regional Commander, Shen Shikui acted domineering and repeatedly sent his men to Seoul to ask for provisions in the name of preparing for future battles against the

⁶³⁵ Kanda, *Naikoku Shiin tō. Tensō shichinen*, 87; Zhongyanyuan shiyusuo 中研院史語所, *Ming-Qing shiliao yibian* 明清史料乙編, vol.2 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), 108a. News of victory reached Shenyang on August 14. See Kanda, *Naikoku Shiin tō. Tensō shichinen*, 101.

⁶³⁶ *Mingshi*, juan 273, 6998; *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/11/7 (1633/12/7); Zhongyanyuan shiyusuo 中研院史語所, *Ming-Qing shiliao wubian* 明清史料戊編, vol.1 (Taipei: Weixin shuju, 1972), 9b-10a.

⁶³⁷ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/11/7 (1633/12/7).

⁶³⁸ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/11/9 (1633/12/9).

⁶³⁹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 11/11/11 (1633/12/11).

Manchus.⁶⁴⁰ The Chosŏn court was forced to comply with Shen's requests, not because he carried Ming authority, but because, as per the 1633 plan that the Chosŏn proposed to Hong Taiji, more Manchus were coming to Seoul to trade. To keep Shen Shikui's men from meeting the Manchus and hence causing any conflict, the Chosŏn court granted whatever was requested so that Shen's men could be sent away to Pidao as soon as possible.⁶⁴¹ Hence there began the two-year grain supply as mentioned, a supply that was much more than the actual demand because, according to Chosŏn records, Shen Shikui then only had a motley crew of 5,000. He moreover embezzled most of these provisions, and none were used to strengthen the military in Pidao.⁶⁴²

The defection of Shang Kexi 尚可喜 (1604-1676) in January 1634 further impaired the military strength in Pidao. A Liaodong native, Shang Kexi took refuge with Mao Wenlong in his youth and gradually worked his way up in the military. In the era of Huang Long, Shang was under Huang's command and participated in the Lüshun Battle. The death of Huang led to a constrained relation between Shang and Shen Shikui because Shang deemed himself more qualified for succeeding Huang. After Shen was eventually granted the title, Shang stationed on Guanglu Island, trying to keep his distance from Pidao, but Shen could not tolerate Shang and tried to lure him to Pidao and kill him. Shen's plan somehow became known to Shang and hence

⁶⁴⁰ See, for instance, *Injo sillok*, Injo 12/2/12 (1634/3/11), Injo 12/7/3 (1634/7/27), Injo 12/8+/1 (1634/9/22); Injo 13/9/3 (1635/10/13).

⁶⁴¹ *Injo sillok*, Injo 12/7/4 (1634/7/28), Injo 12/8+/1 (1634/9/22). Down the road, Shen Shikui himself was well aware of the situation and even instructed the Chosŏn court to lead the Manchus to Seoul by taking a route that his men would not. Shen suggested that he could turn a blind eye to the presence of the Manchus in Chosŏn as long as his men did not bump into them. This suggests that Shen Shikui in fact had no intention to fight but was rather inly interested in acquiring provisions. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 13/7/5 (1635/8/17).

⁶⁴² *Injo sillok*, Injo 13/8/20 (1635/9/30).

drove him to defect to the Manchus.⁶⁴³ After an initial round of correspondence, Shang left Guanglu Island on March 16 and arrived in Shenyang on May 6.⁶⁴⁴ Not only did Shang lead his men to defect, but he also managed to call on the people in nearby Changshan and Shicheng Islands to surrender (Figure 1.1, Table 5.2). Almost all the population on the three islands moved to Haizhou approximate to Shenyang (Figure 2.1).⁶⁴⁵ This meant that there was no Ming military presence on the island chain east of Pidao and hence Pidao was left open to attack.

Place	Object	Quantity
Guanglu Island	Able Men	1,405
	Women & Children	2,466
	Oxen	30
	Horses & Mules	5
Changshan Island	Brigade Vice Commander (Manchu: <i>duse</i> ; Chinese: 都司)	1
	Able Men	600
	Women & Children	500
	Cattle	200
	Horses	5
Shicheng Island	Able Men	over 1,000*
	Women & Children	approx. 2,000*

Source: Kusunoki, *Naikokushiin tō: Tensō hachinen*, 49, 56.

*These were numbers reported to Hong Taiji before Shang Kexi demanded surrender. The number of people who did surrender was not revealed.

Pidao would remain safe until 1637 because there was political turmoil within the Manchu ranks. According to Yao Nianci's meticulous research, the high politics in the early years of

⁶⁴³ "Pingnan jingqinwang Shang Kexi shishice" 平南敬親王尚可喜事實冊, in *Shiliao congkan chubian* 史料叢刊初編, ed. Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1964), 1ab.

⁶⁴⁴ Kusunoki, *Naikokushiin tō: Tensō hachinen*, 19, 92, 117.

⁶⁴⁵ Kusunoki, *Naikokushiin tō: Tensō hachinen*, 93.

Hong Taiji's reign took the form of oligarchy. Hong Taiji, though being the Khan, shared leadership with such oligarchs as Daišan 代善 (1583-1638) and Manggūltai 莽古爾泰 (1587-1633). Years of political struggle witnessed Hong Taiji's effort to concentrate power, and the year 1635 marked the final success. In that year, Hong Taiji took over the control of Plain Blue Banner that Manggūltai's lineage commanded and dismissed Daišan from office so that the two Red Banners led by Daišan fell into decline. By the end of 1635, Hong Taiji personally commanded the two Yellow Banners. Hooge 豪格 (1609-1648), his eldest son, controlled the Plain Blue Banner. Jirgalang 濟爾哈朗 (1599-1655), Dorgon 多爾袞 (1612-1650), and Dodo 多鐸 (1614-1649) were masters of the Bordered Blue, Plain White, and Bordered White Banners respectively, and these three were Hong Taiji's allies. As for the two Red Banners, they could not pose a threat. As a result, Hong Taiji became an absolute monarch.⁶⁴⁶

Hong Taiji was further empowered in 1636 after Erke Khongghor 額爾克孔果爾 (aka. Ejei 額哲, 1622-1641, r.1634-1635), leader of the Chahar Mongols, married a Manchu princess. Erke Khongghor's father, Ligdan Khan 林丹汗 (1588-1634, r. 1604-1634), died in the summer of 1634. This intermarriage symbolized the eventual surrender of the Chahars, as well as the alliance between the Manchus and all the Mongol tribes.⁶⁴⁷ Consequently, on May 15, 1636, Hong Taiji proclaimed himself emperor and officially established the Qing.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁶ Yao Nianci 姚念慈, *Qingchu zhengzhishi tanwei* 清初政治史探微 (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2008), especially 111-125.

⁶⁴⁷ Peter Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Asia* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2005), 124-125. The Manchus were reported to acquire an imperial jade seal in 1635 from the Chahars. The origin of this seal was hazy but was nevertheless used to show that Hong Taiji was granted the Mandate of Heaven. For a study, see Zhong Han 鍾焜, "1635 nian Huang Taiji huoqu zhigao zhibao de zhengzhiyi shixi—yi chuanguo yuxi yu Chengjisihan hasibao de xingzhi bijiao wei zhongxin" 1635年皇太極獲取製誥之寶的政治意義試析—以傳國玉璽與成吉思汗哈斯寶的性質比較為中心, *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 1 (2021).

⁶⁴⁸ MWLD, 1427.

Two Chosŏn envoys Na Tŏkhŏn 羅德憲 (1573-1640) and Yi Kwak 李廓 (1590-1665) also attended Hong Taiji's inauguration but refused to kowtow as one should do to an emperor.⁶⁴⁹ Hong Taiji took offense at their behavior and was further irritated by the backlash from Chosŏn Korea after the envoys carried back Hong Taiji's credential to King Injo. No Chosŏn officials were willing to acknowledge Hong Taiji as emperor. In a tone of grief and anger, P'yŏngan Governor Hong Myŏnggu 洪命耆 (1596-1637), for instance, memorialized to the throne that Na Tŏkhŏn should be executed for attending Hong Taiji's inauguration and Na's head should be sent to Hong Taiji as a protest. Hong concluded that if the Manchus invaded, "will our country's officers and soldiers not roll up their sleeves and meet the blades with hearts resigned to die?" 我國將卒，孰不有奮袂冒刃，北首爭死之心哉?⁶⁵⁰ Hong's hawkish attitude was later made known to Hong Taiji, and what made things worse was that King Injo's reply to P'yŏngan Governor Hong was also intercepted by the Manchus. In this reply, King Injo claimed that the 1627 peace agreement was only a measure of expediency and now he had terminated Chosŏn's relationship with the Manchus. In addition, King Injo also encouraged Governor Hong to strengthen the border defense and recruit men of bravery.⁶⁵¹ To Hong Taiji then, this was not only a personal insult to his authority as emperor, but a military provocation. This, coupled with the previous conflicts including the closing of the border markets and the continuation of grain supply from the Chosŏn to Pidao, led to the war against Chosŏn Korea starting from December 25, 1636. Chosŏn forces proved to be incompetent, and the war soon ended on February 24,

⁶⁴⁹ MWLD, 1427; *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/4/26 (1636/5/30).

⁶⁵⁰ *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/4/26 (1636/5/30).

⁶⁵¹ MWLD, 1714.

1637, with King Injo kowtowing to Hong Taiji and Chosŏn Korea becoming a Qing tributary state.

Immediately after subjugating Chosŏn, the Manchus struck while the iron was hot and attacked Pidao. Kong Youde became one of the commanders of Manchu troops and many ships were requisitioned from Chosŏn Korea. On the night of May 2, covered by the fog, the Manchus landed in Pidao and launched an attack. Caught off guard, the Ming soldiers scattered in all directions and Shen Shikui was captured and then killed.⁶⁵² Shen Shikui's nephew Shen Zhixiang 沈志祥 (?-1648) led the remaining soldiers to flee to Shicheng Island and soon led some of his subordinates in surrendering to the Manchus.⁶⁵³

For the entire period between December 1636 and May 1637, the Ming intelligence network malfunctioned. According to Ning Hao's research, neither the Chosŏn court nor Shen Shikui provided enough military intelligence to Beijing. The Chosŏn court did so to avoid any Ming suspicion that Chosŏn Korea was corresponding with the Manchus who now had an emperor and were imposing an increasingly bigger threat to the Ming. As for Shen Shikui, it was perhaps because he was trying to cover up his incompetence and corruption, and too many information exchanges would expose his wrongdoings. As a result, the Ming court only received intelligence by relying on the confessions and rumours told by the runaways from Liaodong. Such information was, of course, imprecise and delayed. Hence, although news about Manchu military actions did reach Beijing, the Ming court failed to respond immediately.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵² For details of the battle, see Liu Jianxin 劉建新 et al., "Yiliusanqi nian Ming-Qing Pidao zhizhan" 一六三七年明清皮島之戰, *Lishi dang'an* 歷史檔案 3 (1982).

⁶⁵³ *Yang Sichang ji*, 378; *Chongzhen changbian*, Chongzhen 10/5/15 (1637/7/6).

⁶⁵⁴ Ning Hao, 寧浩 "Wei yaodi Jizi jiufeng: Lun Mingting dui bingzizhiyi de qingbao panduan yu juece" 惟遙睇箕子舊封: 論明廷對'丙子之役'的情報判斷與決策, *Shiyuan* 史原 33 (2020).

Beijing eventually received the news regarding the loss of Pidao on May 16, two weeks after the Manchu attack.⁶⁵⁵ By then, Pidao had become a deserted island. Shen Shikui's corpse had been left there unattended for nearly a month until King Injo ordered a P'yŏngan official to go to the island and collect the body in late May.⁶⁵⁶ In September 1637, Yang Sichang, Minister of War, finally persuaded the Chongzhen emperor to give up on Dongjiang and decided to relocate all the remaining population on Shicheng Island to Ningyuan and Chinchow.⁶⁵⁷ The relocation was postponed to the next spring because the coming winter made sailing almost impossible. By June 1638, the relocation was completed.⁶⁵⁸ Subsequently, although no soldiers were to station there, Shicheng Island was incorporated into the guard range of the Deng-Lai navy, whereas Pidao was excluded from the jurisdiction of any Ming authority.⁶⁵⁹ This marks the end of Dongjiang's history.

5.6 Aftermath

Soon after the Battle of Pidao, the Manchus re-established their trade links with Chosŏn on land. The revival of the economic links between the Manchus and Chosŏn certainly was not a pleasant story for the latter, who was in turn subject to political and economic coercion. However, for the Manchus, these links improved their economic conditions and brought in some fine commodities that they had sorely missed. In 1638, Hong Taiji (1592-1643, r.1636-1643) boasted:

⁶⁵⁵ *Yang Sichang ji*, 225.

⁶⁵⁶ *Injo sillok*, Injo 15/4+/6 (1637/5/29).

⁶⁵⁷ *Yang Sichang ji*, 321.

⁶⁵⁸ *Yang Sichang ji*, 554.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ming-Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.3, 234a.

Previously, because the Ming government prohibited the export of fine silks, we received shoddy goods. Now that I have commanded that foreign trade recommence, our markets are filled with a variety of excellent silk goods, which you noblemen and officials wear. Did you ever enjoy this sort of prosperity in the past?⁶⁶⁰

For the Manchus, the victories they achieved on the battlefields in 1637 were important in wresting weapons, wealth, and recourses from Chosŏn and in warranting the future conquest of the Ming.

The Ming dynasty, on the other hand, no longer envisioned a “three-pronged advance” strategy.⁶⁶¹ The loss of Pidao showed first that the Ming forces overseas could not contain the Manchus from the rear, and second that no Ming forces at home had the ability to launch a cross-sea campaign. Eighteen years after its initiation in 1620, this Ming strategy against the Manchus proved to be an utter failure.

What was worse was that the Manchus victory in the Battle of Pidao gave rise to widespread panic at the Ming court that the enemy could come and attack from the sea. Consequently, all Ming coastal areas in the Bohai Region witnessed a build-up of troops.⁶⁶² In Deng-Lai, for instance, part of the navy forces there were dispatched as the advance forces to garrison on Huangcheng and Changshan Islands. They were expected to engage the enemy first and provide early warning. Moreover, almost all the militias in the coastal counties of Qingzhou, Dengzhou, and Laizhou were relocated to the littoral. Together with the rest of the navy forces,

⁶⁶⁰ Quoted from Gang Zhao, *The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 69-70.

⁶⁶¹ *Ming-Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.2, 555a.

⁶⁶² *Yang Sichang ji*, 223. For the militarization in Tianjin, see *Ming-Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.2, 168ab. For the change in the Shanhai Pass, see *Ming-Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.2, 170a.

they were ordered to patrol Shandong's northern coast around the clock—no one was allowed to approach the coast from either side.⁶⁶³

This hyper vigilance turned out to be a false alarm. The Manchus' subjugation of Chosŏn Korea and the subsequent attack on Pidao removed a perennial malady, and hence their long-standing depopulation policy in coastal Liaodong was relaxed to some extent. Hong Taiji ordered the reconstruction of some coastal forts and cities, such as Gaizhou, which had been depopulated and deserted since 1623. The populations were subsequently relocated from the heartland of Liaodong to staff the coastal areas, working on the fertile land. Yet, this relaxation did not mean that people were allowed to put out to sea. By using boundary markers and ropes, as well as soldiers patrolling the borders, the Manchus formed a physical cordon.⁶⁶⁴

The Manchus' focus was still on the mainland. In late 1638, the Manchus bypassed the Great Wall and marched south. In December of that year, when the Manchus attacked Gaoyang 高陽, a county in the capital region, they were resisted by local militias led by Sun Chengzong, who eventually died on the battlefield. The Manchus burnt down the city and continued to raid the North China Plain. This raid continued until early 1639 after the Manchus slaughtered Jinan and then went back to Shenyang. Some of the advance force even reached Linqing 臨清 and Jining 濟寧 (Figure 3.1), two transitional hubs on the Grand Canal in Shandong.⁶⁶⁵ The threat to the Grand Canal temporarily relaxed the coastal defense in Deng-Lai. Soon after the Manchu raid, in February 1639, many Ming forces concentrating on the coast of Deng-Lai were

⁶⁶³ *Yang Sichang ji*, 224.

⁶⁶⁴ Gao Zhichao 高志超, "Lun Houjin shiqi de qianhai" 論後金時期的遷海, *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 1 (2016): 70-71.

⁶⁶⁵ *Chongzhen shilu*, Chongzhen 12/1/14 (1639/2/16).

redeployed to Linqing and Jining, protecting the Grand Canal, the pivotal supply line between the south and the capital region, in case of a Manchu attack.

Nevertheless, Deng-Lai was not defenseless. Dengzhou was left with some 9,000 soldiers of all sorts. They were there to prevent the local population from defecting to the Manchus, creating more enemies for the Ming dynasty.⁶⁶⁶ In addition, there were hectic military constructions in the coastal region in Deng-Lai. The local officials and gentry had reached a consensus that hiding in a fortified city was the best way to ward off the Manchus. This consensus was endorsed by the administrative order issued by Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Yang Wenyue 楊文岳 (?-1642) in August 1639. Thereafter, almost all the coastal counties in Deng-Lai began to fortify their cities. Without funding allocated by the authorities, with a few exceptions, most of the local gentries were willing to pay for the constructions; after all it was a life or death situation.⁶⁶⁷ In June 1640, the Chongzhen emperor ordered that all the docks should be equipped with long-range firepower so that approaching enemies could be shot from a distance.⁶⁶⁸ Although the Manchus never did so, the emperor still had a lingering fear that the enemies would attack from the sea.

Some offshore islands in the Bohai Region were briefly occupied by some Ming officers and their subordinates between 1644 and 1645. They were hiding on the islands for expediency

⁶⁶⁶ A report by Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Yang Wenyue in July 1640 showed that Deng-Lai then had a navy force of 2,800 and an army of 6,200, totaling 9,000. See Fang Yujin 方裕謹, “Chongzhen shisannian Ming-Qing Deng-Lai zhanfang shiliao” 崇禎十三年明清登萊戰防史料, *Lishi dang'an* 歷史檔案 2 (1986): 4. The gazetteer nevertheless has provided a more precise number: 9,197. See Fang Ruyi 方汝翼 et al., *Guangxu zengxiu dengzhoufu zhi* 光緒增修登州府志 (1881), *juan* 12, 5b.

⁶⁶⁷ Zhang, *Mingdai Shandong haifang yanjiu*, 519-520. Fortifying cities led by local gentries for self-defence seemed to be a common practice in the last years of the Ming dynasty. In Shanxi, for instance, there were also widespread military constructions, see Zhao Shiyu 趙世瑜, *Dalishi yu xiaolishi: quyu shehuishi de linian fangfa yu shijian* 大歷史與小歷史: 區域史的理念、方法與實踐 (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 2006), 290-294.

⁶⁶⁸ Fang, “Chongzhen shisannian Ming-Qing Deng-Lai zhanfang shiliao,” 4.

until the situation became clarified. Back in February 1644, the Ming court called for reinforcements in Beijing to protect the throne as Li Zicheng 李自成 (1609-1645) was marching towards to the capital. Only a handful of forces responded, and Beijing was hanging by a thread. In April, Li Zicheng breached the Forbidden City and the Chongzhen emperor committed suicide. Li was soon defeated by the Manchus in June. Dorgon entered Beijing and sent Dodo 多鐸 to wipe out the Southern Ming established in the same month in Nanjing by former Prince Fu 福王, now the Hongguang 弘光 emperor, Zhu Yousong 朱由崧 (1607-1646, r.1644-1645). Once the Manchus entered Beijing, Dorgon dispatched his officials to call for surrender in North China. There were several uprisings in the capital region but were soon crushed. In the Bohai Region, in September 1644, at the behest of Dorgon, one official named Shen Guanchou 沈觀籌 sailed along the coast and induced those officers hiding on the islands to pay allegiance to the Manchus. Shen seemed to have made great progress in his mission. By next spring, almost all the former Ming officers came ashore and were willing to shave their heads. The only documented exceptions were a Deng-Lai officer named Ma Denghong 馬登洪 and a Chosŏn general Im Kyŏngŏp 林慶業 (1594-1646). Both were Ming loyalists, particularly Im, who was unwilling to surrender to the Manchus after 1637 and escaped to the Ming in 1642. They landed on the Shicheng Island in August 1644 and left the island in March 1645 for Nanjing to serve the newly throned Hongguang emperor. After they left, what can be assured is that the islands in the Bohai Region were depopulated. ⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁹ Zhongyanyuan shiyusuo 中研院史語所 ed., *Ming-Qing shiliao bingbian* 明清史料丙編, vol.5 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), 423a, 465a; *Injo sillok*, Injo 23/5/25 (1645/6/18).

Between 1661 and 1683, the Qing court began to scorch and wall off its east coast to isolate the Zheng organization in Taiwan. The Zheng organization was then holding sway over the southeast littoral, accumulating too much wealth and power, standing in the way of the Great Qing Enterprise.⁶⁷⁰ The coastal population in Fujian and Guangdong approximate to Taiwan supposedly suffered the most, but the people in the Bohai Region were equally affected by the government's sea ban, for a rebellion led by a Ming military degree holder Yu Qi 於七 (1609-1672) in Qixia 棲霞 (Figure 3.1), a county in Dengzhou, burst out in 1661.⁶⁷¹ It was a small-scale uprising and was soon crushed in 1662, but nevertheless struck a nerve with the Qing court then busy depopulating the littoral and policing the coast with absolute cautiousness. Consequently, the Deng-Lai forces, which had been previously sent to Linqing and Jining to safeguard the Grand Canal in 1639, were called back to Dengzhou. Over time they had been converted into ground forces. Hence in 1667, at the behest of the Kangxi emperor, Dengzhou re-established its navy and selected 386 soldiers to form its initial force. In 1683 when the Taiwan issue was finally resolved and the Qing court began to conditionally lift the sea ban, Dengzhou's navy forces nevertheless witnessed a build-up of troops. In 1704, the total strength was increased to 1,200 and they were ordered to patrol Shandong's north coast, letting no one come ashore or go offshore. In 1714, the Qing court was eventually assured of coastal safety and disbanded the navy garrisoning in Dengzhou. However, the sea ban was not abandoned entirely. Junks were

⁶⁷⁰ For a concise study with a focus on Fujian, see Daphon Ho, "The Empire's Scorched Shore: Coastal China, 1633-1683," *Journal of Early Modern History* 17 (2013).

⁶⁷¹ Zhao Er'xun 趙爾巽 et al., *Qingshigao* 清史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 167; *Guangxu zengxiu dengzhifu zhi*, juan 13, 17.

allowed to sail along the coast to Tianjin and to the Shanhai Pass, but the oceangoing voyage across the Bohai Sea to Liaodong, now Shengjing 盛京, was strictly forbidden.⁶⁷²

It was not until 1732 that the Qing court allowed navigation across the Bohai Sea. In that year, Deng-Lai was hit hard by famine. Wang Fuu 王洵 (1670-1747) (cf. Wang Fu 王輔, one of Mao Wenlong's subordinates), Chief Minister of Court of Imperial Entertainment (*Guanglu siqing* 光祿寺卿), memorialized the throne to plead for a lift on the sea ban, so that the local merchants could sail to Shengjing to purchase grain. Wang Fuu was the nephew of Wang Daolong, the seasoned sailor, as we have seen, participating first in Tao Langxian's and then in Bi Ziyang's sea shipping missions. As a form of disaster relief, the Yongzheng emperor agreed to temporarily lift the sea ban and allow the Deng-Lai merchants to trade in the port in Niuzhuang 牛莊, that is, Haizhou in the Ming, where Mao Wenlong had once served as an officer.⁶⁷³

The year 1732 became a starting point when the sea ban on the Bohai Region was finally lifted. Later in the eighteenth century, a shipping network for trade in the Bohai Region reemerged. It connected the Yalu River, Niuzhuang, Tianjin, and Deng-Lai, and extended to the ports in Jiaozhou, Qingdao and Huai-Yang. This shipping network was expanded in 1858 after the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin. Yantai 煙台 (Laizhou) and Yingkou 營口 (Niuzhuang) were opened as treaty ports, and sail was gradually replaced by steam.⁶⁷⁴ This new chapter in the history of the Bohai Region was injected with new doses of technological advancements,

⁶⁷² Zhao, *Qingshigao*, 4002; *Guangxu zengxiu dengzhifu zhi*, juan 13, 1.

⁶⁷³ *Qianlong fushanxian zhi* 乾隆福山縣志 (1763), juan 11, 12b-14a; Xu Tan 許檀, "Qingdai qianqi de shanhaiguan yu dongbei yanhai gangkou" 清代前期的山海關與東北沿海港口, *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu* 中國經濟史研究 4 (2001): 65.

⁶⁷⁴ Matsuura Akira 松浦章, "Qingdai Shandong yanhai fanchuan hangyun" 清代山東沿海帆船航運, *Haiyang wenhua xuekan* 海洋文化學刊 4 (2008).

imperialistic interventions, and regional and international dynamics and hence needs a new study to do it justice. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter examines the last years of Dongjiang. The first to be discussed is the execution of Mao Wenlong by Yuan Chonghuan. Unlike the existing studies that focus mainly on whether the killing was justified or not, this chapter places the incident in the larger framework of Ming high politics: the death of the Tianqi emperor and the subsequent collapse of the eunuch faction. As he was an enthusiastic supporter of the eunuch faction, Mao Wenlong's death was a foregone conclusion. The end of Mao did not have a significant influence, but the Manchu invasion in 1629 fundamentally challenged the strategic importance of Dongjiang. Voices that denied its importance appeared on the court in Beijing, and a withdrawal plan of relocating the entire population in Dongjiang to the Ming inland was proposed. Hence, one can reasonably argue that by the end of 1629, the time was almost ripe for the Ming court to end the history of Dongjiang.

However, Dongjiang continued to exist until 1637 not because it functioned as it was supposed to, but because unexpected incidents continued to emerge and hence interfered with the withdrawal plan's implementation. These incidents included the death of a potential Dongjiang leader, power struggles among Dongjiang officers, and several mutinies in and outside Dongjiang. Down the road, the withdrawal plan was dropped, and the strategic importance of Pidao was revived. As has been continuously shown in this dissertation, these incidents demonstrate the importance of historical contingencies in changing the trajectory of historical development.

The ultimate collapse of Pidao resulted from external forces, while the Ming court was surprisingly absent. Of course, the direct cause of Dongjiang's collapse was the Manchu attack. However, contextualizing the attack, as this chapter does, in the interstate relationship between the Manchus and Chosŏn, one can argue that the attack was a by-product of Manchu-Chosŏn conflicts. The Chosŏn court's termination of its border trade with the Manchus while supplying Dongjiang became the fuse for the 1636 war between the Manchus and Chosŏn. That Chosŏn was unwilling to acknowledge Hong Taiji as an emperor instigated the Manchu invasion. The subsequent military subjugation of Pidao was the continuation of the Manchu-Chosŏn war and ended Dongjiang's history.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Dongjiang, as a military organization, emerged along the northwestern coast of the Korean peninsula during the heyday of wartime early seventeenth-century Northeast Asia. It was an integral part of the larger conflict during the Ming-Qing transition and was a lynchpin of Ming, Chosŏn, and Manchu geopolitics. The encompassing thesis of this dissertation, put in the simplest form, is that Dongjiang was a product of Northeast Asian geopolitics. The establishment of Dongjiang started with the Ming court's renewed hope for recovering Liaodong after the territory was lost to the Manchus. The strategic importance of Dongjiang in the Ming military strategy hence became its sole sense of meaning to survive and thrive, which in turn determined, from beginning to end, its reliance on Ming politics. Both Ming and Chosŏn provided material support to Dongjiang. The Ming did so because supplying Dongjiang was part of its political agenda. The Chosŏn did so under the shadow of the suzerain state. King Injo's inflexible pro-Ming stance resulting from his legitimacy flowing from Ming suzerainty gave Chosŏn no choice but to supply Dongjiang with grain. Dongjiang kept lingering in the Manchus' rear and hence stood in the way of their further conquest of Chosŏn and the Ming. It was no match for the Manchus in terms of military power and was eventually destroyed by the enemy with ease.

6.1 A Story of People

However, the story of Dongjiang cannot be glossed over with such murky and abstract summarization. Dongjiang was made up of real people. Hence, the history of Dongjiang—its establishment, development, and collapse—is by and large a story of a large group of people who left the mainland, settled on the islands, and eventually went back to the land. Indeed, much of this dissertation can be read this way.

Why did people leave the mainland? The supposed answer was that they were displaced by war. The violent clashes between the Ming and the Qing created wartime refugees in large numbers. However, wartime conditions alone cannot explain why people chose to leave the mainland and lead a life at sea. One European observer commented in 1577 that “the Chinese were afraid of the sea, being people not accustomed to taking risks.”⁶⁷⁵ Potential bias aside, one should admit that not all people were familiar with the marine environment; not all had the skills to navigate, nor were all confident enough to confront the currents and winds. For many, in fact, the sea was a mysterious and, perhaps, dangerous realm.

There are other reasons to rationalize the choice to leave the mainland. The first reason is that in a very short period, the Ming and the Manchus co-constructed a depopulation zone to the west of the Liao River and hence stopped people from entering Ming territory. The second reason was the Manchus’ extra-economic coercion imposed on the conquered people. The Manchus saw the Liaodong people as an immediate solution to the ongoing famine among the Manchus and as indispensable labour for producing food. The Liaodong people were deprived of their land and forced onto Manchu estates. Consequently, many fled to the east and entered Chosŏn Korea. Chosŏn’s cold reception became a third reason that drove the coming people into a corner. Local Chosŏn officials let the Manchus in to hunt them down, and the Chosŏn court

⁶⁷⁵ Fernand Braudel, Siân Reynolds trans, *The Structures of Everyday Life. Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Vol. 1* (London: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd, 1985), 410. For most of human history, human beings by and large were thalassaphobic. Wang Zhenping has told stories about how ninth-century Japanese aristocrats, such as Takamura and Dōshō, were frightened by the sea, see his *Ambassadors from the Islands of Immortals: China-Japan Relations in the Han-Tang Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, Association for Asian Studies, 2005), 62-65. Yang Yulei shows that in the early Ming, thalassaphobic Chosŏn envoys had no choice but to cross the Bohai Sea to reach the then capital Nanjing in time. Once Beijing became the capital in 1421, a safer overland route immediately replaced the sea lane. See Yang Yulei 楊雨蕾, “Ming-Qing shiqi Chaoxian chaotian yanxing luxian ji qi bianqian” 明清時期朝鮮朝天、燕行路線及其變遷, *Lishi dili* 歷史地理 21(2006). According to John Grills, not until the nineteenth century did the fears long associated with the sea begin to be dismantled in the human world. See John Grills, *The Human Shore: Seacoasts in History* (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 176.

was figuring out how to send them away. At that time, a Ming officer named Mao Wenlong established a defense command on an offshore island and then occupied more nearby islets. Recruiting soldiers from the Liaodong people was the only means for Mao to seize a strong foothold overseas. Lured by Mao's promises of food rations and safe island haven, people left the mainland in large numbers. (Chapter 2)

Life away from mainland, however, proved difficult. The barren islands these people inhabited could not yield enough agricultural output to support the population. Nor, curious enough, is there any documented record showing that the people on the islands tried to extract food resources from the surrounding waters, for instance, by fishing. Some individuals versed in fishing and sailing presumably would have done so, but most people made a living by relying on support from the land. Supplies and provisions were first shipped by sea from Tianjin and Deng-Lai at the behest of the Ming court. Sea shipping then was an onerous and dangerous undertaking. Winds and currents on the high sea imposed several limits on navigation. Shipping large volumes of goods required meticulous preparation and coordination, specialized personnel, capable officials, and, above all, economic resources. It was through great difficulty that the Ming court managed the sea shipping. The Ming court did so not out of charity, of course. It was willing to do the shipping because it expected that the people overseas could constitute a formidable power and open a second front in the Manchus' rear, outflanking the enemies in coordination with the Ming forces engaging the Manchus on the frontline. Essentially, Ming support was an investment in a strategic force in its military strategy against the Manchus. (Chapter 3)

The second significant form of support came from Chosŏn Korea. The Chosŏn court was a long-term supplier of grain, but the grain supply overburdened the locales that shouldered the

task and exhausted finances across the country. What rationalized the state's behaviour was that the grain supply was used to solve its national crises. The first crisis involved the legitimacy of King Injo, who ascended the throne through a coup. To win over Ming recognition and political support, King Injo expected Mao Wenlong to lobby on his behalf at the Ming court, and hence grain was provided as bribery. The second crisis was an internal rebellion that lent Mao an excuse to send soldiers ashore. Therefore, grain was provided as a bargaining chip to persuade Mao to withdraw his men back to the sea. The third crisis was receiving multiple Ming delegations, which exhausted the government's silver reserves and hence drove the court to Mao for loans. Consequently, grain was provided as repayment for the silver loans. (Chapter 4)

Why, then, did people return to the mainland? The short answer was that the people overseas failed to achieve Ming expectations. Over time, Mao Wenlong and associates used the support from the mainland to their own advantage. False reports about military triumphs were made, innocent people were turned in as prisoners of war in exchange for rewards, and supplies and provisions were embezzled to support a luxurious lifestyle. The 1627 Manchu invasion of Korea proved that Mao and his men could not contain the enemy. In the same year, the defeat of the eunuch faction, with which Mao was allied, effected the loss of his protective umbrella. Both conditions contributed to the death of Mao Wenlong and gave rise to a withdrawal plan of relocating all the people overseas back to the mainland in 1629.

Why did it take almost a decade for the plan to be completed? It was due to a series of contingent events. First, the Manchus attacked the outskirts of Beijing in late 1629. As the Ming court was busy warding off the enemy, the relocation process was delayed. Second, in 1631, when a Ming general without any ties to the people overseas was commissioned to implement the court's withdrawal plan, Mao Wenlong's old subordinates toppled his authority. Third,

between 1632 and 1633, a year-long mutiny wreaked havoc on Shandong's northern coast, and the Ming forces overseas were called upon to intervene. They were ordered to intercept the mutineers if they fled by sea. Consequently, Dongjiang's strategic importance was again invoked at the Ming court, and the people there continued to receive support from the Ming, as well as from Chosŏn. Hence the withdrawal plan was dropped. Nonetheless, the continued existence of Dongjiang stood in the way of Manchu conquest. Finally, in 1637, after the Manchus subjugated Chosŏn Korea, they subsequently attacked Pidao. The Ming soldiers on the island suffered a crushing defeat. It was then that the Ming court finally gave up the hope of opening a second front overseas and began to take seriously the withdrawal plan. By mid-1638, the plan was completed. All the people overseas had gone back to the mainland, and hence the history of Dongjiang ended. (Chapter 5)

A difficult question then remains: was Dongjiang's history typical? The short answer is *no*. Any history detailing the lives of real people, as Henrietta Harrison contends, is "never typical."⁶⁷⁶ One can by no means duplicate the same conditions on which human behaviour is based. The previous chapters have delineated so many things that happened by chance. When the Liaodong people were driven into a corner, Mao Wenlong happened to establish a base offering them safe haven. When the Ming court had almost decided to give up on the Ming forces overseas, the Ming military happened to lose Guangning and Mao's forces filled the gap just at the right time. When the people in Dongjiang suffered from hunger, the Chosŏn court happened to run out of silver, and Mao could use what he had in exchange for what he lacked. When the Manchus were bothered with the perennial threat from Pidao, some of Mao's old subordinates

⁶⁷⁶ Henrietta Harrison, *The Man Awakened from Dreams: One Man's Life in a North China Village, 1857–1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 8.

happened to defect to the Manchus, offering weapons, ships, and personnel necessary for attacking Pidao. The list is long, and nothing on it could have been predicted by historical actors at the time, nor did I foresee the events that would take place when researching this dissertation, even with the benefit of hindsight. These historical contingencies, however, are an integral part of human history. Instead of tossing it away, in the words of Fernand Braudel, like froth on the waves of history, incorporating and embracing this reality is to retain the humanistic character of historical research.

6.2 A History of Connection

This dissertation shows how connections were made. In a regional framework of the Bohai Region, physical connections were established by a seaborne logistic network, human mobilization, wars, and so on. Nonphysical connections were maintained by cooperation, comprise, and conflicts between Dongjiang and the other three states. Consequently, numerous events examined in this dissertation are knitted together and woven into a nexus of cause and effect. Here I recap one fascinating episode examined in this dissertation as an example of the way connections were made.

This example concerns Chosŏn's grain supply to Dongjiang. It started with the 1623 coup in Seoul. After that, King Kwanghae was deposed and succeeded by King Injo. In Beijing, this power change was deemed a usurpation and some Ming officials even memorialized the throne to propose a military takeover. To win over the political support of the Ming, one measure King Injo adopted was to send grain to Mao Wenlong, who had just established his defense command on Pidao, hoping Mao would lobby the Ming court on his behalf. This became the starting point for the Chosŏn court's grain supply to Dongjiang. The supply did not end after the Ming court

officially recognized Injo's kingship in 1625. The Ming envoys dispatched to Seoul to bestow upon King Injo the imperial edict were greedy for silver but the Board of Taxation could not afford to pay. Chosŏn's long-standing economic policy favoured taxation in kind and excluded silver from domestic circulation. Consequently, the Board of Taxation was forced to take loans from Mao Wenlong, who received silver as stipends provided by the Ming. The repayment in grain warranted the continuous supply of grain to Dongjiang, which became an excuse used by the Manchus to invade Chosŏn Korea in 1627. Mao and his men escaped the Manchu hunt by hiding themselves on the islands at sea. The 1627 treaty of peace between the Manchus and Chosŏn forbade the latter from supplying Dongjiang. Nevertheless, King Injo's legitimacy depended entirely on Ming suzerainty, rendering Chosŏn foreign policy decisively and inflexibly pro-Ming. As the Ming court continued to see Dongjiang as strategically important and did not order the soldiers there to withdraw even after Mao Wenlong died in 1629, the Chosŏn court had to continue supplying Dongjiang. Hong Taiji meanwhile aspired to expand border markets with Chosŏn, but the negotiations failed in Shenyang. The result was the 1636-37 invasion. The Manchus made Chosŏn their own vassal and then took Pidao and the Ming subsequently withdrew all their forces overseas. Subsequently, the Manchus consolidated their territory in the northeast and were ready for further territorial expansion without worrying about any threat from their rear. (Chapters 4 & 5)

Watershed events in the above example have not gone unstudied, but each event is typically studied in isolation. Seung Bum Kye regards the 1623 coup as the logical result of King Kwanghae's policy incompatible with the chauvinistic conservatism prevailing among the *yangban* elites.⁶⁷⁷ Previous studies of the Manchu invasions emphasize the military subjugations

⁶⁷⁷ Kye, "In the Shadow of the Father."

as a national historical trauma giving rise to hostility towards the Qing,⁶⁷⁸ while a most recent study by Hō T'aegu contends that the Chosŏn was willing to submit to the “barbaric” Qing due to a refashioned political ideology that a cultural China had been separated from a political China.⁶⁷⁹ Liu Jianxin delineates the Battle of Pidao and how it unfolded, meticulously calculating the number of Manchu casualties, which, as Liu shows, has been carefully concealed in the Qing records.⁶⁸⁰

Clearly, historians have done justice to these events as isolated nodes within the context of national history,⁶⁸¹ but hardly do they reveal the interconnectedness of the events. Putting them together, as is shown in the above example, shows a different picture, in the words of Evelyn Rawski, “of the interregional reverberations that ushered in a period of intense interaction”⁶⁸² among the Ming, the Manchu/Qing, and Chosŏn. By weaving ostensibly isolated historical events into a nexus of cause and effect, this dissertation, I hope, can show how the Ming-Qing transition gradually unfolded in the northeast and add nuance to our understanding of this region’s history.

⁶⁷⁸ Ki-Baik Lee and Edward Wagner et al. trans, *A New History of Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 216.

⁶⁷⁹ Hō T'aegu 許泰玖, *Pyōngja horan kwa ye, kŭrigo Chunghwa* 병자호란과 禮, 그리고 中華 (Seoul: Somyōng ch'ulp'an, 2019), 345-362.

⁶⁸⁰ Liu, “Yiliusanqi nian Ming-Qing pidao zhizhan.”

⁶⁸¹ I use “national history” in the most neutral sense: the history that happened within a state’s boundary (boundaries which of course changed over time). For some historians, particularly in the West, the national/dynastic history is a synonym for a metanarrative told from the central perspective and intent on serving both an historical and contemporary political agenda. For instance, see Evelyn Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1, 7; John Herman, “De-centering Chinese History,” *Journal of Chinese History* 2.1 (2018). For a more nuanced appraisal of “national history,” see Ge Zhaoguang, “Is There Still Value in National History in the Trend towards Global History?” in *The ‘Global’ and the ‘Local’ in Early Modern and Modern East Asia*, eds. Benjamin Elman and Chao-Hui Jenny Liu (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2017), 11-18.

⁶⁸² Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia*, 98. Rawski’s book is overarching. For the period concerned in this dissertation, only two Manchu invasions of Korea are analyzed in brief in Rawski’s book, see pp.69-73.

Often, from the perspective of Chinese history, such regional histories that take a cross-border perspective are connected with *de-centering* China——Evelyn Rawski’s *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia* comes to mind as one such study. What I understand about the purpose of de-centering is to interrogate such metanarratives as China/Sino centrism, the *Hua-yi* dichotomy, and Han chauvinism.⁶⁸³ However, by no means should the center be marginalized. Scholars from the South China School (*Huanan xuepai* 華南學派) have revealed the importance of the center *vis-à-vis* the region. David Faure and others have delineated how local people appropriated power symbols from what happened in the center, such as the Jiajing 嘉靖 Emperor’s (1570-1567, r.1521-1567) ritual controversy, in order to establish their places in an overarching imperial order.⁶⁸⁴ At times, a regional history is, in fact, a process, to use Faure’s idea, of bringing in the emperor to the remote village.⁶⁸⁵ Furthermore, writing a regional history is a craft, in the words of Ge Zhaoguang, of “weighing the ‘center’ against the ‘periphery,’ and measuring their proportions in the narration of history.”⁶⁸⁶ Such weighing and measuring differ among historians. Henrietta Harrison, for instance, writing about Liu Dapeng and Shanxi, avoids

⁶⁸³ The idea of de-centring China (or looking at China’s core from the periphery) has become a trend. Recent works about China’s frontiers, to various degrees, reflect this idea. To name a few, see David Bello, *Across Forest, Steppe and Mountain: Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China’s Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Kathlene Baldanza, *Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). However, for a thought-provoking comprehensive reflection on the relationship between core and periphery, as well as on writing Chinese history, one should read no other than the works by Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光. Two of his seminal works originally written in Chinese have been translated into English, including Jesse Field and Qin Fang trans., *Here in ‘China’ I Dwell: Reconstructing Historical Discourse of China for our Time* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2017), especially Chapters 6 and 7; Michael Hill trans., *What is China? Territory, Ethnicity, Culture, and History* (Cambridge, London: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018), especially Chapter 5.

⁶⁸⁴ Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor*, 99-107. For a reflection on how South China was related to the center and how the writing of South China is related to Chinese history, see Liu Zhiwei 劉志偉 and Sun Ge 孫歌, *Zai lishizhong xunzhao zhongguo—Guanyu quyushi yanjiu renshilun de duihua* 在歷史中尋找中國——關於區域史研究認識論的對話 (Hong Kong: Dajia liangyou shuju youxian gongsi, 2014), especially 71-108.

⁶⁸⁵ David Faure, “The Emperor in the Village: Representing the State in South China,” *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 35 (1995).

⁶⁸⁶ Ge, “Is There Still Value in National History in the Trend towards Global History?” 12.

“narratives of the great political events of the day” because “most people participate[d] only as observers and the changes in their lives [took] place over a much longer term.”⁶⁸⁷ In comparison, this dissertation has considered many things happening in the center, in fact, centers. The above grain supply case can serve again as a case in point. We see the coup in Seoul, the backlash in Beijing, and the failed negotiation in Shenyang. Hence, incorporating the centre is both a choice and a necessity for understanding the region. It is not just because the centers mattered but also because it is a history of connection, in which the centers, real or imagined, were connected to the region.

6.3 Dongjiang vs the Zheng Organization

Looking beyond Dongjiang and the Bohai Region, almost at the same time, a similar island-based organization appeared in southeast China. This organization under four generations of leaders from the Zheng 鄭 family dominated coastal Fujian, Taiwan and the surrounding waters from 1620 to 1720. Some scholars have suggested similarities shared by the Zheng organization and Dongjiang.⁶⁸⁸ Indeed, both took islands as their operational bases in a maritime region. Dongjiang had Pidao in the Bohai Region and Zheng-occupied Taiwan in “Greater Fujian.”⁶⁸⁹ Both were under the command of military men. Mao Wenlong and his subordinates controlled Dongjiang, and Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 (1604-1601) and his descendants commanded their family enterprise. Moreover, both organizations, though to different degrees and in different ways, flourished in a period of dynastic eclipse and regional turmoil.

⁶⁸⁷ Harrison, *The Man Awakened from Dreams*, 7.

⁶⁸⁸ Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia*, 73-74; Liu, “Beyond the Land,” 233-234.

⁶⁸⁹ By “Greater Fujian,” I follow Daphon Ho’s definition: The sea space encompasses the Taiwan Straits plus much of the southeast coast macroregion and connects to Ryukyu. See Ho, “Sealords Live in Vain,” 43.

However, the Zheng organization demonstrated much more strength than Dongjiang in economic, military, and institutional domains. At its prime, according to Xing Hang, the Zheng organization developed a vibrant market economy across the Taiwan strait and earned an annual income at least 30% more than the revenue than the Dutch made when they previously ruled the same region.⁶⁹⁰ While in Dongjiang, although there were steady flows of supplies and provisions coming from Ming and Chosŏn, the people on the islands were generally impoverished and famine often occurred. Regarding military power, the Zheng organization was able to compete with the VOC (Dutch East Indian Company) for sea lanes and seize Taiwan from the Dutch through wars.⁶⁹¹ On the other hand, Dongjiang as a military power, at best, consisted of various guerilla forces and could not match the Manchus, who eventually destroyed them on the battlefield. As for institutional development, Dongjiang, from the beginning to the end, remained a loosely organized military unit based on personal ties and loyalties. There was no institution that could formalize the hierarchy and hence mutinies and power changes occurred. In contrast, the Zheng organization, as Xing Hang shows, developed a sophisticated bureaucracy using a combination of the Ming imperial system, Confucian ideology, and a corporation system to formalize and consolidate the rule of the Zheng.⁶⁹²

These differences can be traced back to their congenital variants. The Zheng organization, in its initial stage, can be described as one, in the words of Robert Antony, that

⁶⁹⁰ Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, C. 1620-1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 160-162.

⁶⁹¹ Tonio Andrade has detailed the war between the Zheng and the Dutch over Taiwan's control. See his *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

⁶⁹² Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 89-96.

“exemplified the pirate-cum-merchants-cum-rebels” of the pirate epoch in South China,”⁶⁹³ or similarly as one that followed “piracy cycle,” a term coined by John Anderson.⁶⁹⁴ That is, the Zheng, like many sea lords preceding them, accumulated wealth and power from maritime commercial activities—legal trade, smuggling, and raid—and formed their own institutionalized organization. Hence, the establishment of the Zheng organization was by and large a spontaneous process based on self-driven mercantile activities. In comparison, Dongjiang was established for the military purpose of containing the Manchus and served as an integral part of the Ming strategy. It came into existence only because the Ming military leadership deemed Mao and his force strategically important and so shipped supplies across the sea, enabling them to get a foothold in Chosŏn. In other words, the establishment of Dongjiang relied on empowerment from the Ming court. These congenital differences thus paved the way for their drastically divergent developmental trajectories.

These are of course modern readings of these histories with the advantage of hindsight, and are imbued with the privilege of imagining an alternative past. Hence, a hypothetical question can be asked: if Mao Wenlong and his men had also started from the grass-roots level, as pirates-cum-merchants, would Dongjiang have become as successful as the Zheng organization? I believe the answer is no, and the differences in their respective geopolitical environments offer the explanation.

Greater Fujian, where the Zheng organization was located, was in the core of an intra-East Asian maritime exchange network. Admittedly, Fujian was not in a dominant productive

⁶⁹³ Robert J. Antony, *Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2003), 20.

⁶⁹⁴ John Anderson, “Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation,” *Journal of World History* 6.2 (Fall, 1995): 183-184.

area compared with, for instance, Jiangnan, which had great productive and traffic-generating power coming from its resources and proximity to major market centers. But Fujian became prosperous because of its intermediary location. Ships that called there came from all over East and Southeast Asia as it was distant from the authorities and by extension from the Ming court's prohibition on private sea borne trade. When the Ming court did partially lift the sea ban (*haijin* 海禁) and designated a few ports in Fujian as legal places for private trade after the mid-sixteenth century, even more traffic and seaborne trade were driven to there. Clearly, geography alone could not explain the vibrant seaborne commercial sector in Greater Fujian; it was the combination of geography and politics that shaped this maritime region. Consequently, Greater Fujian in the Ming was what Daphon Ho calls a "functional region,"⁶⁹⁵ that is, a zone of activity, not a zone of static characteristics. This functional region owed its existence to the flows of trade, peoples, and, of course, wars.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁵ Ho, "Sealords Live in Vain," 39.

⁶⁹⁶ The Zheng organization competed fiercely against the VOC to seize ports and islands and control sea lanes in the East and South China seas. What made the Zheng organization successful was not only its sophisticated bureaucracy, but also what Xing Hang calls "capitalized coercion." That is, the Zheng organization incorporated "merchants and militarists into their governance and used the latter to actively protect and promote the former's interests and property at home and abroad." This was a feature that the Zheng shared with the VOC and thus placed the two on an equal footing in trade competition and monopoly. The result of the competition was that the VOC withdrew its forces from Chinese waters, and the Zheng made a sovereign claim on the sea space and maintained that claim by using military forces. Daphon Ho has reminded us that due to the Ming sea ban, "in East Asian waters, China was the nexus of activity, but did not own the seas." Chinese people put out to sea, Chinese commodities circulated beyond the land, and China exercised primary leverage over the shape of the seaborne economy, but the Ming state's reach was limited within its own littorals. Hence, for most of the time during the Ming, the sea spaces represented, as Ho argues, "zones of historical interaction rather than zones of ownership." In a similar vein, Angela Schottenhammer also argues that "after the mid-fifteenth century China was no longer a maritime power, its naval activities primarily concentrated on coastal defence... China's maritime power passed into 'private' hands." In this sense, the Zheng organization was the first polity in the Ming that transformed the East and South China seas from "a no-man's territory" into "the Zheng's territory." It is for this reason that Sebastian Prange, an expert on the history of the Indian Ocean, groups the Zheng organization together with other thalassocracies in history, including the Maratha empire in India, the Ya'rubī dynasty of Oman, as well as the European thalassocracies built by the Portuguese, Dutch, and English, who made territorial claims to the sea as they expanded on the deep. See Leonard Blussé, "No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690," *Modern Asian Studies* 30. 1(1996); Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 99-110; Ho, "Sealords Live in Vain," 45-46; Angela Schottenhammer, "China's Rise and Retreat as a Maritime Power," *Beyond the Silk Roads: New Discourses on China's Role in East Asian Maritime History*, ed. Robert Antony and Angela

By contrast, the Bohai Region, where Dongjiang was located, was a relatively less functional region, characterized by smaller flows of trade and people. Compared to Taiwan with bountiful natural resources and linkages to markets extending to Southeast Asia, Pidao and the nearby islands had been traditionally used as Chosŏn's royal ranches and isolated from the outside world. The environment there was so harsh that even the horses bred there were "only as big as donkeys...and as small as rats."⁶⁹⁷ However, at the same time, Ryukyu 琉球, for instance, was equally barren and impoverished, but attracted large volumes of traffic on the sea because Ryukyu enjoyed special access granted by the Ming court to a port in Fujian. Had the Ming lifted the sea ban and opened its coast to private trade, ships might well have bypassed the Ryukyu entirely.⁶⁹⁸ Yet again, geography alone could not explain a maritime region's low "functionality." Politics weigh much more in the explanation. Whereas state power could barely reach the far south, its own influence was omnipresent in the north. In the Bohai Region, the long-standing sea ban policy implemented by Ming and Chosŏn put the coast under strict control. The sea ban was briefly lifted during the Imjin War (1592-1598). Many people from both countries were involved in the seaborne logistic network, and hence such misdeeds as private trade and transacting contraband occurred. Consequently, an ever-stricter maritime prohibition as a repercussion ensued.⁶⁹⁹

Therefore, the waters in the south beyond state control and full of interactions, interconnectivity, and prosperity could give birth to a self-contained maritime regime like the

Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden Harrassowitz Verlag, 2017), 205; Sebastian Prange, "The Contested Sea: Regimes of Maritime Violence in the Pre-Modern Indian Ocean," *Journal of Early Modern History* 17 (2013): 32.

⁶⁹⁷ John S. Lee, "Postwar Pines: The Military and the Expansion of State Forest in Post-Imjin Korea, 1598-1684," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 77.2 (2018): 327.

⁶⁹⁸ Ho, "Sealords Live in Vain," 52.

⁶⁹⁹ Jing Liu, "Warfare, Military Men, and the Maritime Orientation of Northeast Asia in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of Asian History* 54.2 (2020): 298-303.

Zheng organization, whereas the static waters in the north would probably fail to do so. Yet, this is not a purely hypothetical deduction. The Zheng organization represented the culmination of those pirates-cum-merchants lured to the sea in the south starting from the fifteenth century. Almost at the same time in the north, impoverished coastal people in Liaodong and northwestern Chosŏn Korea, categorized by the Chosŏn court as water bandits (*sujŏk* 水賊), also sought to lead a life at sea. But unlike their counterparts in the south, who gradually accumulated wealth and power, they largely disappeared in the sixteenth century due to the tightening maritime prohibitions issued by Ming and Chosŏn, followed by the Ming order to depopulate the islands along the coast of Liaodong and Shandong.⁷⁰⁰

The maritime policies implemented by the Chinese state exercised primary leverage over the shape of its maritime regions and created drastic regional variations. Historians whose expertise lies in maritime China⁷⁰¹ have already noticed that the sea ban of Ming-Qing China made the Chinese seas unusual. Its European and Southeast Asian counterparts did not enact such prohibition, but rather invested in state power to encourage and monopolize seaborne trade. However, many also argue that “stringent attempts at prohibition only moderately impeded a

⁷⁰⁰ Liu, “Beyond the Land,” 69-118.

⁷⁰¹ Maritime China can be defined as “a chain of ports, islands, and coastal territory stretching from the Liaodong peninsula in the north to Hainan in the south.” See Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 9. The studies of maritime China encompass a wide range of topics, but what they share is a shifting of the frame from the land to the sea. One significant result of this change in the framework is about the nature of late imperial China. Conventional wisdom has regarded the Central Kingdom as a homogeneous, landlocked, and inward-looking country, but late imperial China can also be seen as a maritime power. Historians have defined China as a maritime power in the broadest sense, but even as a terrestrial state, China exerted huge influences on the maritime world. It seems that as long as the Chinese government engaged the seas in one way or another, China was a maritime power. For instance, see Schottenhammer, “China’s Rise and Retreat as a Maritime Power,” 189-211; Ronald Po, *The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 209. In comparison, the definition of a maritime power in the Western context is more exclusive. A European maritime power in history, defined by Andrew Lambert, had an oligarchic/republican political model and a group of empowered commercial elites. It focused on naval power instead of land-based power and developed a culture suffused with the sea. More importantly, the maritime power was a constructed identity that required repetition and reassertion. See Andrew Lambert, *Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 4-16, 333.

thriving maritime trade, in which East Asians—and particularly Chinese—outcompeted other groups, including Europeans who had far more state support for their endeavours.” This argument, however, is based on the experience of Southeastern China, and particularly on the Zheng organization.⁷⁰² More recent studies on North China seas try to challenge the “Southeast China-centric framework”⁷⁰³ and emphasize the regional differences. Guang Ma, for instance, focusing on Shandong in the Yuan-Ming transitional period, documents how the Ming state transformed Shandong’s coastal regions from a once economically vibrant zone in the Yuan 元 (1271-1368) into heavily fortified areas in the early Ming in response to the *wokou* (倭寇 literally, Japanese dwarf pirates) problem.⁷⁰⁴ In her series of studies on Ming China and Chosŏn Korea’s northern sea space, Jing Liu shows the complicated interactions between maritime governance and coastal population, showing how the states filtered and scrutinised maritime mobility and, sometimes, violence.⁷⁰⁵ By documenting Dengzhou in the Qing dynasty, Ronald Po shows how the navy in this northern port city declined in scale over time, which in turn resulted into the city’s economic downturn. In a similar vein, Po highlights the militaristic feature of Qinhuangdao 秦皇島, another northern port in the Qing sheltering Beijing on the maritime frontier and argues that this feature differentiated the city from those in the

⁷⁰² For a collection of essays that can reflect this issue, see Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang eds., *Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai: Maritime East Asia in Global History, 1550-1700* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016), 5. This collection contains 16 essays and 9 of them are, to various degrees, related to the Zheng organization.

⁷⁰³ Guang Ma, *Rupture, Evolution, and Continuity: The Shandong Peninsula in East Asian Maritime History During the Yuan-Ming Transition* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2021), 1. Similar criticism can also be found in Liu, “Beyond the Land,” 20; Ronald Po, “A Port City in Northeast China: Dengzhou in the Long Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 28.1 (2017): 162.

⁷⁰⁴ Ma, *Rupture, Evolution, and Continuity*, Chapters 3-5.

⁷⁰⁵ Liu, “Beyond the Land;” “Warfare, Military Men, and the Maritime Orientation of Northeast Asia in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries;” “Beyond Categories and Boundaries: Transmarine Mobility and Coastal Governance of Northeast Asia in the Sixteenth Century,” *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* 3 (2022): 1-22.

southeast.⁷⁰⁶ These studies vary in topics and arguments, but the consensus is that the state's influence was so omnipresent in the northern China seas, that the state gained the upper hand in shaping the maritime space. In this sense, by examining an island-based military organization in the Bohai Region and its relationship with the surrounding states, this dissertation contributes its part, however small, to understanding the intriguing history of maritime China.

⁷⁰⁶ Po, "A Port City in Northeast China;" "The Pearl by the Bohai Sea: Qinhuangdao in the Early Modern Period," in *Voyages, Migration, and the Maritime World: On China's Global Historical Role*, eds., Clara Ho et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 143-164.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Chronology of Events

1576		Mao Wenlong born in Qiantang, Zhejiang Province
1588		Nurhaci unifies Jianzhou Jurchens
1601		Nurhaci creates Four Banners
1605		Mao Wenlong made Battalion Commander of Haizhou
1608		Xiong Tingbi made Regional Inspector of Liaodong
1611		Xiong Ting transferred to another post in Nanzhili
1615		Shandong drought
1616	Jan.	Nurhaci creates Eight Banners
	Feb.	Nurhaci declares creation of Later Jin; Hetu Ala made capital
1618	May	Nurhaci issues Seven Grievances against Ming; Manchus attack Fushun
		Liaodong Surtax levied
	Aug.	Tao Langxian initiates sea shipping between Shandong and Liaodong
1619	Apr.	Battle of Sarhu
	May	Xiong Tingbi made Liaodong Military Commissioner
	Jul.	Manchus seize Kaiyuan and Tieling
1620	Aug.	Emperor Wanli dies; Emperor Taichang ascends throne
	Sep.	Emperor Taichang dies; Emperor Tianqi ascends throne
	Nov.	Xiong Tingbi removed from office; Yuan Yingtai succeeds Xiong as Liaodong Military Commissioner
1621	May	Manchus seize Shenyang and Liaoyang; Yuan Yingtai died
		Shandong-Liaodong sea shipping suspended
		Xiong Tingbi recalled to service and made Liaodong Military Commissioner; Xiong proposes the “three-pronged advance” strategy
		Mao Wenlong flees to Beijing; return to Liaodong ordered by Wang Huazhen
	Aug.	Nurhaci initiates the enclosure movement
	Sep.	Mao Wenlong seizes Zhenjiang

		Manchus takes back Zhenjiang; Mao Wenlong retreats to Chosŏn Korea
		Manchus begin to constructor a new imperial residence near Liaoyang
	Oct.	Manchus annex almost all the territory east of Liao River
		King Kwanghae sends envoys to foster a cordial neighborly relation with Manchus
1622	Jan.	Battle of Impan
	Mar.	Manchus seize Guangning Manchus depopulate Guangning, Yizhou, and Chinchow
	Apr.	Xiong Tingbi and Wang Huazhen imprisoned
	May	Ming receive Liaodong refugees in Yongping, Jizhou, and Tianjin Liang Zhiyuan arrives in Seoul Tao Langxian resigns; Yuan Keli succeeds Tao as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator
	Jun.	Ming sends reinforcements to Mao Wenlong Bi Ziyang initiates sea shipping between Tianjin and Chosŏn Korea
	Jul.	Xu Hongru starts White Lotus Sect rebellion
	Aug.	Tao Langxian accused of corruption and imprisoned
	Sep.	Mao Wenlong makes a plan for military deployment along the northeast coast of Liaodong peninsula Sun Chengzong presides over Ming military; Ming begins to build Guan-Ning Defence Line
	Oct.	Huang Yin'en delivers provisions to Mao Wenlong in Sŏnch'ŏn
	Dec.	Xu Hongru captured; White Lotus Sect rebellion ends Mao Wenlong moves his base of operations to Pidao
1623	Mar.	Earthquake in Shandong
	Apr.	King Kwanghae deposed; King Injo ascends the throne Earthquake in Shandong
	May	Mao Wenlong begins to lobby Ming for King Injo's investiture; Chosŏn begins to provide Dongjiang with grain Heavy rain hit Chosŏn Korea and continues until August
	Jun.	Manchus massacre in Jinzhou and Fuzhou

		Zhang Pan, Mao Wenlong's subordinate, seizes Lüshun
	Jul.	Rainstorm in North China
		Zhang Pan raids Jinzhou and retreats to Lüshun
	Aug.	Mao Wenlong makes a false report about the battles in Manp'o and Ch'angsōng
	Sep.	Manchus attack Jinzhou and destroy the city
	Nov.	Fang Youdu bribed by Mao Wenlong and impeaches Yuan Keli
1624	Jan.	Earthquake in Tianjin
		Ming confers the kingship on Injo
	Mar.	Yi Kwal rebels and is soon killed; King Injo requests reinforcements from Mao Wenlong
		Kim Yōngjo, a Chosōn envoy, arrives in Pidao
	Apr.	Mao Wenlong sends troops to Ch'ōlsan
		Bi Ziyān invents the " <i>huikong eryun</i> " shipping method and tries to make Deng-Lai shoulder part of the sea shipping duty
		Yuan Keli dismissed from office; Wu Zhiwang succeeds Yuan as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator
	May	Chosōn authorities capture people from Pidao fleeing from starvation
		Xu Lili, a Ming envoy, arrives in Pidao and goes to Ch'ōlsan at Mao Wenlong's invitation
		Mao Wenlong plans a northward military expedition to Hamgyōng Province
	Jul.	Mao Wenlong sends ordinary Liaodong farmers as war captives to Dengzhou
		Mao Wenlong pulls back troops from Hamgyōng Province
	Oct.	Mao Wenlong's troops engage Manchus at Zhongjiang
	Nov.	Military constructions start in Lüshun
1625	Feb.	Manchus attack Lüshun and destroy the city
	Mar.	Manchus move capital from Liaoyang to Shenyang
		Tao Langxian dies in prison; Ming presses for recovering the alleged illicit money that Tao embezzled
		Deng-Lai begins to be involved in the sea shipping duty

Apr.	Wu Zhiwang proposes a redeployment in Lüshun and the coastal islands
	Dengzhou receive 125 alleged war captives from Pidao
	Ming envoys Wang Minzheng and Wu Liangfu arrive in Seoul
May	Wu Zhiwang takes over control of Lüshun and dispatches Zhang Pann
Jul.	Mao Wenlong dispatches troops to station in Lüshun
	Zhang Pann retreats to the Huangcheng Island
	Mao Wenlong asks for silver from the Ming court
Sep.	Manchus attack Lüshun; Mao Wenlong's troops retreat
	Xiong Tingbi executed
Oct.	Wu Zhiwang impeaches Mao Wenlong and makes public his conflict with Mao
Nov.	Ming approve Mao Wenlong's requests for silver and merchant goods
	Chosŏn begins to levy the <i>moryang</i> surtax
	Manchu massacre of Liaodong people
1626 Jan.	Mao Wenlong accuses Yun Ŭirip of plotting with Manchus
	Wu Zhiwang transferred to another post; Li Song succeeded Wu as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator
Feb.	Battle of Ningyuan; Ming achieves strategic victory, Manchus burn grain reserves in Juehua Island
	Tianjin sends reinforcements to the Juehua Island
Mar.	Ming envoys Jiang Yueguang and Wang Mengyin arrive in Seoul
Apr.	Yuan Chonghuan appointed Liaodong Grand Coordinator
Jun.	Deng-Lai sends reinforcements to the Juehua Island
Sep.	Nurhaci dies
	Chosŏn pays back silver borrowed from Mao Wenlong in grain
Oct.	Dengzhou receives 207 alleged war captives from Pidao
	Hong Taiji succeeds Nurhaci
Dec.	Mao Wenlong retreats to Yuncong Island
1627 Feb.	Manchus invade Chosŏn Korea
Apr.	Treaty of Kanghwa Island

May	Treaty of Pyongyang
	Battle of Yalu River; Mao Wenlong's troops join Chosŏn righteous army and engage Manchus
Jun.	Mao Wenlong's troops sack Anju
	Li Song removed from his post; Sun Guozhen succeeds Sun as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator
	Battle of Ning-Chin: Hong Taiji defeated in Ningyuan and Chinchow
Jul.	Chosŏn uses the <i>moryang</i> surtax to supply Manchus in Ŭiju; Dongjiang cut off grain supply from Chosŏn
Aug.	Mao Wenlong receives Ming eunuch Hu Liangfu
	Yuan Chonghuan forced to resign
Sep.	Emperor Tianqi dies
Oct.	Emperor Chongzhen ascends the throne
	Manchus withdraw from Ŭiju
Dec.	Eunuch Wei Zhongxian banished to Fengyang and dies en route
1628 Feb.	Ming officials start to impeach Mao Wenlong
Mar.	Yuan Chonghuan recalled to service and appointed Minister of War
May	Emperor Chongzhen shows support for Dongjiang but suggests streamlining the troops there
Jun.	Bi Ziyao made Minister of Revenue
Aug.	Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Sun Guozhen cuts down the grain supply to Dongjiang
	Ningyuan mutiny starts because soldiers go four months without pay; Liaodong Grand Coordinator Bi Zisu commits suicide; Yuan Chonghuan pacifies the mutiny
	Yuan Chonghuan arrives in Beijing and meets the emperor
Sep.	Mao Wenlong arrives in Dengzhou and asks Sun Guozhen for provisions
	Battle of Huangniwa: a Ming force engages a Manchu force coming back from the expedition against the Chahar Mongols
Oct.	Wang Tingxi succeeds Sun Guozhen as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator
	Liu Xingzuo and Liu Xingzhi defect to Mao Wenlong

1629	Jan.	Yuan Chonghuan imposes economic sanctions on Dongjiang
	Jul.	Yuan Chonghuan meets Mao Wenlong in Shuangdao; Mao killed; Yuan divides Mao's troops into four groups; Liu Xingzuo takes de facto command of Dongjiang
	Oct.	Liu Xingzuo leaves for Ningyuan at the behest of Yuan Chonghuan
	Nov.	Liu Xingzuo meets Yuan Chonghuan in Chinchow; Liu stays in the Shanhai Pass
	Dec.	Manchus reach the outskirts of Beijing
1630	Jan.	Yuan Chonghuan imprisoned; Sun Chengzong recalled to service to succeed Yuan Sun Chengzong orders Liu Xingzuo to station in Yongping Prefecture
	Feb.	Liu Xingzong defeats Manchus in Qingshanying, but killed in Lianghuikou
	Apr.	Minister of War Liang Tingdong proposes the withdrawal plan regarding Dongjiang
	May	Mutiny on Juehua Island; Zhou Wenyu pacifies the mutiny Liu Xingzhi kills Chen Jisheng
	Jun.	Zu Dashou takes back control of Luanzhou, Yongping, Qian'an, and Zunhua
	Jul.	Zhou Wenyu ordered to offer amnesty to Liu Xingzhi; Zhou and Liu meet on Xiaoping Island
	Aug.	Sun Yuanhua succeeds Wang Tingshi as Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator
	Sep.	Liu Xingzhi goes back to Pidao in the capacity of Vice Regional Commander Yuan Chonghuan executed
	Dec.	Huang Long appointed commander of Dongjiang
1631	Apr.	Liu Xingzhi killed in a mutiny in Pidao
	Jun.	Huang Long arrives in Pidao
	Sep.	Manchus besiege Dalinghe City
	Oct.	Huang Long demands grain from Chosŏn
	Nov.	Mutiny in Pidao; Huang Long detained; Shen Shikui becomes de facto commander

		Zu Dashou surrenders to Manchus; Dalinghe City destroyed; Sun Chengzong resigns
	Dec.	Huang Long leaves Pidao for Lüshun
1632	Jan.	Wuqiao Mutiny starts under Kong Youde
	Feb.	Kong Youde seizes Dengzhou; Sun Yuanhua captured then released
	May	Hong Taiji dispatches forces to raid Hoeryǒng
		Manchus attack Chahar Mongols
	Aug.	Chosŏn Queen Inmok dies
	Sep.	Sun Yuanhua executed in Beijing
	Oct.	Ming forces defeat Kong Youde at Laizhou
	Nov.	Shen Shikui sends people to attend the funeral of Queen Inmok
		Hong Taiji refuses to accept Chosŏn tributes and deports envoy Pak Nanyǒng
1633	Mar.	Kong Youde retreats from Dengzhou
	Apr.	Huang Long and Zhou Wenyu engage Kong Youde at Lüshun
	Jun.	Kong Youde surrenders to Manchus
	Aug.	Manchus seize Lüshun; Huang Long killed; Zhou Wenyu flees and is later dismissed from office
	Dec.	Shen Shikui given the title Regional Commander of Dongjiang and succeeds Huang Long
		Ming eunuch He Chenggong killed in Chǒngju
1634	Jan.	Shang Kexi surrenders to Manchus
	Summer	Ligdan Khan dies
1635	Jun.	Erke Khongghor, son of Ligdan Khan, surrenders to Manchus
1636	Feb.	Erke Khongghor marries Manchu princess
	May.	Hong Taiji declares Qing dynasty
		Erke Khongghor awarded title Prince of Chahar
	Dec.	Manchus invade Chosŏn Korea
1637	Feb.	King Injo surrenders to Hong Taiji
	May	Manchus attack Pidao; Shen Shikui killed

	Sep.	Emperor Chongzhen abolishes Dongjiang
1638	Apr.	Shen Zhixiang, nephew of Shen Shikui, surrenders to Manchus
1638	Jun.	Relocation of Dongjiang population completed
	Dec.	Manchus raid northern China; Sun Chengzong killed at Gaoyang
1639	Feb.	Ming forces in Deng-Lai redeployed to Linqing and Jining
	Aug.	Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Yang Wenyue orders to fortify local cities
1640	Jun.	Emperor Chongzhen reiterates the importance of coastal defence in Deng-Lai
	Jul.	Manchus besiege Chinchow
1641	Feb.	Li Zicheng sacks Luoyang
	Mar.	Yang Sichang dies
		Zhang Xianzhong attacks Xiangyang
1642	Apr.	Manchus seize Chinchow; Hong Chengchou surrenders
	Nov.	Manchus raid North China
1643	Sep.	Manchus attack Ningyuan
	Oct.	Wu Sangui defeats Manchus
1644	Apr.	Li Zicheng enters Beijing; Emperor Chongzhen commits suicide
	May	Wu Sangui engages Li Zicheng at Shanhai Pass; Wu surrenders to Manchus; Li flees to Xi'an
	Jun.	Manchus seize Beijing; Emperor Shunzhi ascends the throne
		Ming Prince Fu declares himself Emperor Hongguang in Nanjing
	Aug.	Ma Denghong and Im Kyöngöp take shelter on Shicheng Island
1645	Mar.	Ma Denghong and Im Kyöngöp leave for Nanjing
1661		Qing sea ban starts
1662		Yu Qi rebels in Qixia
1667		Dengzhou re-establishes navy
1683		Qing annex Taiwan; Zheng organization destroyed
1704		Dengzhou navy strengthened
1714		Sea ban in Dengzhou partially lifted

1732

Wang Fu pleas for sea shipping between Dengzhou and Niuzhuang; sea ban in Dengzhou lifted

Appendix B: Terms, Titles, and Proper Names

Aiyang 爨陽

ancha neidi (place inland) 安插內地

anjiayin (one-off stipend paid to a redeployed soldier) 安家銀

Anju 安州

Bailianjiao (White Lotus Sect) 白蓮教

Baiyandai 擺言代

Balipu 八里鋪

baojia (communal surveillance system) 保甲

beizei nankou (ward off the enemies attacking southwards) 備賊南寇

Beizhili 北直隸

benseyin (grain converted from wages in silver) 本色銀

Bi Ziyang 畢自巖

Bi Ziyin 畢自寅

Bingbu youshilang (First Vice Minister of War) 兵部右侍郎

Bohai (Bohai Sea) 渤海

Boye dusi (Intelligence Chief) 撥夜都司

Caicun 蔡村

Canjiang (Assistant Regional Commander) 參將

caomi (tribute rice) 漕米

Ch'angsōng 昌城

Ch'ōlsan 鐵山

Ch'ōngbuk 清北

Ch'ōngch'ōn'gang (Ch'ōngch'ōn River) 清川江

ch'ōnggan (upright and simple) 清簡

ch'ōngya (scorched earth) 清野

Chahan 插漢 (Ligdan Khan)

Chang Man 張晚

Changbaishan (Changbai Mountain) 長白山, aka. Paektusan (Paektu Mountain) 白頭山

Changshandao (Changshan Island) 長山島

chehai (withdraw from the sea) 撤海

Chen Baotai 陳保泰

Chen Dashao 陳大韶

Chen Jisheng 陳繼盛

Chen Liangce 陳良策

Chen Lianghan 陳良漢

Chen Tianmin 陳天民

Chen Yijing 陳一敬

Chengde 承德

Chengshanjiao (Cape of Chengshan) 成山角

Chifeng 赤峰

Chinchow 錦州

chindal (true barbarians) 真獫狁

chinsa (metropolitan degree holder) 進士

Cho Chip 趙澱

Chōng Ch'ungsin 鄭忠信

Chōng Kisu 鄭麒壽

Chōng Chun 鄭遵

Chōng Pongsu 鄭鳳壽

Chōng Tuwōn 鄭斗源

Chōngju 定州

Chōngmyo horan (1627 Manchu Invasion of Chosōn Korea) 丁卯胡亂

Chongyang 重陽

Chongzhen 崇禎

chōnse (land tax) 田稅

Chōppansa (Escort Commissioner) 接伴使

chounje (tribute grain transport system) 漕運制

Chwaūijōng (Second State Councilor) 左議政

dacaogu (loot forts and cities for supplies)
打草穀
Daišan 代善
dajie (great victory) 大捷
Dalinghe (Daling River, also refer to the city) 大凌河
Deng-Lai 登萊
Deng-Lai dao fushi (Vice Commissioner of Deng-Lai Circuit) 登萊道副使
Dengzhou tongpan (Assistant Prefect of Dengzhou) 登州通判
Dengzhou zhifu (Dengzhou Prefect) 登州知府
Dengzhou 登州
Dezhou 德州
Dodo 多鐸
Dong Yingju 董應舉
Dongjiang xiangsi (an office in Ningyuan responsible for supplying Dongjiang) 東江餉司
Dongjiang 東江
Donglindang (Donglin Faction) 東林黨
Dorgon 多爾袞
duhui (metropolis) 都會
Duoyan sanwei (Duoyan Three Guards) 朵顏三衛; aka. Uryanghai Mongols
Duoyan 朵顏
Dusi (Brigade Vice Commander) 都司
Duxiang shilang (Vice Minister of Revenue Overseeing Military Logistics) 督餉侍郎
Erke Khongghor 額爾克孔果爾, aka. Ejei 額哲
Fan Fucui 范復粹
Fang Youdu 方有度
Fenghuangcheng 鳳凰城
Fengyang 鳳陽

Fenxun yongping yanjian biingbeidao (Circuit Intendant of Yongping and Yanjian) 分巡永平、燕建兵備道
Fushan wangshi (the Wang Clan of Fushan) 福山王氏
Fushan 福山
Fushun 撫順
Fuyu 福餘
Fuzhou 復州
Gaizhou 蓋州
Gaoyang 高陽
Geng Zhongming 耿仲明
Guan Dafan 管大藩
Guan Yingzhen 官應震
guancheng (inner city) 關城
Guangludao (Guanglu Island) 廣鹿/祿島
Guanglu siqing (Chief Minister of Court of Imperial Entertainment) 光祿寺卿
Guangning 廣寧
Guanning fangxian (Guan-Ning Defence Line) 關寧防線
gujan (orphan warriors) 孤軍
guodu (national moths) 國蠹
gyorin (cordial neighborly relation) 交鄰
Haeju 海州
haijin (sea ban) 海禁
Haizhou 海州
Hamhŭng 咸興
Han Gongzong 韓功宗
Han Myŏngnyŏn 韓明璉
Han Yun 韓潤
Hangzhou 杭州
He Chenggong 河承功
He Er 何二
He San 何三
Heichao (Black Current) 黑潮

Hetu Ala 赫圖阿拉
Hoeryōng 會寧
Hojo (Department of Taxation) 戶曹
Hojo ch'amp'an (Second Director of the Department of Taxation) 戶曹參判
Hong Chengchou 洪承疇
Hong Myōnggu 洪命耆
Hong Taiji 皇太極
Hooge 豪格
Hou Zhenyang 侯震暘
Hu Liangfu 胡良輔
Huai-Yang 淮陽
Huanan xuepai (South China School) 華南學派
Huanbohaiquyu (Bohai Region) 環渤海區域
Huang Long 黃龍
Huang Yin'en 黃胤恩
Huang Zhongse 黃中色
Huangchengdao (Huangcheng Island) 皇城島
Huanghai (Yellow Sea) 黃海
Huangniwa 黃泥窪
Huangxian 黃縣
Huangzuibao 黃嘴堡
Huduntu 虎墩兔; Huduntuhan 虎墩兔憨 (Ligdan Khan)
huikong eryun (After delivering the goods shipped from Tianjin, the empty ships would go to Dengzhou, pick up the grain procured there, and make a second shipment) 回空二運
Huitong Canal 會通河
hulukou (a hooper opening) 葫蘆口
Huo Weihua 霍維華
Huqiu 虎酋 (Ligdan Khan)

Im Kyōngōp 林慶業
Impan 林畔
Injo 仁祖
Inmok wanghu (Queen Inmok) 仁穆王后
jiandi (sharp-bottomed) 尖底
Jiang Yueguang 姜曰廣
Jianzhou Nüzhen (Jianzhou Jurchens) 建州女真
jiaojia (shipping cost) 腳價
Jiaozhou 膠州
jiecao (retain tribute grain) 截漕
jiechao (excerpts) 節鈔
jjihu 寄籍戶
Jin Guan 金冠
Jinan 濟南
Jingbian nianli yin (Annual Military Subsidies) 京邊年例銀
Jinglüe (Military Commissioner) 經略
Jining 濟寧
Jinzhou 金州
Jirgalang 濟爾哈朗
Jisi zhi bian (1629-30 Manchu raid inside the Shanhai Pass) 己巳之變
Jiuliyin (Liaodong Surtax in the Qing) 九釐銀
Jizhou 薊州
Juehuadao (Juehua Island) 覺華島
Chindo (Chin Island) 珍島
junzhen (defense command) 軍鎮
Juye 巨野
kadal (fake barbarians) 假獫狁
Kado (Ka Island) 椴島
Kaech'ōn 价川
Kaesōng 開城
Kaesōngbu yusu (Regent of Kaesōng) 開城府留守

Kaiyuan 開原
Kanghwado (Kanghwa Island) 江華島
kehuo (merchant goods) 客貨
Kim Yǒngjo 金榮祖
Kōmsasan (Kōmsa Mountain) 劍山
Kong Youde 孔有德
Kuandian canjiang (Assistant Regional
Commander of Fort Kuandian) 寬甸參將
Kuandian 寬甸
kun (county) 郡
Kusǒng 龜城
Kwaksan 郭山
Kwanghaegun 光海君
Kwanhyangsa (Supervisor of Military
Provisions) 管餉使
Laizhou 萊州
Lanzidao (Kr. Nanjado, Lanzi/Nanja Island)
蘭子島
Li Banghua 李邦華
Li Changgeng 李長庚
Li Chengliang 李成梁
Li Jingxian 李景先
Li Junzhan 李君湛
Li Runan 李汝楠
Li Song 李嵩
Li Yongfang 李永芳
Li Yushan 李玉山
Li Zicheng 李自成
Lianbing youji (Brigade Commander of
Training Soldiers) 練兵游擊
Liang Tingdong 梁廷棟
Liang Zhiyuan 梁之垣
Lianghuikou 兩灰口
Liaodong 遼東
Liaoxi zoulang (Liaoxi Corridor) 遼西走廊
Liaoxiang (Liaodong Surtax) 遼餉

Liaoyang 遼陽
Ligdan Khan 林丹汗
Lin Yaoyu 林堯俞
Linqing 臨清
Linzi Bi shi (the Bi Clan of Linzi) 臨淄畢氏
Liu Xingzhi 劉興治
Liu Xingzuo 劉興祚
longgu (keel) 龍骨
Longwuying youxie fuzongbing (Vice
Regional Commander of the Right Troops of
Longwu Navy) 龍武營右協副總兵
Longwuying zhongxie (Middle Troops of
Longwu Navy) 龍武營中協
Luanzhou 灤州
Ludao (Lu Island) 鹿島
luocheng (outer city) 羅城
Lüshun 旅順
Ma Cong 馬驄
Ma Denghong 馬登洪
Ma Yingkui 馬應魁
Manggūltai 莽古爾泰
mangyi (embroidered robe) 蟒衣
Manp'o ch'ōmsa (Manpo Commander) 滿浦
僉使
Manp'o 滿浦
Mao Chengdou 毛承斗
Mao Chenglu 毛承祿
Mao Wenlong 毛文龍
Mao Yingshi 毛應時
Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀
Meng Yangzhi 孟養志
mok (special county) 牧
Momuken 摩木措
Moryang (the land surtax levied to pay the
cost of supplying Dongjiang) 毛糧

Mun'ansa (an envoy to send greetings on the king's behalf) 問安使
muyŏk (trade) 貿易
Na Tŏkhŏn 羅德憲
Nam Iung 南以雄
Namhan sansŏng (Namhan Mountain Fortress) 南漢山城
Nanzhilu 南直隸
Ningyuan 寧遠
Niuzhuang 牛莊
Nobi sin'gong (slave tribute tax) 奴婢身貢
Nŭngha sansŏng (Nŭngha Mountain Fortress) 凌漢山城
Nurhaci 努爾哈赤
P'aju 坡州
P'yŏngan kamsa (Governor of P'yŏngan Province) 平安監司
P'yŏngando (P'yŏngan Province) 平安道
Paengma sansŏng (Paengma Mountain Fortress) 白馬山城
Pak Nanyŏng 朴蘭英
Pak Sŭngchong 朴承宗
Pak Yŏp 朴燁
Pan Ruzhen 潘汝禎
Peng Sunyi 彭孫貽
Pibyŏnsa (Border Defense Council) 備邊司
Pidao 皮島
Pusa (magistrate) 府使
Puwŏnsu (Assistant Supreme Commander) 副元帥
Pyŏngja horan (1636-37 Manchu Invasion of Chosŏn Korea) 丙子胡亂
Qian Longxi 錢龍錫
Qian'an 遷安
Qianhu (Battalion Commander) 千戶
Qianshan (Qian Mountain) 千山
Qiantang 錢塘

Qiantongdao (Kr. Kŏmdongdo, Qiantong/Kŏmdong Island) 黔同島
Qidahen (seven grievances) 七大恨
qigong dajie (extraordinary merit and great triumph) 奇功大捷
Qingming 清明
Qingshanying 青山營
Qingzhou 青州
Qinhuangdao 秦皇島
Qixia 棲霞
Qu Cheng'en 曲承恩
Qu Shisi 瞿式耜
ruguan (enter the Shanhai Pass) 入關
Ryukyu 琉球
Sakchu 朔州
Samnam 三南
sanfang buzhi (three-pronged advance strategy) 三方佈置
Sanshandao (Sanshan Island) 三山島
Sap'o 蛇浦
Sarhu 薩爾滸
Sŏnjo 宣祖
Shang Kexi 尚可喜
shangyin (silver as rewards) 賞銀
Shanhaiguan (Shanhai Pass) 山海關
Shen Guanchou 沈觀籌
Shen Guangzuo 沈光祚
Shen Shikui 沈世魁
Shen Xun 沈珣
Shen Zhixiang 沈志祥
Shengjing 盛京
Shenyang 沈陽
Shi Keda 時可達
Shicheng Island 石城島
Shisanshan (Shisan Mountain) 十三山

Shoubei (Assistant Brigade Commander) 守備
Shoufu (Senior Grand Secretary) 首輔
Shuangdao (Shuang Island) 雙島
Shuibingying youji (Marine Brigade Commander) 水兵營游擊
Shunzhi 順治
Sin Talto 申達道
Sinmido (Sinmi Island) 身彌島
sixie (four groups) 四協
Sōhae (Western Sea) 西海
Sōin (Westerners Faction) 西人
Sōnch'ōn 宣川
Songlinshan (Songling Mountain) 松陵山
sujōk (water bandits) 水賊
Sun Changling 孫昌齡
Sun Chengzong 孫承宗
Sun Degong 孫德功
Sun Guozhen 孫國楨
Sun Yan 蘇琰
Sun Yuanhua 孫元化
T'aech'ōn 泰川
Taesagan (Censor-General) 大司諫
Taichang 泰昌
Taining 泰寧
Taizi shaofu (Junior Mentor of the Heir Apparent) 太子少傅
Tang Yaoqing 唐堯卿
tangbao (military report) 塘報
Tangzhan 湯站
Tao Langxian 陶朗先
Tianjin 天津
Tianqi 天啟
Tieling 鐵嶺
Tizidao (Kr. Ch'ejado, Tizi/Ch'eja Island) 替子島

Tōgwōn 德源
Tong Yangzhen 佟養真
tongxiang (fellow countryman) 同鄉
Towōnsu (Chief Supreme Commander) 都元帥
Tuiguan (Prefecture Judge) 推官
tunmin (village folks) 屯民
Ŭiju 義州
ūibyōng (righteous army) 義兵
Waegwan (Japan House) 倭館
Wang Chongxiao 汪崇孝
Wang Daolong 王道隆
Wang Fu 王輔
Wang Fuu 王洙
Wang Huazhen 王化貞
Wang Mengyin 王夢尹
Wang Minzheng 王敏政
Wang Qia 王洽
Wang Shijie 王世傑, aka. Wang Bing 王丙
Wang Tingshi 王廷試
Wang Xiangqian 王象乾
Wang Yining 王一寧
Wang Yirong 王懿榮
Wang Zaijin 王在晉
Wang Zhaoxun 王詔勛
Wang Zhi 王鷲
Wang Zongmu 王宗沐
Wanli 萬曆
Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢
Weixian 濰縣
wokou (Japanese dwarf pirates) 倭寇
Wu Liangfu 吳良輔
Wu Sangui 吳三桂
Wu Sheng 吳牲
Wu Zhiwang 武之望
Wu Zongwu 吳宗武

Wuqiao 吳橋
Xia Zhiling 夏之令
xiangda (surrendered Manchus) 降韃
Xiangyang 襄陽
xiangyin (silver wage) 餉銀
xianyun (Ming sea shipping to Dongjiang) 鮮運
Xiaopingdao (Xiaoping Island) 小平島
Xiaosongdao (Xiaosong Island) 小松島
Xincheng Wang shi (the Wang Clan of Xincheng) 新城王氏
Xingshan 杏山
Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼
Xipingbao (Fort Xiping) 西平堡
Xu Fuzou 徐敷奏
Xu Gucheng 徐孤臣
Xu Hongru 徐鴻儒
Xu Lili 許立禮
Xunfu (Grand Coordinator) 巡撫
Yalujiang (Yalu River) 鴨綠江
Yan Mingtai 閻鳴泰
Yandang (Eunuch Faction) 閹黨
Yang Chōmhyōng 楊漸亨
Yang Daoying 楊道寅
Yang Hao 楊鎬
Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌
Yangsō kwanhyangsa (Supervisor of Military Provisions in Hwanghae and P'yōngan Provinces) 兩西管餉使
Yangsō 兩西
Yongch'ōn 龍川
Yang Wenyue 楊文岳
Yang Yuan 楊淵
Yantai 煙台
Yanzhou 兗州
Yashan 鴨山

Ye Xianggao 葉向高
Ye Yousheng 葉有聲
yebushou (night patrols) 夜不收
Yōnp'yōng Puwōngun (Prince Yōnp'yōng) 延平府院君
Yi Hūikōn 李希建
Yi Kwak 李廓
Yi Kwal 李适
Yi Kwi 李貴
Yi Minsōng 李民晟
Yi Sanggil 李尚吉
Yi Sik 李植
yi zhiliūe chen (a wise and resourceful minister) 一智略臣
yimin (righteous subjects) 義民
Yingkou 營口
Yintaoguo 櫻桃坨
Yiwulūshan (Yiwulū Mountain) 醫巫閭山
Yizhou 義州
Yōngbyōn 寧邊
Yōngdong 嶺東
Yonggolsan (Yonggol Mountain) 龍骨山
Yonggoltae 龍骨大, aka. Inggūldai 英俄爾岱
Yongping 永平
Yōngūijōng (Chief State Councilor) 領議政
Yōngyu 永柔
Yu Qi 於七
Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥
Yuan Hongxun 袁弘勛
Yuan Keli 袁可立
Yuan Yingtai 袁應泰
Yue Hesheng 岳和聲
Yuegang (Moon Harbour) 月港
yueliang (monthly food ration) 月糧

Yukchin (six defense commands in
Northeastern Chosŏn) 六鎮
Yun Hwŏn 尹暄
Yun Inpal 尹仁發
Yun Ŭirip 尹毅立
Yuncheng 鄆城
Yuncong (Yuncong Island) 雲從島
Yutian 玉田
Zhang Heming 張鶴鳴
Zhang Jingshi 張經世
Zhang Jishan 張繼善
Zhang Kui 張魁
Zhang Pan 張盤
Zhang Pann 張攀
Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠
Zhao Guangyu 趙光裕
Zhao Yan 趙彥
zhaomai (procure grain from purchase) 召買
Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍
Zhenjiang 鎮江
zheseyin (silver converted from food rations)
折色銀
Zhongjiang (Kr. Chunggang) 中江
Zhongshu sheren (Secretariat Drafter) 中書
舍人
Zhu Guochang 朱國昌
Zhu Kongshao 朱孔韶
Zhu Shichang 祝世昌
Zhu Yousong 朱由崧, aka. Prince Fu 福王,
aka. Hongguang 弘光 Emperor
zili weiwang (declared himself a king) 自立
為王
Zongbing (Regional Commander) 總兵
Zu Dashou 祖大壽
Zunhua 遵化

Zunyong dajie (1630 Ming victory against
the Manchus, taking back control of
Luanzhou, Yongping, Qian'an, and Zunhua)
遵永大捷